Sections 177 and 178
Voting
by show of hands
[2003]
43 SCL 186 (Kar.)
N.
KUMAR, J.
COMPANY
PETITION NOS. 97, 270 and 271 OF 2002
FEBRUARY
13, 2003
Section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, read with
section 19(2) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 - Compromise and arrangement
- Whether Court cannot act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over
informed view of concerned parties to compromise as same would be in realm of
corporate and commercial wisdom of parties - Held, yes - Whether, though
convening of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on Court to accord
sanction of scheme under Act, but when there are different classes of
shareholders as well as creditors of company and if any particular class is
numerically very small and if they on coming to know of scheme voluntarily,
unconditionally, give their consent or approval in writing to such a scheme,
calling such class of members or creditors to a meeting to express their mind
by way of casting vote would not be necessary - Held, yes - Whether Court in
proceeding under section 391 cannot hold enquiry and go into question of
entitlement of brands, names and trademarks and such a matter can be initiated
either in civil court or before appropriate form and sanctioning of scheme
would in no way put fetters on power of Court or forum adjudicating same -
Held, yes - Whether when secured creditors have approved scheme, whereunder
property of company would be sold and mode of utilizing said sale proceeds is
reasonable and in best interest of company, objection by one financial
institution does not carry much weight, as interest of that institution is also
taken care of and is fully protected - Held, yes - Whether, where, proposed
scheme is not found to be violative of any provisions of law nor is it contrary
to public policy and members and creditors of companies has acted bona fide and
in good faith and not coercing minority in order to promote any interest
adverse to that of latter, it is open to Court to scrutinise scheme with a view
to find out whether better scheme could have been adopted by parties - Held, no
Section 177 of the Companies Act, 1956 -
Meeting and proceedings - Voting to be by show of hands in first instance -
Whether voting for or against motion subject to conditions stipulated in vote
is no voting in eye of law - Held, yes - Whether in construing whether a
resolution is passed by three-fourths majority present and voting, what is to
be taken into consideration in calculating majority is not number of persons
present and voting, but number of valid votes polled in such meeting which
includes only votes which are indicating mind of voter for or against
resolution - Held, yes
Facts
In this
petition, the petitioners, namely, KECL being transferor-company and KSPL and
BCAL being transferee-companies sought sanction of proposed scheme of
arrangement. The main objective of said scheme was to address the weakness KECL
without relying on the external debt for funding of rehabilitation needs and to
leverage the internal assets of the company to the extent possible. The KECL
convened meeting of shareholders, secured creditors, unsecured creditors as
contemplated under section 391. Out of 17 members who attended the meeting of
secured creditors 12 members representing 81 per cent in value of total votes,
voted for the scheme unconditionally and 3 secured creditors representing 19
per cent voted against the said scheme. Two secured creditors voted for the
scheme subject to certain conditions, and, therefore, their votes were held
invalid. The preference shares of the company were held by only one
shareholder, viz., IDBI Ltd. No
meeting was convened as such as instead a letter was sent seeking their
approval. In reply, IDBI accepted the scheme subject to modifications. However,
they did not suggest any modification or additions in the scheme. The
transferee-companies also convened the aforesaid meetings and the members and
creditors—secured and unsecured— unanimously approved the scheme.
After admission
of the aforesaid three company petitions, the company was directed to take out
advertisement and also notice was ordered to the Regional Director. In
pursuance of the aforesaid notice, the Regional Director of the Company’s
Affairs filed its statement raising objections that the scheme of arrangement
was approved only by 58.31 per cent of secured creditors of company who were
present and voted in the meeting, which was much below the three-fourths
majority mark. It was also contended that no preference shareholders’ meeting
was held for approval of the scheme and, therefore, legal formalities had not
been completed and complied with as required under section 392. Thus, the
sanction sought for could not be granted.
A company KPL
raised an objection that word trademark ‘Kirloskar’ belonged to them and KECL
was permitted user of the trademark under an agreement which now stood
terminated and, therefore, KECL had no right to transfer said name or trademark
to KSPL under the proposed scheme since it was opposed to provisions of Trade
and Merchandise Act and would affect their interest. Hence, that company sought
for deletion of such offending clause from the scheme.
Another Bank
‘T’ contended that KECL owed a sum in lakhs to the bank and was indebted heavily
and the same had been treated as non-performing assets. Under the scheme, the
estate of the company in Bangalore was proposed to be sold which would
substantially dilute the level of security for the facilities intended to be
extended to the new entities. The restructuring would also mean that the banks
would have to provide further non-fund based facility. And as they were not
willing to assume further exposure, they sought for rejection of the scheme.
Held
Where a scheme is put forward by a company
for the sanction of the Court, in the first instance, the Court has to direct
holding of meeting of creditors or class of creditors, or members or class of
members who are concerned with such a scheme. Once the majority in number
representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors or
members or class of members, as the case may be, present or voting either in
person or by proxy at such a meeting accord their approval to any compromise or
arrangement, the Court gets jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. Once such a
compromise is sanctioned by the Court, it would be binding on all the creditors
or class of creditors, or members or class of members, as the case may be,
which would also necessarily mean that even on dissenting creditors or class of
creditors or dissenting members or class of members, such sanctioned scheme
would remain binding. [Para 35]
Before sanctioning such a scheme even though
approved by a majority of the concerned creditors or members, the Court has to
be satisfied that the company or any other person moving such an application
for sanction under sub-section (2) of section 391 has disclosed all the
relevant matters mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) of the section. So
far as the meetings of the creditors or members, or their respective classes
for whom the scheme is proposed are concerned, it is enjoined by section
391(1)(a) that the requisite
information as contemplated by the said provision is also required to be placed
for consideration of the concerned voters so that the parties concerned before
whom the scheme is placed for voting can take an informed and objective
decision whether to vote for the scheme or against it. [Para 36]
The Company Court, which is called upon to
sanction such a scheme is not merely to go by the ipse dixit of the majority of the shareholders or
creditors or the respective classes who might have voted in favour of the
scheme with the requisite majority but the Court has to consider the pros
and cons of the scheme with a view to
find out whether, the scheme is fair, just and reasonable and is not contrary
to any provision of law and it does not violate any public policy. No Court of
law would ever countenance any scheme of compromise or arrangement arrived at
between the parties and which might be supported by the requisite majority if
the Court finds that it is a unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is
otherwise unfair and unjust to the class of shareholders or creditors for whom
it is meant. The Court is not to act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost
automatically put its seal of approval on such a scheme being approved by the
majority. [Para 37]
However, the question remained whether the
Court has jurisdiction like an Appellate Authority to minutely scrutinise the
scheme and arrive at an independent conclusion whether the scheme should be
sanctioned or not when the creditors and members have approved the scheme as
required by section 391(2). The Court has to keep in view the commercial wisdom
of the parties to the scheme who have taken an informed decision about the
usefulness and propriety of the scheme by supporting it by requisite majority.
The Court certainly would not act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over
the informed view of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would
be in the realm of corporate and commercial wisdom of the parties. The Court
has neither the expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the
commercial wisdom exercised by the creditors and members of the company who
have ratified the scheme by the requisite majority. To that extent the
jurisdiction of the Company Court is peripheral and supervisory and not
appellate. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Company Court can also be culled
out from the provisions of section 392. The propriety and the merits of the
compromise and arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui
juris with their open eyes and fully
informed about the pros and cons
of the scheme arrive at their own reasonable judgment and agree to be bound by
such a compromise or arrangement. [Para 38]
Sub-section (2) of section 391 requires that
a scheme of compromise or arrangement must be approved by majority of
creditors/members representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class
of creditors, or members or class of members, present and voting either in
person or where proxies are allowed, by proxy. There is no difficulty in
understanding the word ‘present’ as the creditors or members should be
physically present in person or through their proxy in the meeting. The problem
arises in the context of the word ‘voting’. Voting is formal expression of will
or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue
in question. Voting is explained as the expression of one’s will, preference or
choice in regard to the decision to be made by the body as a whole upon any
proposed measure or proceeding. Right to vote means right to exercise the right
in favour or against the motion or resolution. A member present and voting may
remain neutral, indifferent, unbiased or impartial not engaged on either side.
Voting has to be either in the affirmative or negative, i.e., ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the ballot paper or voting
paper. One is not supposed to write anything except putting ‘yes’ or ‘no’
either in favour of the proposition or against the proposition. In addition to
the same, if any suggestion, condition, reservation or stipulation is written
stating that the expression of the will or opinion either for or against the
proposition is subject to those things, then the votes have to be necessarily
treated as invalid or void, as such votes are no votes leading either way. [Para
43]
Voting for or against the motion subject to
the conditions stipulated in the vote is no voting in the eye of law.
Therefore, voting understood in a proper perspective, it could be either in the
affirmative or in the negative, Therefore, in construing whether a resolution
is passed by three-fourths majority present and note, what is to be taken into
consideration in calculating the majority is not the number of persons present
and voting, but the number of valid votes polled in such meeting. The number of
valid votes includes only votes which are indicating the mind of the voter for
or against the resolution. Therefore, by ‘voting’, the mind, intention,
preference of the voter must be clearly expressed. There should not be any
ambiguity and scope for interpretation. It should be clear, unqualified and
pointing. In this context, a voter who is not present at the meeting, who is
present and not voting, present and voting by casting a blank ballot, and
casting a ballot with conditions and stipulations, all stand on the same
footing. It is no ‘voting’ in the eye of law. Therefore, the proper
construction to be placed in calculating whether any resolution is approved or
passed by three-fourths majority present and voting necessarily means the value
of the valid votes and on the basis of the same whether the resolution has been
passed with three-fourths majority. [Paras 43 & 44]
In the instant case, though 17 persons voted
in the meeting, it was found that two secured creditors gave consent to the
scheme subject to certain modifications. Therefore, the Chairman of the meeting
had rightly treated those two ballots as invalid, because the said two
creditors were not expressing their will or opinion in favour of the resolution
unconditionally. The said votes were not votes leading either way and,
therefore, they would not be taken into consideration either for or against the
scheme. Therefore, though 17 persons voted in the said meeting, as the 2 votes
cast were invalid, in order to determine the majority what was to be taken into
considerations was only the value of 15 creditors who voted in the said
meeting. The value of such 15 creditors was 1833959275. The 12 out of the 15
creditors voted for the scheme and the value of those creditors was 1477391975.
The value of the 3 votes cast against the scheme was 356567300. Therefore, it
was clear that the scheme was approved by a majority of 80.56 per cent which
was above the three-fourths majority required under law, as the value of the
valid votes against the scheme was 19.44 per cent. In that view of the matter,
it could not be said that the secured creditors had not approved the scheme by
a three-fourths majority as required under law. [Para 44]
The requirement that the scheme should be
approved by the requisite majority has been held to be directory and not
mandatory. If the company has stopped its business, a large number of employees
and workers have become jobless, plant and machineries have been resting and
losses have been mounting, the scheme presented is a viable alternative even if
the same is not approved by three-fourths majority, Courts have sanctioned such
schemes. Principle underlying the same appears to be that a scheme under
section 391 cannot be regarded as an alternative mode of liquidation; it is
only an alternative to liquidation. [Para 45]
In the instant case, the company had been
declared as a sick industry under the provisions of the Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and having regard to the losses suffered by
them and the money that was required to make the unit viable, no financial
institution or no private entrepreneur had come forward to revive the industry
and the only course left was for the BIFR to recommend to the High Court for
winding-up of the company. In those circumstances, if the company itself with
the assistance of its members and creditors as a whole and with the active support
of the labour put-forth a scheme of reconstruction for revival of the company
and as aforesaid when all the shareholders, unsecured creditors had approved
such a scheme with overwhelming majority and even the secured creditors as
aforesaid had approved the scheme with three-fourths majority of persons
present and who had cast valid votes, the Court could not blindly by technical
interpretation refuse to sanction the scheme on the ground of non-compliance of
section 391(2). [Para 46]
The second objection raised was that no
meeting of the preference shareholders was convened to consider the scheme and
there was no resolution passed approving the said scheme and, therefore, the
requirement of section 391(1) was not complied with. [Para 47]
The meeting contemplated under section 391
is analogous to an extraordinary general meeting of the company inasmuch as
three-fourths majority is required to pass the required resolution. The normal
rule is that the consent of the shareholders where it is unanimous or by a
three-fourths majority must be obtained in a meeting summoned on the orders of
the Court under section 391. That is in accordance with the general principle
that members must act in a general meeting. Inroads have, however, been made on
this formal doctrine. Firstly, the consent of all or virtually all the
shareholders given even outside a meeting is sufficient to comply with the
requirements of a meeting. Secondly, written resolutions instead of those
passed in meeting are capable of being registered, e.g., section 192. Thirdly, the doctrine of
lifting the veil of incorporation and looking at the reality of action of the
members enables the Court to secure the consent of the overwhelming majority of
the shareholders outside the meeting which is sufficient to show that the
resolution is supported by virtually all the members of the company. In these
three ways substantial compliance rather than a formal compliance meets the
requirements of the statute. A third exception to the rule that all the
shareholders of a company must cast their votes in a formally called meeting is
made by the doctrine of acquiescence. If all the shareholders acquiesce in a
certain arrangement, the question of a meeting being called does not arise at
all. [Para 49]
Therefore, it becomes clear that convening
of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on the Court to accord sanction
of a scheme under the Companies Act. But, when there are different classes of
shareholders as well as creditors of the company, if any particular class is
numerically very small and if they on coming to know of the scheme voluntarily,
unconditionally, give their consent or approval for such a scheme, calling such
class of members or creditors to a meeting to express their mind by way of casting
vote would be an empty formality. If a copy of the scheme propounded stating
the terms of the compromise or arrangement and explaining its effects is sent
and acknowledged by that class of members or creditors who are numerically
small and if they give their consent to such a scheme in writing, there is no
necessity in law to convene the meeting of such class of shareholder creditors.
The said consent letter or approval given can be acted upon and is sufficient
to show that they have approved the scheme. [Para 49]
In this context, in the facts of the case,
it was not in dispute the entire preference shares in the company were held by
IDBI. By a letter, the company brought to the notice of the IDBI the aforesaid
scheme and further informed that as they were the only preference shareholder,
no separate meeting of preference shareholders had been convened and therefore
IDBI was requested to convey their approval or otherwise to the proposed
scheme. Along with the said letter, a copy of the scheme was also sent for
reference. IDBI agreed with the scheme of arrangement saying that
modifications, if any, would be stipulated by them in the Court itself.
However, the IDBI did not stipulate any modifications or additional conditions.
The hearing of the company petition had been duly notified in the newspaper and
the IDBI did not appear before the Court to suggest any modifications or to
impose any additional conditions before the High Court. Under these
circumstances, when the sole preferential shareholder had given their consent
in writing approving the scheme even before convening of the meeting and had
not opposed the scheme at the hearing before the Court, it was obvious that
they had also approved the scheme proposed by the company. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that the company had not complied with the
legal requirement of holding a meeting of the preferential shareholder. Thus,
the company had complied with section 391(1). [Para 50]
The third objection was raised by KPL
regarding a clause on use of trademark, contained in the scheme of arrangement.
[Para 51]
The offending clause provided that all the
brand trade mark/s, the registered trade mark/s, and benefits of permitted user
agreements of the petitioner-company would be available to the KSPL to
manufacture products being currently manufactured by the company so long as new
company held not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of KSPL.
It also made it clear that no separate deed or document was required for such
permission and the offending clause itself was to be construed as such
agreement. It also made it clear that the same was subject to approval of the
scheme by the High Court. The said clause proceeded on the assumption that the
company owned brands, trade marks, registered trade marks and benefits under a
permitted user agreement and the same was sought to be made available to KSPL
under the terms of the scheme for which also approval of the scheme by the
Court was sought for. Therefore, in the instant proceedings, what the Court had
to consider was whether that clause was legal and valid and it contravened any
law for the time being in force. On the face of it, it did not contravene any
provisions of law, but, if as contended by KPL, those brands, trade marks, fell
into their ownership and they had given the same to the company under a
permitted user agreement and if they were objecting to transfer of those rights
to KSPL, then, the Court had to go into the question whether it was against any
law. [Para 54]
In view of the disputed facts, in a
proceeding under section 391, the Court could not hold enquiry and go into the
question as to who was entitled to the ownership of those brands, names and
trade marks. It was totally outside the purview of section 391. However, any
sanction to be accorded by the Court to the scheme could not be construed as
taking away the right of KPL, if they had any. Therefore, to that extent, the
interest of KPL had to be protected. Therefore, it was made clear that the
order of sanctioning the scheme by the Court would in no way affect the
rights/interests of KPL in respect of the brand name, trade mark or user
agreement of theirs. It was always open to them to initiate appropriate legal
proceedings either in the civil court or before appropriate forum to protect
their rights in respect of brand name, trade mark, etc. If any such proceedings
were initiated, the authorities who were empowered to decide shall decide the
rights independently on merits and in accordance with law without in any way being
influenced by any of the observations made by the Court in its order and the
sanctioning of the scheme by the Court would in no way put fetters on the power
of the Court or the forum to go into these disputed questions. It would not be
open to the company to contend in the proceedings that as the scheme containing
the aforesaid offending clause was approved by the Court, the authorities could
not go into the legality or validity of those transactions. [Para 54]
Therefore, with that reservation the interest
of KPL was fully protected and the said objection could not come in the way of
sanctioning of the scheme by the High Court and sanctioning of the scheme would
not amount to contravening the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. [Para
54]
Sofar as the contention of Bank ‘T’ that if
the proposed scheme was sanctioned, their interest in company as second charge
creditors would suffer, was concerned, the bank ‘T’ was one of the secured
creditors. All that the secured creditor would be interested in was in
repayment of the loan borrowed by the company. The scheme envisaged repayment
of 312 lakhs immediately after the sale of land. Insofar the balance amount was
concerned, the bank was given first pari passu charge for Rs. 555 lakhs on the fixed assets and a second pari
passu charge on current assets and for
the balance amount, if would have a first pari passu charge on the current assets and a second pari
passu charge on fixed assets. Thus,
the interest of the bank was completely taken care of. If the company was wound
up, the bank being a second charge holder, was not sure of getting back its
full money having regard to the extent of liability of the company. Moreover,
the time to be consumed for such payment was unpredictable. Insofar as their
objection regarding shifting of the unit and objection to the sale of the
property was concerned, they could not have any say in such matter. The
propriety and the merits of the compromise or arrangement has to be judged by
the parties who as sul juris
with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the scheme arrive at their own reasoned
judgment and agree to be bound by such compromise or arrangement. The Court
could not, therefore, undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme placed
for its sanction with a view to finding out whether a better scheme could have
been adopted by the parties. [Para 58]
This exercise remains only for the parties
and is in the realm of commercial democracy permeating the activities of the
concerned creditors and members of the company who in their best commercial and
economic interest by majority agree to give green signal to a compromise or
arrangement. In the instant case, a consortium of 22 financial institutions had
been formed under the scheme for the purpose of selling the assets of the
company and for discharge of the liability of the company. When secured
creditors had approved the scheme, whereunder the property of the company would
be sold and the mode of utilizing the said sale proceeds was reasonable and in
the best interest of the company, objection by one such financial institution
did not carry much weight, as the interest of Bank T was also taken care of and
was fully protected. There was no substance in the said objections raised by
the bank. As such, the same was rejected. [Para 58]
From the aforesaid discussions, it became
clear that all the three companies involved in the scheme of reconstruction had
complied with the legal requirements of section 391(1)(a) inasmuch as all of them had called the
meetings of the shareholders and creditors of the company and placed before
them the scheme for approval. Further, the material on record disclosed that
the shareholders and creditors of the company had approved the aforesaid scheme
by the requisite three-fourths majority as required under section 391(2). In
fact, no shareholder or creditor of the company had complained either in the
aforesaid meetings or before the Court that the scheme which was approved
adverse to their interest and that their interest was not taken care of by the
majority while approving the resolution. The proposed scheme was not found to
be violative of any provisions of law nor was it contrary to public policy. The
members and the creditors of the companies had acted bona fide and in good faith and not coercing the
minority in order to promote any interest adverse to the latter. [Para
59]
It was to be taken note of that the matter
was before the BIFR. The BIFR was unable to rehabilitate the company. It was,
in that context, at their suggestion, the company had come forward with the
scheme to rehabilitate and restructure the company to the satisfaction of all
the members, creditors and workforce. The only alternative to the scheme was
winding- up of the company, in which event, neither the creditors nor the
members and the workmen would be benefited. [Para 59]
Therefore, taking into consideration all
circumstances of the case, an opportunity was to be given to the company to
restructure the company as suggested in the scheme which would be beneficial
for one and all. As a whole, the scheme was just, fair and reasonable. It was
not open to the Court to undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme with
a view to find out whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the
parties. When the creditors and members of the company, who in their best
commercial and economic interest by a majority, agree and approve the scheme,
the discretion of the Court is to be exercised in approving such a scheme.
Under these circumstances, the scheme was fair, just, bona fide, honest and it took into consideration the
interest of the members, the creditors, the workmen and that was the best that
could be done under the circumstances and was the only mode in which winding-up
of the company could be prevented. [Para 61]
Cases referred to
Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC
506 (para 39) and Arvind Mills Ltd.
[2002] 111 Comp. Cas. 118 (para 44).
K.G.
Raghavan for ICICI, Udaya
Holla for objector Cauvery Gears
Pvt. Ltd.; R.B. Deshpande for
Objector R.P. Enterprises; Vishwanath Shendge, ACGSC, for ROC; H.S. Srinivasa
Murthy for applicant in CA
793/2002-Opposing Creditor. Samarthna Associates for objector.
Order
1.
Company Petition No. 97/2002 is filed by Kirloskar Electric Company Ltd. to
obtain sanction of this Court to the scheme of arrangement whereby the Company
may be restructured by addressing its weaknesses and by leveraging the internal
assets of the Company, to reduce outside liabilities on manufacturing
operations, rationalise the debt burden on manufacturing units to long term
sustaining level, rationalise the work force and bring the employee cost in
line with the industry norms, restore bankability of business units and achieve
long term viability under given economic and industry scenario.
2.
Under the scheme of arrangement, the petitioner-Company, namely, Kirloskar
Electric Company Limited, would be the transferor Company and the Kaytee
Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. and Best Trading and Agencies Limited, are the transferee
companies. For the purpose of brevity, Kirloskar Electric Company Limited is
referred to as the ‘Company’ or (KECL) in this order.
3. The
petitioner-Company was incorporated as a Public Limited Company on 26-7-1946
under the Mysore Companies Act at Bangalore having its registered office at
industrial Suburb, Rajajinagar, Bangalore-10. The authorised share capital of
the Company is Rs. 700,000,000 (Rupees Seven Hundred Million) divided into
40,000,000 (Forty Million) Equity shares of Rs. 10.00 each and 3,000,000 (three
Million) preference shares of Rs. 100.00 each. The issued, subscribed and
paid-up share capital is Rs. 25,268,817 (twenty five million two hundred and
sixty eight thousand eight hundred and seventeen) Equity Shares of Rs. 10.00
each and 1,800,000 (One million eight hundred thousand) Preference Shares of
Rs. 100.00 each.
4. The
object of the Company is to manufacture electric apparatus and appliances
required for or capable of being used in connection with the generation,
distribution, supply, accumulation and employment of electricity, produce a
wide range of electricity motors, alternators, traction equipment, rotating
machines, transformers, switch gears, voltage regulators, industrial
electronics, automotive controls, etc., and other manufacturing activity as set
out in the Memorandum and Articles of Association.
5. The
petitioner-Company has various manufacturing and other units at eleven places,
they are :
Unit |
Products |
Location |
Unit-1 |
Extra Large, Large and |
Bangalore |
|
Medium AC Motors/Generators |
|
Unit-2 |
Medium and Small AC Motors/ |
Hubli |
|
Generators |
|
Unit-3 |
DC machines, Traction |
Bangalore |
|
equipment |
|
Unit-4 |
Industrial Electronics |
Mysore |
Unit-5 |
Transformers |
Bangalore |
Unit-7 |
Components for medium and small
AC motors |
Tumkur |
Unit-10 |
Switchgears |
Hebbal |
Unit-12 |
Spares Division |
Bangalore |
PSG |
Projects & Systems Group |
Bangalore |
REG |
Renewable Energy Group (Wind
Mills) |
Karnataka and |
|
|
Tamil Nadu |
6. The
petitioner-Company has a dominant market position in large and medium sized
rotating machines and traction equipments and over the years it has built reputation
and the Company enjoys goodwill in the domestic and foreign markets and the
Company was having sound financial position till about 1997-98. The Company’s
profitability started getting affected from 1998-99 onwards on account of the
recession in capital goods industry, downturn of infrastructure and core
sectors, which are generally the end-users of the Company’s products. The other
factors which lead to the decline in profitability are high level of debt,
excess labour force and high employee cost, high interest cost, high level of
receivables, continuing large losses, continuing poor financial situation and
threat of legal cases from creditors/statutory authorities. Therefore, the
Board of Directors of the petitioner-company felt that unless the debt of the
Company is restructured the survival of the Company will be jeopardized. The
main objective of the restructuring is to address the weakness of the Company
without relying on the external debt for funding of rehabilitation needs and to
leverage the internal assets of the Company to the extent possible. Further,
they want to rationalize the workforce and bring the employee cost in line with
industry norms, restore bankability of business units, achieve long term
viability under given economic and industry scenario, achieve positive net
worth situation as early as possible and keep options open for future
possibilities of Joint Venture with Strategic Partners. Therefore, a detailed
technical feasibility report for relocation and consolidation of manufacturing
facilities has been made by the technical team of the petitioner-Company. The
manufacturing Unit for large motors/generators (part of Unit-1) and DC machines
and Traction equipment (Unit-3) will be consolidated at a new location to
derive advantages of sharing of common facilities, minimizing material flow,
higher productivity and reduction of employee costs. In this connection, ICICI
(lead Institution) at the request of consortium of Banks and term lenders has
obtained report from an independent technical consultant, who has confirmed the
feasibility and rationale of relocation as proposed in the scheme. Therefore,
they have formulated a scheme of arrangement between the petitioner-company and
its members and creditors which is produced at Annexure-B.
7. In
terms of the scheme, with a view to consolidate the production facility, to
reduce overheads and to unlock the real asset value at Bangalore the following
operational restructuring is proposed :
- Shift unit (1) (AC Machines - Small and Medium Plant) from
Bangalore to Hubli.
- Shift Unit 1 (AC Machines - Large and Extra Large Plant) from
Bangalore to a new location near Bangalore.
- Shift Unit 3 (DC Machines and Traction Plant) from Bangalore to a
new location near Bangalore.
- Shift Unit 5 (Transformers Plant) from Bangalore to Mysore.
- Shift Unit 10 (Switchgear Plant) from Hebbal, Bangalore to Mysore.
- Shift PSG from Bangalore to Mysore.
Subsequent to
such operational restructuring, there will be two Business Groups namely (i) Rotating Machine Group (RMG) at
Hubli/New Locations near Bangalore, Tumkur. Spares Division in Bangalore and
Wind Mills (REG) in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and (ii) Static Equipment Group (SEG) at Mysore. The rationale for
segregation into the two business groups is to consolidate operations based on
the respective synergies and to develop the vehicle for exploring the joint
venture/strategic alliance for the Rotating Machine Group.
8.
Under the scheme, three entities are created to manage the existing assets of
KECL, they are :
(i) “Rotating Machine Group”
(RMG) means the following businesses being hived off to Kaytee Switchgear
Private Limited:
(a) Extra Large and Large
AC Motors/Generators
(Unit-1) at New
Location near Bangalore.
(b) Medium and Small AC Motors/Generators
(Unit-2) at Hubli.
(c) DC Machines &
Traction (Unit-3) at New Location near Bangalore.
(d) Component Unit
(Unit-7) at Tumkur.
(e) Spares Division
(Unit-12) at Bangalore, and
(f) Renewable Energy
Group (REG) at Existing locations.
(ii) “Static
Equipments Group” (SEG) means the following businesses which will remain with
residual KECL:
(a) Industrial
Electronics (Unit-4) at Mysore
(b) Transformers (Unit-5)
at Bangalore to be shifted to Mysore
(c) Switchgears (Unit-10)
at Bangalore to be shifted to Mysore, and
(d) Projects and Systems
Group (PSG) (Unit-1) to be shifted to Mysore.
(iii) “Special
Purpose Vehicle” (SPV) means an entity to which the non-manufacturing surplus
assets and real estate to KECL will be transferred for liquidating/repayment of
secured creditors liabilities and Statutory and other dues of the KEC. Best
Trading & Agencies Limited (BCAL), a subsidiary company of KECL,
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is the entity identified for this
purpose.
The other entities
which are relevant is as under :
(i) “KEC-1” means the
“Rotating Machine Group” or Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited (KSPL)
(ii) “Residual
KEC” means the Company remaining after transfer of assets and liabilities to
KEC-1 and SPV and
(iii) “New Location”
means the new location for shifting of the existing plant at Unit-1 and Unit-3
as may be deemed fit by the management.
9. With
effect from the appointed date, KECL will be de-merged/hived off into three
entities so as to achieve the objectives of restructuring :
(a) Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to leverage Non-manufacturing Surplus Assets and real
estate.
(b) KEC-1:
(Hubli, New Location near Bangalore, Tumkur, Spares Division and REG in
existing locations) called the Rotating Machine Group.
(c) Residual KEC
: Unit 4 (Electronics,) Unit 5 (Transformer), unit 10 (Switchgear), and PSG.
(i) Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV)
SPV will be carved
out of KECL to comprise of surplus non-manufacturing and liquid assets such as
real estate at Bangalore (other than a part of the land retained in residual
KECL), Peenya, Pune and surplus machinery and group company advances and
receivables. The total realizable amount from sale of such assets is estimated
at Rs. 14,855 lakhs (net of cost of sales). The liabilities of secured lenders
to extent of Rs. 12,159 lakhs besides other liabilities of Rs. 2,698 lakhs
(including VRS, cost of shifting etc.) will also be transferred to SPV. The
proceeds from sale of SPV’s assets will be utilized towards payments of its
liabilities. The surplus assets transferred to SPV will have assured
realization within time frame of about 18-36 months. Securitisation of such
surplus assets will ensure repayment of major part of the existing term
liabilities.
The details of
assets to be transferred to SPV and amount of liabilities to be assigned are
given below :—
Liabilities |
Assets |
||
Rs. in lakhs |
Rs. in lakhs
|
||
Equity to ICICI/NCD |
1 |
Property at Malleswaram* |
11,600 |
holders & Residual |
|
Land and Buildg. at Pune |
200 |
KEC |
|
Property at Peenya |
800 |
Liabilities of Term |
|
Surplus m/c |
612 |
Lenders |
9,223 |
Group advances |
1,191 |
Liabilities of Banks |
|
Group company recoveries |
762 |
(WCTL) |
2,935 |
|
|
Other Liabilities |
|
Less : Cost of Sales |
310 |
- VRS (part) |
2,346 |
|
|
- Cost of Shifting |
350 |
|
|
Total Liabilities |
14,855 |
Total Assets |
14,855 |
*Excludes part of
the land retained in the Residual KEC :
The valuation of assets
to be transferred to SPV is taken on the basis of Current Fair Market Value
(FMV) of assets, with a view to facilitate the scheme, the charge holders will
concede proportionate representation in the SPV to all the secured lenders
irrespective of their existing charge position on the assets being transferred
to SPV. The detailed break-up of liabilities of individual lenders to be
transferred to SPV is given in the Annexure 1, to the scheme.
Residual KEC will
hold the initial equity capital of SPV to the extent of 1% and the existing
charge holders i.e., ICICI and
NCD holders will hold the balance of 99 per cent of the equity in the
proportion of their existing outstandings.
An asset sale
committed will be constituted comprising of one representative each from the
participating institutions/banks and one from KEC. The sale of any asset of SPV
shall be with the approval of the members representing minimum of 75% in value
of the total loan outstandings at any point of time in SPV.
The sale proceeds shall
be appropriated first to meet cost of VRS, cost of shifting operations from the
existing locations, etc. The amount remaining thereafter shall be utilized for
payment to lenders in SPV proportionately.
No rent or other
charges shall be payable to SPV by KECL or RMG from the appointed date to the
date of vacation of the Malleswaram property. KECL and RMG shall vacate the
premises within 9 (nine) months from the date of receipt of Rs. 2,696 lakhs
from SPV towards the cost of shifting and voluntary retirement expenses.
(ii) KEC-1 (RMG)
KEC-1 will be
Rotating Machine Group (RMG) with a business valuation of Rs. 19,000 lakhs on
the basis of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method. The fixed assets of RMG
together with current assets and current liabilities will be transferred to
Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited. This Company will be assigned liabilities of
Rs. 19,000 lakhs as under :—
Particulars |
Rs. in
lakhs |
Equity to KECL |
5,292 |
Equity to lenders of KEC (in lieu of) |
|
Conversion of KECL (liabilities) |
1,308 |
Net worth |
6,600 |
Assignment (Transfer) of Liabilities of KECL to Rmg |
|
i. Balance of Term Debt of secured term
lenders and FITL |
6,741 |
ii. WCTL to Banks |
1,297 |
Sub Total |
8,038 |
Working Capital of Banks |
3,362 |
Overdue sundry Creditors |
1,000 |
Grant Total |
19,000 |
The break up of
liabilities being transferred to KEC-1 (RMG) is given in Annexure-1.
The secured lenders will
be allotted equity to the extent of 29% of the Company at Rs. 20.50 per share
(inclusive of premium of Rs. 10.50) towards conversion of their dues, while
balance 71 per cent will be allotted to Residual KEC at Rs. 33.88 per share
(inclusive of a premium of Rs. 23.88). No party (Financial institutions/Banks
or KECL) shall dispose of the shares held in RMG without the written consent of
others, for a minimum period of three years from the date of allotment.
The assigned term debt
and WCTL would be paid-off within a period of 8 years and the estimated cash
generation of KEC-1 would ensure acceptable level of average Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR). Term Lenders in RMG will have an option to convert upto
10 per cent of their dues in RMG to normal working capital Loan. In the event
of such conversion, the corresponding amount of normal working capital of banks
will be converted to WCTL.
(iii) Residual
KECL - (SEG):
The residual Company
after transferring the assets to SPV and RMG will essentially be Static
Equipments Group (SEG). The residual liabilities in this Company will be mainly
preference shares of Rs. 1200 lakhs, unpaid dividend on preference shares of
Rs. 494 lakhs, WCTL of Banks of Rs. 986 lakhs besides normal working capital
within Drawing Power (DP) of Rs. 858 lakhs.
The promoter
stakeholders shall bring in a sum of Rs. 800 lakhs as equity in residual KEC
over a period of two years from the effective date for meeting the
restructuring funding needs for which residual KEC would make a preferential
issue of equity to the promoter stakeholders at a price of Rs. 30 per share
(inclusive of a premium of Rs. 20).
The Term debts retained
in Residual KEC would be paid off within a period of 9 years and the estimated
cash generations of the company would ensure acceptable level of Average-Debt
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR).
According to the scheme,
the manufacturing operations of the main plant in Bangalore have to be shifted
and the premises vacated. Certain expenditure like payments towards Statutory
dues, workers’ dues, part of cost of VRS, purchase of land at the new location,
construction of buildings and shifting of the plant and machinery to the new
location, etc., is involved. This requirement of funds has to be met out of the
sale proceeds of the land, as no financial institution/Bank is willing to
advance fresh funds for payment towards such expenditure.
The Company intends to
sell a part of the land measuring about 31000 square metres at the Bangalore
main plant to a party with whom an agreement has been entered into for a sale
price of approximately Rs. 2000 lakhs. The sale proceeds are to be utilised to
meet certain expenditure such as payments towards statutory dues, workers’
dues, part of cost of VRS, purchase of land at the new location, construction
of buildings and shifting of the plant and machinery to the new location etc.
The details of the asset
(part of the Malleswaram land) retained in Residual KEC and amount of
liabilities assigned are given below :
Liabilities |
|
Assets |
|
Existing Liabilities |
Rs. in Lakhs
|
Sale price for |
Rs.
in Lakhs |
CST, Sales Tax, Entry |
|
part of Bangalore |
2000 |
Tax etc. |
302 |
Complex land |
|
Salary Arrears |
446 |
|
|
PF, Income Tax etc., |
133 |
Less : Cost of |
|
Gratuity |
439 |
Sales |
50 |
Total |
1320 |
|
|
Other Liabilities |
|
|
|
VRS (Part) |
180 |
|
|
Cost of Shifting |
450 |
|
|
Total |
630 |
|
|
Total Liabilities |
1950 |
Total Assets |
1950 |
10. The
Company filed C.A. No. 134/2002 under section 391 of the Companies Act
requesting this Court to permit them to convene a meeting of the shareholders,
secured creditors and unsecured creditors for the purpose of considering and,
if thought fit, approving, with or without modifications, the said Scheme of
Arrangement. The said permission was granted by this court by an order dated
14-3-2002. The meeting was held under the Chairmanship of Mr. Vijay R.
Kirloskar. Notices of the meeting were duly advertised in the English daily
“Times of India” and Kannada daily “Prajavani”. The meeting was convened on
26-4-2002 and it was held at the registered office. The Chairman of the meeting
has filed his report. In the said meeting 18 secured creditors of the company
attended the meeting and the total of their debt is Rs. 2,53,36,43,491. The
creditors suggested certain amendments and sought modification of the scheme.
The modified scheme was approved in the said meeting by a majority of
1,47,73,91,975 votes in favour and 35,65,67,300 votes against the said
resolution. Out of the 18 secured creditors who attended the meeting 12 secured
creditors represented 81 per cent in value of the total votes polled by Secured
creditors present and voting have voted for the scheme unconditionally as
against 3 secured creditors representing 19 per cent voted against the said
scheme. Two secured creditors, Bank of India and Bank of Baroda voted for the
scheme subject to certain conditions. Their approval being conditional, their
votes have been held invalid. All other secured creditors approving the scheme
have voted for the scheme of arrangement unconditionally.
11. The
meeting of the unsecured creditors was attended either personally or by proxy
by 401 unsecured creditors of the company and the total value of their debt is
Rs. 25,29,76,149.07. The scheme was approved by a majority of 24,91,52,868.10
votes against 38,23,280.97 votes.
12. The
meeting of the equity shareholders was attended either personally or by proxy
by 910 equity sharesholders of the company entitled together to 1,42,25,793
equity shares of Rs. 10.00 aggregating to Rs. 14,22,57,930.00. The scheme was
approved by a majority of 1,42,22,428 votes against 424 votes.
13. The
preference shares issued by the company are held by one share- holder only viz., IDBI Limited. No meeting as
such was convened to ascertain their view. Instead by a letter dated 18-4-2002
they were requested to convey their approval or otherwise of the proposed
scheme. In reply thereto by their letter dated 26-7-2002 they stated that in
principle agreement to the company’s demerger proposal is accepted by them
subject to the modification of the scheme or additional conditions, if any, as
may be stipulated by them in the ensuing High Court hearing. However, they have
not suggested any modification or additional condition to be stipulated in the
scheme. Thus, all the legal formalities have been complied with by the
petitioner-company.
14. It
is also pertinent to point out the petitioner-company being a sick company, a
reference has been made under section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 to the BIFR by its application dated 26-3-2002
and the matter is now pending before BIFR.
15.
Thereafter, the petitioner-company sought for sanctioning of the scheme by this
Court. However, this Court by an order dated 22-10-2002 rejected the petition
on the ground that the transferee companies have not sought permission of this
Court for convening the meeting of their shareholders and creditors to consider
and approve the scheme formulated by the petitioner-company and as the scheme
would affect the interest of the members of the said companies. Aggrieved by
the said order the petitioners preferred an appeal in O.S.A. No. 108/2002
before the Division Bench of this Court. On a representation made by the
petitioner-company the transferee companies would make necessary application
under section 391 of the Companies Act seeking permission of the Court to
convene the meeting of their shareholders and creditors and only if the scheme
of arrangement is approved in those meetings their request for sanction of the
scheme could be considered, the order passed by the Company Judge was set aside
and the matter was remanded back to this Court. That is how this petition is
before me.
16. The
transferee Company No. 1 - Kaytee Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated on
2-3-1983 at Bangalore under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, having
its registered office at Industrial Suburb Rajajinagar, Bangalore - 560 010.
The main object of this transferee Company is to carry on the business of
manufacturing, processing, formulating, repairing, fitting, erecting, using,
importing, exporting, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in all kinds and
types of Control Gear, Switch Gear, Switches, Staters, Switch Boards, Panels,
Contractors, Push Button Switches, etc. as clearly set down in the Memorandum
and Articles of Association which is produced along with Company Petition No.
270/2002. The authorized share capital of this transferee Company is Rs. 3
Crores and the subscribed capital is Rs. 2,000 divided into 200 equity shares
of Rs. 10 each.
17. The
Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited, the petitioner in COP 270/2002, made an
application in CA 1044/2002 before this Court under section 391 of the
Companies Act seeking permission of this Court to call for the meetings of the
shareholders are creditors of the Company to consider and approve the scheme.
By an order dated 31-10-2002 this Court granted the permission sought for and directed
the meetings of the shareholders and creditors to be held on 1st of December,
2002. Accordingly, notices were issued to the shareholders and meeting was held
on 1st of December, 2002. The said meeting was attended by two equity
shareholders of the said Company entitled together to 200 shares of the value
of Rs. 2000.00 and the scheme of arrangement was unanimously approved. The
Chairman of the meeting has filed his report. Thereafter, they have filed COP
270/2002 seeking sanctioning of the scheme.
18. The
transferee Company No. 2 - Best Trading and Agencies Limited was incorporated
on 2-5-1988 in Delhi, as Best Credits Private Limited, under the provisions of
the Companies Act, 1956. Subsequently, vide
a fresh certificate consequent on change of name dated 18-6-1999, it was
incorporated as Best Trading and Agencies Ltd. at Bangalore having its
registered office at Industrial Suburb Rajajinagar, Bangalore. The main object
of the said Company is to carry on the business of agency of all kinds and to act
as traders, dealers, importers, exporters, merchants, wholesalers, retailers,
stockists, distributors and other business as mentioned in the Memorandum and
Articles of Association annexed along with Company Petition No. 271/2002. The
authorised share capital of this Company is Rs. 1 Crore and the subscribed
capital is Rs. 1000 divided into 100 equity shares of Rs. 10 each.
19.
Similarly, Best Trading and Agencies Limited, the petitioner in COP 271/2002, also
filed an application in CA No. 1048/2002 under section 391 of the Companies Act
seeking permission of the Court to call for the meeting of the shareholders and
creditors of the company, consider and approve the scheme. By an order dated
31-10-2002 the permission sought for was granted and the meeting was directed
to be held on 1st December, 2002. Accordingly, the meeting was held on 1st
December, 2002 and the said meeting was attended by four equity shareholders
entitled together to 100 shares to the value of Rs. 1,00,000 and the
shareholders and creditors of the company have unanimously approved the scheme
of arrangement. The Chairman of the meeting has filed his report before this
Court. It is thereafter the present COP 271/2002 is filed for sanctioning of
the scheme.
20.
After admission of the aforesaid three Company Petitions, the Company was
directed to take out advertisement and also notice was ordered to the Regional
Director, Department of Company Affairs, Chennai.
21. In pursuance
of the aforesaid notice, the Regional Director of Company Affairs appeared and
filed his statement of objections. The two main objections raised are that
though the scheme of arrangement was approved by the requisite majority of
unsecured creditors and equity shareholders, it was approved only by 58.31 per
cent of the secured creditors of the said company present and voting in the
meeting with certain modifications. Secondly it was contended that the entire
preference share capital of the Company is held by IDBI. No preference share-
holders meetings was held for approval of the scheme nor the same was dispensed
with by this court nor the Company obtained written consent of the IDBI in this
regard. Therefore, they contend as the legal formalities have not been complied
with as required under section 392 of the Companies Act the sanction sought for
cannot be granted.
22. Yet
another objection is from the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited. They contend that
the word trade mark “Kirloskar” belongs to them: The KECL was the permitted
user of the trade mark “Kirloskar” under an agreement which has been terminated
on 24-1-2001 which termination has been accepted by the said Company.
Therefore, they have no right to transfer the said name or trade mark or the benefits
of the permitted user agreement to Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited. Not only
the same is opposed to the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Act but also
the said property do not belong to them as it belongs to the Kirloskar
Proprietary Limited. If the scheme as propounded by the Company is approved it
would mean that this Court has granted permission for such transfer which is
prohibited by law and it would also affect their interest and therefore they
want Clause (2) in para 3 of the scheme to be deleted.
23. A
reply was filed to the said objections by the KECL contending that the said
dispute is of a civil nature, it cannot be decided in these proceedings. They
contend the word “Kirloskar” and the trade mark “Kirloskar” belongs to them
exclusively. The objectors right to take action against the company on the
ground of alleged violation also remains unaffected and therefore they have
prayed for rejection of the said objections.
24.
Another secured creditors ICICI Bank Limited has filed an application
requesting the Court to modify the scheme by enabling them to hold upto 19 per
cent of the shareholding in the transferee company by themselves and in their
names and further to nominate such person or persons as the applicant may deem
fit to hold the shareholding in the transferee company such that their
shareholding put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholdings to
which the applicant company is entitled to under the scheme. KECL has no
objection for granting the said objection and modifying the scheme accordingly.
25. Yet
another objection is filed by State Bank of Travancore. They contend the
Company owes a sum of Rs. 1,030.98 lakhs to the bank. Under the scheme the
estate of the Company in Bangalore is proposed to be sold. This will
substantially dilute the level of security for the facilities. Even after the
clearing of Rs. 312 lakhs as proposed in the scheme, the remaining Fund Based
Exposure of Rs. 697 lakhs would remain a Non- Performing Asset, which position
is not acceptable to the bank and therefore they have sought for rejection of
the application for sanction.
26. In
reply to the said objection the Company has stated when the scheme has been
approved by the majority of the secured creditors at the instance of one
secured creditor the same cannot be rejected. They further contend the
objector-bank has a second charge on the fixed assets including the real estate
at Bangalore. Its first charge is only on the current assets. But under the
proposed scheme the objector-bank will be getting first pari passu charge on fixed assets and a second pari passu charge on the current
assets for a total amount of Rs. 555.00 lakhs and the first pari passu charge on the current
assets and a second pari passu
charge on fixed assets for Rs. 426.00 lakhs and the balance of Rs. 22.00 lakhs
will be equity. The objector thus gets improved security cover under the
proposed scheme. The sale of real estate at Bangalore will not dilute the
security as contended by the objector but the sale proceeds will be used for
paying off the loans as per the scheme. The remaining security remains intact
and is quite adequate to cover the liabilities assigned to the Rotating Machine
Group as well as the KECL. Therefore, it is submitted that the said objection
has no substance.
27. The
employees of the Kirloskar Electric Company Employees Association have filed an
affidavit stating that the employees have no objection of or sanction of the
scheme. All that has been said in the affidavit is that the management has
mutually agreed with the Union that Voluntary Retirement Scheme will not be
forced on the workmen.
28. The
order passed by the BIFR in case No. 320/2002 of M/s. Kirloskar Electric
Company Limited is also placed on record. It discloses that M/s. Kirloskar
Electric Company Limited has been declared as a sick industrial company in
terms of section 3(1)(o) of the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. They have further
observed that the Company could make the net worth exceed the accumulated
losses within a reasonable period on their own as per the rehabilitation
package to be formulated and submitted by them under section 17(2) of the Act.
Further a direction was issued to the Company to discuss the rehabilitation
package with all secured creditors and other concerned parties and reach an
agreement on the reliefs and concessions envisaged from them. A direction was
issued to the company not to dispose of any fixed asset or current assets of
the company without the consent of the secured creditors and the BIFR and they
have issued other directions in this regard. That is how the petitioner-company
has formulated the scheme and has obtained the approval of the shareholders and
the secured creditors.
29.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner P. Chidambaram, submitted that the
scheme is approved by the shareholders and the creditors by three-fourths
majority present and voting and therefore the legal requirement of section
391(1) of the Act has been complied with. Elaborating the contention, he submitted,
insofar as the secured creditors are concerned, for the purpose of
three-fourths majority what is to be taken into consideration is the total
number of valid votes polled and out of those votes whether the scheme is
approved by three-fourths majority. If a secured creditor is present and has
not voted and if voted the said vote has become invalid, then the said vote
cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, he submits, the secured
creditors who were present and cast a valid vote have approved the scheme by
three-fourths majority, as such, the legal requirement is complied with. In so
far as preferential shareholders are concerned, the entire preference shares
are held by one secured creditor, namely, IDBI, who have given their consent
for the scheme in writing and therefore non-convening the meeting of the
preference shareholder under the aforesaid circumstances would not vitiate the
legal requirement contemplated under section 391(1) of the Act. Coming to the
objections regarding violation of Trade Mark Act is concerned, he submitted,
there is no transfer of a trade mark involved under the scheme. Even if it
amounts to a transfer, the rights of the Kirloskar Proprietary Concern, which
claims to be the proprietor of the trade mark, would in no way be affected by
this Court according the sanction of the scheme, as the Kirloskar Proprietary
Concern could always initiate legal proceedings to protect their interest, if
any, and while according sanction, this Court may explicitly make this position
clear so as to protect the interest of the Kirloskar Proprietary Concern.
Insofar as the modification suggested by the secured creditors ICICI is
concerned, he submitted, the same can be modified, as it would not in any way
affect the working of the scheme. Insofar as the objection of State Bank of
Travancore is concerned, he submitted, the Bank had only second charge on the
property. Now, under the scheme, they would get a first charge on the property
and to this effect an agreement has been entered into between all the secured
creditors creating a pari passu
charge on the property and therefore the apprehension expressed by the Bank is
wholly misconceived. Therefore, he submitted, as all the legal requirements
have been complied with and the scheme do not contravene any law and it is made
with bona fide intention and
good faith and the shareholders, creditors and the workman have given their
consent for sanction of the scheme, there is no impediment for sanction of the
scheme.
30. Per contra, Smt. Madumita Bagachi,
learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, submitted if the total
number of votes cast in the secured creditors meeting is taken into
consideration, the scheme is not approved by three-fourths majority of
creditors present and voting, and therefore, there is non-compliance of section
391(2) of the Act. Secondly, she contended, admittedly, no meeting is convened
of the preference shareholders, as such, the legal requirement contemplated
under section 391(1) of the Act is not complied with. Compliance of sections
391(1) and 391(2) of the Act is a condition precedent for the Court considering
sanction of the scheme, as such the scheme cannot be sanctioned.
31.
Learned counsel appearing for Kirloskar Proprietary Limited, submitted, Clause
2 of Part III of the scheme read as a whole provides for transfer of the trade
marks which are permitted to be used by the Company, in favour of the
transferee companies and therefore it violates the provisions of the Trade
Marks Act. Once sanction is granted by this Court, the right to challenge such
assignment would be lost to the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited. Therefore, he
submits, as the aforesaid clause in the scheme is contrary to law, the Court
should not grant the sanction of the scheme.
32.
Learned counsel Sri K.G. Raghavan, appearing for ICICI, submitted, under the
original agreement, the entire share to be allotted to ICICI Ltd. was to be
held by them. Subsequent thereto by the approval granted by the RBI on
2-5-2002, ICICI Ltd. has been merged with ICICI Bank, which is governed by
Banking Regulations Act, 1949. Section 19(2) of the said Act, prohibits holding
of 56 per cent of the share capital. Therefore, they have proposed a
modification to the effect that 19 per cent of shares could be held by ICICI Bank
and 37 per cent of shares could be held by their nominees and accordingly have
sought for modification of the scheme to that extent.
33.
Learned counsel appearing for State Bank of Travancore submitted, the Bank had
a charge on the property of the Company which is now sought to be sold under
the terms of the scheme. If scheme is sanctioned and the property is sold, the
interest of the Bank would suffer and therefore to the extent of the scheme
provide for the sale of the property mortgaged to them cannot be sanctioned.
34. In
view of the aforesaid rival contentions, the following points arise for my
consideration:
“(i) whether
the scheme put up for sanction is approved by majority of secured creditors as
required under section 391(2) of the Act ?
(ii) Whether
non-convening of the meeting of the preference shareholders violate the
statutory requirement contemplated by section 391(1) of the Act ?
(iii) whether
the sanctioning of the scheme amounts to contravening the provisions of the
Trade Marks Act ?
(iv) whether
the modification of the scheme suggested by the secured creditor ICICI is
reasonable ?
(v) whether
sanctioning of the scheme resulting is sale of portion of the property at
Bangalore would substantially dilute the security offered to State Bank of
Travancore ?
(vi) whether
the scheme requires to be sanctioned with or without modification ?”
35.
Before I deal with the aforesaid points for determination, it is necessary to
keep in view the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which
is called upon to sanction the scheme of amalgamation as per the provisions of
section 391 read with section 393 of the Act. The aforesaid provisions of the
Act provides that compromise or arrangement can be proposed between a Company
and its creditors or any class of them, or between a Company and its members or
any class of them. When a scheme is put forward by a Company for the sanction
of the Court, in the first instance the Court has to direct holding of meetings
of creditors or class of creditors, or members or class of members who are
concerned with such a scheme. Once the majority in number representing
three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or
class of members, as the case may be, present or voting either in person or by
proxy at such a meeting accord their approval to any compromise or arrangement
the Court gets jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. Once such a compromise is
sanctioned by the Court, it would be binding on all the creditors or class of
creditors, or members or class of members, as the case may be, which would also
necessarily mean that even to dissenting creditors or class of creditors or
dissenting members or class of members, such sanctioned scheme would remain
binding.
36. Before
sanctioning such a scheme even though approved by a majority of the concerned
creditors or members, the Court has to be satisfied that the Company or any
other person moving such an application for sanction under sub-section (2) of
section 391 has disclosed all the relevant matters mentioned in the proviso to
sub-section (2) of the section. So far as the meetings of the creditors or
members, or their respective class for whom the scheme is proposed are
concerned, it is enjoined by section 391(1)(a) that the requisite information as contemplated by the said
provision is also required to be placed for consideration of the concerned
voters so that the parties concerned before whom the scheme is placed for
voting can take an informed and objective decision whether to vote for the
scheme or against it.
37. The
Company Court, which is called upon to sanction such a scheme is not merely to
go by the Ipse Dixit of the
majority of the shareholders or creditors or the respective classes who might
have voted in favour of the scheme with the requisite majority but the Court
has to consider the pros and cons
of the scheme with a view to find out whether the scheme is fair, just and
reasonable and is not contrary to any provision of law and it does not violate
any public policy. No Court of law would ever countenance any scheme of
compromise or arrangement arrived at between the parties and which might be
supported by the requisite majority if the Court finds that it is a
unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is otherwise unfair and unjust to the
class of shareholders or creditors for whom it is meant. The Court is not to
act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost automatically put its seal of
approval on such a scheme being approved by the majority.
38.
However, the question remains whether the Court has jurisdiction like an
Appellate Authority to minutely scrutinise the scheme and arrive at an
independent conclusion whether the scheme should be sanctioned or not when the
creditors and members have approved the scheme as required by section 391(2).
The Court has to keep in view the commercial wisdom of the parties to the
scheme who have taken an informed decision about the usefulness and propriety
of the scheme by supporting it by the requisite majority. The Court certainly
would not act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over the informed view
of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would be in the realm of
corporate and commercial wisdom of the parties. The Court has neither the
expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the commercial wisdom
exercised by the creditors and members of the Company who have ratified the
scheme by the requisite majority. To that extent the jurisdiction of the
Company Court is peripheral and supervisory and not appellate. The supervisory
jurisdiction of the Company Court can also be culled out from the provisions of
section 392 of the Act. The propriety and the merits of the compromise and
arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui juris with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the scheme arrive at
their own reasonable judgment and agree to be bound by such a compromise or
arrangement.
39. In
this regard, it is useful to refer to the observations found in the oft-quoted
passage in Bucklay on the Companies Act, 14th Edition. They are as under :
“In exercising its power of sanction the Court
will see, first that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, secondly,
that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and
that the statutory majority are acting bona
fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interest
adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that
the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class
concerned and acting in respect of this interest, might reasonably approve.
The Court does not sit merely to see that the
majority are acting bona fide
and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but at the same time,
the Court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has
not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considering the matter with
a view to the interest of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot
is found in the Scheme.”
The
observations of Fry, L.J. in this regard is also useful, which reads as under :
“The next enquiry is - Under what
circumstances is the Court to sanction a resolution which has been passed
approving of a compromise or arrangement? I shall not attempt to define what
elements may enter into the consideration of the Court beyond this, that I do
not doubt for a moment that the Court is bound to ascertain that all the
conditions required by the statute have been complied with; it is bound to be
satisfied that the proposition was made in good faith; and, further, it must be
satisfied that the proposal was at least so far fair and reasonable, as that an
intelligent and honest man, who is a member of that class, and acting alone in
respect of his interest as such a member, might approve of it. What other
circumstances the Court may take into consideration I will not attempt to
forecast.”
After
reviewing the entire case law, the Supreme Court in the case of Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC
506 has laid down the following broad contours defining the jurisdiction of the
Company Court in these matters, which is as hereunder :
“1. The sanctioning Court has to see to it that all the requisite
statutory procedure for supporting such a scheme has been complied with and
that the requisite meetings as contemplated by section 391(1)(a) have been held.
2. That
the scheme put up for sanction of the court is backed up by the requisite
majority vote as required by section 391, sub-section (2).
3. That
the concerned meetings of the creditors or members or any class of them had the
relevant material to enable the voters to arrive at an informed decision for
approving the scheme in question. That the majority decision of the concerned
class of voters is just and fair to the class as a whole so as to legitimately
bind even the dissenting members of that class.
4. That
all necessary material indicated by section 393(1)(a) is placed before the voters at the concerned meetings as
contemplated by section 391, sub-section (1).
5. That
all the requisite material contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (2) of
section 391 of the Act is placed before the Court by the concerned applicant
seeking sanction for such a scheme and the Court gets satisfied about the same.
6. That
the proposed scheme of compromise and arrangement is no found to be violative
of any provision of law and is not contrary to public policy. For ascertaining
the real purpose underlying the scheme with a view to be satisfied on this
aspect, the Court, if necessary, can pierce the veil of apparent corporate
purpose underlying the scheme and can judiciously X-ray the same.
7. That
the Company Court has also to satisfy itself that members or class of members
or creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, were acting bona fide and in good faith and were
not coercing the minority in order to promote any interest adverse to that of
the latter comprising of the same class whom they purported to represent.
8. That
the scheme as a whole is also found to be just, fair and reasonable from the
point of view of prudent men of business taking a commercial decision
beneficial to the class represented by them for whom the scheme is meant.
9. Once
the aforesaid broad parameters about the requirement of a scheme for getting
sanction of the Court are found to have been met, the Court will have no
further jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the commercial wisdom of the
majority of the class of persons who with their open eyes have given their
approval to the scheme even if in the view of the Court there would be a better
scheme for the company and its members or creditors for whom the scheme is
framed. The Court cannot refuse to sanction such a scheme on that ground as it
would otherwise amount to the Court exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
scheme rather than its supervisory jurisdiction.
The aforesaid parameters of the scope and
ambit of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction
a Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement are not exhaustive but only broadly
illustrative of the contours of the Court’s jurisdiction.” (p. 520)
40. In
the background of this legal position, I have to examine the scheme placed before
this court for sanction, in the light of the objections raised for its
sanction.
41. Regarding Point No. (i) :
It is not in
dispute that the unsecured creditors and shareholders have approved the scheme
by three-fourths majority. The dispute pertains to the majority of secured
creditors. The total number of secured creditors present were 18 in number and
their value is 2533643491. Out of 18 present, one abstained from voting.
Therefore, it is 17 persons whom were present and have voted. The value of the
one secured creditor who was present and who did not vote is 309821941. The
total value of secured creditors present and voting is 2223821550. There were 2
invalid votes, value of which is 389862275. Therefore, the total number of
valid votes cast is 15 and their value is 1833959275. Out of the valid vote
cast, 12 voted for the resolution and their value is 1477391975, 3 persons
voted against the resolution and their value is 356567300. If the total secured
creditors present and voted is taken into consideration and the votes held in
favour of the said resolution out of them is taken into consideration, the
resolution is passed by 58.31 per cent which is below the three-fourths
majority mark. If out of the valid votes cast, votes polled for resolution is
taken into consideration, it would be 80.58 per cent well above the three-
fourths mark. The number of votes voted against the resolution out of the valid
votes is taken into consideration, the value of votes would be 19.44 per cent.
42. In
the light of these aforesaid facts, the question for consideration is: whether
“present” and “voting” means even those persons who cast the votes and whose
votes were found to be invalid ought to be taken into consideration or it is
among the valid votes cast three-fourths majority is to be taken into
consideration.
43.
Sub-section (2) of section 391 requires that a scheme of compromise or
arrangement must be approved by majority of creditors/members representing
three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors, or members or
class of members, present and voting either in person or where proxies are
allowed, by proxy. There is no difficulty in understanding the word ‘present’
as the creditors or members should be physically present in person or through
their proxy in the meeting. The problem arises in the context of the word
‘voting’. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled
to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question. Voting is explained
as the expression of ones will, preference, or choice in regard to the decision
to be made by the body as a whole upon any proposed measure or proceeding.
Right to vote means right to exercise the right in favour of or against the
motion or resolution. A member present and voting may remain neutral,
indifferent, unbiased or impartial not engaged on either side. Voting has to be
either in the affirmative or negative i.e.,
‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the ballot paper or voting paper. One is not supposed to write
anything except putting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ either in favour of the proposition or
against the proposition. In addition to the same, if any suggestion, condition,
reservation or stipulation is written stating that the expression of the will
or opinion either for or against the proposition is subject to those things,
then, the votes have to be necessa-rily treated as invalid or void, as such
votes are no votes leading either way. A vote cast without indicating the mind
of the voter either for or against the resolution is no voting at all. Similarly,
voting for or against the motion subject to the conditions stipulated in the
vote is no voting in the eye of law. Therefore, voting understood in a proper
perspective, it could be either in the affirmative or in the negative.
Therefore, in construing whether a resolution is passed by three-fourths
majority present and voting, what is to be taken into consideration in
calculating the majority is not the number of persons present and voting, but
the number of valid votes polled in such meeting. The number of valid votes
includes only votes which are indicating the mind of the voter for or against
the resolution.
44.
Therefore, by “voting”, the mind, intention, preference of the voter must be
clearly expressed. There should not be any ambiguity and scope for interpretation.
It should be clear, unqualified and pointing. In this context, a voter who is
not present at the meeting, who is present and not voting, present and voting
by casting a blank ballot, and casting a ballot with conditions and
stipulations, all stand on the same footing. It is no “voting” in the eye of
law. Therefore, in my opinion, the proper construction to be placed in
calculating whether any resolution is approved or passed by a three-fourths
majority present and voting necessarily mean the value of the valid votes and
out of the same whether the resolution has been passed with three-fourths
majority. This view of mine is supported by a judgment of the Gujarat High
Court in the case of Arvind Mills Ltd.
[2002] 111 Comp. Cas. 118, where it has been held as under :
“Thus it will be seen from the above that a
member present and voting may remain neutral, indifferent, unbiased, impartial,
not engaged on either side. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by
the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question
has to be either in the affirmative or negative, that is yes or no. On the
ballot paper or voting paper one is not supposed to writ anything, except
putting a “X”, “V” either in favour of the proposition or against the
proposition and any writing suggesting condition or reservation cannot be said
to be an expression of will or opinion either for or against
the proposition and those votes have to be necessarily treated as invalid or void
as such votes are no votes leading either way.
It need hardly be said that the votes cast on
the proposition and voting thereof are to be construed in the ordinary and
usual sense and that mean “expressing the will, mind or preference; casting or
giving a vote.” They do not include the votes or ballots, that do not cast a
vote on the proposition legally or void votes may not be counted either for or
against the proposition submitted even though they may have been even received,
placed in the ballot box and constitute sum of the total number of ballots. A
bare attempt to vote by depositing blank ballot containing any writing is not
effective and cannot be included in the total count upon the 3/4ths majority is
to be estimated. Only those ballots that express voters points with such
clearing that the ballot can be counted for or against can be counted in total.
The requirement contemplates two ballots only, one affirmative and the other
negative. To adopt any other rule would be to say that three ballots were
contemplated one affirmative, one negative and the other neither affirmative or
negative but forming a new class into which all ballots for any reason void
must go....”
Applying the
aforesaid principles to the facts of this case, if we look into the voting
pattern, though 17 persons voted in the meeting, it was found 2 secured
creditors (1) Bank of Baroda, (2) Bank of India, have voted for the resolution.
But the Bank of Baroda in the ballot paper mentioned that the vote is for the
resolution with modifications below :
“(1) we may agree for demerger on principle subject to final approval
by higher authorities with regard to stock verification etc.
(2) we will not agree for equity participation
letter to the company has already been submitted.”
Insofar as
Bank of India is concerned, have also cast their vote for the resolution
subject to the modifications suggested by them which was annexed to the ballot
paper. There they have suggested 13 modifications to the scheme and it is made
clear they are giving consent to the scheme subject to the aforesaid
modifications. Therefore, the Chairman of the meeting has rightly treated those
two ballots as invalid, because the said two creditors were not expressing
their will or opinion in favour of the resolution unconditionally. The said
votes are not votes leading either way and therefore they cannot be taken into
consideration either for or against the scheme. Therefore, though 17 persons
voted in the said meeting, as the 2 votes cast were invalid, in order to
determine the majority what is to be taken into consideration is only the value
of 15 creditors who voted in the said meeting. The value of such 15 creditors
is 1833959275 which is not in dispute 12 out of the 15 creditors voted for the
scheme and the value of those creditors is 1477391975. The value of the 3 votes
cast against the scheme is 356567300. Therefore, it is clear that the scheme is
approved by a majority of 80.56 per cent which is above the three-fourths
majority required under law, as the value of the valid votes voted against the
scheme is 19.44 per cent. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that
the secured creditors have not approved the scheme by a three-fourths majority
as required under law.
45. It
is also relevant to point out at this juncture the requirement that the scheme
should be approved by the requisite majority has been held to be directory and
not mandatory. If the Company has stopped its business, a large number of
employees and workers has become jobless, plant and machineries were resting
and losses were mounting, the scheme presented is a viable alternative even if
the same is not approved by three-fourths majority, Courts have sanctioned such
schemes. Principle underlying the same appears to be a scheme under section 391
cannot be regarded as an alternative mode of liquidation it is only an
alternative to liquidation.
46. In
the instant case, the Company has been declared as a sick industry under the
provisions of BIFR and having regard to the losses suffered by them and the
money that is required to make the unit viable, no financial institution or no
private entrepreneur has come forward to revive the industry, the only course
that would be left is for the BIFR to recommend to the High Court for winding
up of the Company. In those circumstances, if the Company itself with the
assistance of its members and creditors as a whole with the active support of
the labour puts-forth a scheme of reconstruction for revival of the Company and
as aforesaid when all the shareholders, unsecured creditors have approved such
a scheme with overwhelming majority and even the secured creditors as aforesaid
have approved the scheme with three-fourths majority of persons present and who
have cast a valid vote, the Court cannot blindly by technical interpretation
refuse to sanction the scheme on the ground of non-compliance of section 391(2)
of the Companies Act. It is also to be remembered here that 2 creditors whose
votes have held to be invalid have also voted for the scheme. Under these
circumstances, I am satisfied that the secured creditors also have approved the
scheme with three-fourths majority as required under section 391(1) of the
Companies Act. As such, there is compliance with the said statutory requirement
also.
47.
Regarding Point No. (ii) :
The second
objection raised was that no meeting of the preference shareholders are
convened to consider the scheme and there is no resolution passed approving the
said scheme and therefore the requirement of section 391(1) of the Companies
Act is not complied with. As such, the Court cannot accord sanction to the
scheme.
48.
Therefore, the question for consideration is : convening of a meeting of the
members and creditors of the Company, or any class of them, to consider and
approve the same is mandatory?
49. The
meeting contemplated under section 391 is analogous to an extra-ordinary
general meeting of the Company inasmuch as three-fourths majority is required
to pass the required resolution. The normal rule is that the consent of the
shareholders where it is unanimous or by a three-fourth majority, must be
obtained in a meeting summoned on the orders of the Court under section 391.
This is in accordance with the general principals that members must act in a
general meeting. Inroads have, however, been made on this formal doctrine.
Firstly, the consent of all or virtually all the shareholders given even
outside a meeting is sufficient to comply with the requirements of a meeting.
Secondly, written resolutions instead of those passed in meeting are now
capable of being registered e.g.,
section 192 of the Companies Act. Thirdly, the doctrine of lifting the veil of
incorporation and looking at the reality of action of the members enables the
Court to hold the consent of the overwhelming majority of the shareholders
outside the meeting is sufficient to show that the resolution was supported by
virtually all the members of the Company. In these three ways substantial
compliance rather than a formal compliance meets the requirements of the
statute. A third exception to the rule that all the shareholders of a company
must cast their votes in a formally called meeting is made by the doctrine of
acquiescence. If all the shareholders acquiesce in a certain arrangement, the
question of a meeting having been called does not arise at all. The Supreme
Court in the case of Miheer H.
Mafatlal (supra),
dealing with this question has held as under :
“. . . Moreover, when the company has decided
what classes are necessary parties to the scheme, it may happen that one class
will consist of small number of persons who will all be willing to be bound by
the scheme. In that case it is not the practice to hold a meeting of that
class, but to make the class a party to the scheme and to obtain the consent of
all its members to be bound. It is however, necessary for at least one class
meeting to be held in order to give the Court jurisdiction under the section.”
Therefore, it
becomes clear that convening of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on
the Court to accord sanction of a scheme under the Companies Act. But, when
there are different classes of shareholders as well as creditors of the
Company, if any particular class is numerically very small and if they on
coming to know of the scheme voluntarily, unconditionally, give their consent
or approval for such a scheme, calling a meeting of such class of members or
creditors to a meeting to express their mind by way of casting vote in a
meeting would be an empty formality. If a copy of the scheme propounded stating
the terms of the compromise or arrangement and explaining its effects is sent
and acknowledged by that class of members or creditors who are numerically
small and if they give their consent to such a scheme in writing, there is no
necessity in law to convene the meeting of such class of shareholders or
creditors. The said consent letter or approval given can be acted upon and is
sufficient to show that they have approved the scheme.
50. In
this context, in the facts of the case, it is not in dispute the entire preference
shares in the Company is held by Industrial Development Bank of India. By a
letter dated 18th April, 2002, the Company brought to the notice of the IDBI
the aforesaid scheme and further informed that as they are the only preference
shareholder, no separate meeting of preference shareholders has been convened
and therefore IDBI was requested to convey their approval or otherwise to the
proposed scheme. Along with the said letter, a copy of the scheme was also sent
for reference. Acknowledging the said letter, IDBI wrote on 26th July, 2002.
The said letter reads as under :
“Proposal
for demerger - Please refer to your request for IDBI’s approval for the
company’s proposed demerger scheme filed before the High Court of Karnataka.
IDBI’s in principle agreement to the company’s
demerger proposal may be conveyed at the ensuing High Court hearing. The final
approval shall be subject to the modifications to the scheme or additional
conditions, if any, as may be stipulated by IDBI.”
However, the
IDBI, did not stipulate any modifications or additional conditions. The hearing
of this Company Petition has been duly notified in the newspaper and the IDBI
did not appear before the Court to suggest any modifications or to impose any
additional conditions before the High Court. In other words, the IDBI have
agreed to the scheme proposed by the Company. Under these circumstances, when
the sole preferential shareholder has given their consent in writing approving
the scheme even before convening of the meeting and have not opposed the scheme
at the hearing before this Court, it is obvious that they have also approved
the scheme proposed by the Company. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the Company has not complied with the legal requirement of holding a
meeting of the preferential shareholder. Thus, the Company has complied with
section 391(1) of the Companies Act.
51.
Regarding Point No. (iii):
The third
objection is raised by the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘KPL’ for short). Their objection is to the paragraph 2 in part III
of the scheme, which reads as under :
“2. It has been mutually agreed between the
Company and KSPL (RMG) that all the brand/s trade mark/s, the registered trade
mark/s and benefits of permitted user agreements
of KECL shall be available to KSPL for manufacture of products being
currently manufactured by the Company so long as KECL holds not less than 51
per cent of the paid up equity capital of KSPL. The present covenant shall
serve as requisite consent for use of the brand name/trade mark without
requiring the execution of any further deed or document as to assignment and
permitted user of the said brand name/trade mark, subject, however to approval
of instant Scheme or Arrangement by the Hon’ble Court.”
Their
contention is that they are the owners of the trade mark “Kirloskar”; the
Company is the permitted user of the said trade mark; and by a letter dated
24-1-2001 they have terminated the agreement permitting/licensing the use of
KPL’s trade mark “Kirloskar”. Therefore, the Company has no right to use the
said trade mark nor is entitled to allow the use of said trade mark by Kaytee
Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. or to any other person. It is also stated by them that
even if the scheme is approved by the Court, the said scheme or any clause
thereof, cannot effect KPL’s paramount statutory and common law rights.
Therefore, they submitted that if the scheme is to be approved by the Court,
the aforesaid objectionable part of the scheme is to be deleted.
52. The
Company has filed its objections contending that the contentions raised by KPL
do not in any way require to be heard in this petition, as the issue of
Company’s right of use of the trade mark “Kirloskar” does not alter the
corporate entity of the Company which remains intact irrespective of the name
and style under which it carries on its business, nor does it effect the
proposed scheme of arrangement. As the Company’s identity as a corporate entity
remains unaffected even after the scheme, the KPL’s right to take action
against the Company on the ground of alleged violation also remains unaffected.
They have also contended that the KPL does not manufacture any goods and in
fact those trade marks originally belong to the Company who in turn assigned in
favour of the KPL for the benefit of the group. The said assignment was without
any consideration. The Company has been doing business under the name and style
of “Kirloskar” for over 50 years, and therefore, they requested the Court to
reject the said objection of the KPL. Learned counsel for the Company contended
that all those disputed questions cannot be gone into in a proceedings under
section 391 of the Act. If the KPL has any grievance against the petitioner in
this regard, it is always open to them to initiate appropriate legal
proceedings in the Civil Court or in any other Court and can agitate their
rights, and sanctioning of the scheme by this Court would in no way take away
those rights and he further submitted this Court could clarify the said legal proposition
to protect the interest of the KPL.
53. Per contra, learned counsel appearing
for KPL submitted, as the offending clause in the scheme amounts to transfer of
interest in the user agreement, it is prohibited in law. The Court cannot
accord sanction to a scheme which contains a clause which is forbidden by law.
Therefore, he submits that the said clause to be deleted from the scheme.
54. The
offending clause provides that all the brand/s, trade mark/s, the registered
trade mark/s, and benefits of permitted user agreements of KECL shall be
available to the KSPL to manufacture products being currently manufactured by
the Company so long as KECL holds not less than 51 per cent of the paid up
equity capital of KSPL. It also makes it clear no separate deed or document is
required for such permission and the offending clause itself is to be construed
as such agreement. It also makes it clear that the same is subject to approval
of the scheme by this Court. The said clause proceeds on the assumption that the
Company owns brands, trade marks, registered trade marks and benefits under a
permitted user agreements and the same is sought to be made available to KSPL
under the terms of the scheme for which also approval of the scheme by this
Court is sought for. Therefore, in the present proceedings, what the Court has
to consider is whether that clause is legal and valid and it contravenes any
law for the time being in force. On the face of it, it does not contravene any
provisions of law, but, if as contended by KPL those brands, trade marks, fall
in to their ownership and they have given the same to the Company under a
permitted user agreement and if they are objecting to transfer of those rights
to KSPL, then, the Court has to go into the question whether it is against any
law. The Company has denied the right of KPL, as claimed by them. On the
contrary, they contend that this brands and trade marks belong to them, they
are using it for the last 50 years, it is they who have assigned it in favour
of KPL, without consideration for the benefit of the group, and therefore, KPL
has no right to the same. In view of these disputed facts, in a proceeding
under section 391 of the Act, this Court cannot hold enquiry and go into the
question who is entitled to the ownership of these brands, names and trade
marks. It is totally outside the purview of section 391. However, any sanction
to be accorded by this Court to the scheme cannot be construed as taking away
the right of KPL, if they have any. Therefore, to that extent, the interest of
KPL has to be protected. Therefore, it is made clear that this order of
sanctioning the scheme by this Court would in no way effect the
rights/interests of KPL to the brand name, trade mark or user agreement of
theirs. It is always open to them to initiate appropriate legal proceedings
either in the Civil Court or before appropriate forum to protect their rights
in respect of brand name, trade mark, etc. If any such proceedings are
initiated, those authorities who are empowered to decide shall decide those
rights independently on merits and in accordance with law without in any way
being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order
and the sanctioning of the scheme by this court would in no way put fetters on
the power of the Court or the forum to go into these disputed questions. It
will not be open to the Company to contend in those proceedings that as the
scheme containing the aforesaid offending clause is approved by this Court,
those authorities cannot go into the legality or validity of those
transactions. Therefore, with this reservation the interest of KPL is fully
protected and the said objection cannot come in the way of sanctioning of the
scheme by this Court and sanctioning of the scheme would not amount to contravening
the provisions of the Trade Marks Act.
55.
Regarding Point No. (iv)
The fourth
objection pertains to the modifications sought by ICICI Limited. Under the
terms of the scheme, ICICI Limited, which is one of the secured creditors is to
be given 56 per cent of the equity share capital in the Special Performance
Vehicle while other creditors to together will hold 43 per cent of the shares
and 1 per cent would be held by Residual KEC. When the said scheme was put to
vote at the meeting of the creditors of the Company on 26-4-2002, ICICI Limited
was to be allotted the aforesaid 56 per cent of the equity shares. However,
subsequent thereto by the approval granted by the Reserve Bank of India on
2-5-2002, ICICI Limited has been merged with ICICI Bank. ICICI Bank is now
governed by the Regulations (which governs Banking Companies) under the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949. Section 19(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949,
stipulates that a banking company cannot hold shares in any company, whether as
pledge, mortgagee or an absolute owners thereon, for an amount exceeding 30 per
cent of the paid up share capital of the Company or 30 per cent of its own paid
up share capital and reserves. In the light of the said subsequent event and
the legal position and in view of the accounting standards and norms required
to be maintained by it, it has become essential that the above scheme be
modified by additionally permitting the ICICI Bank Limited to hold up to 19 per
cent of the share holding in the SPV by themselves and by permitting ICICI Bank
Limited to nominate such person or persons as they may deem appropriate for the
allotment and for holding the remaining shares in the SPV such that their
shareholding and their nominee put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholdings to which ICICI Bank Limited is
entitled under the scheme. The Company has no objection for the proposed
modification by the secured creditor. Accordingly, the scheme stands modified
enabling the ICICI Bank Limited to hold 19 per cent of the shareholding in the
SPV by themselves and in their names and further to nominate such person or
persons, as they may deem fit, to hold the shareholding in the SPV, such that
their shareholding put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholdings
to which they are entitled under the scheme. To this extent, the terms of the
scheme stands modified.
56.
Regarding Point No. (v) :
The State Bank
of Travancore opposing the scheme contends that the Company is due in a sum of Rs.
1,030.98 lakhs and the same has been treated as a Non Performing Assets; the
Company is heavily indebted; the Company is not able to service its debts for a
long time; even after the proposed restructuring, it is not possible for the
Company to service the debts and the proposed scheme will only postpone the
repayment; the valuable real estate of the Company in Bangalore is proposed to
be sold as part of the arrangement which will substantially dilute the level of
the security for the facilities proposed to be extended to RMG and residual
KECL entities; the Company has been incurring losses for a long time and
shifting of units away from Bangalore cannot make the operations profitable;
even after clearing of Rs. 312 lakhs as proposed in the scheme, remaining Fund
Based Exposure of Rs. 697 lakhs will remain a Non Performing Asset, which
position is not acceptable to them; the restruc-turing will also mean that the
Banks will have to provide further non-fund based facility; they made it very
clear that they are no willing to assume further exposure and therefore, they
have sought for rejection of the scheme.
57. The
Company has filed its reply. It is contended by the Company that the shifting of
the operations of the Bangalore Unit to a new location is necessary to make
available the real estate at the existing unit for paying off the debts in
Special Purpose Vehicle. The shifting will also improve the operational
efficiencies as common processes will be integrated and shared. The units of
Mysore, Hubli and Tumkur will continue at the existing locations. Under the
scheme, the Bank is given first pari
passu charge for Rs. 555 lakhs on the fixed assets and a second pari passu charge on the current
assets and for the balance amount it will have a first pari passu charge on the current assets and second pari passu charge on fixed assets.
Since Debt Servicing Capital Ratio is at acceptable level and RMG and residual
KECL both are profitable companies, account of the Bank will not be a Non
Performing Asset. It was also submitted that the Company has not sought for any
higher non-fund based facility than the sanctioned existing limits. Thus, the
Bank’s interest remain unaffected and are in fact better protected and as such
there is no legally justifiable reason for the Bank to object the scheme.
58. The
Bank is one of the secured creditors. All that the secured creditor would be
interested is in repayment of the loan borrowed by the Company. The scheme envisages
repayment of 312 lakhs immediately after the sale of land at Bangalore. In so
far the balance amount is concerned, the Bank is given first pari passu charge for Rs. 555 lakhs
on the fixed assets and a second pari
passu charge on current assets and for the balance amount, it will have
a first pari passu charge on
the current assets and a second pari
passu charge on fixed assets. Thus, the interest of the Bank is
completely taken care of. If the Company is wound up, the Bank being a second
charge holder, is not sure of getting back its full money having regard to the
extent of liability of the Company. Moreover, the time to be consumed for such
payment is unpredictable. Insofar as their objection regarding shifting of the
unit and objection to the sale of the Bangalore property is concerned, they
cannot have any say in this matter. The proprietary and the merits of the
compromise or arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sub juris with their open eyes and
fully informed about the pros and cons
of the scheme arrive at their own reasoned judgment and agree to be bound by
such compromise or arrangement. The Court cannot therefore undertake the
exercise of scrutinizing the scheme placed for its sanction with a view to
finding out whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the parties.
This exercise remains only for the parties and is in the realm of commercial
democracy permeating the activities of the concerned creditors and members of
the Company who in their best commercial and economic interest by majority
agree to give green signal to a compromise or arrangement. In the instant case,
a consortium of 22 financial institutions has been formed under the scheme for
the purpose of selling the assets of the Company and for discharge of the liability
of the Company. When these secured creditors have approved the scheme, where
under the property of the Company will be sold and the mode of utilizing the
said sale proceeds is reasonable and in the best interest of the Company,
objection by one such financial institution do not carry much weight, as the
interest of State Bank of Travancore is also taken care of and is fully
protected. I do not find any substance in the said objections raised by the
Bank. As such, the same is rejected.
59.
From the aforesaid discussions, it becomes clear that all the three Companies
involved in this scheme of reconstruction have complied with the legal
requirements of section 391(1)(a)
of the Act inasmuch as all of them have called the meetings of the shareholders
and creditors of the Company and placed before them the scheme for approval.
Further, the material on record discloses that the shareholders and creditors
of the Company have approved the aforesaid scheme by the requisite
three-fourths majority as required under section 391(2) of the Act. In fact, no
shareholder or creditor of the Company has complained either in the aforesaid
meetings or before this Court that the scheme which is now approved is adverse
to their interest and that their interest is not taken care of by the majority
while approving the resolution. The proposed scheme is not found to be
violative of any provisions of law nor is it contrary to public policy. The
members and the creditors of the Companies have acted bona fide and in good faith and not coercing the minority in
order to promote any interest adverse to that of the latter. The interest of
Kirloskar Proprietary Limited is taken care of making it clear that the
sanction of the scheme by this court could in no way affect their rights. The
modifications suggested by ICICI Bank has not been opposed by the Companies, as
such, the scheme stands modified to the extent of the modifications suggested
by ICICI Bank. The interest of the secured creditor, namely, the State Bank of
Travancore is fully taken care of by making a provision for the repayment of
the loan to the extent of Rs. 312 lakhs and providing sufficient security for
the remaining 555 lakhs and other amounts due to them from the Company. It is
also to be taken note of here that the matter is before the BIFR. The Board is
unable to rehabilitate this Company. It is in that context, at their
suggestion, the Company has come forward with the scheme to rehabilitate and
restructure the Company to the satisfaction of all the members, creditors and
workforce. The only alternative for the scheme is winding up of the Company, in
which event, neither the creditors nor the members nor the workmen would be
benefited.
60.
Broadly speaking, the scheme contemplates that the value of the large real estate
assets belongs to the Company, the land and building in Malleswaram at
Bangalore will have to be unlocked upon implementation of operational
restructuring. The real estate value can be suitably leveraged for reducing the
debt burden on manufacturing operations. An asset sale committee has been
constituted comprising of one representative each from the participating
institutions/banks and one from the Company. The sale of any asset of SPV shall
be with the approval of members representing minimum of 75 per cent in value of
the total loan outstanding at any point of time in SPV. The sale proceeds shall
be appropriated first to meet cost of VRS, cost of shifting operations from the
existing locations etc. The amount remaining thereafter shall be utilised for
payment to lenders in SPV proportionately. The entire overdue compound
interest, penal interest and liquidated damages has been waived of by all the
secured creditors. RMG undertakes to engage on and from the effective date all
permanent employees of KECL engaged in its RMG on the same terms and conditions
on which they are employed as on the effective date by KECL without any
interruption of services as a result of the transfer. RMG agrees that the
services of all such employees with KECL up to the effective date shall be
taken into account for purposes of all retirement benefits including
retrenchment compensation to which they may be eligible in KECL on the
effective date. However, such of the employees who would not accept the
transfer and those who are found surplus will accept voluntary retirement as
per the Rules of the Company. That is how the interest of the workforce is
taken care of under the scheme. The secured creditors having come forward to
waive of all the compound interest, penal interest and liquidated damages have
shown their eagerness to participate and assist the Company in restructuring,
so that the money lent by them can be recovered. Therefore, all the secured
creditors have been associated in the asset sale committee which is entrusted
with the responsibility of selling the assets of the Company and utilizing the
proceeds and appropriating the same towards discharge of the debts due to them
by the Company. A portion of the amounts due to them is sought to be adjusted
by allotment of equity to those secured creditors. Thus, the interest of the
creditors have been taken care of completely under the scheme. Insofar as the
interest of the shareholders are concerned, if restructuring of the Company is
not done, the only option is winding up of the Company in which event
shareholders interest is completely ruined. On the contrary, if the scheme is
worked out, they stand to gain, the Company will be fully functioning and their
interest is protected, and, therefore, they cannot have any grievance
whatsoever. In fact, the shareholders and creditors of the transferee companies
have unanimously approved the scheme.
61.
Therefore, taking into consideration all circumstances of the case, an
opportunity is to be given to the Company to restructure the Company as
suggested in the scheme which would be beneficial for one and all. As a whole,
the scheme is just, fair and reasonable. It is not open to this court to
undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme with a view to find out
whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the parties. When the
creditors and members of the Company, who in their best commercial and economic
interest by a majority agree and approve the scheme, the discretion of this
court is to be exercised in approving such a scheme. Under these circumstances,
I am satisfied that the scheme is fair, just, bona fide, honest and it takes into consideration the interest
of the members, the creditors, the workmen and this is the best that could be
done under the circumstances and the only mode in which winding up of the
Company could be prevented.
Accordingly, I
pass the following :
Order
All the three
Company Petitions are allowed.
This Court
doth hereby sanction the arrangement set forth in the scheme produced as
Annexure O to the petitions and doth hereby declare the same to be binding on
all the creditors, members of the petitioner-Companies and also on the
companies subject to the following modifications :
(a) the ICICI
Bank Limited is permitted to hold upto 19 per cent of the shareholding in the
SPV by themselves and they are permitted to nominate such person or persons as
they may deem appropriate for the allotment and for holding the remaining
shares in the SPV to the extent of 37 per cent so that their shareholding and
their nominees put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholding to
which ICICI Bank Limited is entitled under the scheme; and
(b) the
sanctioning of the scheme by this court would in no way affect the
rights/interest of the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited to the brand name, trade
mark or user agreement of theirs, if they have any. It is always open to them
to initiate appropriate legal proceedings to protect their rights in respect of
brand name, trade mark etc. If any proceedings are initiated, the authorities
before whom such rights are agitated are empowered to decide those rights
independently on merits and in accordance with law without in any way being
influenced by any of the observations made by this court in this order. It is
made clear that the sanctioning of the scheme by this Court would in no way put
fetters on the powers of such authorities to go into those disputed questions.
The Companies do file with the Registrar of
Companies a certified copy of this order within thirty days from this day.
[2003] 43 SCL 186
(Kar.)
N.
KUMAR, J.
COMPANY
PETITION NOS. 97, 270 and 271 OF 2002
FEBRUARY
13, 2003
Section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, read with
section 19(2) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 - Compromise and arrangement
- Whether Court cannot act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over
informed view of concerned parties to compromise as same would be in realm of
corporate and commercial wisdom of parties - Held, yes - Whether, though
convening of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on Court to accord
sanction of scheme under Act, but when there are different classes of
shareholders as well as creditors of company and if any particular class is
numerically very small and if they on coming to know of scheme voluntarily,
unconditionally, give their consent or approval in writing to such a scheme,
calling such class of members or creditors to a meeting to express their mind
by way of casting vote would not be necessary - Held, yes - Whether Court in
proceeding under section 391 cannot hold enquiry and go into question of
entitlement of brands, names and trademarks and such a matter can be initiated
either in civil court or before appropriate form and sanctioning of scheme
would in no way put fetters on power of Court or forum adjudicating same -
Held, yes - Whether when secured creditors have approved scheme, whereunder
property of company would be sold and mode of utilizing said sale proceeds is
reasonable and in best interest of company, objection by one financial
institution does not carry much weight, as interest of that institution is also
taken care of and is fully protected - Held, yes - Whether, where, proposed
scheme is not found to be violative of any provisions of law nor is it contrary
to public policy and members and creditors of companies has acted bona fide and
in good faith and not coercing minority in order to promote any interest
adverse to that of latter, it is open to Court to scrutinise scheme with a view
to find out whether better scheme could have been adopted by parties - Held, no
Section 177 of the Companies Act, 1956 -
Meeting and proceedings - Voting to be by show of hands in first instance -
Whether voting for or against motion subject to conditions stipulated in vote
is no voting in eye of law - Held, yes - Whether in construing whether a
resolution is passed by three-fourths majority present and voting, what is to
be taken into consideration in calculating majority is not number of persons
present and voting, but number of valid votes polled in such meeting which
includes only votes which are indicating mind of voter for or against
resolution - Held, yes
Facts
In this petition,
the petitioners, namely, KECL being transferor-company and KSPL and BCAL being
transferee-companies sought sanction of proposed scheme of arrangement. The
main objective of said scheme was to address the weakness KECL without relying
on the external debt for funding of rehabilitation needs and to leverage the
internal assets of the company to the extent possible. The KECL convened
meeting of shareholders, secured creditors, unsecured creditors as contemplated
under section 391. Out of 17 members who attended the meeting of secured
creditors 12 members representing 81 per cent in value of total votes, voted
for the scheme unconditionally and 3 secured creditors representing 19 per cent
voted against the said scheme. Two secured creditors voted for the scheme
subject to certain conditions, and, therefore, their votes were held invalid.
The preference shares of the company were held by only one shareholder, viz., IDBI Ltd. No meeting was
convened as such as instead a letter was sent seeking their approval. In reply,
IDBI accepted the scheme subject to modifications. However, they did not
suggest any modification or additions in the scheme. The transferee-companies
also convened the aforesaid meetings and the members and creditors—secured and
unsecured— unanimously approved the scheme.
After
admission of the aforesaid three company petitions, the company was directed to
take out advertisement and also notice was ordered to the Regional Director. In
pursuance of the aforesaid notice, the Regional Director of the Company’s
Affairs filed its statement raising objections that the scheme of arrangement
was approved only by 58.31 per cent of secured creditors of company who were
present and voted in the meeting, which was much below the three-fourths
majority mark. It was also contended that no preference shareholders’ meeting
was held for approval of the scheme and, therefore, legal formalities had not
been completed and complied with as required under section 392. Thus, the
sanction sought for could not be granted.
A company KPL
raised an objection that word trademark ‘Kirloskar’ belonged to them and KECL
was permitted user of the trademark under an agreement which now stood
terminated and, therefore, KECL had no right to transfer said name or trademark
to KSPL under the proposed scheme since it was opposed to provisions of Trade
and Merchandise Act and would affect their interest. Hence, that company sought
for deletion of such offending clause from the scheme.
Another Bank
‘T’ contended that KECL owed a sum in lakhs to the bank and was indebted
heavily and the same had been treated as non-performing assets. Under the
scheme, the estate of the company in Bangalore was proposed to be sold which
would substantially dilute the level of security for the facilities intended to
be extended to the new entities. The restructuring would also mean that the
banks would have to provide further non-fund based facility. And as they were
not willing to assume further exposure, they sought for rejection of the
scheme.
Held
Where a scheme is put forward by a company
for the sanction of the Court, in the first instance, the Court has to direct
holding of meeting of creditors or class of creditors, or members or class of
members who are concerned with such a scheme. Once the majority in number
representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors or
members or class of members, as the case may be, present or voting either in
person or by proxy at such a meeting accord their approval to any compromise or
arrangement, the Court gets jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. Once such a
compromise is sanctioned by the Court, it would be binding on all the creditors
or class of creditors, or members or class of members, as the case may be,
which would also necessarily mean that even on dissenting creditors or class of
creditors or dissenting members or class of members, such sanctioned scheme
would remain binding. [Para 35]
Before sanctioning such a scheme even though
approved by a majority of the concerned creditors or members, the Court has to
be satisfied that the company or any other person moving such an application
for sanction under sub-section (2) of section 391 has disclosed all the
relevant matters mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) of the section. So
far as the meetings of the creditors or members, or their respective classes
for whom the scheme is proposed are concerned, it is enjoined by section
391(1)(a) that the requisite
information as contemplated by the said provision is also required to be placed
for consideration of the concerned voters so that the parties concerned before
whom the scheme is placed for voting can take an informed and objective
decision whether to vote for the scheme or against it. [Para 36]
The Company Court, which is called upon to
sanction such a scheme is not merely to go by the ipse dixit of the majority of the shareholders or
creditors or the respective classes who might have voted in favour of the
scheme with the requisite majority but the Court has to consider the pros
and cons of the scheme with a view to
find out whether, the scheme is fair, just and reasonable and is not contrary
to any provision of law and it does not violate any public policy. No Court of
law would ever countenance any scheme of compromise or arrangement arrived at
between the parties and which might be supported by the requisite majority if
the Court finds that it is a unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is
otherwise unfair and unjust to the class of shareholders or creditors for whom
it is meant. The Court is not to act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost
automatically put its seal of approval on such a scheme being approved by the
majority. [Para 37]
However, the question remained whether the
Court has jurisdiction like an Appellate Authority to minutely scrutinise the
scheme and arrive at an independent conclusion whether the scheme should be
sanctioned or not when the creditors and members have approved the scheme as
required by section 391(2). The Court has to keep in view the commercial wisdom
of the parties to the scheme who have taken an informed decision about the
usefulness and propriety of the scheme by supporting it by requisite majority.
The Court certainly would not act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over
the informed view of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would
be in the realm of corporate and commercial wisdom of the parties. The Court
has neither the expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the
commercial wisdom exercised by the creditors and members of the company who
have ratified the scheme by the requisite majority. To that extent the
jurisdiction of the Company Court is peripheral and supervisory and not
appellate. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Company Court can also be culled
out from the provisions of section 392. The propriety and the merits of the
compromise and arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui
juris with their open eyes and fully
informed about the pros and cons
of the scheme arrive at their own reasonable judgment and agree to be bound by
such a compromise or arrangement. [Para 38]
Sub-section (2) of section 391 requires that
a scheme of compromise or arrangement must be approved by majority of
creditors/members representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class
of creditors, or members or class of members, present and voting either in
person or where proxies are allowed, by proxy. There is no difficulty in
understanding the word ‘present’ as the creditors or members should be
physically present in person or through their proxy in the meeting. The problem
arises in the context of the word ‘voting’. Voting is formal expression of will
or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue
in question. Voting is explained as the expression of one’s will, preference or
choice in regard to the decision to be made by the body as a whole upon any
proposed measure or proceeding. Right to vote means right to exercise the right
in favour or against the motion or resolution. A member present and voting may
remain neutral, indifferent, unbiased or impartial not engaged on either side.
Voting has to be either in the affirmative or negative, i.e., ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the ballot paper or voting
paper. One is not supposed to write anything except putting ‘yes’ or ‘no’
either in favour of the proposition or against the proposition. In addition to
the same, if any suggestion, condition, reservation or stipulation is written
stating that the expression of the will or opinion either for or against the
proposition is subject to those things, then the votes have to be necessarily
treated as invalid or void, as such votes are no votes leading either way. [Para
43]
Voting for or against the motion subject to
the conditions stipulated in the vote is no voting in the eye of law.
Therefore, voting understood in a proper perspective, it could be either in the
affirmative or in the negative, Therefore, in construing whether a resolution
is passed by three-fourths majority present and note, what is to be taken into
consideration in calculating the majority is not the number of persons present
and voting, but the number of valid votes polled in such meeting. The number of
valid votes includes only votes which are indicating the mind of the voter for
or against the resolution. Therefore, by ‘voting’, the mind, intention,
preference of the voter must be clearly expressed. There should not be any
ambiguity and scope for interpretation. It should be clear, unqualified and
pointing. In this context, a voter who is not present at the meeting, who is
present and not voting, present and voting by casting a blank ballot, and
casting a ballot with conditions and stipulations, all stand on the same
footing. It is no ‘voting’ in the eye of law. Therefore, the proper construction
to be placed in calculating whether any resolution is approved or passed by
three-fourths majority present and voting necessarily means the value of the
valid votes and on the basis of the same whether the resolution has been passed
with three-fourths majority. [Paras 43 & 44]
In the instant case, though 17 persons voted
in the meeting, it was found that two secured creditors gave consent to the
scheme subject to certain modifications. Therefore, the Chairman of the meeting
had rightly treated those two ballots as invalid, because the said two
creditors were not expressing their will or opinion in favour of the resolution
unconditionally. The said votes were not votes leading either way and,
therefore, they would not be taken into consideration either for or against the
scheme. Therefore, though 17 persons voted in the said meeting, as the 2 votes
cast were invalid, in order to determine the majority what was to be taken into
considerations was only the value of 15 creditors who voted in the said
meeting. The value of such 15 creditors was 1833959275. The 12 out of the 15
creditors voted for the scheme and the value of those creditors was 1477391975.
The value of the 3 votes cast against the scheme was 356567300. Therefore, it
was clear that the scheme was approved by a majority of 80.56 per cent which
was above the three-fourths majority required under law, as the value of the
valid votes against the scheme was 19.44 per cent. In that view of the matter,
it could not be said that the secured creditors had not approved the scheme by
a three-fourths majority as required under law. [Para 44]
The requirement that the scheme should be
approved by the requisite majority has been held to be directory and not
mandatory. If the company has stopped its business, a large number of employees
and workers have become jobless, plant and machineries have been resting and
losses have been mounting, the scheme presented is a viable alternative even if
the same is not approved by three-fourths majority, Courts have sanctioned such
schemes. Principle underlying the same appears to be that a scheme under
section 391 cannot be regarded as an alternative mode of liquidation; it is
only an alternative to liquidation. [Para 45]
In the instant case, the company had been
declared as a sick industry under the provisions of the Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and having regard to the losses suffered by
them and the money that was required to make the unit viable, no financial
institution or no private entrepreneur had come forward to revive the industry
and the only course left was for the BIFR to recommend to the High Court for
winding-up of the company. In those circumstances, if the company itself with
the assistance of its members and creditors as a whole and with the active
support of the labour put-forth a scheme of reconstruction for revival of the
company and as aforesaid when all the shareholders, unsecured creditors had
approved such a scheme with overwhelming majority and even the secured
creditors as aforesaid had approved the scheme with three-fourths majority of
persons present and who had cast valid votes, the Court could not blindly by
technical interpretation refuse to sanction the scheme on the ground of
non-compliance of section 391(2). [Para 46]
The second objection raised was that no
meeting of the preference shareholders was convened to consider the scheme and
there was no resolution passed approving the said scheme and, therefore, the
requirement of section 391(1) was not complied with. [Para 47]
The meeting contemplated under section 391
is analogous to an extraordinary general meeting of the company inasmuch as
three-fourths majority is required to pass the required resolution. The normal
rule is that the consent of the shareholders where it is unanimous or by a
three-fourths majority must be obtained in a meeting summoned on the orders of
the Court under section 391. That is in accordance with the general principle
that members must act in a general meeting. Inroads have, however, been made on
this formal doctrine. Firstly, the consent of all or virtually all the
shareholders given even outside a meeting is sufficient to comply with the
requirements of a meeting. Secondly, written resolutions instead of those
passed in meeting are capable of being registered, e.g., section 192. Thirdly, the doctrine of
lifting the veil of incorporation and looking at the reality of action of the
members enables the Court to secure the consent of the overwhelming majority of
the shareholders outside the meeting which is sufficient to show that the
resolution is supported by virtually all the members of the company. In these
three ways substantial compliance rather than a formal compliance meets the
requirements of the statute. A third exception to the rule that all the
shareholders of a company must cast their votes in a formally called meeting is
made by the doctrine of acquiescence. If all the shareholders acquiesce in a
certain arrangement, the question of a meeting being called does not arise at
all. [Para 49]
Therefore, it becomes clear that convening
of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on the Court to accord sanction
of a scheme under the Companies Act. But, when there are different classes of
shareholders as well as creditors of the company, if any particular class is
numerically very small and if they on coming to know of the scheme voluntarily,
unconditionally, give their consent or approval for such a scheme, calling such
class of members or creditors to a meeting to express their mind by way of casting
vote would be an empty formality. If a copy of the scheme propounded stating
the terms of the compromise or arrangement and explaining its effects is sent
and acknowledged by that class of members or creditors who are numerically
small and if they give their consent to such a scheme in writing, there is no
necessity in law to convene the meeting of such class of shareholder creditors.
The said consent letter or approval given can be acted upon and is sufficient
to show that they have approved the scheme. [Para 49]
In this context, in the facts of the case,
it was not in dispute the entire preference shares in the company were held by
IDBI. By a letter, the company brought to the notice of the IDBI the aforesaid
scheme and further informed that as they were the only preference shareholder,
no separate meeting of preference shareholders had been convened and therefore
IDBI was requested to convey their approval or otherwise to the proposed
scheme. Along with the said letter, a copy of the scheme was also sent for
reference. IDBI agreed with the scheme of arrangement saying that
modifications, if any, would be stipulated by them in the Court itself.
However, the IDBI did not stipulate any modifications or additional conditions.
The hearing of the company petition had been duly notified in the newspaper and
the IDBI did not appear before the Court to suggest any modifications or to
impose any additional conditions before the High Court. Under these
circumstances, when the sole preferential shareholder had given their consent
in writing approving the scheme even before convening of the meeting and had
not opposed the scheme at the hearing before the Court, it was obvious that
they had also approved the scheme proposed by the company. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that the company had not complied with the
legal requirement of holding a meeting of the preferential shareholder. Thus,
the company had complied with section 391(1). [Para 50]
The third objection was raised by KPL
regarding a clause on use of trademark, contained in the scheme of arrangement.
[Para 51]
The offending clause provided that all the
brand trade mark/s, the registered trade mark/s, and benefits of permitted user
agreements of the petitioner-company would be available to the KSPL to
manufacture products being currently manufactured by the company so long as new
company held not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of KSPL.
It also made it clear that no separate deed or document was required for such
permission and the offending clause itself was to be construed as such
agreement. It also made it clear that the same was subject to approval of the
scheme by the High Court. The said clause proceeded on the assumption that the
company owned brands, trade marks, registered trade marks and benefits under a
permitted user agreement and the same was sought to be made available to KSPL
under the terms of the scheme for which also approval of the scheme by the
Court was sought for. Therefore, in the instant proceedings, what the Court had
to consider was whether that clause was legal and valid and it contravened any
law for the time being in force. On the face of it, it did not contravene any
provisions of law, but, if as contended by KPL, those brands, trade marks, fell
into their ownership and they had given the same to the company under a
permitted user agreement and if they were objecting to transfer of those rights
to KSPL, then, the Court had to go into the question whether it was against any
law. [Para 54]
In view of the disputed facts, in a
proceeding under section 391, the Court could not hold enquiry and go into the
question as to who was entitled to the ownership of those brands, names and
trade marks. It was totally outside the purview of section 391. However, any sanction
to be accorded by the Court to the scheme could not be construed as taking away
the right of KPL, if they had any. Therefore, to that extent, the interest of
KPL had to be protected. Therefore, it was made clear that the order of
sanctioning the scheme by the Court would in no way affect the rights/interests
of KPL in respect of the brand name, trade mark or user agreement of theirs. It
was always open to them to initiate appropriate legal proceedings either in the
civil court or before appropriate forum to protect their rights in respect of
brand name, trade mark, etc. If any such proceedings were initiated, the
authorities who were empowered to decide shall decide the rights independently
on merits and in accordance with law without in any way being influenced by any
of the observations made by the Court in its order and the sanctioning of the
scheme by the Court would in no way put fetters on the power of the Court or
the forum to go into these disputed questions. It would not be open to the
company to contend in the proceedings that as the scheme containing the
aforesaid offending clause was approved by the Court, the authorities could not
go into the legality or validity of those transactions. [Para 54]
Therefore, with that reservation the
interest of KPL was fully protected and the said objection could not come in
the way of sanctioning of the scheme by the High Court and sanctioning of the
scheme would not amount to contravening the provisions of the Trade Marks Act,
1999. [Para 54]
Sofar as the contention of Bank ‘T’ that if
the proposed scheme was sanctioned, their interest in company as second charge
creditors would suffer, was concerned, the bank ‘T’ was one of the secured
creditors. All that the secured creditor would be interested in was in repayment
of the loan borrowed by the company. The scheme envisaged repayment of 312
lakhs immediately after the sale of land. Insofar the balance amount was
concerned, the bank was given first pari passu charge for Rs. 555 lakhs on the fixed assets and a second pari
passu charge on current assets and for
the balance amount, if would have a first pari passu charge on the current assets and a second pari
passu charge on fixed assets. Thus, the
interest of the bank was completely taken care of. If the company was wound up,
the bank being a second charge holder, was not sure of getting back its full
money having regard to the extent of liability of the company. Moreover, the
time to be consumed for such payment was unpredictable. Insofar as their
objection regarding shifting of the unit and objection to the sale of the
property was concerned, they could not have any say in such matter. The
propriety and the merits of the compromise or arrangement has to be judged by
the parties who as sul juris
with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the scheme arrive at their own reasoned
judgment and agree to be bound by such compromise or arrangement. The Court
could not, therefore, undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme placed
for its sanction with a view to finding out whether a better scheme could have
been adopted by the parties. [Para 58]
This exercise remains only for the parties and
is in the realm of commercial democracy permeating the activities of the
concerned creditors and members of the company who in their best commercial and
economic interest by majority agree to give green signal to a compromise or
arrangement. In the instant case, a consortium of 22 financial institutions had
been formed under the scheme for the purpose of selling the assets of the
company and for discharge of the liability of the company. When secured
creditors had approved the scheme, whereunder the property of the company would
be sold and the mode of utilizing the said sale proceeds was reasonable and in
the best interest of the company, objection by one such financial institution
did not carry much weight, as the interest of Bank T was also taken care of and
was fully protected. There was no substance in the said objections raised by
the bank. As such, the same was rejected. [Para 58]
From the aforesaid discussions, it became
clear that all the three companies involved in the scheme of reconstruction had
complied with the legal requirements of section 391(1)(a) inasmuch as all of them had called the
meetings of the shareholders and creditors of the company and placed before
them the scheme for approval. Further, the material on record disclosed that
the shareholders and creditors of the company had approved the aforesaid scheme
by the requisite three-fourths majority as required under section 391(2). In
fact, no shareholder or creditor of the company had complained either in the
aforesaid meetings or before the Court that the scheme which was approved
adverse to their interest and that their interest was not taken care of by the
majority while approving the resolution. The proposed scheme was not found to
be violative of any provisions of law nor was it contrary to public policy. The
members and the creditors of the companies had acted bona fide and in good faith and not coercing the
minority in order to promote any interest adverse to the latter. [Para
59]
It was to be taken note of that the matter
was before the BIFR. The BIFR was unable to rehabilitate the company. It was,
in that context, at their suggestion, the company had come forward with the
scheme to rehabilitate and restructure the company to the satisfaction of all
the members, creditors and workforce. The only alternative to the scheme was
winding- up of the company, in which event, neither the creditors nor the
members and the workmen would be benefited. [Para 59]
Therefore, taking into consideration all
circumstances of the case, an opportunity was to be given to the company to
restructure the company as suggested in the scheme which would be beneficial
for one and all. As a whole, the scheme was just, fair and reasonable. It was
not open to the Court to undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme with
a view to find out whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the
parties. When the creditors and members of the company, who in their best
commercial and economic interest by a majority, agree and approve the scheme,
the discretion of the Court is to be exercised in approving such a scheme.
Under these circumstances, the scheme was fair, just, bona fide, honest and it took into consideration the
interest of the members, the creditors, the workmen and that was the best that
could be done under the circumstances and was the only mode in which winding-up
of the company could be prevented. [Para 61]
Cases referred to
Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC
506 (para 39) and Arvind Mills Ltd.
[2002] 111 Comp. Cas. 118 (para 44).
K.G.
Raghavan for ICICI, Udaya
Holla for objector Cauvery Gears
Pvt. Ltd.; R.B. Deshpande for
Objector R.P. Enterprises; Vishwanath Shendge, ACGSC, for ROC; H.S. Srinivasa
Murthy for applicant in CA
793/2002-Opposing Creditor. Samarthna Associates for objector.
Order
1.
Company Petition No. 97/2002 is filed by Kirloskar Electric Company Ltd. to
obtain sanction of this Court to the scheme of arrangement whereby the Company
may be restructured by addressing its weaknesses and by leveraging the internal
assets of the Company, to reduce outside liabilities on manufacturing
operations, rationalise the debt burden on manufacturing units to long term
sustaining level, rationalise the work force and bring the employee cost in
line with the industry norms, restore bankability of business units and achieve
long term viability under given economic and industry scenario.
2.
Under the scheme of arrangement, the petitioner-Company, namely, Kirloskar
Electric Company Limited, would be the transferor Company and the Kaytee
Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. and Best Trading and Agencies Limited, are the transferee
companies. For the purpose of brevity, Kirloskar Electric Company Limited is
referred to as the ‘Company’ or (KECL) in this order.
3. The
petitioner-Company was incorporated as a Public Limited Company on 26-7-1946
under the Mysore Companies Act at Bangalore having its registered office at
industrial Suburb, Rajajinagar, Bangalore-10. The authorised share capital of
the Company is Rs. 700,000,000 (Rupees Seven Hundred Million) divided into
40,000,000 (Forty Million) Equity shares of Rs. 10.00 each and 3,000,000 (three
Million) preference shares of Rs. 100.00 each. The issued, subscribed and
paid-up share capital is Rs. 25,268,817 (twenty five million two hundred and
sixty eight thousand eight hundred and seventeen) Equity Shares of Rs. 10.00
each and 1,800,000 (One million eight hundred thousand) Preference Shares of
Rs. 100.00 each.
4. The
object of the Company is to manufacture electric apparatus and appliances
required for or capable of being used in connection with the generation,
distribution, supply, accumulation and employment of electricity, produce a
wide range of electricity motors, alternators, traction equipment, rotating
machines, transformers, switch gears, voltage regulators, industrial
electronics, automotive controls, etc., and other manufacturing activity as set
out in the Memorandum and Articles of Association.
5. The
petitioner-Company has various manufacturing and other units at eleven places,
they are :
Unit |
Products |
Location |
Unit-1 |
Extra Large, Large and |
Bangalore |
|
Medium AC Motors/Generators |
|
Unit-2 |
Medium and Small AC Motors/ |
Hubli |
|
Generators |
|
Unit-3 |
DC machines, Traction |
Bangalore |
|
equipment |
|
Unit-4 |
Industrial Electronics |
Mysore |
Unit-5 |
Transformers |
Bangalore |
Unit-7 |
Components for medium and small
AC motors |
Tumkur |
Unit-10 |
Switchgears |
Hebbal |
Unit-12 |
Spares Division |
Bangalore |
PSG |
Projects & Systems Group |
Bangalore |
REG |
Renewable Energy Group (Wind
Mills) |
Karnataka and |
|
|
Tamil Nadu |
6. The
petitioner-Company has a dominant market position in large and medium sized rotating
machines and traction equipments and over the years it has built reputation and
the Company enjoys goodwill in the domestic and foreign markets and the Company
was having sound financial position till about 1997-98. The Company’s
profitability started getting affected from 1998-99 onwards on account of the
recession in capital goods industry, downturn of infrastructure and core
sectors, which are generally the end-users of the Company’s products. The other
factors which lead to the decline in profitability are high level of debt,
excess labour force and high employee cost, high interest cost, high level of
receivables, continuing large losses, continuing poor financial situation and
threat of legal cases from creditors/statutory authorities. Therefore, the
Board of Directors of the petitioner-company felt that unless the debt of the
Company is restructured the survival of the Company will be jeopardized. The
main objective of the restructuring is to address the weakness of the Company
without relying on the external debt for funding of rehabilitation needs and to
leverage the internal assets of the Company to the extent possible. Further,
they want to rationalize the workforce and bring the employee cost in line with
industry norms, restore bankability of business units, achieve long term
viability under given economic and industry scenario, achieve positive net
worth situation as early as possible and keep options open for future
possibilities of Joint Venture with Strategic Partners. Therefore, a detailed
technical feasibility report for relocation and consolidation of manufacturing
facilities has been made by the technical team of the petitioner-Company. The
manufacturing Unit for large motors/generators (part of Unit-1) and DC machines
and Traction equipment (Unit-3) will be consolidated at a new location to
derive advantages of sharing of common facilities, minimizing material flow,
higher productivity and reduction of employee costs. In this connection, ICICI
(lead Institution) at the request of consortium of Banks and term lenders has
obtained report from an independent technical consultant, who has confirmed the
feasibility and rationale of relocation as proposed in the scheme. Therefore,
they have formulated a scheme of arrangement between the petitioner-company and
its members and creditors which is produced at Annexure-B.
7. In
terms of the scheme, with a view to consolidate the production facility, to
reduce overheads and to unlock the real asset value at Bangalore the following
operational restructuring is proposed :
- Shift unit (1) (AC Machines - Small and Medium Plant) from
Bangalore to Hubli.
- Shift Unit 1 (AC Machines - Large and Extra Large Plant) from
Bangalore to a new location near Bangalore.
- Shift Unit 3 (DC Machines and Traction Plant) from Bangalore to a
new location near Bangalore.
- Shift Unit 5 (Transformers Plant) from Bangalore to Mysore.
- Shift Unit 10 (Switchgear Plant) from Hebbal, Bangalore to Mysore.
- Shift PSG from Bangalore to Mysore.
Subsequent to
such operational restructuring, there will be two Business Groups namely (i) Rotating Machine Group (RMG) at
Hubli/New Locations near Bangalore, Tumkur. Spares Division in Bangalore and
Wind Mills (REG) in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and (ii) Static Equipment Group (SEG) at Mysore. The rationale for
segregation into the two business groups is to consolidate operations based on
the respective synergies and to develop the vehicle for exploring the joint
venture/strategic alliance for the Rotating Machine Group.
8.
Under the scheme, three entities are created to manage the existing assets of
KECL, they are :
(i) “Rotating Machine Group”
(RMG) means the following businesses being hived off to Kaytee Switchgear
Private Limited:
(a) Extra Large and Large
AC Motors/Generators
(Unit-1) at New Location near Bangalore.
(b) Medium and Small AC
Motors/Generators (Unit-2) at Hubli.
(c) DC Machines &
Traction (Unit-3) at New Location near Bangalore.
(d) Component Unit
(Unit-7) at Tumkur.
(e) Spares Division
(Unit-12) at Bangalore, and
(f) Renewable Energy
Group (REG) at Existing locations.
(ii) “Static
Equipments Group” (SEG) means the following businesses which will remain with
residual KECL:
(a) Industrial
Electronics (Unit-4) at Mysore
(b) Transformers (Unit-5)
at Bangalore to be shifted to Mysore
(c) Switchgears (Unit-10)
at Bangalore to be shifted to Mysore, and
(d) Projects and Systems
Group (PSG) (Unit-1) to be shifted to Mysore.
(iii) “Special
Purpose Vehicle” (SPV) means an entity to which the non-manufacturing surplus
assets and real estate to KECL will be transferred for liquidating/repayment of
secured creditors liabilities and Statutory and other dues of the KEC. Best
Trading & Agencies Limited (BCAL), a subsidiary company of KECL,
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is the entity identified for this
purpose.
The other
entities which are relevant is as under :
(i) “KEC-1” means the
“Rotating Machine Group” or Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited (KSPL)
(ii) “Residual
KEC” means the Company remaining after transfer of assets and liabilities to
KEC-1 and SPV and
(iii) “New
Location” means the new location for shifting of the existing plant at Unit-1
and Unit-3 as may be deemed fit by the management.
9. With
effect from the appointed date, KECL will be de-merged/hived off into three
entities so as to achieve the objectives of restructuring :
(a) Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to leverage Non-manufacturing Surplus Assets and real
estate.
(b) KEC-1:
(Hubli, New Location near Bangalore, Tumkur, Spares Division and REG in
existing locations) called the Rotating Machine Group.
(c) Residual KEC
: Unit 4 (Electronics,) Unit 5 (Transformer), unit 10 (Switchgear), and PSG.
(i) Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV)
SPV will be carved
out of KECL to comprise of surplus non-manufacturing and liquid assets such as
real estate at Bangalore (other than a part of the land retained in residual
KECL), Peenya, Pune and surplus machinery and group company advances and
receivables. The total realizable amount from sale of such assets is estimated
at Rs. 14,855 lakhs (net of cost of sales). The liabilities of secured lenders
to extent of Rs. 12,159 lakhs besides other liabilities of Rs. 2,698 lakhs
(including VRS, cost of shifting etc.) will also be transferred to SPV. The proceeds
from sale of SPV’s assets will be utilized towards payments of its liabilities.
The surplus assets transferred to SPV will have assured realization within time
frame of about 18-36 months. Securitisation of such surplus assets will ensure
repayment of major part of the existing term liabilities.
The details of
assets to be transferred to SPV and amount of liabilities to be assigned are
given below :—
Liabilities |
Assets |
||
Rs. in lakhs |
Rs. in lakhs
|
||
Equity to ICICI/NCD |
1 |
Property at Malleswaram* |
11,600 |
holders & Residual |
|
Land and Buildg. at Pune |
200 |
KEC |
|
Property at Peenya |
800 |
Liabilities of Term |
|
Surplus m/c |
612 |
Lenders |
9,223 |
Group advances |
1,191 |
Liabilities of Banks |
|
Group company recoveries |
762 |
(WCTL) |
2,935 |
|
|
Other Liabilities |
|
Less : Cost of Sales |
310 |
- VRS (part) |
2,346 |
|
|
- Cost of Shifting |
350 |
|
|
Total Liabilities |
14,855 |
Total Assets |
14,855 |
*Excludes part of
the land retained in the Residual KEC :
The valuation of
assets to be transferred to SPV is taken on the basis of Current Fair Market
Value (FMV) of assets, with a view to facilitate the scheme, the charge holders
will concede proportionate representation in the SPV to all the secured lenders
irrespective of their existing charge position on the assets being transferred
to SPV. The detailed break-up of liabilities of individual lenders to be
transferred to SPV is given in the Annexure 1, to the scheme.
Residual KEC will
hold the initial equity capital of SPV to the extent of 1% and the existing
charge holders i.e., ICICI and
NCD holders will hold the balance of 99 per cent of the equity in the
proportion of their existing outstandings.
An asset sale
committed will be constituted comprising of one representative each from the
participating institutions/banks and one from KEC. The sale of any asset of SPV
shall be with the approval of the members representing minimum of 75% in value
of the total loan outstandings at any point of time in SPV.
The sale proceeds
shall be appropriated first to meet cost of VRS, cost of shifting operations
from the existing locations, etc. The amount remaining thereafter shall be
utilized for payment to lenders in SPV proportionately.
No rent or other
charges shall be payable to SPV by KECL or RMG from the appointed date to the
date of vacation of the Malleswaram property. KECL and RMG shall vacate the
premises within 9 (nine) months from the date of receipt of Rs. 2,696 lakhs
from SPV towards the cost of shifting and voluntary retirement expenses.
(ii) KEC-1 (RMG)
KEC-1 will be
Rotating Machine Group (RMG) with a business valuation of Rs. 19,000 lakhs on
the basis of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method. The fixed assets of RMG
together with current assets and current liabilities will be transferred to
Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited. This Company will be assigned liabilities of
Rs. 19,000 lakhs as under :—
Particulars |
Rs. in
lakhs |
Equity to KECL |
5,292 |
Equity to lenders of KEC (in lieu of) |
|
Conversion of KECL (liabilities) |
1,308 |
Net worth |
6,600 |
Assignment (Transfer) of Liabilities of KECL to Rmg |
|
i. Balance of Term Debt of secured term
lenders and FITL |
6,741 |
ii. WCTL to Banks |
1,297 |
Sub Total |
8,038 |
Working Capital of Banks |
3,362 |
Overdue sundry Creditors |
1,000 |
Grant Total |
19,000 |
The break up of
liabilities being transferred to KEC-1 (RMG) is given in Annexure-1.
The secured lenders will
be allotted equity to the extent of 29% of the Company at Rs. 20.50 per share
(inclusive of premium of Rs. 10.50) towards conversion of their dues, while
balance 71 per cent will be allotted to Residual KEC at Rs. 33.88 per share (inclusive
of a premium of Rs. 23.88). No party (Financial institutions/Banks or KECL)
shall dispose of the shares held in RMG without the written consent of others,
for a minimum period of three years from the date of allotment.
The assigned term debt
and WCTL would be paid-off within a period of 8 years and the estimated cash
generation of KEC-1 would ensure acceptable level of average Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR). Term Lenders in RMG will have an option to convert upto
10 per cent of their dues in RMG to normal working capital Loan. In the event
of such conversion, the corresponding amount of normal working capital of banks
will be converted to WCTL.
(iii) Residual
KECL - (SEG):
The residual Company
after transferring the assets to SPV and RMG will essentially be Static
Equipments Group (SEG). The residual liabilities in this Company will be mainly
preference shares of Rs. 1200 lakhs, unpaid dividend on preference shares of
Rs. 494 lakhs, WCTL of Banks of Rs. 986 lakhs besides normal working capital
within Drawing Power (DP) of Rs. 858 lakhs.
The promoter
stakeholders shall bring in a sum of Rs. 800 lakhs as equity in residual KEC
over a period of two years from the effective date for meeting the
restructuring funding needs for which residual KEC would make a preferential
issue of equity to the promoter stakeholders at a price of Rs. 30 per share
(inclusive of a premium of Rs. 20).
The Term debts retained
in Residual KEC would be paid off within a period of 9 years and the estimated
cash generations of the company would ensure acceptable level of Average-Debt
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR).
According to the scheme,
the manufacturing operations of the main plant in Bangalore have to be shifted
and the premises vacated. Certain expenditure like payments towards Statutory
dues, workers’ dues, part of cost of VRS, purchase of land at the new location,
construction of buildings and shifting of the plant and machinery to the new
location, etc., is involved. This requirement of funds has to be met out of the
sale proceeds of the land, as no financial institution/Bank is willing to
advance fresh funds for payment towards such expenditure.
The Company intends to
sell a part of the land measuring about 31000 square metres at the Bangalore
main plant to a party with whom an agreement has been entered into for a sale
price of approximately Rs. 2000 lakhs. The sale proceeds are to be utilised to
meet certain expenditure such as payments towards statutory dues, workers’
dues, part of cost of VRS, purchase of land at the new location, construction
of buildings and shifting of the plant and machinery to the new location etc.
The details of the asset
(part of the Malleswaram land) retained in Residual KEC and amount of
liabilities assigned are given below :
Liabilities |
|
Assets |
|
Existing Liabilities |
Rs. in Lakhs
|
Sale price for |
Rs.
in Lakhs |
CST, Sales Tax, Entry |
|
part of Bangalore |
2000 |
Tax etc. |
302 |
Complex land |
|
Salary Arrears |
446 |
|
|
PF, Income Tax etc., |
133 |
Less : Cost of |
|
Gratuity |
439 |
Sales |
50 |
Total |
1320 |
|
|
Other Liabilities |
|
|
|
VRS (Part) |
180 |
|
|
Cost of Shifting |
450 |
|
|
Total |
630 |
|
|
Total Liabilities |
1950 |
Total Assets |
1950 |
10. The
Company filed C.A. No. 134/2002 under section 391 of the Companies Act
requesting this Court to permit them to convene a meeting of the shareholders,
secured creditors and unsecured creditors for the purpose of considering and, if
thought fit, approving, with or without modifications, the said Scheme of
Arrangement. The said permission was granted by this court by an order dated
14-3-2002. The meeting was held under the Chairmanship of Mr. Vijay R.
Kirloskar. Notices of the meeting were duly advertised in the English daily
“Times of India” and Kannada daily “Prajavani”. The meeting was convened on
26-4-2002 and it was held at the registered office. The Chairman of the meeting
has filed his report. In the said meeting 18 secured creditors of the company
attended the meeting and the total of their debt is Rs. 2,53,36,43,491. The
creditors suggested certain amendments and sought modification of the scheme.
The modified scheme was approved in the said meeting by a majority of 1,47,73,91,975
votes in favour and 35,65,67,300 votes against the said resolution. Out of the
18 secured creditors who attended the meeting 12 secured creditors represented
81 per cent in value of the total votes polled by Secured creditors present and
voting have voted for the scheme unconditionally as against 3 secured creditors
representing 19 per cent voted against the said scheme. Two secured creditors,
Bank of India and Bank of Baroda voted for the scheme subject to certain
conditions. Their approval being conditional, their votes have been held
invalid. All other secured creditors approving the scheme have voted for the
scheme of arrangement unconditionally.
11. The
meeting of the unsecured creditors was attended either personally or by proxy
by 401 unsecured creditors of the company and the total value of their debt is
Rs. 25,29,76,149.07. The scheme was approved by a majority of 24,91,52,868.10
votes against 38,23,280.97 votes.
12. The
meeting of the equity shareholders was attended either personally or by proxy
by 910 equity sharesholders of the company entitled together to 1,42,25,793
equity shares of Rs. 10.00 aggregating to Rs. 14,22,57,930.00. The scheme was
approved by a majority of 1,42,22,428 votes against 424 votes.
13. The
preference shares issued by the company are held by one share- holder only viz., IDBI Limited. No meeting as
such was convened to ascertain their view. Instead by a letter dated 18-4-2002
they were requested to convey their approval or otherwise of the proposed
scheme. In reply thereto by their letter dated 26-7-2002 they stated that in
principle agreement to the company’s demerger proposal is accepted by them
subject to the modification of the scheme or additional conditions, if any, as
may be stipulated by them in the ensuing High Court hearing. However, they have
not suggested any modification or additional condition to be stipulated in the
scheme. Thus, all the legal formalities have been complied with by the
petitioner-company.
14. It
is also pertinent to point out the petitioner-company being a sick company, a
reference has been made under section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 to the BIFR by its application dated 26-3-2002
and the matter is now pending before BIFR.
15.
Thereafter, the petitioner-company sought for sanctioning of the scheme by this
Court. However, this Court by an order dated 22-10-2002 rejected the petition
on the ground that the transferee companies have not sought permission of this
Court for convening the meeting of their shareholders and creditors to consider
and approve the scheme formulated by the petitioner-company and as the scheme
would affect the interest of the members of the said companies. Aggrieved by
the said order the petitioners preferred an appeal in O.S.A. No. 108/2002
before the Division Bench of this Court. On a representation made by the
petitioner-company the transferee companies would make necessary application
under section 391 of the Companies Act seeking permission of the Court to
convene the meeting of their shareholders and creditors and only if the scheme
of arrangement is approved in those meetings their request for sanction of the
scheme could be considered, the order passed by the Company Judge was set aside
and the matter was remanded back to this Court. That is how this petition is
before me.
16. The
transferee Company No. 1 - Kaytee Switchgear Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated on
2-3-1983 at Bangalore under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, having
its registered office at Industrial Suburb Rajajinagar, Bangalore - 560 010.
The main object of this transferee Company is to carry on the business of
manufacturing, processing, formulating, repairing, fitting, erecting, using,
importing, exporting, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in all kinds and
types of Control Gear, Switch Gear, Switches, Staters, Switch Boards, Panels,
Contractors, Push Button Switches, etc. as clearly set down in the Memorandum
and Articles of Association which is produced along with Company Petition No.
270/2002. The authorized share capital of this transferee Company is Rs. 3
Crores and the subscribed capital is Rs. 2,000 divided into 200 equity shares
of Rs. 10 each.
17. The
Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited, the petitioner in COP 270/2002, made an
application in CA 1044/2002 before this Court under section 391 of the
Companies Act seeking permission of this Court to call for the meetings of the
shareholders are creditors of the Company to consider and approve the scheme.
By an order dated 31-10-2002 this Court granted the permission sought for and
directed the meetings of the shareholders and creditors to be held on 1st of
December, 2002. Accordingly, notices were issued to the shareholders and
meeting was held on 1st of December, 2002. The said meeting was attended by two
equity shareholders of the said Company entitled together to 200 shares of the
value of Rs. 2000.00 and the scheme of arrangement was unanimously approved.
The Chairman of the meeting has filed his report. Thereafter, they have filed
COP 270/2002 seeking sanctioning of the scheme.
18. The
transferee Company No. 2 - Best Trading and Agencies Limited was incorporated
on 2-5-1988 in Delhi, as Best Credits Private Limited, under the provisions of
the Companies Act, 1956. Subsequently, vide
a fresh certificate consequent on change of name dated 18-6-1999, it was
incorporated as Best Trading and Agencies Ltd. at Bangalore having its
registered office at Industrial Suburb Rajajinagar, Bangalore. The main object
of the said Company is to carry on the business of agency of all kinds and to
act as traders, dealers, importers, exporters, merchants, wholesalers,
retailers, stockists, distributors and other business as mentioned in the
Memorandum and Articles of Association annexed along with Company Petition No.
271/2002. The authorised share capital of this Company is Rs. 1 Crore and the
subscribed capital is Rs. 1000 divided into 100 equity shares of Rs. 10 each.
19.
Similarly, Best Trading and Agencies Limited, the petitioner in COP 271/2002,
also filed an application in CA No. 1048/2002 under section 391 of the
Companies Act seeking permission of the Court to call for the meeting of the
shareholders and creditors of the company, consider and approve the scheme. By
an order dated 31-10-2002 the permission sought for was granted and the meeting
was directed to be held on 1st December, 2002. Accordingly, the meeting was
held on 1st December, 2002 and the said meeting was attended by four equity
shareholders entitled together to 100 shares to the value of Rs. 1,00,000 and
the shareholders and creditors of the company have unanimously approved the
scheme of arrangement. The Chairman of the meeting has filed his report before
this Court. It is thereafter the present COP 271/2002 is filed for sanctioning
of the scheme.
20. After
admission of the aforesaid three Company Petitions, the Company was directed to
take out advertisement and also notice was ordered to the Regional Director,
Department of Company Affairs, Chennai.
21. In
pursuance of the aforesaid notice, the Regional Director of Company Affairs
appeared and filed his statement of objections. The two main objections raised
are that though the scheme of arrangement was approved by the requisite
majority of unsecured creditors and equity shareholders, it was approved only
by 58.31 per cent of the secured creditors of the said company present and
voting in the meeting with certain modifications. Secondly it was contended
that the entire preference share capital of the Company is held by IDBI. No
preference share- holders meetings was held for approval of the scheme nor the
same was dispensed with by this court nor the Company obtained written consent
of the IDBI in this regard. Therefore, they contend as the legal formalities
have not been complied with as required under section 392 of the Companies Act
the sanction sought for cannot be granted.
22. Yet
another objection is from the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited. They contend that
the word trade mark “Kirloskar” belongs to them: The KECL was the permitted
user of the trade mark “Kirloskar” under an agreement which has been terminated
on 24-1-2001 which termination has been accepted by the said Company.
Therefore, they have no right to transfer the said name or trade mark or the
benefits of the permitted user agreement to Kaytee Switchgear Private Limited.
Not only the same is opposed to the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Act
but also the said property do not belong to them as it belongs to the Kirloskar
Proprietary Limited. If the scheme as propounded by the Company is approved it
would mean that this Court has granted permission for such transfer which is
prohibited by law and it would also affect their interest and therefore they
want Clause (2) in para 3 of the scheme to be deleted.
23. A
reply was filed to the said objections by the KECL contending that the said
dispute is of a civil nature, it cannot be decided in these proceedings. They
contend the word “Kirloskar” and the trade mark “Kirloskar” belongs to them
exclusively. The objectors right to take action against the company on the
ground of alleged violation also remains unaffected and therefore they have
prayed for rejection of the said objections.
24.
Another secured creditors ICICI Bank Limited has filed an application
requesting the Court to modify the scheme by enabling them to hold upto 19 per
cent of the shareholding in the transferee company by themselves and in their
names and further to nominate such person or persons as the applicant may deem
fit to hold the shareholding in the transferee company such that their
shareholding put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholdings to
which the applicant company is entitled to under the scheme. KECL has no
objection for granting the said objection and modifying the scheme accordingly.
25. Yet
another objection is filed by State Bank of Travancore. They contend the
Company owes a sum of Rs. 1,030.98 lakhs to the bank. Under the scheme the
estate of the Company in Bangalore is proposed to be sold. This will
substantially dilute the level of security for the facilities. Even after the
clearing of Rs. 312 lakhs as proposed in the scheme, the remaining Fund Based
Exposure of Rs. 697 lakhs would remain a Non- Performing Asset, which position
is not acceptable to the bank and therefore they have sought for rejection of
the application for sanction.
26. In
reply to the said objection the Company has stated when the scheme has been
approved by the majority of the secured creditors at the instance of one
secured creditor the same cannot be rejected. They further contend the
objector-bank has a second charge on the fixed assets including the real estate
at Bangalore. Its first charge is only on the current assets. But under the
proposed scheme the objector-bank will be getting first pari passu charge on fixed assets and a second pari passu charge on the current
assets for a total amount of Rs. 555.00 lakhs and the first pari passu charge on the current
assets and a second pari passu
charge on fixed assets for Rs. 426.00 lakhs and the balance of Rs. 22.00 lakhs
will be equity. The objector thus gets improved security cover under the
proposed scheme. The sale of real estate at Bangalore will not dilute the
security as contended by the objector but the sale proceeds will be used for
paying off the loans as per the scheme. The remaining security remains intact
and is quite adequate to cover the liabilities assigned to the Rotating Machine
Group as well as the KECL. Therefore, it is submitted that the said objection
has no substance.
27. The
employees of the Kirloskar Electric Company Employees Association have filed an
affidavit stating that the employees have no objection of or sanction of the
scheme. All that has been said in the affidavit is that the management has
mutually agreed with the Union that Voluntary Retirement Scheme will not be
forced on the workmen.
28. The
order passed by the BIFR in case No. 320/2002 of M/s. Kirloskar Electric
Company Limited is also placed on record. It discloses that M/s. Kirloskar
Electric Company Limited has been declared as a sick industrial company in
terms of section 3(1)(o) of the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. They have further
observed that the Company could make the net worth exceed the accumulated
losses within a reasonable period on their own as per the rehabilitation
package to be formulated and submitted by them under section 17(2) of the Act.
Further a direction was issued to the Company to discuss the rehabilitation
package with all secured creditors and other concerned parties and reach an agreement
on the reliefs and concessions envisaged from them. A direction was issued to
the company not to dispose of any fixed asset or current assets of the company
without the consent of the secured creditors and the BIFR and they have issued
other directions in this regard. That is how the petitioner-company has
formulated the scheme and has obtained the approval of the shareholders and the
secured creditors.
29.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner P. Chidambaram, submitted that the
scheme is approved by the shareholders and the creditors by three-fourths
majority present and voting and therefore the legal requirement of section
391(1) of the Act has been complied with. Elaborating the contention, he
submitted, insofar as the secured creditors are concerned, for the purpose of
three-fourths majority what is to be taken into consideration is the total
number of valid votes polled and out of those votes whether the scheme is
approved by three-fourths majority. If a secured creditor is present and has not
voted and if voted the said vote has become invalid, then the said vote cannot
be taken into consideration. Therefore, he submits, the secured creditors who
were present and cast a valid vote have approved the scheme by three-fourths
majority, as such, the legal requirement is complied with. In so far as
preferential shareholders are concerned, the entire preference shares are held
by one secured creditor, namely, IDBI, who have given their consent for the
scheme in writing and therefore non-convening the meeting of the preference
shareholder under the aforesaid circumstances would not vitiate the legal
requirement contemplated under section 391(1) of the Act. Coming to the
objections regarding violation of Trade Mark Act is concerned, he submitted, there
is no transfer of a trade mark involved under the scheme. Even if it amounts to
a transfer, the rights of the Kirloskar Proprietary Concern, which claims to be
the proprietor of the trade mark, would in no way be affected by this Court
according the sanction of the scheme, as the Kirloskar Proprietary Concern
could always initiate legal proceedings to protect their interest, if any, and
while according sanction, this Court may explicitly make this position clear so
as to protect the interest of the Kirloskar Proprietary Concern. Insofar as the
modification suggested by the secured creditors ICICI is concerned, he
submitted, the same can be modified, as it would not in any way affect the
working of the scheme. Insofar as the objection of State Bank of Travancore is
concerned, he submitted, the Bank had only second charge on the property. Now,
under the scheme, they would get a first charge on the property and to this
effect an agreement has been entered into between all the secured creditors
creating a pari passu charge on
the property and therefore the apprehension expressed by the Bank is wholly
misconceived. Therefore, he submitted, as all the legal requirements have been
complied with and the scheme do not contravene any law and it is made with bona fide intention and good faith
and the shareholders, creditors and the workman have given their consent for
sanction of the scheme, there is no impediment for sanction of the scheme.
30. Per contra, Smt. Madumita Bagachi,
learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, submitted if the total
number of votes cast in the secured creditors meeting is taken into
consideration, the scheme is not approved by three-fourths majority of
creditors present and voting, and therefore, there is non-compliance of section
391(2) of the Act. Secondly, she contended, admittedly, no meeting is convened
of the preference shareholders, as such, the legal requirement contemplated
under section 391(1) of the Act is not complied with. Compliance of sections
391(1) and 391(2) of the Act is a condition precedent for the Court considering
sanction of the scheme, as such the scheme cannot be sanctioned.
31.
Learned counsel appearing for Kirloskar Proprietary Limited, submitted, Clause
2 of Part III of the scheme read as a whole provides for transfer of the trade
marks which are permitted to be used by the Company, in favour of the
transferee companies and therefore it violates the provisions of the Trade
Marks Act. Once sanction is granted by this Court, the right to challenge such
assignment would be lost to the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited. Therefore, he
submits, as the aforesaid clause in the scheme is contrary to law, the Court
should not grant the sanction of the scheme.
32.
Learned counsel Sri K.G. Raghavan, appearing for ICICI, submitted, under the
original agreement, the entire share to be allotted to ICICI Ltd. was to be
held by them. Subsequent thereto by the approval granted by the RBI on
2-5-2002, ICICI Ltd. has been merged with ICICI Bank, which is governed by
Banking Regulations Act, 1949. Section 19(2) of the said Act, prohibits holding
of 56 per cent of the share capital. Therefore, they have proposed a
modification to the effect that 19 per cent of shares could be held by ICICI
Bank and 37 per cent of shares could be held by their nominees and accordingly
have sought for modification of the scheme to that extent.
33.
Learned counsel appearing for State Bank of Travancore submitted, the Bank had
a charge on the property of the Company which is now sought to be sold under the
terms of the scheme. If scheme is sanctioned and the property is sold, the
interest of the Bank would suffer and therefore to the extent of the scheme
provide for the sale of the property mortgaged to them cannot be sanctioned.
34. In
view of the aforesaid rival contentions, the following points arise for my
consideration:
“(i) whether
the scheme put up for sanction is approved by majority of secured creditors as
required under section 391(2) of the Act ?
(ii) Whether
non-convening of the meeting of the preference shareholders violate the
statutory requirement contemplated by section 391(1) of the Act ?
(iii) whether
the sanctioning of the scheme amounts to contravening the provisions of the
Trade Marks Act ?
(iv) whether
the modification of the scheme suggested by the secured creditor ICICI is
reasonable ?
(v) whether
sanctioning of the scheme resulting is sale of portion of the property at
Bangalore would substantially dilute the security offered to State Bank of
Travancore ?
(vi) whether
the scheme requires to be sanctioned with or without modification ?”
35.
Before I deal with the aforesaid points for determination, it is necessary to
keep in view the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which
is called upon to sanction the scheme of amalgamation as per the provisions of
section 391 read with section 393 of the Act. The aforesaid provisions of the
Act provides that compromise or arrangement can be proposed between a Company
and its creditors or any class of them, or between a Company and its members or
any class of them. When a scheme is put forward by a Company for the sanction
of the Court, in the first instance the Court has to direct holding of meetings
of creditors or class of creditors, or members or class of members who are concerned
with such a scheme. Once the majority in number representing three-fourths in
value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members, as
the case may be, present or voting either in person or by proxy at such a
meeting accord their approval to any compromise or arrangement the Court gets
jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. Once such a compromise is sanctioned by
the Court, it would be binding on all the creditors or class of creditors, or
members or class of members, as the case may be, which would also necessarily
mean that even to dissenting creditors or class of creditors or dissenting
members or class of members, such sanctioned scheme would remain binding.
36.
Before sanctioning such a scheme even though approved by a majority of the
concerned creditors or members, the Court has to be satisfied that the Company
or any other person moving such an application for sanction under sub-section
(2) of section 391 has disclosed all the relevant matters mentioned in the
proviso to sub-section (2) of the section. So far as the meetings of the
creditors or members, or their respective class for whom the scheme is proposed
are concerned, it is enjoined by section 391(1)(a) that the requisite information as contemplated by the said
provision is also required to be placed for consideration of the concerned
voters so that the parties concerned before whom the scheme is placed for
voting can take an informed and objective decision whether to vote for the
scheme or against it.
37. The
Company Court, which is called upon to sanction such a scheme is not merely to
go by the Ipse Dixit of the
majority of the shareholders or creditors or the respective classes who might
have voted in favour of the scheme with the requisite majority but the Court has
to consider the pros and cons
of the scheme with a view to find out whether the scheme is fair, just and
reasonable and is not contrary to any provision of law and it does not violate
any public policy. No Court of law would ever countenance any scheme of
compromise or arrangement arrived at between the parties and which might be
supported by the requisite majority if the Court finds that it is a
unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is otherwise unfair and unjust to the
class of shareholders or creditors for whom it is meant. The Court is not to
act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost automatically put its seal of
approval on such a scheme being approved by the majority.
38.
However, the question remains whether the Court has jurisdiction like an Appellate
Authority to minutely scrutinise the scheme and arrive at an independent
conclusion whether the scheme should be sanctioned or not when the creditors
and members have approved the scheme as required by section 391(2). The Court
has to keep in view the commercial wisdom of the parties to the scheme who have
taken an informed decision about the usefulness and propriety of the scheme by
supporting it by the requisite majority. The Court certainly would not act as a
Court of appeal and sit in judgment over the informed view of the concerned
parties to the compromise as the same would be in the realm of corporate and
commercial wisdom of the parties. The Court has neither the expertise nor the
jurisdiction to delve deep into the commercial wisdom exercised by the
creditors and members of the Company who have ratified the scheme by the
requisite majority. To that extent the jurisdiction of the Company Court is
peripheral and supervisory and not appellate. The supervisory jurisdiction of
the Company Court can also be culled out from the provisions of section 392 of
the Act. The propriety and the merits of the compromise and arrangement have to
be judged by the parties who as sui
juris with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the scheme arrive at
their own reasonable judgment and agree to be bound by such a compromise or
arrangement.
39. In
this regard, it is useful to refer to the observations found in the oft-quoted passage
in Bucklay on the Companies Act, 14th Edition. They are as under :
“In exercising its power of sanction the Court
will see, first that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, secondly,
that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and
that the statutory majority are acting bona
fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interest
adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that
the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class
concerned and acting in respect of this interest, might reasonably approve.
The Court does not sit merely to see that the
majority are acting bona fide
and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but at the same time,
the Court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has
not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considering the matter with
a view to the interest of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot
is found in the Scheme.”
The
observations of Fry, L.J. in this regard is also useful, which reads as under :
“The next enquiry is - Under what
circumstances is the Court to sanction a resolution which has been passed
approving of a compromise or arrangement? I shall not attempt to define what
elements may enter into the consideration of the Court beyond this, that I do
not doubt for a moment that the Court is bound to ascertain that all the
conditions required by the statute have been complied with; it is bound to be
satisfied that the proposition was made in good faith; and, further, it must be
satisfied that the proposal was at least so far fair and reasonable, as that an
intelligent and honest man, who is a member of that class, and acting alone in
respect of his interest as such a member, might approve of it. What other
circumstances the Court may take into consideration I will not attempt to
forecast.”
After
reviewing the entire case law, the Supreme Court in the case of Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC
506 has laid down the following broad contours defining the jurisdiction of the
Company Court in these matters, which is as hereunder :
“1. The sanctioning Court has to see to it
that all the requisite statutory procedure for supporting such a scheme has
been complied with and that the requisite meetings as contemplated by section
391(1)(a) have been held.
2. That the scheme put up for sanction of
the court is backed up by the requisite majority vote as required by section
391, sub-section (2).
3. That the concerned meetings of the
creditors or members or any class of them had the relevant material to enable
the voters to arrive at an informed decision for approving the scheme in
question. That the majority decision of the concerned class of voters is just
and fair to the class as a whole so as to legitimately bind even the dissenting
members of that class.
4. That all necessary material indicated by
section 393(1)(a) is placed
before the voters at the concerned meetings as contemplated by section 391,
sub-section (1).
5. That all the requisite material
contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 391 of the Act is
placed before the Court by the concerned applicant seeking sanction for such a
scheme and the Court gets satisfied about the same.
6. That the proposed scheme of compromise
and arrangement is no found to be violative of any provision of law and is not
contrary to public policy. For ascertaining the real purpose underlying the
scheme with a view to be satisfied on this aspect, the Court, if necessary, can
pierce the veil of apparent corporate purpose underlying the scheme and can
judiciously X-ray the same.
7. That the Company Court has also to satisfy
itself that members or class of members or creditors or class of creditors, as
the case may be, were acting bona fide
and in good faith and were not coercing the minority in order to promote any
interest adverse to that of the latter comprising of the same class whom they
purported to represent.
8. That the scheme as a whole is also found
to be just, fair and reasonable from the point of view of prudent men of
business taking a commercial decision beneficial to the class represented by
them for whom the scheme is meant.
9. Once the aforesaid broad parameters about
the requirement of a scheme for getting sanction of the Court are found to have
been met, the Court will have no further jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the
commercial wisdom of the majority of the class of persons who with their open
eyes have given their approval to the scheme even if in the view of the Court
there would be a better scheme for the company and its members or creditors for
whom the scheme is framed. The Court cannot refuse to sanction such a scheme on
that ground as it would otherwise amount to the Court exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the scheme rather than its supervisory jurisdiction.
The aforesaid parameters of the scope and
ambit of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction
a Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement are not exhaustive but only broadly
illustrative of the contours of the Court’s jurisdiction.” (p. 520)
40. In
the background of this legal position, I have to examine the scheme placed
before this court for sanction, in the light of the objections raised for its
sanction.
41. Regarding Point No. (i) :
It is not in
dispute that the unsecured creditors and shareholders have approved the scheme
by three-fourths majority. The dispute pertains to the majority of secured
creditors. The total number of secured creditors present were 18 in number and
their value is 2533643491. Out of 18 present, one abstained from voting.
Therefore, it is 17 persons whom were present and have voted. The value of the
one secured creditor who was present and who did not vote is 309821941. The
total value of secured creditors present and voting is 2223821550. There were 2
invalid votes, value of which is 389862275. Therefore, the total number of
valid votes cast is 15 and their value is 1833959275. Out of the valid vote
cast, 12 voted for the resolution and their value is 1477391975, 3 persons
voted against the resolution and their value is 356567300. If the total secured
creditors present and voted is taken into consideration and the votes held in
favour of the said resolution out of them is taken into consideration, the
resolution is passed by 58.31 per cent which is below the three-fourths
majority mark. If out of the valid votes cast, votes polled for resolution is
taken into consideration, it would be 80.58 per cent well above the three-
fourths mark. The number of votes voted against the resolution out of the valid
votes is taken into consideration, the value of votes would be 19.44 per cent.
42. In
the light of these aforesaid facts, the question for consideration is: whether
“present” and “voting” means even those persons who cast the votes and whose
votes were found to be invalid ought to be taken into consideration or it is
among the valid votes cast three-fourths majority is to be taken into
consideration.
43.
Sub-section (2) of section 391 requires that a scheme of compromise or
arrangement must be approved by majority of creditors/members representing
three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors, or members or
class of members, present and voting either in person or where proxies are
allowed, by proxy. There is no difficulty in understanding the word ‘present’
as the creditors or members should be physically present in person or through
their proxy in the meeting. The problem arises in the context of the word
‘voting’. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled
to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question. Voting is explained
as the expression of ones will, preference, or choice in regard to the decision
to be made by the body as a whole upon any proposed measure or proceeding.
Right to vote means right to exercise the right in favour of or against the
motion or resolution. A member present and voting may remain neutral,
indifferent, unbiased or impartial not engaged on either side. Voting has to be
either in the affirmative or negative i.e.,
‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the ballot paper or voting paper. One is not supposed to write
anything except putting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ either in favour of the proposition or
against the proposition. In addition to the same, if any suggestion, condition,
reservation or stipulation is written stating that the expression of the will
or opinion either for or against the proposition is subject to those things,
then, the votes have to be necessa-rily treated as invalid or void, as such
votes are no votes leading either way. A vote cast without indicating the mind
of the voter either for or against the resolution is no voting at all. Similarly,
voting for or against the motion subject to the conditions stipulated in the
vote is no voting in the eye of law. Therefore, voting understood in a proper
perspective, it could be either in the affirmative or in the negative.
Therefore, in construing whether a resolution is passed by three-fourths
majority present and voting, what is to be taken into consideration in
calculating the majority is not the number of persons present and voting, but
the number of valid votes polled in such meeting. The number of valid votes
includes only votes which are indicating the mind of the voter for or against
the resolution.
44.
Therefore, by “voting”, the mind, intention, preference of the voter must be
clearly expressed. There should not be any ambiguity and scope for
interpretation. It should be clear, unqualified and pointing. In this context,
a voter who is not present at the meeting, who is present and not voting,
present and voting by casting a blank ballot, and casting a ballot with
conditions and stipulations, all stand on the same footing. It is no “voting”
in the eye of law. Therefore, in my opinion, the proper construction to be
placed in calculating whether any resolution is approved or passed by a
three-fourths majority present and voting necessarily mean the value of the
valid votes and out of the same whether the resolution has been passed with
three-fourths majority. This view of mine is supported by a judgment of the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Arvind
Mills Ltd. [2002] 111 Comp. Cas. 118, where it has been held as under :
“Thus it will be seen from the above that a
member present and voting may remain neutral, indifferent, unbiased, impartial,
not engaged on either side. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by
the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question
has to be either in the affirmative or negative, that is yes or no. On the
ballot paper or voting paper one is not supposed to writ anything, except
putting a “X”, “V” either in favour of the proposition or against the
proposition and any writing suggesting condition or reservation cannot be said
to be an expression of will or opinion either for or against
the proposition and those votes have to be necessarily treated as invalid or
void as such votes are no votes leading either way.
It need hardly be said that the votes cast on
the proposition and voting thereof are to be construed in the ordinary and
usual sense and that mean “expressing the will, mind or preference; casting or
giving a vote.” They do not include the votes or ballots, that do not cast a
vote on the proposition legally or void votes may not be counted either for or
against the proposition submitted even though they may have been even received,
placed in the ballot box and constitute sum of the total number of ballots. A
bare attempt to vote by depositing blank ballot containing any writing is not
effective and cannot be included in the total count upon the 3/4ths majority is
to be estimated. Only those ballots that express voters points with such
clearing that the ballot can be counted for or against can be counted in total.
The requirement contemplates two ballots only, one affirmative and the other
negative. To adopt any other rule would be to say that three ballots were
contemplated one affirmative, one negative and the other neither affirmative or
negative but forming a new class into which all ballots for any reason void
must go....”
Applying the
aforesaid principles to the facts of this case, if we look into the voting
pattern, though 17 persons voted in the meeting, it was found 2 secured
creditors (1) Bank of Baroda, (2) Bank of India, have voted for the resolution.
But the Bank of Baroda in the ballot paper mentioned that the vote is for the
resolution with modifications below :
“(1) we may agree for demerger on principle
subject to final approval by higher authorities with regard to stock
verification etc.
(2) we will not agree for equity participation
letter to the company has already been submitted.”
Insofar as Bank
of India is concerned, have also cast their vote for the resolution subject to
the modifications suggested by them which was annexed to the ballot paper.
There they have suggested 13 modifications to the scheme and it is made clear
they are giving consent to the scheme subject to the aforesaid modifications.
Therefore, the Chairman of the meeting has rightly treated those two ballots as
invalid, because the said two creditors were not expressing their will or
opinion in favour of the resolution unconditionally. The said votes are not
votes leading either way and therefore they cannot be taken into consideration
either for or against the scheme. Therefore, though 17 persons voted in the
said meeting, as the 2 votes cast were invalid, in order to determine the
majority what is to be taken into consideration is only the value of 15
creditors who voted in the said meeting. The value of such 15 creditors is
1833959275 which is not in dispute 12 out of the 15 creditors voted for the
scheme and the value of those creditors is 1477391975. The value of the 3 votes
cast against the scheme is 356567300. Therefore, it is clear that the scheme is
approved by a majority of 80.56 per cent which is above the three-fourths
majority required under law, as the value of the valid votes voted against the
scheme is 19.44 per cent. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that
the secured creditors have not approved the scheme by a three-fourths majority
as required under law.
45. It
is also relevant to point out at this juncture the requirement that the scheme
should be approved by the requisite majority has been held to be directory and
not mandatory. If the Company has stopped its business, a large number of
employees and workers has become jobless, plant and machineries were resting
and losses were mounting, the scheme presented is a viable alternative even if
the same is not approved by three-fourths majority, Courts have sanctioned such
schemes. Principle underlying the same appears to be a scheme under section 391
cannot be regarded as an alternative mode of liquidation it is only an
alternative to liquidation.
46. In
the instant case, the Company has been declared as a sick industry under the
provisions of BIFR and having regard to the losses suffered by them and the money
that is required to make the unit viable, no financial institution or no
private entrepreneur has come forward to revive the industry, the only course
that would be left is for the BIFR to recommend to the High Court for winding
up of the Company. In those circumstances, if the Company itself with the
assistance of its members and creditors as a whole with the active support of
the labour puts-forth a scheme of reconstruction for revival of the Company and
as aforesaid when all the shareholders, unsecured creditors have approved such
a scheme with overwhelming majority and even the secured creditors as aforesaid
have approved the scheme with three-fourths majority of persons present and who
have cast a valid vote, the Court cannot blindly by technical interpretation
refuse to sanction the scheme on the ground of non-compliance of section 391(2)
of the Companies Act. It is also to be remembered here that 2 creditors whose
votes have held to be invalid have also voted for the scheme. Under these
circumstances, I am satisfied that the secured creditors also have approved the
scheme with three-fourths majority as required under section 391(1) of the
Companies Act. As such, there is compliance with the said statutory requirement
also.
47.
Regarding Point No. (ii) :
The second
objection raised was that no meeting of the preference shareholders are
convened to consider the scheme and there is no resolution passed approving the
said scheme and therefore the requirement of section 391(1) of the Companies
Act is not complied with. As such, the Court cannot accord sanction to the
scheme.
48.
Therefore, the question for consideration is : convening of a meeting of the
members and creditors of the Company, or any class of them, to consider and
approve the same is mandatory?
49. The
meeting contemplated under section 391 is analogous to an extra-ordinary
general meeting of the Company inasmuch as three-fourths majority is required
to pass the required resolution. The normal rule is that the consent of the
shareholders where it is unanimous or by a three-fourth majority, must be
obtained in a meeting summoned on the orders of the Court under section 391.
This is in accordance with the general principals that members must act in a
general meeting. Inroads have, however, been made on this formal doctrine.
Firstly, the consent of all or virtually all the shareholders given even
outside a meeting is sufficient to comply with the requirements of a meeting.
Secondly, written resolutions instead of those passed in meeting are now capable
of being registered e.g.,
section 192 of the Companies Act. Thirdly, the doctrine of lifting the veil of
incorporation and looking at the reality of action of the members enables the
Court to hold the consent of the overwhelming majority of the shareholders
outside the meeting is sufficient to show that the resolution was supported by
virtually all the members of the Company. In these three ways substantial
compliance rather than a formal compliance meets the requirements of the
statute. A third exception to the rule that all the shareholders of a company
must cast their votes in a formally called meeting is made by the doctrine of
acquiescence. If all the shareholders acquiesce in a certain arrangement, the
question of a meeting having been called does not arise at all. The Supreme
Court in the case of Miheer H.
Mafatlal (supra),
dealing with this question has held as under :
“. . . Moreover, when the company has decided
what classes are necessary parties to the scheme, it may happen that one class
will consist of small number of persons who will all be willing to be bound by
the scheme. In that case it is not the practice to hold a meeting of that
class, but to make the class a party to the scheme and to obtain the consent of
all its members to be bound. It is however, necessary for at least one class
meeting to be held in order to give the Court jurisdiction under the section.”
Therefore, it
becomes clear that convening of a meeting is a must to confer jurisdiction on
the Court to accord sanction of a scheme under the Companies Act. But, when
there are different classes of shareholders as well as creditors of the
Company, if any particular class is numerically very small and if they on
coming to know of the scheme voluntarily, unconditionally, give their consent
or approval for such a scheme, calling a meeting of such class of members or
creditors to a meeting to express their mind by way of casting vote in a
meeting would be an empty formality. If a copy of the scheme propounded stating
the terms of the compromise or arrangement and explaining its effects is sent
and acknowledged by that class of members or creditors who are numerically
small and if they give their consent to such a scheme in writing, there is no
necessity in law to convene the meeting of such class of shareholders or
creditors. The said consent letter or approval given can be acted upon and is
sufficient to show that they have approved the scheme.
50. In
this context, in the facts of the case, it is not in dispute the entire
preference shares in the Company is held by Industrial Development Bank of
India. By a letter dated 18th April, 2002, the Company brought to the notice of
the IDBI the aforesaid scheme and further informed that as they are the only
preference shareholder, no separate meeting of preference shareholders has been
convened and therefore IDBI was requested to convey their approval or otherwise
to the proposed scheme. Along with the said letter, a copy of the scheme was
also sent for reference. Acknowledging the said letter, IDBI wrote on 26th
July, 2002. The said letter reads as under :
“Proposal
for demerger - Please refer to your request for IDBI’s approval for the
company’s proposed demerger scheme filed before the High Court of Karnataka.
IDBI’s in principle agreement to the company’s
demerger proposal may be conveyed at the ensuing High Court hearing. The final
approval shall be subject to the modifications to the scheme or additional
conditions, if any, as may be stipulated by IDBI.”
However, the
IDBI, did not stipulate any modifications or additional conditions. The hearing
of this Company Petition has been duly notified in the newspaper and the IDBI
did not appear before the Court to suggest any modifications or to impose any
additional conditions before the High Court. In other words, the IDBI have
agreed to the scheme proposed by the Company. Under these circumstances, when
the sole preferential shareholder has given their consent in writing approving
the scheme even before convening of the meeting and have not opposed the scheme
at the hearing before this Court, it is obvious that they have also approved
the scheme proposed by the Company. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the Company has not complied with the legal requirement of holding a
meeting of the preferential shareholder. Thus, the Company has complied with
section 391(1) of the Companies Act.
51.
Regarding Point No. (iii):
The third
objection is raised by the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘KPL’ for short). Their objection is to the paragraph 2 in part III
of the scheme, which reads as under :
“2. It has been mutually agreed between the
Company and KSPL (RMG) that all the brand/s trade mark/s, the registered trade
mark/s and benefits of permitted user
agreements of KECL shall be available to KSPL for manufacture of
products being currently manufactured by the Company so long as KECL holds not
less than 51 per cent of the paid up equity capital of KSPL. The present
covenant shall serve as requisite consent for use of the brand name/trade mark
without requiring the execution of any further deed or document as to
assignment and permitted user of the said brand name/trade mark, subject,
however to approval of instant Scheme or Arrangement by the Hon’ble Court.”
Their contention
is that they are the owners of the trade mark “Kirloskar”; the Company is the
permitted user of the said trade mark; and by a letter dated 24-1-2001 they
have terminated the agreement permitting/licensing the use of KPL’s trade mark
“Kirloskar”. Therefore, the Company has no right to use the said trade mark nor
is entitled to allow the use of said trade mark by Kaytee Switchgear Pvt. Ltd.
or to any other person. It is also stated by them that even if the scheme is
approved by the Court, the said scheme or any clause thereof, cannot effect
KPL’s paramount statutory and common law rights. Therefore, they submitted that
if the scheme is to be approved by the Court, the aforesaid objectionable part
of the scheme is to be deleted.
52. The
Company has filed its objections contending that the contentions raised by KPL
do not in any way require to be heard in this petition, as the issue of
Company’s right of use of the trade mark “Kirloskar” does not alter the
corporate entity of the Company which remains intact irrespective of the name
and style under which it carries on its business, nor does it effect the
proposed scheme of arrangement. As the Company’s identity as a corporate entity
remains unaffected even after the scheme, the KPL’s right to take action
against the Company on the ground of alleged violation also remains unaffected.
They have also contended that the KPL does not manufacture any goods and in
fact those trade marks originally belong to the Company who in turn assigned in
favour of the KPL for the benefit of the group. The said assignment was without
any consideration. The Company has been doing business under the name and style
of “Kirloskar” for over 50 years, and therefore, they requested the Court to
reject the said objection of the KPL. Learned counsel for the Company contended
that all those disputed questions cannot be gone into in a proceedings under
section 391 of the Act. If the KPL has any grievance against the petitioner in
this regard, it is always open to them to initiate appropriate legal
proceedings in the Civil Court or in any other Court and can agitate their
rights, and sanctioning of the scheme by this Court would in no way take away
those rights and he further submitted this Court could clarify the said legal
proposition to protect the interest of the KPL.
53. Per contra, learned counsel appearing
for KPL submitted, as the offending clause in the scheme amounts to transfer of
interest in the user agreement, it is prohibited in law. The Court cannot
accord sanction to a scheme which contains a clause which is forbidden by law.
Therefore, he submits that the said clause to be deleted from the scheme.
54. The
offending clause provides that all the brand/s, trade mark/s, the registered
trade mark/s, and benefits of permitted user agreements of KECL shall be
available to the KSPL to manufacture products being currently manufactured by
the Company so long as KECL holds not less than 51 per cent of the paid up
equity capital of KSPL. It also makes it clear no separate deed or document is
required for such permission and the offending clause itself is to be construed
as such agreement. It also makes it clear that the same is subject to approval
of the scheme by this Court. The said clause proceeds on the assumption that
the Company owns brands, trade marks, registered trade marks and benefits under
a permitted user agreements and the same is sought to be made available to KSPL
under the terms of the scheme for which also approval of the scheme by this
Court is sought for. Therefore, in the present proceedings, what the Court has
to consider is whether that clause is legal and valid and it contravenes any
law for the time being in force. On the face of it, it does not contravene any
provisions of law, but, if as contended by KPL those brands, trade marks, fall
in to their ownership and they have given the same to the Company under a
permitted user agreement and if they are objecting to transfer of those rights
to KSPL, then, the Court has to go into the question whether it is against any
law. The Company has denied the right of KPL, as claimed by them. On the
contrary, they contend that this brands and trade marks belong to them, they
are using it for the last 50 years, it is they who have assigned it in favour
of KPL, without consideration for the benefit of the group, and therefore, KPL
has no right to the same. In view of these disputed facts, in a proceeding
under section 391 of the Act, this Court cannot hold enquiry and go into the
question who is entitled to the ownership of these brands, names and trade
marks. It is totally outside the purview of section 391. However, any sanction
to be accorded by this Court to the scheme cannot be construed as taking away
the right of KPL, if they have any. Therefore, to that extent, the interest of
KPL has to be protected. Therefore, it is made clear that this order of
sanctioning the scheme by this Court would in no way effect the
rights/interests of KPL to the brand name, trade mark or user agreement of
theirs. It is always open to them to initiate appropriate legal proceedings
either in the Civil Court or before appropriate forum to protect their rights
in respect of brand name, trade mark, etc. If any such proceedings are
initiated, those authorities who are empowered to decide shall decide those
rights independently on merits and in accordance with law without in any way
being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this order
and the sanctioning of the scheme by this court would in no way put fetters on
the power of the Court or the forum to go into these disputed questions. It
will not be open to the Company to contend in those proceedings that as the
scheme containing the aforesaid offending clause is approved by this Court,
those authorities cannot go into the legality or validity of those
transactions. Therefore, with this reservation the interest of KPL is fully
protected and the said objection cannot come in the way of sanctioning of the
scheme by this Court and sanctioning of the scheme would not amount to
contravening the provisions of the Trade Marks Act.
55.
Regarding Point No. (iv)
The fourth
objection pertains to the modifications sought by ICICI Limited. Under the
terms of the scheme, ICICI Limited, which is one of the secured creditors is to
be given 56 per cent of the equity share capital in the Special Performance
Vehicle while other creditors to together will hold 43 per cent of the shares
and 1 per cent would be held by Residual KEC. When the said scheme was put to
vote at the meeting of the creditors of the Company on 26-4-2002, ICICI Limited
was to be allotted the aforesaid 56 per cent of the equity shares. However,
subsequent thereto by the approval granted by the Reserve Bank of India on
2-5-2002, ICICI Limited has been merged with ICICI Bank. ICICI Bank is now
governed by the Regulations (which governs Banking Companies) under the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949. Section 19(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949,
stipulates that a banking company cannot hold shares in any company, whether as
pledge, mortgagee or an absolute owners thereon, for an amount exceeding 30 per
cent of the paid up share capital of the Company or 30 per cent of its own paid
up share capital and reserves. In the light of the said subsequent event and
the legal position and in view of the accounting standards and norms required
to be maintained by it, it has become essential that the above scheme be
modified by additionally permitting the ICICI Bank Limited to hold up to 19 per
cent of the share holding in the SPV by themselves and by permitting ICICI Bank
Limited to nominate such person or persons as they may deem appropriate for the
allotment and for holding the remaining shares in the SPV such that their
shareholding and their nominee put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholdings to which ICICI Bank Limited is
entitled under the scheme. The Company has no objection for the proposed
modification by the secured creditor. Accordingly, the scheme stands modified
enabling the ICICI Bank Limited to hold 19 per cent of the shareholding in the
SPV by themselves and in their names and further to nominate such person or
persons, as they may deem fit, to hold the shareholding in the SPV, such that
their shareholding put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the
shareholdings to which they are entitled under the scheme. To this extent, the
terms of the scheme stands modified.
56.
Regarding Point No. (v) :
The State Bank
of Travancore opposing the scheme contends that the Company is due in a sum of
Rs. 1,030.98 lakhs and the same has been treated as a Non Performing Assets;
the Company is heavily indebted; the Company is not able to service its debts
for a long time; even after the proposed restructuring, it is not possible for
the Company to service the debts and the proposed scheme will only postpone the
repayment; the valuable real estate of the Company in Bangalore is proposed to
be sold as part of the arrangement which will substantially dilute the level of
the security for the facilities proposed to be extended to RMG and residual KECL
entities; the Company has been incurring losses for a long time and shifting of
units away from Bangalore cannot make the operations profitable; even after
clearing of Rs. 312 lakhs as proposed in the scheme, remaining Fund Based
Exposure of Rs. 697 lakhs will remain a Non Performing Asset, which position is
not acceptable to them; the restruc-turing will also mean that the Banks will
have to provide further non-fund based facility; they made it very clear that
they are no willing to assume further exposure and therefore, they have sought
for rejection of the scheme.
57. The
Company has filed its reply. It is contended by the Company that the shifting
of the operations of the Bangalore Unit to a new location is necessary to make available
the real estate at the existing unit for paying off the debts in Special
Purpose Vehicle. The shifting will also improve the operational efficiencies as
common processes will be integrated and shared. The units of Mysore, Hubli and
Tumkur will continue at the existing locations. Under the scheme, the Bank is
given first pari passu charge
for Rs. 555 lakhs on the fixed assets and a second pari passu charge on the current assets and for the balance
amount it will have a first pari passu
charge on the current assets and second pari
passu charge on fixed assets. Since Debt Servicing Capital Ratio is at
acceptable level and RMG and residual KECL both are profitable companies,
account of the Bank will not be a Non Performing Asset. It was also submitted that
the Company has not sought for any higher non-fund based facility than the
sanctioned existing limits. Thus, the Bank’s interest remain unaffected and are
in fact better protected and as such there is no legally justifiable reason for
the Bank to object the scheme.
58. The
Bank is one of the secured creditors. All that the secured creditor would be
interested is in repayment of the loan borrowed by the Company. The scheme
envisages repayment of 312 lakhs immediately after the sale of land at
Bangalore. In so far the balance amount is concerned, the Bank is given first pari passu charge for Rs. 555 lakhs
on the fixed assets and a second pari
passu charge on current assets and for the balance amount, it will have
a first pari passu charge on the
current assets and a second pari passu
charge on fixed assets. Thus, the interest of the Bank is completely taken care
of. If the Company is wound up, the Bank being a second charge holder, is not
sure of getting back its full money having regard to the extent of liability of
the Company. Moreover, the time to be consumed for such payment is
unpredictable. Insofar as their objection regarding shifting of the unit and
objection to the sale of the Bangalore property is concerned, they cannot have
any say in this matter. The proprietary and the merits of the compromise or
arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sub juris with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the scheme arrive at
their own reasoned judgment and agree to be bound by such compromise or
arrangement. The Court cannot therefore undertake the exercise of scrutinizing
the scheme placed for its sanction with a view to finding out whether a better
scheme could have been adopted by the parties. This exercise remains only for
the parties and is in the realm of commercial democracy permeating the
activities of the concerned creditors and members of the Company who in their
best commercial and economic interest by majority agree to give green signal to
a compromise or arrangement. In the instant case, a consortium of 22 financial
institutions has been formed under the scheme for the purpose of selling the
assets of the Company and for discharge of the liability of the Company. When
these secured creditors have approved the scheme, where under the property of
the Company will be sold and the mode of utilizing the said sale proceeds is
reasonable and in the best interest of the Company, objection by one such
financial institution do not carry much weight, as the interest of State Bank
of Travancore is also taken care of and is fully protected. I do not find any
substance in the said objections raised by the Bank. As such, the same is
rejected.
59.
From the aforesaid discussions, it becomes clear that all the three Companies
involved in this scheme of reconstruction have complied with the legal
requirements of section 391(1)(a)
of the Act inasmuch as all of them have called the meetings of the shareholders
and creditors of the Company and placed before them the scheme for approval.
Further, the material on record discloses that the shareholders and creditors
of the Company have approved the aforesaid scheme by the requisite
three-fourths majority as required under section 391(2) of the Act. In fact, no
shareholder or creditor of the Company has complained either in the aforesaid
meetings or before this Court that the scheme which is now approved is adverse
to their interest and that their interest is not taken care of by the majority
while approving the resolution. The proposed scheme is not found to be
violative of any provisions of law nor is it contrary to public policy. The
members and the creditors of the Companies have acted bona fide and in good faith and not coercing the minority in
order to promote any interest adverse to that of the latter. The interest of
Kirloskar Proprietary Limited is taken care of making it clear that the
sanction of the scheme by this court could in no way affect their rights. The
modifications suggested by ICICI Bank has not been opposed by the Companies, as
such, the scheme stands modified to the extent of the modifications suggested
by ICICI Bank. The interest of the secured creditor, namely, the State Bank of
Travancore is fully taken care of by making a provision for the repayment of
the loan to the extent of Rs. 312 lakhs and providing sufficient security for
the remaining 555 lakhs and other amounts due to them from the Company. It is
also to be taken note of here that the matter is before the BIFR. The Board is
unable to rehabilitate this Company. It is in that context, at their
suggestion, the Company has come forward with the scheme to rehabilitate and
restructure the Company to the satisfaction of all the members, creditors and
workforce. The only alternative for the scheme is winding up of the Company, in
which event, neither the creditors nor the members nor the workmen would be
benefited.
60.
Broadly speaking, the scheme contemplates that the value of the large real
estate assets belongs to the Company, the land and building in Malleswaram at
Bangalore will have to be unlocked upon implementation of operational
restructuring. The real estate value can be suitably leveraged for reducing the
debt burden on manufacturing operations. An asset sale committee has been
constituted comprising of one representative each from the participating
institutions/banks and one from the Company. The sale of any asset of SPV shall
be with the approval of members representing minimum of 75 per cent in value of
the total loan outstanding at any point of time in SPV. The sale proceeds shall
be appropriated first to meet cost of VRS, cost of shifting operations from the
existing locations etc. The amount remaining thereafter shall be utilised for
payment to lenders in SPV proportionately. The entire overdue compound
interest, penal interest and liquidated damages has been waived of by all the
secured creditors. RMG undertakes to engage on and from the effective date all
permanent employees of KECL engaged in its RMG on the same terms and conditions
on which they are employed as on the effective date by KECL without any
interruption of services as a result of the transfer. RMG agrees that the
services of all such employees with KECL up to the effective date shall be
taken into account for purposes of all retirement benefits including
retrenchment compensation to which they may be eligible in KECL on the
effective date. However, such of the employees who would not accept the
transfer and those who are found surplus will accept voluntary retirement as
per the Rules of the Company. That is how the interest of the workforce is
taken care of under the scheme. The secured creditors having come forward to
waive of all the compound interest, penal interest and liquidated damages have
shown their eagerness to participate and assist the Company in restructuring,
so that the money lent by them can be recovered. Therefore, all the secured
creditors have been associated in the asset sale committee which is entrusted
with the responsibility of selling the assets of the Company and utilizing the
proceeds and appropriating the same towards discharge of the debts due to them
by the Company. A portion of the amounts due to them is sought to be adjusted
by allotment of equity to those secured creditors. Thus, the interest of the
creditors have been taken care of completely under the scheme. Insofar as the
interest of the shareholders are concerned, if restructuring of the Company is
not done, the only option is winding up of the Company in which event
shareholders interest is completely ruined. On the contrary, if the scheme is
worked out, they stand to gain, the Company will be fully functioning and their
interest is protected, and, therefore, they cannot have any grievance
whatsoever. In fact, the shareholders and creditors of the transferee companies
have unanimously approved the scheme.
61.
Therefore, taking into consideration all circumstances of the case, an
opportunity is to be given to the Company to restructure the Company as
suggested in the scheme which would be beneficial for one and all. As a whole,
the scheme is just, fair and reasonable. It is not open to this court to
undertake the exercise of scrutinizing the scheme with a view to find out
whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the parties. When the
creditors and members of the Company, who in their best commercial and economic
interest by a majority agree and approve the scheme, the discretion of this
court is to be exercised in approving such a scheme. Under these circumstances,
I am satisfied that the scheme is fair, just, bona fide, honest and it takes into consideration the interest
of the members, the creditors, the workmen and this is the best that could be
done under the circumstances and the only mode in which winding up of the
Company could be prevented.
Accordingly, I
pass the following :
Order
All the three
Company Petitions are allowed.
This Court
doth hereby sanction the arrangement set forth in the scheme produced as
Annexure O to the petitions and doth hereby declare the same to be binding on
all the creditors, members of the petitioner-Companies and also on the
companies subject to the following modifications :
(a) the ICICI
Bank Limited is permitted to hold upto 19 per cent of the shareholding in the
SPV by themselves and they are permitted to nominate such person or persons as
they may deem appropriate for the allotment and for holding the remaining
shares in the SPV to the extent of 37 per cent so that their shareholding and
their nominees put together does not exceed 56 per cent of the shareholding to
which ICICI Bank Limited is entitled under the scheme; and
(b) the
sanctioning of the scheme by this court would in no way affect the
rights/interest of the Kirloskar Proprietary Limited to the brand name, trade
mark or user agreement of theirs, if they have any. It is always open to them
to initiate appropriate legal proceedings to protect their rights in respect of
brand name, trade mark etc. If any proceedings are initiated, the authorities
before whom such rights are agitated are empowered to decide those rights
independently on merits and in accordance with law without in any way being
influenced by any of the observations made by this court in this order. It is
made clear that the sanctioning of the scheme by this Court would in no way put
fetters on the powers of such authorities to go into those disputed questions.
The Companies do file with the Registrar of
Companies a certified copy of this order within thirty days from this day.
v.
MUKHARJI, J.
SUIT NO. 901 OF 1954
APRIL 1, 1954
S.M. Bose, Advocate-General, H.N. Sanyal and A.K. Sen, for the Applicant.
S. Chaudhuri and P. Ginwallah, for the Respondents.
Mukharji, J.—This is an application by the plaintiff for an injunction to restrain the first defendant, Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited, from acting upon and communicating to the Central Government the resolutions purported to have been passed in the meeting of the defendant company, Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited, held on March 16, 1954.
The tussle is over the managing agency of this company. The main issue in this controversy relates to the transfer by sale of the total interest of ordinary shareholders in Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd., the present managing agents, Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. has been the managing agent of the defendant company for a long time. Some share holders are in favour of such sale of the shares of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. and others against it. There are allegations that they are being sold at a fabulous price which allegations are denied. Rivalry between Lala Lakshmipat Singhania and Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. is alleged to be the main motive of these proceedings.
At the moment the present controversy relates to a meeting of the shareholders where it was decided that such transfer should be made. The actual resolution before the company was:
"That the proposed sale of the 100 percent. interest of the ordinary shareholders in Kettlewell Bullon & Co. Ltd, the managing agents of the company to Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., of 7, Lyons Range, Calcutta, be and is hereby approved and that the directors be and are hereby authorised to notify the managing agents of this company's approval of such sale."
At the meeting of March 16, 1954, the chairman declared the resolution passed with 1,164 votes for and 313 votes against. The voting was not by a show of hands but by a poll.
The suit filed by the plaintiff challenges this result of the meeting. Its main ground for the challenge is that the chairman of the company and directors of the company in collusion with the scrutineers fraudulently rejected certain proxies, a list of which is set out in paragraph 18 of the petition. It is the case of the plaintiff that such rejection was improper and illegal. The main point of submission on the allegation of improper and illegal rejection of proxies is not concerned, however, with any alleged fraud or conspiracy, and the learned Advocate-General appearing for the plaintiff applicant rightly conceded before me that he was not pressing the question of fraud or conspiracy at this stage of the interlocutory application. Obviously that was the correct approach because no question of fraud and conspiracy can be tried on mere affidavits on an application. The learned Advocate-General contended that he was putting his client's case only on a point of law. The point of law on which he says the rejection of the proxies was illegal must therefore be, briefly, set forth.
The Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India Ltd. were the holders of 256 shares and 1,735 shares respectively. In respect of their holdings the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. gave two proxies, one to the applicant for 50 and the other to the directors of the company for 206, and the Bank of India gave two proxies, one to the applicant for 85 and another to the directors of the company for 1,650 ordinary shares and 61 preference shares. It is the applicant's case that the votes of a shareholder could not be split up in that manner and all should have been rejected but notwithstanding the same the chairman wrongfully and illegally rejected the proxy given by the Bank of India Ltd. in favour of the applicant and wrongly accepted those in favour of the resolution. The chairman also, it is contended, wrongly accepted all the votes cast under the two proxies given by the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. On behalf of the company it is stated that the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd is the holder of 196 shares and gave proxies in respect of 30 shares to the applicant and in respect of 165 shares to Geoffrey John Gardner, a director of the company, and himself, a defendant in this suit. It is also said on behalf of the defendants that the Bank of India Ltd. is the holder of 1,541 shares and gave a proxy in respect of 95 shares to the applicant which, according to the company, was lodged too late and proxies in respect of 1,292 ordinary shares and 61 first preference shares to the same Geoffrey Gardner.
It is contended on this issue by the company that shares registered in the names of the banks and their nominees are in the majority of cases shares that belong to the constituents of such banks, and in respect of such shares the banks are trustees and are bound to vote as their respective constituents may direct. It is also said that it is the usual practice for banks to issue different proxies in respect of different parcels of shares.
It has also been shown on a calculation (which appears as Annexure F to Gardner's affidavit) that even if the opponents of the resolution had been allowed to vote in respect of the disputed 445 shares in respect of which registration was refused and even if all the proxies lodged in time which are alleged to have been improperly rejected were counted and corresponding deductions were made from the total of votes cast in favour of the resolution, the said resolution would still have been passed with a majority. The Advocate-General contends that Annexure F shows a perilous majority of one, and if his contention is accepted this majority of one will be wiped off.
This particular point of splitting the proxy has to be decided as a point of law.
In an interlocutory application there must be a prima facie cast both on facts and law which should justify the grant of an interim injunction restraining company management. That prima facie case should all the more be clearly made in the case where attempt is made to restrain the normal function of a company according to the decisions of the domestic forum of the company. Bearing these principles in mind, I now propose to discuss the prima facie case on law and on facts.
By Article 90 of the articles of association of the Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited it is provided: "In case of any dispute as to the admission or rejection of any vote, the chairman shall determine the same and such determination made in good faith shall be final and conclusive." Prima facie, therefore, unless a case of bad faith is made, I consider it to be the normal course of the court to allow the decision of the chairman to stand as prima facie final until it can be found to be wrong at the trial and decision in the suit. If that principle is once accepted, then there is no scope here in this case for grant of an interlocutory injunction on the ground that the chairman has wrongly rejected certain votes given by proxy or wrongly accepted such votes.
The principle is fairly well settled on this point. In In re Indian Zoedone Company, the Lord Chancellor Selbobne observes at page 77:—
"The minutes in the books are to be received, not as conclusive, but as prima facie evidence of resolutions and proceedings at general meetings; and also it may be added, and I think correctly that the chairman, who presides at such meetings and has to receive the poll and declare its result, has prima facie authority to decide all emergent questions which necessarily require decision at the time, his decision of those questions will naturally govern, and properly govern the entry of the minute in the books; and, though in no sense conclusive, it throws the burden of proof upon the other side, who may say, contrary to the entry in the minute-book, following the decision of the chairman, that the result of the poll was different from that there recorded."
That represents the main principle which should guide these courts in granting an interlocutory injunction in these matters. In fact, Lord Justice Cotton in the same case observed at page 81 as follows:
"The appellants seem to consider that it was for the respondents to justify and support the chairman's decision. In my opinion that is their fallacy; it is for them to satisfy us that that decision was wrong not for those who rely upon that decision to bring evidence to show that in fact it was right."
The principle is also emphasised in a more recent decision in Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Limited. There an article of association provided that no objection should be made to the validity of any vote except at the meeting at which it was tendered, and that every vote, whether given in person or by proxy, not disallowed at any meeting should be deemed valid for all purposes. It was held, affirming Romer J., that the decision of the chairman, who, in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred upon him by the article, had refused to disallow a vote by proxy to which objection had been taken at the meeting, was final and would not be reviewed by the court. Pollock M. R., at page 145, delivering judgment observed:—
"If the chairman's discretion or powers are to be wide enough for him to determine the matter, and he does not disallow the votes, they are to stand and to be valid for all purposes whatsoever."
The Master of the Rolls discusses different situations which it is needless for me to quote. I cannot improve on what has been said by Sargant L.J., who was one of the members of the Court of Appeal deciding that case along with Pollock M.R., at page 148, and this is what Lord Justice Sargant says:—
"It is obviously desirable that questions of this sort should be determined in a summary way and without the necessity of coming to the courts. Mr. Swords says that, according to the terms of this article if the chairman had disallowed a vote his decision is not conclusive. It may well be that in the case where a vote has been disallowed, the shareholder whose right has been impeached to that extent should have a right to apply to the courts. Here all that is done is to take away from a shareholder a right of appeal against a decision disallowing an objection by him against the votes of some other shareholder, and it seems to me quite reasonable that such a question should be allowed to be decided summarily and finally by the chairman, although there should not be the same summary and final effect given to a decision against the right of a shareholder to vote."
I have only cited these cases to show the general principle in the matter of voting at company meetings and which can be taken as a guide for granting interlocutory injunctions against companies in course of their management.
Here the article that I have quoted is very much wider than the article which was considered by Lord Justice Sargant in the case of Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Limited. I am not concerned at present with the ultimate scope, effect and validity of this provision in the articles of association in excluding, if it does, the review by courts. What is being emphasised is that prima facie it is the company's articles which have said that the chairman's decision, if in good faith, shall be final and conclusive. Whether it succeeds in completely excluding the courts from reviewing such decision in any case is not a matter which I am called upon to decide on this application and I do not do so. But it is quite clear that from the point of view of a prima facie case, the chairman's decision should prima facie be allowed to stand before the suit is heard and a decision is given at the trial.
The results of my review of the authorities on this point show that the courts have evolved certain well-defined principles which regulate company meetings. Primarily the articles of association and the company statute provide the matrix of the company law on the point. Secondly, the courts are generally reluctant to interfere with the decisions taken at company meetings, unless there is almost a manifest breach of the articles or the statute, because it is the company and not the court which is responsible for its management. The court is hardly a substitute for the company in this respect except in specified cases provided by statute and these again are mostly cases where the company itself finds it difficult to manage its own affairs as in liquidation or schemes or where in public interest the court has to interfere or sanction as in cases of fraud by the majority on the minority or cases of amalgamation or reduction. This is the rule of domestic forum applied to company jurisprudence. The third principle which the courts have evolved as a corollary of the first two principles is that prima facie the decision of the chairman at such company meetings is allowed to stand until it is proved to be in breach of the articles or the statute. The burden of proving the chairman's decision to be wrong rests with the party challenging his decision and it is not for those who rely on his decision to bring evidence in the first instance to show that the chairman was right. This is the rule of convenience and of practical wisdom. It is of great practical utility. The chairman, by virtue of his position and the nature of his duties, has to decide on the spot all emergent questions that arise at the meeting and it will be mere folly to reduce the prima facie authority of his verdict. The burden of holding and conducting conducting meetings and recording votes cast therein and for taking decisions at such meetings is the primary responsibility of the company's shareholders and their chosen directors and not of this court.
The learned Advocate-General realised that unless he could show prima facie that some of these proxies which were accepted or rejected were cases of obvious or prima facie illegal rejection or reception of votes, he could not sustain his application for interlocutory injunction. By consent of Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel appearing for the company, and the learned Advocate-General for the plaintiff, it was decided to scrutinise the disputed proxies which were brought into this court to enable the learned Advocate-General to prove his prima facie case. The learned Advocate-General selected two classes of proxies—one of Sourashtra and the other of Central Bank of India Ltd., and said that he would satisfy me that prima facie his client's case should be accepted. I roust record here that on examination it was found that there was no prima facie case against the defendants on these two proxies. The prima facie case of the plaintiff therefore fails on this aspect of the case.
I am therefore satisfied on the basis of these principles, that the prima facie case on facts in this case is against the applicant and that justifies the refusal of this court to grant an interlocutory injunction.
Then comes the prima facie question of law. As I have already indicated, the main challenge is that the shareholder holding a number of votes cannot split his votes and give a few to one proxy and others to another proxy.
The basis of the argument is the plausible one that a shareholder being one person, whether a company or a corporation, cannot be expected to say "yes" and "no" on the same resolution. The answer that is given is that each share carries the right to vote, and, therefore, logically and legally every share has a voice to be heard and there is nothing in law which prevents such voice being exercised in any way as the holder chooses to do. He may say "yes" and "no" in the same resolution and make himself foolish or he may say that he has not been able to come to a Decision one way or the other and so distribute his votes equally to maintain the balance by distributing his votes equally on either side. Nor is it unknown in company meetings or other meetings for the chairman to have a casting vote in addition to the one he has as a member and there is nothing in the rule of law or practice which prevents the chairman from using his original vote for, and his casting vote against, the resolution. The learned Advocate-General, who appears for the plaintiff in this case, then proceeds to contend that this view cannot be supported because it is inapplicable in a case where there is voting by show of hands. A man can only show his hands once and having done so, his power is exhausted although he may be holding proxies for numerous other persons. The analogy of voting by show of hands is misleading and its fallacy requires to be demonstrated because the plausibility of that argument appears very convincing at the first blush. The learned Advocate-General has backed up his argument by reference to the new amendment in the English company law which is now Section 138 of the English Companies Act of 1948 which says: "On a poll taken at the meeting of a company or meeting of any class of members of a company, the member entitled to more than one vote, need not, if he votes, use all his votes or cast all his votes he uses in the same way."
From this the learned Advocate-General concludes that this was necessary because it could not be done without an Act of Parliament. He backs it up by drawing my attention to paragraph 77 of the Indian Company Law Committee Report where the same proposal has been made with further improvement by including even the proxies. I will presently show from an extract from the Report of the Committee presided over by Mr. Justice Cohen in England which was the precursor of the amended English Companies Act on this point, that the learned Advocate-General's hypothesis is wrong.
I have carefully gone through the authorities on this branch of the law and I am satisfied that the learned Advocate-General's contention is not sound and cannot be accepted. The main reason for not accepting his argument is first, that the analogy that proxies cannot be counted on a show of hands and therefore should be rejected is a defective analogy. The main reason to describe the analogy as defective is that by a long series of cases and judicial pronouncements in England it has been clearly laid down that proxies cannot be used on a show of hands but they can be used on a poll. The second reason for rejecting the Advocate-General's contention is that it is not correct from the point of view of legal history, when he said that without an Act of Parliament this splitting of votes could not be done. I find from the history of precedents and review of authorities in England that it was done and at least attempted to be done more than once and there was serious conflict of judicial opinion on the point whether it could be done or not. The reason, therefore, of an Act of Parliament was to clarify the law and to set all this conflict at rest. It is abundantly made clear by a reference to paragraph 135 of the Cohen Committee's Report on English company law amendment where it is recorded: ''When a nominee holds shares in a company on behalf of more than one beneficial owner, he normally consults the persons on whose behalf be holds the shares before voting on any resolution before the shareholders. The beneficial owners of the shares may have divergent views on the proposals put before them. Some will instruct the nominee to vote for the proposals, some will instruct him to vote against. Nominees usually carry out these instructions. It is however doubtful whether it is legal for a shareholder to use some of his voting power in support of a resolution and some of it against the same resolution, though in practice, it is obviously desirable that a nominee should express as faithfully as possible the views of the persons on whose behalf he acts. We accordingly suggest that it should expressly be laid down that a shareholder may, if he wishes, either in completing a proxy form or in voting himself on a poll at a meeting, direct that some of his votes shall be cast for the resolution and some against or use only a part of the votes to which he is entitled."
I propose to indicate the landmarks in the case law on the point in order to show that the prima facie case in law even is against the contention of the plaintiff.
The first decision is In re Horbury Bridge Coal, Iron and Waggon Company decided in the year 1879. In that case Bacon V.C. held that the proper mode of voting was by heads or by shares and he was of the view that even on a show of hands the shares had to be counted and that even in a case where no poll was demanded. The decision of Bacon V.C. was upset in the Court of Appeal by Jessel M.R. sitting with Bramwell L.J. and Brett L. J. Jessel M. R. at page 115 of that report observes: —
"We will first of all consider what may be termed the common law of the country as to voting at meetings. It is undoubted, and it was admitted by Sir Henry Jackson in his argument for the respondents, that, according to such common law, votes at all meetings are taken by show of hands. Of course, it may not always be a satisfactory mode—persons attending in large numbers may be small shareholders, and persons attending in small numbers may be large shareholders, and, therefore, in companies provision is made for taking a poll, and when a poll is taken the votes are to be counted according to the number of shares, in some cases according to the number of shares absolutely, as in this company, viz., a vote for every share, while in other companies there is another scale, and the number of votes increases, but not so rapidly as the number of shares, and there is a. limit to the number of votes which a single shareholder can have."
The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion in that case that proxies were to be counted on a show of hands.
Chronologically the next case of importance is Bidwell Brothers, In re. It represents an interesting and important episode on the evolution of this branch of the company law. It came in the year 1893-There Vaughan Williams J. observes at page 607:—
"I have come to
the conclusion that the votes of the members who were present only by proxy
ought to be taken into consideration even though no poll was demanded."
The learned Judge also expressed the view at page 608: —
''It is said the votes of those persons can be counted, and will be counted, when a poll is demanded, and that it is intended that their voice shall be heard on that occasion only. It seems to me that a decision to that effect would create great injustice to the members present at a meeting by proxy only, because, according to the decision in R. v. Government Stock Investment Company the proxies do not seem able to demand a poll. I think that, under these circumstances, I ought to hold that the chairman of this company was right in counting the votes of the members who were present by proxy. The votes of those persons must be counted as the votes of persons actually present, not according to the number of shares they hold, but each person present by proxy must vote as one person and one person only, and the chairman must ascertain the way in which he wishes to vote from his proxy."
This case was not followed by Chitty J. in the year 1896 in Ernest v. Loma Gold Mines Limited. There Chitty J. came to the conclusion that at a meeting of the shareholders of a company convened for the purpose of a special resolution, though the regulations of the company provide that votes may be given personally or by proxy, a member present only by proxy has no right to vote upon a show of hands. Chitty J. disapproved of the decision in Bidwell Brothers In re. Most of the arguments of Chitiy J. from page 578 to 580 is concerned with showing the practical inconvenience of counting proxies on a show of hands. But the learned Judge does say at page 579-80: "The proxies come in when the poll is demanded."
Then in the year 1807 the view of Chitty J. in the above case was upheld in appeal, overruling finally the decision in Bidwell Brothers In re. The real basis of that decision was that it was against the nature of a show of hands that one hand should count for more than another and a man who holds up his hand holds it up in respect of all his voting power. The decision in appeal was rendered by Lindley L.J. sitting with A. L. Smith L.J.
The review of those authorities shows that certainly from 1879 until 1897 there was great divergence of judicial opinion. This fact alone indicates that it cannot be suggested that the new Section 138 in the English Companies Act was only introduced to create a new statutory right which was never recognised before.
From these authorities two propositions emerge quite clearly. First, that while there was at common law no right of voting by proxy it has come in by way of special company regulations and company statutes. It was never questioned that proxies must be counted at a poll though not by a show of hands and, therefore, the Advocate-General's argument of reducing votes by poll to the same level as votes by show of hands is unsound. The next proposition then is that if the proxies are to be counted at a poll, and I need only repeat here that in the case before me it is not a case of show of hands but of poll, then how are the proxies to be counted? In this case, for instance, the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India Ltd. held a number of shares for which they appointed simultaneously two proxies, each with a number of shares. The shares in this case with which I am concerned carry the right to vote attached to each share. All authorities are clear on the point that proxies have the right to vote. Now, if each share has a vote, then the fact that one person happens to hold a number of shares and, therefore, a number of votes, cannot preclude the operation of the separate voting right attached to each share.
In a sense it is remarkable how this argument has been developed. It is accepted without demur that X holding some forty shares with a vote for each share will have forty votes and he can exercise all these forty votes on one side. Yet it is the argument that while all the votes can be used on one side they cannot be used one against the other, because it is said to be against common sense that a person should be allowed to vote both for and against the same resolution. Supposing a man wishes to do so, he may be whimsical or he can make himself a nuisance or he may genuinely be vacillating or he may genuinely think that his voting rights should be distributed in some proportion both for and against the same resolution. The central idea in solving this particular problem, apart from authorities, is to remember and consider that each share carries with it a right to vote. The fact that all the shares happen to be in the hands of one person does not merge the different voting rights and make them one. The plurality of votes cannot disappear because of the singularity of the person who holds these votes. It is settled in company law that the right to vote attached to a share is property and it will in ray judgment be a most wanton confiscation of property rights in respect of company shares which cannot be justified in law by the magic of one person holding many shares or by the innovation of a spurious doctrine of a newfangled merger. Those who advocate obliteration of the different voting rights in respect of different shares because of the fact that the relative shares happen to be held by one person do not seem to realize that such a holder may sell his different shares to different persons and if that is so these different voting rights will have to re-emerge because the persons holding them become different again. The fallacy of the view lies in the failure to realise that the holders of these shares may coalesce but neither the shares nor the the votes do. The right to vote, therefore, is to be judged not by the personality but by the share. If the shares are different, the votes can be different and the holder need not be precluded by any doctrine of convenience or inconvenience or propriety that he cannot vote both "yes" and "no" on the same resolution. As owner of the specific property in each specific share he can distribute his votes on the shares he holds in any manner he chooses. The way he votes cannot take away the legal right in each share carrying the right to vote.
There is one other point made by the company. It is not disputed that the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India held the shares on behalf of their individual constituents and it is only proper that holding their proxies they must vote according to the desires of their individual constituents although in paper these corporations are holders of the shares. The learned Advocate-General argued that to recognise that fact will mean that the company has to recognise trusts which of course the company cannot do. I am afraid this argument misconceives the whole doctrine of non-recognition of trust in company jurisprudence. What is said in Section 33 of the Indian Companies Act is that no notice of any trust, express or implied or constructive, shall be entered on the register or receivable by the registrar. Nothing of that kind is done by allowing the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India to vote according to the dictates of the constituents on whose behalf they hold the shares. Indeed to extend the doctrine of non-recognition of trust in the manner argued by the learned Advocate-General will be to destroy the whole principle of voting by proxy. I am therefore unable to uphold the Advocate-General's contention on this point.
On these grounds I am satisfied prima facie that there should be no interlocutory injunction, first, because prima facie article 90 is on the way, secondly, because the trend in law and in fact is against the applicant.
I,
therefore, dismiss this application with costs. I certify this motion for two
counsel.
[1937] 7 Comp. cas.
417 (CAL.)
v.
Nilkamal
Chakravarthy
Nasim Ali, J. and Remfry,
J.
June 7, 1937
A.C. Gupta, Asitaranjan Ghose and G.C. Chatterjee for the Appellants.
M.N. Das Gupta and N.K. Das Gupta for the Respondents.
Nasim Ali, J. —The Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd., Appellant No. 1 in this appeal, is a joint stock company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913). It was registered under the Act on September 6th, 1922. The registered share capital of the company is rupees thirty lacs divided into three lacs shares of Rs. 10 each. Appellants Nos. 2 to 4 are the Managing Directors and Appellants Nos. 5 to 10 and Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 are the Directors of the company. Respondent No. 1 purchased 20 shares of the company on December 17th, 1926.
By Article 63 of the Articles of Association of this company it is provided that the monthly salary of the Managing Director or Managing Directors in any case shall not exceed Rs. 1000 and the rate of commission payable to them shall not exceed more than 5 per cent of the net profit.
On April 30th, 1933, a general meeting of the shareholders of the company was held to consider a special resolution for altering these provisions in Art. 63 with the object of increasing the monthly allowance of the Managing Director or Managing Directors to Rs. 1500 and the commission to 7½ per cent of the net profits, if the profits would exceed to per cent. of the subscribed capital of the company. At this meeting the Chairman declared on a show of hands that the resolution was carried. No poll was demanded.
On May 22nd, 1933, the Respondent No. 1 instituted a suit in the third Court of the Munsif at Dacca against the appellants and the other respondents in this appeal for a declaration that the resolution was not binding on the company as it was not carried by the majority as required by Sec. 81 of the Indian Companies Act and for consequential injunctions. The Appellants contested the suit. Their defences so far as they are material for the purpose of the present appeal, are: (1) that the suit is not maintainable in law; and (2) that the resolution was binding on the company as it was passed by the statutory majority.
The Courts below have overruled these defences and have decreed the suit. Hence this second Appeal by the company, its Managing Directors and some of its Directors.
The first point for determination in this appeal is whether the suit is maintainable.
"It is clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company. . . . . .the action should prima facie be brought by the company itself" . .. . . .Per Lord-Davey in Burland v. Earle (1902) A.C. 83 at p. 93.
The will of the majority of the shareholders is ordinarily the will of the company for this purpose. Where the acts complained of can be ratified by the majority there is nothing for which the company can sue. The rule, that it is the company which must decide whether the litigation should be undertaken, ought therefore to be limited to cases where the act complained of is ratifiable.
If the majority of its shares are controlled by those against whom the relief is sought the complaining share-holders may sue in their own names, but must show that the acts complained of are of a fraudulent character or beyond the powers of the company Burland v. Earle. In the case of Dominion Cotton Mills Company, Ltd. v. George E. Amyot (1912) A. C. 546 at P. 551 the following observations of Lord Macnaghten appear: —
"The principle applicable to cases where a dissentient minority of share-holders in a Company seek redress against the action of the majority of their association are well settled. Indeed they were not contested at the Bar. In order to succeed it is incumbent on the minority either to show that the action of the majority is ultra vires or to prove that the majority have abused their powers and are depriving the minority of their rights. It would be pedantry to go through the line of decisions by which those principles have been established".
Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the Appellants contended that as the managing directors did not hold the majority of the shares of the company, the Plaintiff before the institution of the suit was bound to give the company an opportunity of expressing its views whether litigation should be undertaken. We are unable to accept this contention.
"Assuming that the act complained of is fraudulent or ultra vires of the corporation it could not be ratified by any majority and therefore the rule that it is the corporation which must decide whether or not litigation shall be undertaken has been generally taken to apply only to cases where the act complained of is ratifiable. There is some weak authority for a view that all decisions as to whether litigation shall proceed are of an internal character and it has been held even in cases where the act is covered by a majority resolution that a locus poenitentiae should be allowed, and the action has been adjourned for a general meeting. The case for such adjournment is strong where the act impugned is that of directors acting on their own responsibility and it may be urged that a company should in every case have an opportunity of expressing its view whether litigation should be avoided since, if not involving it in costs, it may still affect its credit.
"The bulk of the cases in which corporators have been allowed to succeed on proof of ultra vires or fraud give no clear guidance as to whether, in the absence of any explanation for the corporation not being consulted, the action could have succeeded. They are rather occupied in pointing out the circumstances which make the action good, and where the action fails, it is on the merits, and not because no meeting has been called. In some cases the plaintiffs actually represent the majority of share-holders, though not of the directors; in others a meeting has already been held, or cannot be held, and generally circumstances exist to show that the corporation will take no action. It is, however, possible to point to judicial utterances which suggest that no meeting of the corporation need have been called. Thus Lord Langdale, M.R., said: "If a rule has been laid down that in a case of this kind an individual has not the right to sue on behalf of himself and others, when there is an injury done to the whole corporation, without having first attempted to get the concurrence of the whole corporation, it is not my province or duty to deviate from it . . . . . . This bill may be sustained in its present form though there has been no attempt to obtain the concurrence of the company"; and Jessel, M.R., in another case asked "is it reasonable to say to a minority of share-holders who are defrauded by the majority that they must apply to the company to institute proceedings". It therefore appears that it is not necessary, as a matter of law, formally to ascertain the views of the majority before proceeding, but nevertheless, if no reason is given for the corporation not being consulted before litigation is undertaken it must be clearly alleged, and made to appear that the transaction is fraudulent or ultra vires". Street's Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 1930 Edition at pages 352-353.
The following observations of Swinfen Eady, L. J., in Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Company Ltd., (1915) 1 Ch. 503 at p. 518 are also pertinent to the point under discussion:
"It was then contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue. The plaintiff's counsel urged that if this as a special resolution was invalidly passed, how is it to be impeached if the plaintiff cannot sue; how can the question of illegality be raised? Suppose he called a meeting and the majority of the share-holders were to say 'We are content with the present position and we will not raise any question; can it be said that by a side-wind as it were, not being able to pass a valid special resolution, they could pass an invalid one and then by a bare majority say 'We will not allow any proceedings to be taken". In my opinion they cannot do that".
The case of the defendants in the present suit is that the resolution was carried by a majority. Immediately after the resolution was passed on April 30th 1933, the plaintiff wrote to the company stating that it was not passed by the statutory majority. The company took no steps in the matter. On May 22nd 1933, the plaintiff instituted the present suit impleading the company as a defendant in the suit. The company it its defence took up the position that the resolution was carried by the statutory majority. It would have been therefore useless for the plaintiff to ask the company to call a meeting to decide whether a suit should be instituted for a declaration that the resolution was not binding on the company.
For the aforesaid reasons we are of opinion that the suit cannot be thrown out on the ground that the plaintiffs did not consult the views of the majority before they instituted the present suit, if from the allegations from the plaint it would appear that the act complained of was ultra vires.
Plaintiff's case is that the alteration of Art. 63 was ultra vires and is not binding on the company and its members as the majority of the three fourths of the shareholders present at the meeting did not give their consent to the alteration at the general meeting held on April 30th 1933.
The Articles of Association of a company define the duties, the rights and powers of the governing body as between themselves and the company at large and the mode and form in which the business of the company is to be carried on and the mode and form in which the changes in the internal regulation of the company may from time to time be made.
"Of the internal regulations of the Company the members of it are absolute masters and provided they pursue the course marked out in the Act, that is to say, holding a general meeting and obtaining the consent of the shareholders they may alter those regulations from time to time". See Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company v. Hector Riche, L.R. 7 H.L. 653 at p. 671.
Under Sec. 21 of the Indian Companies Act, the Articles of Association of a company bind the company and the members thereof. By Sec. 20 of the Act a company may by a special resolution alter its Articles. The provisions relating to the mode in which such a special resolution can be passed by a company are contained in cls. 1, 2, and 3 of Sec. 81 of the Indian Companies Act as it stood before its amendment in 1936. They are as follows"—(1) A resolution shall be an extraordinary resolution where it has been passed by a majority of not less than three fourths of such members entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy (where proxies are allowed) at a general meeting of which notice specifying the intention to propose the resolution as an extraordinary resolution has been duly given. (2) A resolution shall be a special resolution when it has been (a) passed in manner required for the passing of an extraordinary resolution and (b) confirmed by a majority of such members entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy (where proxies are allowed) at a subsequent general meeting of which notice has been duly given and held after an interval of not less than fourteen days nor more than one month, from the date of the first meeting.
(3) At any meeting at which an extraordinary resolution is submitted to be passed or a special resolution is submitted to be passed or confirmed, a declaration of the Chairman on a show of hands that the resolution is carried shall, unless a poll is demanded, be conclusive evidence of the fact without proof of the number or proportion of the votes recorded in favour of or against the resolution.
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the alteration of Art. 63 was not in accordance with these statutory provisions the alteration will not be binding on the company. The decision on the question whether the present suit is maintainable by the plaintiff will depend upon the decision on its merits.
The next point for determination therefore is whether the special resolution was passed in contravention of the provisions contained in Sec. 81 of the Indian Companies Act. Cl. 3 of Sec.81 makes the declaration of the Chairman that the resolution is carried conclusive evidence of the fact that it was carried by the majority of the shareholders as laid down in Cl. (1) It therefore excludes evidence to show that at the meeting less than three fourths of the members voted for the resolution. But before the bar under this clause can be applied, the Court has to determine what the declaration is. If there is no dispute about the Chairman's declaration no difficulty arises, but if there is a dispute the Court has to determine on evidence what the declaration was. In this case the finding of the courts below is that the declaration was in these terms: —218 Votes for, 78 against, Resolution carried"—The object of demanding a poll after the declaration on a show of hands is to ascertain how many voted for and how many against but if the declaration of the Chairman is that so many voted for and so many against and no one disputes the figures the question of demanding a poll does not arise. It is true that there was no dispute in this case that the Chairman declared the resolution as carried. But this declaration was preceded by the announcement that 218 voted for and 78 against the resolution which on the face of it showed that the resolution was lost. The conclusiveness of the declaration of the Chairman contemplated by cl. (3) of Sec. 81 attaches to the declaration where the Chairman does not find by his declaration the figures for and against the resolution. See In re Hadleigh Castle Gold Mines Ltd., Arcot v. United African Lands Ltd. and In re E. D. Sasson United Mills Ltd. But, where, as in the present case the Chairman by his declaration finds the figures and erroneously in point of point of law holds that the resolution has been duly passed the resolution cannot be said to have been passed according to law. See In re Caratal New Mines Ltd., In re Clark and Co., Ltd. [English and Empire Digest Vol. 9 page 578 footnote] and Allison v. Johnson. The special resolution passed on April 30th 1933 is therefore not binding on the company. The decrees of the courts below cannot therefore be successfully challenged in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Remfry, J.,—I agree.
The decision of Buckley, J., as he then was, in In re Caratal New Mines Ltd. did not seem to me to explain the difficulty that the section makes the declaration of the Chairman conclusive and the declaration appeared to me to be of the result of the voting and of nothing more. But Farwell, J.—as he then was—is reported in Allison v. Johnson to have held that the Chairman's note as to the voting was part of the declaration. Therefore though not without considerable hesitation, I agree that these two decisions should be followed.
[1992]
75 COMP CAS 198 (MAD.)
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
v.
Egmore Benefit Society Ltd.
ARUMUGHAM J.
Original Application No. 288 of 1991 and
Applications Nos. 2597 and 2598 of 1991 in Civil Suit No. 420 of 1991 and
Original Application No. 289 of 1991 and Applications Nos. 2595 and 2596 of
1991 in Civil Suit No. 421 of 1991
APRIL 29, 1992
V.
Subramaniam, G. Subramaniam, M. Uttam Reddy, C. Harikrishnan and S. Subbulakshmi for the Applicants.
JUDGMENT
Arumugham,
J.—The
applicants/plaintiffs have filed this application under Order 14, rule 8 of the
Original Side Rules, read with Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure
Code, against the respondent/first defendant, seeking an order of interim
injunction restraining the respondent from holding any extraordinary general
body meeting either on April 2, 1991, or any other date, in pursuance of notice
dated March 7, 1991, on the subject noted in the notice dated March 7, 1991,
pending disposal of the above suit.
The
short facts which are culled out from the affidavit, filed in support of the
application, are as follows:
The
applicants/plaintiffs herein are the shareholders of the respondent/first
defendant company which is more than 100 years old, having been incorporated
under the Companies Act and that the applicants had been elected as directors
of the respondent at the annual general body meeting held on December 24, 1990,
and that since then onwards, they are functioning as the directors of the first
respondent company and that defendants Nos. 2 to 5 in the suit were the
directors of the respondent company, earlier to the election held on December
24, 1990, and they were to retire by rotation by the abovesaid 120th annual
general body meeting and that accordingly, defendants Nos. 2 to 4 stood for
being re elected as directors of the first defendant company as well as to fill
up the vacancy caused by the retirement of one of the directors by name V.
Karthikeyan. Defendants Nos. 4 to 13 in the suit are the requisitionists who
had requisitioned an extraordinary general meeting of the first respondent and
notice had been given for the holding of an extraordinary general meeting on
April 2, 1991. The main business of the respondent is to accept deposits and
grant loans on jewels and other approved securities and it is governed by its
memorandum and articles of association, registered under the Companies Act for
the administration of the respondent itself and that as such, the authorised
capital of the company is Rs. 5,00,000 consisting of 5,00,000 shares of Re. 1
each with the paid-up capital of Rs. 1,48,906, each share being Re. 1.
According to the memorandum and articles of association of the respondent, it
has a board of directors consisting of 12, among whom l/3rd are to retire at
every general body meeting of the first respondent by rotation and that the
said retiring directors are eligible for re-election under the memorandum and
articles of association and that from the l/3rd number of directors, four
retiring by rotation as also a vacancy on the retirement of one Mr. V.
Karthikeyan in whose place the fifth applicant has been elected.
Pursuant
to the notice issued on November 8,1990, by the respondent for its annual
general body meeting that was to take place on December 24, 1990, and in which
one of the subjects proposed in the said meeting was to elect directors in the
place of defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and one Karthikeyan who was co-opted during the
year in the place of Thiru Tarapore who resigned in June, 1990, and thereby
caused a vacancy and that as such, it was stated in the said notice that the above
person has offered himself for reappointment and, consequently, the applicants
herein were nominated as the directors of the respondent and that such
notification was also published in the Indian
Express dated December 14, 1990, and that after having deposited the
requisite sums as per section 257 of the Companies Act, the first respondent
has received the nomination from the applicants and that, accordingly, the
advertisement was given on December 14, 1990, as abovereferred. Thus, the
applicant's name had been proposed in the place of all the directors which was
one of the items in the agenda to be discussed in the annual general body
meeting of the respondent to be held on December 24, 1990.
Accordingly,
all the applicants were nominated for being elected to the post of retiring
directors as well as for the post of one director which had fallen vacant in
the annual general body meeting of the respondent, held on December 24, 1990,
and the election of directors was taken up on voting by show of hands, the plaintiffs/applicants
were declared had elected as directors, as the chairman directed a poll suo motu to be conducted on the same
date, the poll was conducted and the consequent counting was taken up on
December 26, 1991, and the results were announced on December 29,1991, wherein
all the applicants were declared to be duly elected. Consequently, resolutions
were passed to that effect and the same were entered in the minutes book of the
company as contemplated by law. While that was so, on January 2,1991, the
applicants were duly intimated about their having been elected as directors
and, accordingly, they had given their consent letters and the necessary
returns to the Registrar of Companies on January 7, 1991, have been filed since
then, the applicants had been acting as directors till this date. Frustrated at
this, defendants Nos. 4 and 5 in the suit having lost the election held, had
been writing certain letters to the first respondent stating falsely that they
had mustered some support to call for an extraordinary general body meeting on
April 2, 1991, and for which a notice has been given for holding such an
extraordinary general body meeting dated March 7, 1991.
In
the context of a valid election having been conducted and the applicants were
elected duly as provided by law and that the resolution has been entered into
the books of the respondent as provided under the provisions of the Companies
Act, the resolution itself has become final and cannot be questioned and it
cannot be held as null and void by a subsequent resolution and if at all the
requisitionists are interested, they could seek the remedy under section 284 of
the Companies Act. Based on these grounds, it was averred by the applicants
that the extraordinary general body meeting is illegal and in fact void as
evident from the explanatory statement given by the first respondent in the
notice itself. Apprehending that their rights are being prejudiced by the
proposed extraordinary general meeting to be held on April 2, 1991, or on any
other subsequent dates, an order of ad interim injunction is being sought for
against the respondent.
On
moving the above application urgently on March 26, 1991, this court on finding
a prima facie case in favour of
the applicants, granted the and interim injunction against the respondent and
thereby restrained the respondent from convening the extraordinary general body
meeting to be held on April 2, 1991, or on any other subsequent date.
The
fourth respondent in the suit, though not a party to this application, has
filed a counter-affidavit to the above application in his individual capacity
or as a member in which it was contended, inter alia, while admitting the averments made in paragraphs 2
and 3 of the affidavit filed by the applicant, that the president who was the
chairman of the meeting held on December 24, 1990, had announced a poll only in
accordance with the demand by this respondent and others. With regard to the
carrying out of the resolutions which were entered in the books of the company,
it was the contention of this respondent that the resolution proposing the
reappointment of this fourth respondent as the director, must be deemed to have
been passed as there were no votes given against the resolution by persons
present in person or by proxy at the meeting held on December 24, 1990, and
that thereafter, there was no vacancy for proposing any resolution for the
appointment of a director in his place and that as such, the resolutions
declared to have been passed are void under the provisions of sections 169 and
263 of the Companies Act.
It
was the substratum of the main contention of the defendant that this defendant
and others had to requisition a general meeting as the scrutineers appointed
for the poll had manipulated the poll result and the chairman and the board of
directors had accepted the poll result without taking into account the
objections taken by this defendant and other retiring directors. The said
requisition is in accordance with section 169 of the Companies Act and in
accordance with the articles of association of the company and they had called
for an extraordinary general body meeting held on April 2, 1991. In short, the
alleged resolutions entered in the books of the respondent are void by virtue
of the provisions of the company law and that, therefore, no proceedings are
necessary for the removal of any of the directors and that since the
requisition given for calling the extraordinary general body meeting has been
provided by the provisions of company law, the demand for calling the extraordinary
general body meeting by these respondents and another were deemed to be held
valid in law and that initiating the proceedings and obtaining the interim
order is quite against the interest of this defendant and that, therefore, the
respondent prays that in the interest of justice, the applicants should not be
allowed to function as directors in the context of the interim injunction
granted already. To the above extent, this respondent prays for the
modification of the order of interim injunction passed, by restraining the
applicants from in any manner acting as directors of the respondent, pending
disposal of the suit.
The
fifth defendant, Yamuna Reddy, in the suit also filed a counter-affidavit to
the above application in which she simply followed and endorsed the contentions
raised on behalf of the fourth defendant and prayed for the modification of the
ad interim injunction order passed against the first respondent and restraining
the applicant from acting as the director of the first respondent company.
The
first plaintiff, Thiru B. Sivaraman, has filed a reply affidavit to the
counter-affidavit filed by defendants Nos. 4 and 5 wherein he has denied each
and every one of the contentions raised by defendants Nos. 4 and 5, but at the
same time, reiterated his contentions made in the plaint itself.
Upon
the abovesaid pleadings, the question that arises for consideration is the
following:
"Whether
the applicants/plaintiffs have established a prima facie case to sustain the order of interim injunction passed
on March 26,1991, as absolute, till the disposal of the suit?"
Applications
Nos. 2597 and 2598 of 1991:
Both
defendants Nos. 4 and 5 in the suit have filed the abovesaid Applications Nos.
2597 and 2598 of 1991, under Order 14, rule 8 of the Original Side Rules and
Order 39, rule 4 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, for modification
of the order passed by this court in Original Application No. 288 of 1991 on
March 26, 1991, by restraining the applicants from in any manner acting as the
directors, on the result of the poll conducted at the 120th annual general body
meeting held on December 24, 1990, on the same ground they had raised in the
respective separate counter-affidavit filed in O.A. No. 288 of 1991. As I have
already briefed the main contentions raised in the counter-affidavit filed in
O.A. No. 288 of 1991, there exists no need to traverse each and every one of
the same.
Under
the above circumstances, the only question which arises for consideration is as
follows:
"Whether
the applicants in the above Applications Nos. 2597 and 2598 of 1991 have
established a prima facie case
to seek the indulgence of this court to modify the order of ad interim
injunction passed on March 26, 1991?"
O.A No. 289 of 1991 in C.S.
No. 421 of 1991:
The
applicants/plaintiffs have filed this application under Order 14, rule 8 of the
Civil Procedure Code, read with Order 39, rules 1 and 2 and section 151 of the
Civil Procedure Code, against the respondents for an order of interim
injunction and thereby restraining the respondents, their men and agents from
in any manner conducting the extraordinary general body meeting on April 2,
1991, or any other date for. considering the subjects proposed in the notice
dated March 7, 1991, pending disposal of the suit.
The
short facts as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the above
application are as follows:
The
applicants being the shareholders of the first respondent company which is one
incorporated under the Companies Act carrying on business of accepting deposits
and advancing loans for a long time as per the memorandum and articles of
association had attended the annual general body meeting of the first
respondent company in which respondents Nos. 2 to 4 sought re-election as
directors, but were not elected and that, in their place, new persons were
appointed as directors and that had been given effect to and they are
functioning as directors of the first respondent company and while that was so,
the applicants herein had come to see an advertisement caused in a Tamil news
daily, Dinamani dated March 11,
1991, that an extraordinary general body meeting of the first respondent has
been convened on April 2, 1991; and that when they made enquiries, they were
told by respondents Nos. 2 to 5 that they have challenged the validity of the
poll conducted in the extraordinary general body meeting held on December 24,
1990, and that since the first respondent had not agreed with the contention of
respondents Nos. 2 to 5, they had given a notice for holding an extraordinary
general body meeting of the first respondent and that the subjects proposed for
the agenda are to declare the poll conducted on December 24, 1990, void and for
electing respondents Nos. 2 to 5 as directors of the first respondent company.
On
the basis of these allegations, the applicants have averred that the proposed
action of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 is illegal, non est and cannot be permitted.
Since the applicants are affected by the proposal of respondents Nos. 2 to 5
individually and also as the shareholders of the first respondent and in order
to prevent the illegality, they had instituted the suit for declaration and
injunction and that, therefore, with a view to avoid any confusion to be
created in the proposed extraordinary general body meeting by respondents Nos.
2 to 5, the applicants want that the said respondents Nos. 2 to 5 are to be
restrained from convening the extraordinary general body meeting proposed to be
held on April 2, 1991, by means of an injunction as prayed for.
On
moving the said application urgently, in filing the suit in C.S. No. 421 of
1991, having identified with the prima
facie case inherent with the applicant, this court has granted the ad
interim injunction against respondents Nos. 2 to 5 on March 26, 1991.
The
fourth respondent, Thiru P. Obul Reddy, has filed a counter-affidavit in which
he contends, inter alia, while
admitting the poll of the first respondent conducted at the 120th annual
general body meeting held on December 24, 1990, that the resolution proposing
re-appointment of this respondent as a director must be deemed to have been
passed in accordance with section 189 of the Companies Act, as there were no
votes cast against the resolution by the persons present or by proxy at the
said meeting and that thereafter, there was no vacancy for proposing any
resolution for the appointment of a director in his place and that as such, the
resolutions declared to have been passed by the respondents are void, under the
provisions of the Companies Act.
While
admitting the averments made in para 3 of the affidavit, he contends further
that the scrutineers appointed for conducting the poll had since manipulated
the poll themselves and that the chairman of the meeting and the board of
directors had accepted the poll results without taking into account the
objection taken by these respondents and other retiring directors, the said
results claimed by the applicants effecting the appointment of new persons are
not valid in law and binding on him and that, therefore, this respondent wants
not only the application to be dismissed but also for vacating the order of
interim injunction passed in O.A. No. 289 of 1991.
The
fifth respondent, Thirumathi Yamuna Reddy, also filed a counter-affidavit
wherein she has followed the same contentions raised by the fourth defendant,
Thiru P. Obul Reddy, and endorsed the same views in praying for dismissing and
vacating the interim order passed already.
Dr.
N.V. Krishna, who has sworn the affidavit filed in support of the above
application, has filed a reply-affidavit, wherein he has specifically denied
and repudiated everyone of the contentions made by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in
their counter-affidavit and also reiterated his stand which was narrated in his
affidavit filed in support of the above application.
Upon
the above pleadings, the only question which arises for consideration is as
follows.
"Whether
the applicants have established a prima
facie case, warranting the indulgence of this court to sustain the order
of interim injunction passed on March 26,1991, as absolute against the
respondents?"
Applications Nos. 2595 of 1991 and 2596, of 1991:
On
the basis of the contentions raised in the counter-affidavit by respondents
Nos. 4 and 5 in Original Application No. 289 of 1991 who are the applicants in
the above respective applications, it is prayed for vacating the ad interim
injunction passed against the first respondent on March 26, 1991, on the same
grounds. Therefore, there exists no need for me to traverse each and every one
of the averments and the counter-affidavit once again for the purpose of the
above applications.
The
only question that arises for consideration, is as follows:
"Whether
the applicants/respondents Nos. 4 and 5 have made out a case to vacate the
order of interim injunction passed on March 26,1991, as prayed for in
Application No. 289 of 1991?"
As
the questions involved in all the above applications are identical and one and
the same, relating to the election of the first respondent as claimed by the
applicant and controverted by the respondent, I have proposed to dispose of all
these applications, together by common considerations.
The
relief claimed in the suit in C.S. No. 420 of 1991 is for a declaration that
the notice dated March 7, 1991, issued by the first defendant/respondent for
holding an extraordinary general meeting on April 2, 1991, is illegal, void and
non est in law and not binding on the plaintiffs/applicants and for a permanent
injunction restraining the first respondent and their men from holding an
extraordinary general meeting either on April 2, 1991, or on subsequent dates
pursuant to the notice dated March 7, 1991, issued by the first respondent.
This suit was filed by Mr. B. Sivaraman and four others who are the newly elected
directors of the first respondent and identical reliefs were asked for in C.S.
No. 421 of 1991 by Dr. N.V. Krishna, P.S. Ananthakrishnan and S. Muruganandan
in their capacity as shareholders of the. first respondent company. The reliefs
claimed in all the above applications are also identical with each other and
involve a common question of law and facts to be considered. The fact that the
first respondent company has been incorporated on 20th January, 1882, and that
the applicants and the respondents are the shareholders of the company and that
to elect the directors in order to fill up the vacancy that arose, the 120th
annual general meeting was held on December 24, 1990, and that at which
carrying on with other subject-matters as per agenda, it was decided that the
applicants were to be elected as directors and that, for the said purpose, the
chairman has ordered the poll and, accordingly, there was a contest for the
election of five directors of the first respondent company and that as such,
the poll was conducted and concluded, are all admitted. This was preceded by
the annual general body meeting of the first respondent held on December 24,
1990, as scheduled at Swamy Sankaradoss Kalai Arangam, at No. 153, Habibullah
Road, Madras 600 017, and it was presided over by Mr. K.D. Parekh, who
announced that the meeting had been attended by 810 members in person and that
there were 9,727 proxies lodged with the first respondent and that on
explaining the procedure to be followed for conducting the elections to be
directed by the chairman, counsel for the first respondent, Thiru T. Raghavan,
stated that every motion was to be voted individually, firstly, by show of
hands and then on poll, if directed by the chairman, and the poll was ordered
to be conducted by the chairman on the same date and it was scrutinized by
Messrs. D.G. Masilamani and S. Jayaraman and with the approval of all the
members present, the chairman directed that the members holding proxy be
allowed to use one poll paper for casting votes for themselves and on behalf of
the proxies. It was the case of the applicants that after the poll was
conducted on the same date, counting had taken place on 26th December, 1990,
after all the ballot boxes were duly sealed and kept under safe custody and
that after scrutiny, the result of the poll was announced on December 29, 1990,
declaring that all the applicants herein were declared as directors of the
first respondent which factum was duly recorded in the minutes book, maintained
for the general meeting of the first respondent and was signed by the chairman.
Then the newly elected applicants-directors had assumed office and their
consent was given in Forms Nos. 29 and 32, after having been duly filled up by
the first respondent and filed with the Registrar of Companies, Madras, for
intimating about the change in the composition of the board of directors of the
first respondent. Basing on the abovesaid facts, it was the contention of the
applicants in proving that as per the provisions of company law and the memorandum
and articles of association of the first respondent, the vacancy arising out of
the retirement of the four directors by rotation and one vacancy caused by the
resignation and death of one director, it was decided in the annual general
meeting held on December 24, 1990, under the chairmanship of Thiru K.D. Parekh,
while transacting several other businesses notified in the agenda by show of
hands, that the five applicants should be elected for the five vacancies as
directors of the board of the first respondent and on an explanatory mode or
procedure to be followed by the first respondent, all the members were present
and the poll was conducted as ordered by the chairman and counting had taken
place on December 26,1990, and after due scrutiny by the respondents, result of
the poll was announced on December 29, 1990, and in and by which, all the five
applicants were elected as the directors of the board of the first respondent which fact has been duly recorded in the minutes book of
the first respondent, maintained for the general meeting as signed by the
chairman and in implementing thereof, Forms Nos. 29 and 32 were also prepared
with the consent of the newly elected directors, viz., the applicants and the
Registrar of Companies was intimated of the change in the composition of the
board of directors and that in which the respondents who contested for election
had been defeated and that, therefore, everything has been duly and lawfully
carried out and there were no laches or infirmities during the completion of
the said process and that in pursuance thereof, the administration of the first
respondent is being carried on.
All the documents filed
along with the plaint numbering exhibits A-1 to A-25 have been relied on by the
applicants to substantiate their case abovereferred to. I may refer to the said
documents for the purpose of appreciating the facts involved in this
application. Exhibit A-1 is the printed book of the memorandum and articles of
association of the first respondent; exhibit A-2 is the printed copy of the
annual report of the first respondent for the 120th annual general body meeting
for the year 1989-90; exhibit A-3 is the copy of the notice published in the
newspaper, as contemplated under section 257(1A) of the Companies Act on behalf
of the first respondent exhibit A-4 is the photostat copy of the proceedings of
the 120th annual general body meeting held on December 24, 1990, at 9.30 a.m.
at Swami Sankaradoss Kalai Arangam, No. 153, Habibullah Road, T. Nagar, Madras
600 017, signed by the chairman on January 22, 1991. These documents assume
every significance in this case in the sense that the whole procedure which had
taken place on the annual general meeting held on December 24, 1990, has been
narrated as contemplated by law and these documents provide a clear answer to
the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents herein; exhibits A-5 to A-9
are the copies of letters addressed by the chairman of the annual general
meeting to all the applicants herein on January 2, 1991, intimating them that
they have been duly elected as the directors of the first respondent company;
exhibits A-10 to A-15 are the copies of the necessary forms filled up by the
first respondent-company as contemplated by the company law and sent to the
Registrar of Companies for legal intimation; exhibits A-16 to A-23 are the
copies of exchange of letters and reply letters among counsel for the
applicant, the first respondent and other respondents, reiterating their
contention made in the affidavits and the counter-affidavits. Exhibit A-24
dated March 4, 1991, is the explanatory statement given by Thiru T. Raghavan,
counsel for the first respondent; and, lastly, exhibit A-25 is the printed
notice dated March 7,1991, sent by the secretary of the first respondent, calling for the extraordinary
general meeting, issued under section 169 of the Companies Act, to be held on
April 2, 1991, to discuss and carry out the resolutions pertaining to the
result of the poll and the consequent resolutions passed on the appointment of
the applicants as directors at the 120th annual general body meeting of the
company announced on December 29, 1990, to be declared as void and that in
their places, Thiru C.A. Ramakrishnan, Thiru N. Seshachalam, Thiru P. Obul
Reddy and Thirumathi Yamuna Reddy have to be declared as directors and this
notice forms the basis for the filing of the above suit and applications by the
applicants.
The
plaintiff in C.S. No. 421 of 1991 also filed the printed memorandum and
articles of association covered under exhibit A-1; the printed annual report of
the 120th annual general body meeting of the first respondent for the year
1989-90 was also filed by the plaintiffs and marked as exhibit A-2; exhibit A-3
dated December 24, 1990, is the same copy of the proceedings of the 120th
annual general meeting of the shareholders, which was marked in the other suit;
exhibit A-4 is the copy of the report sent by scrutineers by name Messrs. S.
Jayaraman and D.G. Masilamani on December 26, 1990, to the chairman of the
meeting which assumes every importance and occupies a very predominant role in
the instant case about which I will discuss later; exhibit A-5 is the public
notice caused to be published in the English newspaper about the calling of the
extraordinary general meeting along with the explanatory statement by the
secretary of the first respondent as required under section 173 of the
Companies Act; exhibit A-6 is the copy of the same impugned notice marked as
exhibit A-2 5 in the other suit. The abovesaid documents which were relied on
by the plaintiffs in both the suits and the applicants in all the original
applications are more or less identical and one and the same.
A
careful perusal of exhibit A-4 in C.S. No. 420-of 1991, the copy of the
proceedings of the 120th annual general meeting of the shareholders of the
first respondent held on December 24,1990, at 9.30 a.m. at Swamy Sankaradoss
Kalai Arangam at No. 153, Habibullah Road, T. Nagar, Madras 600 017, signed by
the chairman of the said meeting provides a complete and clear answer to all
the disputes raised by the respondents herein. The other clinching document
available in this case marked as exhibit A-4 in C.S. No. 421 of 1991, is the
copy of the report of the scrutineers who scrutinized the poll result by name
Messrs. D. Jayaraman and D.G. Masilamani, dated December 26, 1990. Exhibits A-5
to A-10 and A-11 to A-15 in C.S. No. 420 of 1991 clearly demonstrate the fact
that consequent on the appointment of the applicants as directors on the basis
of exhibit A-4 in C.S. No. 421 of 1991, the same was duly intimated to all the
applicants by the chairman and the prescribed forms were filled up and sent to
the Registrar of Companies as provided by law and thus the resolutions passed
in the said annual general meeting and the subsequent resolutions were all duly
entered in the minutes book of the first respondent as provided under section
173 of the Companies Act. Exhibit A-4 filed in C.S. No. 421 of 1991, viz., the
report of the scrutineers, clinches the fact that the total votes polled on
that date are 68,582 and the number of invalid votes are 3,235 and deducting
the same, the valid votes polled on that date are 65,347. Then it was
categorised that among the said total, the number of votes polled in person are
33,501 and by proxy 35,081; itemising the votes polled for the respective
candidates who stood for contest, firstly, between Thiru C.A. Ramakrishnan and
the first applicant, Thiru B. Sivaraman, it seems that the first applicant,
Thiru B. Sivaraman, obtained 34,557 votes and Thiru C.A. Ramakrishnan obtained
30,783 votes, that, secondly, among the two candidates, Thiru N. Seshachalam
and Thiru T.T. Selvam, the second applicant, Thiru T.T. Selvam, obtained 35,074
votes as against 30,260 votes obtained by Thiru N. Seshachalam; that between
Thiru P. Obul Reddy and Thiru R.S. Jeevarathinam, Thiru P. Obul Reddy obtained
29,661 votes as against 35,683 votes obtained by Thiru R.S. Jeevarathinam, the
third applicant; that between Tmt. Yamuna Reddy and Thiru M.A. Mohanakrishnan,
Thiru M.A. Mohanakrishnan, the fourth applicant, secured 34,557 votes as
against Tmt. Yamuna Reddy who secured 30,790 and that the fifth applicant,
Thiru C.R. Vedachalam, alone contested and for whom among the shareholders of
the first respondent company who have participated in the poll on that date
cast their votes in favour of Thiru C.R. Vedachalam numbering 36,743 and
against him 28,088 votes.
It
has to be seen that on the basis of the votes secured on that date, the
applicants were declared as elected and the rival contestants, viz., the fourth
and the fifth defendants, were declared as defeated.
It
was the main plank of attack brought on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 and 5,
Thiru P. Obul Reddy and Tmt. Yamuna Reddy, that since there were no votes
polled against their candidature and they obtained considerable votes, they
should be deemed and declared as elected. Reiterating the contentions, Thiru G.
Subramaniam, counsel for the contesting respondents, strenuously argued before
me that since there were no votes polled against their clients and as they
secured a large number of votes, they are to be declared as elected in the said
annual general meeting and that the said aspect has not been considered either
by the scrutineers or by the chairman of the said meeting and the said election
claimed to have been conducted on December 26, 1990, has to be set aside and
that only with the said object, exhibit A-25 in C.S. No. 420 of 1991 and
exhibit A-6 in C.S. No. 421 of ,1991, the notice calling for the extraordinary
general meeting of the first respondent was being requisitioned by all the
members of the first respondent at the behest of the contesting respondents who
were defeated. Having perused very meticulously the report of the scrutineers
covered under exhibit A-4 filed in C.S. No. 421 of 1991, I feel totally unable
to subscribe any view in favour of the contentions of the contesting
respondents or the arguments advanced on their behalf by Thiru G. Subramanian,
learned counsel. There is a fallacy in his arguments that since there were no
votes polled against the candidates, viz., Thiru C.A. Ramakrishnan, Thiru N.
Seshachalam, Thiru P. Obul Reddy and Smt. Yamuna Reddy, they are to be declared
as elected. After a careful scrutiny of the said report, I am able to see that
for the vacancy of the directorship, there were two contestants by name Thiru
C.A. Ramakrishnan and Thiru B. Sivaraman between whom the latter has secured
more votes, that is, 34,557, than the former who secured 30,783; that between
Thiru N. Seshachalam, and Thiru T.T. Selvam, the latter has secured more votes,
i.e., 35,074 than the former who secured 30,260; that between Thiru P. Obul
Reddy and Thiru R.S. Jeevarathinam, the latter has sequred more votes, that is,
35,683 than the former who secured 29,661; and that between Tmt. Yamuna Reddy
and Thiru M.A. Mohanakrishnan, the latter has secured more votes, that is
34,557 than the former who secured 30,790 and that as such, the contestants who
have secured more votes than their rivals were declared as duly elected. The
votes were polled in person and by proxy and the total number of votes polled
are 65,347 and the voters by casting the votes preferred the said applicants to
the contesting respondents. In the cases of two persons contesting the
election, it is he who secured more votes who was declared as duly elected, but
in the case of a contest for one post of directorship, the question of votes
polled against the candidates does not arise, as was contended by learned
senior counsel. For example, Thiru C.R. Vedachalam, the fifth applicant herein,
is the only one candidate who stood for contesting the election for
directorship and among the total number of votes both in person and proxy,
36,743 votes were polled in his favour and 28,088 were polled against him. That
virtually means, 28,088 were against him but the majority of 36,743 votes were
polled in his favour which are more than the votes polled against him and he
was declared as elected. I would like to make it clear that in such of the
directorship posts, if there is a contest among two or more candidates, whoever
secures the majority of votes among the contesting candidates is the only one
criterion and that alone has to be taken into consideration for declaring him
elected. But, in the case of only one person seeking approval of his being
elected, then alone the question of polling the votes for and against him comes
into the picture. In the context of the above position, I may reject the
contentions raised on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 that since there were
no votes against them, they should be declared to be elected as directors. In
my firm view, their contentions seem to be absolutely meaningless and no legal
sanctity can be attached to that and cannot be sustained for any moment.
Then
another attack was brought on behalf of the respondents that the scrutineers
appointed during the annual general meeting, in filing the report, have
mishandled and committed so many malpractices in declaring the applicants as
elected and they have not adopted the normal procedure and mode and that,
therefore, their contentions cannot be accepted. To substantiate this written
plea, there were no arguments advanced by counsel on behalf of the respondents.
Even so, there was no material or iota of evidence made available to suspect
the report filed by the scrutineers, covered under exhibit A-4. The
counter-affidavit filed by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 contains no iota of
materials to substantiate the plea of misdeeds, malpractices and mishandling in
the votes polled in preparing a report by the scrutineers. Therefore, I may
straightaway reject their contention as not at all maintainable either in law
or on facts.
But
a careful and meticulous perusal of the report filed by the scrutineers with
all the details and the proceedings of the report of the annual general meeting
held on December 24, 1990, proves that it is a vital document which clearly
demonstrates the fact that the poll conducted during the 120th annual general
meeting of the first respondent and completed by electing the fifth applicant
herein, as was rightly and justifiably contended by Thiru V.S. Subramaniam,
learned counsel appearing for the applicant in C.S. No. 420 of 1991 and Thiru
C. Harikrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff in C.S. No. 421 of
1991, that the election has been conducted and held lawfully and in keeping
with the legal norms as contemplated by law and procedure being followed by the
respondents, as advised by their legal adviser and as such, the said aspect was
proved and recognised by the resolutions passed and entered in the minutes book
which was duly intimated to the Registrar of Companies as contemplated by law.
All the above facts have been clearly fortified by the minutes of the annual
general body meeting held on December 24, 1990, prepared by the chairman of the
first respondent company.
On
a careful perusal of the entire documents relied on behalf of the
applicants/plaintiffs in both the suits, I am fully satisfied to hold that
there are no infirmities or laches or any malpractices committed by the
scrutineers on behalf of the applicants/plaintiffs in conducting the elections
and electing of the applicants herein as abovereferred. Accordingly, the
recomposition of the board of directors on the basis of the election results
was duly intimated to the Registrar of Companies, as contemplated under the
provisions of the Companies Act, after having entered the said resolutions in
the minutes book of the annual general meeting of the first respondent company.
At this juncture, it will be worth referring to sections 193 to 195 of the
Companies Act, 1956, as amended up-to-date.
"193.
(1) Every company shall cause minutes of all proceedings of every general
meeting and of all proceedings of every meeting of its board of directors or of
every committee of the board, to be kept by making within thirty days of the
conclusion of every such meeting concerned, entries thereof in books kept for
that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
(1A)
Each page of every such book shall be initialled or signed and the last page of
the record of proceedings of each meeting in such books shall be dated and
signed—
(a) in
the case of minutes of proceedings of a meeting of the board or of a committee
thereof, by the chairman of the said meeting or the chairman of the next
succeeding meeting;
(b) in
the case of minutes of proceedings of a general meeting, by the chairman of the
same meeting within the aforesaid period of thirty days or in the event of the
death or inability of that chairman within that period, by a director duly
authorised by the board for the purpose".
It
is relevant to advert to section 194 of the Act which reads as follows:
"Minutes
of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence
of the proceedings recorded therein".
This
section is followed by section 195 which occupies a significant role and the
same is as follows:
"Where
minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of the company or of any
meeting of its board of directors or of a committee of the board (have been
kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193), then, until the
contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and
held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and in particular,
all appointments of directors or liquidators made at the meeting shall be
deemed to be valid".
Thus,
a cursory perusal of this section 195 regarding the presumption to be drawn
where minutes of the company duly drawn and signed, clearly proves that the
presumption arising in this section is a rebuttable one by adducing contrary
evidence; that if a proper minutes book is kept and proceedings of meetings are
duly recorded, it shall be deemed that the meeting has been duly called, held and
all proceedings thereat have duly taken place and the consequent appointment of
director or directors has been validly made. If the minutes are not recorded or
signed within the prescribed period, then it is to be presumed that it is not
properly kept and it will not be receivable in evidence.
Keeping
the above legal norm provided in section 195, based on sections 193 and 194 of
the Companies Act to the facts of the present one, with reference to exhibit
A-4, the proceedings of the minutes, covering the 120th annual general body
meeting of the first respondent held on December 24, 1990, at a place called
Swami Sankaradoss Kalai Arangam, T. Nagar, Madras, from 9.30 a.m. till the
evening, as was signed by its chairman, Thiru K.D. Parekh, duly passed and entered
in the minutes book, it is manifest that the same squarely comes within the
legal limbs of the above provisions of law.
The
legal presumption arising out of this minutes as was entered in the books of
the annual general body meeting of the company by its chairman and which was
duly intimated to the Registrar of Companies, as contemplated under section 264
of the Companies Act, clearly and totally is in favour of the applicants herein
and unless and until the contrary is proved by respondents Nos. 4 and 5, the
meeting held on December 24, 1990, shall be deemed to be duly called and held
and all the proceedings shall be held as having duly taken place and in
particular, the election of all these applicants as directors of the board of
directors of the first respondent shall be valid one. However, the onus cast on
the person who challenges the resolution or the entering of the minutes on the
ground of malpractice or misdeed is only upon the contesting respondents Nos. 4
and 5 as has been clearly provided by this section and though the respondents
had attempted to cast aspersions or a challenge against the lawful contention
of the election of the applicants, they have virtually and deliberately failed
to prove even a semblance of proof as contemplated by this section.
Under
the circumstances, I am fully satisfied to hold that in conducting the annual
general body meeting of the first respondent on December 24, 1990, as claimed
and contended on behalf of the applicants/plaintiffs, is valid, lawful and
completed without any iota of laches or infirmities or irregularities
whatsoever and that with regard to the same in the context of the duly recorded
minutes in the books of the first respondent as duly intimated to the Registrar
of Companies, as provided under sections 177, 178, 179, 184 and 264 of the
Companies Act, it has been clearly made out that the applicants have
established a strong prima facie
case against the respondents herein.
I
have carefully perused the memorandum and articles of association of the first
respondent which is available in the printed book form covered under exhibit
A-l in both the above original applications. The memorandum and articles of
association of the first respondent do not contain any article providing the
mode upon which the elections to the board of directors to fill up the
vacancies are to be conducted. In the absence of any specific articles or
provision, what is the mode of election to be followed in electing the
directors or the managing directors of the company, viz., the first respondent.
It is the case of the plaintiff that on the date of the annual general body
meeting held on December 24, 1990, all the five applicants were declared as the
real contestants by show of hands. The chairman who presided over the meeting
then ordered the poll and, consequently, the legal adviser of the first
respondent, viz., learned counsel, Thiru T. Raghavan, explained the various
procedures and modes to be followed in conducting the poll for electing the
five directors of the board of the first respondent company to all the
shareholders and members of the first respondent, who were on the eve of the
election and thus everyone was apprised of the mode and that at the meeting,
the contesting respondents Nos. 4 and 5 as well as the other defeated
candidates were also present. It has to be seen that it is not the case of the
respondent that they were not aware of the mode of election followed by the
chairman of the annual general meeting or the manner in which the poll was
conducted on the subsequent dates. It is the undisputed case among the parties
that pursuant to the decision taken in the annual general meeting held on
December 24, 1990, by appointing the scrutineers, the poll was conducted on
December 26, 1990, and that following the poll, the scrutineers had taken
charge and they completed their job and the chairman announced the result of
the poll on December 29, 1990. Therefore, with regard to the mode of poll
conducted by the first respondent company in electing the five directors, there
is no dispute among the parties herein. What the respondent contended was that
the scrutineers appointed for the purpose of completing the poll have committed
malpractices, misdeeds and so many nefarious activities in declaring all the
present applicants as the successful candidates. But for which, as I have
already observed, the proceedings of the minutes of the annual general meeting
held on December 24, 1990, and the report of the scrutineers, with the
subsequent documents, exhibits A-6 to A-15 would clearly provide a fitting
reply and answer for the same. It, therefore, follows that the contesting
respondents were not able to point out a single infirmity in the results of the
poll conducted by the first respondent on December 24, 1990, and announced on December
29, 1990. They have miserably failed to do so and except a mere self-serving
and ipse dixit of the claim, there is no semblance or iota of evidence made
available before this court to substantiate the contentions of the respondents
herein. Their contentions with regard to the above said aspect of poll is
vitiated by fraud and so on, remains as a solitary aspect as not having been
brought to prove to any extent. On the other hand, by adducing documentary
evidence and written pleadings, the applicants had candidly established a
strong prima facie case in
their favour against the respondent and about the mode of conducting the
elections and the result of the same, consisting of every legal formalities had
been performed in doing so. In this context, the arguments advanced on behalf
of the plaintiffs in both the suits by Thiru V.S. Subramaniam and Thiru
Harikrishnan, learned counsel for the applicants in both the suits, are to be
countenanced in their entirety and, accordingly, I accept the same.
Then
comes the question of the legal aspects of the requisition given by the
respondents and their group, viz., the defeated shareholders and their
supporters calling for a requisition to the first respondent company to convene
the extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the first respondent,
covered under exhibits A-6 and A-25, in both the above suits. A casual look at
the notice dated March 7, 1991, abovereferred to clinches the fact that this
notice has been given under section 169 of the Companies Act, 1956, for the
purposes of convening the extraordinary general meeting to consider the
business set out in the agenda by means of carrying out the resolution, viz., (i) to declare that the result of the
poll on the resolutions on the appointment of directors held on 24th December,
1990, at the 120th annual general meeting of the company and announced on 29th
December, 1990, and (ii) to
declare that Thiruvalargal C.A. Ramakrishnan, N. Seshachalam, P. Obul Reddy and
Smt. Yamuna Reddy, the defeated candidates, as the directors of the company.
This notice has been given in compliance with the legal terms provided under
section 169 of the Companies Act. On receipt of this notice on February 18,
1991, the first respondent company sought legal opinion and gave an explanatory
statement. It was on the basis of this notice that the proposed calling for the
extraordinary general meeting of the first respondent by the requisitionists of
this notice has been stayed by the order of this court, on moving the abovesaid
applications, urgently.
Thiru
G. Subramaniam, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent,
contends by relying on this section, viz., section 169 of the Companies Act,
that the requisitionists had complied with all the legal norms and ingredients
in sending this notice to the first respondent calling for the extraordinary
general meeting of the first respondent by virtue of the provision of this
section and that the requirement provided in this section amounts to a
mandatory one, the first respondent cannot evade the calling of the
extraordinary general body meeting or refuse to comply with the demand made
therein for the reason that this section is an exhaustive one and provided
every remedy to such of the shareholders who may have every grievance over the
mode of functioning of the directors of a company and that, therefore, the
prayer asked for by the contesting respondents in the respective applications
in both the suits, can safely be granted.
At
this juncture, it may become useful to refer to section 169 of the Companies
Act, which is extracted as hereunder, though not in full, but with the relevant
clauses alone:
"169.
Calling of extraordinary general
meeting.—(1) The board
of directors of a company shall, on the requisition of such number of members
of the company as is specified in sub-section (4), forthwith proceed duly to
call an extraordinary general meeting of the company.
(2)
The requisition shall set out the matters for the consideration of which the
meeting is to be called, shall be signed by the requisitonists, and shall be
deposited at the registered office of the company.
(3)
The requisition may consist of several documents in like form, each signed by
one or more requisitionists".
Then
the relevant clause for the purpose of this case is sub-clause (6) which reads
as follows:
"If
the board does not, within twenty-one days from the date of the deposit of a valid requisition in regard to any
matters, proceed duly to call a meeting for the consideration of those matters
on a day not later than forty-five days from the date of the deposit of the
requisition, the meeting may be called—
(a) by the requisitionists themselves,
(b) in
the case of a company, having a share capital, by such of the requisitionists
as represent either a majority in value of the "paid- up share capital
held by all of them or not less than one-tenth of such of the paid-up share
capital of the company as is referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (4), whichever is less, "...
Sub-section
(7)(a) has some relevance to be
referred to which is as follows:
"
(a) shall be called in the same
manner, as nearly as possible, as that in which meetings are to be called by
the board; but
(b) shall not be held after the expiration
of three months from the date of the deposit of the requisition,"
Thus,
it has been made clear that if the respondent company received a notice from
the required number of shareholders, under this section, that they intended to
move resolutions for. the removal of the applicants who were the directors and
also to move resolutions for appointment of other persons as directors, then it
was for the company to circulate the notice to all the directors and that upon
doing so, the company should call for an extraordinary general meeting for the
purpose of carrying on the business specified in the said notice and in the
event of not convening the extraordinary general meeting, it was provided in
this section that the requisitionists may by themselves convene the
extraordinary general meeting after and within the stipulated time and carry
out the resolution.
It
has to be seen that a legal obligation is placed on a company to convene the
extraordinary general meeting on the receipt of a valid notice under section
169 of the Companies Act, and the convening of an extraordinary general meeting
is mandatory. If that is so, then the contesting respondents along with their
supporters may subsequently add and carry the resolutions as clearly specified
in the notice, exhibit A-25, in this case and that in such position, the duly
elected directors, viz., the applicants herein, are to be removed which no law
would recognize and it follows to that extent, the mandatory provisions and
requirement provided under section 169 of the Companies Act are to be followed
by the first respondent company.
In
the context of the specific purpose and object, the respondents had called for
the extraordinary general meeting, taking shelter under section 169 of the
Companies Act in exhibit A-25, the notice dated March 7, 1991, to remove all
the applicants herein who were duly elected in a poll conducted in accordance
with the procedure and accepted mode, and announced that there were no laches
of any kind in appointing the requisitionists themselves, as directors, in
their place. This anomaly may provide a good ground to stop the normal and
regular administration of the first respondent company, under the shelter of
section 169 of the Companies Act.
Nevertheless,
I may observe in the above context that what subsection (6) of section 169 of
the Act provides is that the requisitionists may themselves call a meeting, if
the board does not call a meeting within 21 days from the date of deposit of a
valid requisition. The word "valid" provided in this sub-section
clearly indicates that the requisition which was made must be valid and lawful.
In other words, such a requisition was for consideration of a resolution which
would amount per se to a valid requisition; otherwise, it would clearly mean that
the directors were not required to call a meeting. May be true that the word
"valid", adopted in this section, has no reference to the object of
the requisition but rather to the requirements in that section itself.
Therefore, it is clear that what is required to be seen is whether the
requisition deposited with the first respondent was in accordance with the
provisions of this section, as to its contents and other aspects. But, if it is
considered to be valid, then the directors of the company shall not refuse to
act on the requisition, but if the object for which the requisition was made is
not for carrying out a valid purpose, then it may provide a speculation or a
deadlock in this context. It is only at this juncture, that the applicants had
approached this court for their redressal, by means of granting interim
injunction and that accordingly, on finding a prima facie case, this court had granted the order and the same
is in force.
Here
is a case in which it has been candidly established that the election of the
applicants/plaintiffs was lawfully and legally conducted pursuant to all the
legal formalities and lawful modes accepted and adopted and entered in the
minutes book of the company and followed by duly intimating to the Registrar of
Companies in compliance with all the legal formalities which would virtually
mean that the resolution carried in the annual general meeting held, has been
fully implemented and accordingly, all the applicants and plaintiffs have been
working constituting the board of directors of the first respondent and
discharging their duties in carrying out the administration of the first
respondent.
Then
the question that remains to be solved is what is the remedy open to the
applicants herein in the context of a notice lawfully complying with the
ingredients contemplated under section 169 of the Companies Act given by the
respondent herein contemplating their removal and appointing the respondents
and their men as directors of the company, under the pretext of the majority?
If I answer this question, that the applicant has no remedy, then, I am afraid
that I shall be guilty of not rendering justice to the parties and I shall be
guilty of encouraging the respondents in dislodging the due and lawful election
conducted by the first respondent. A careful perusal of almost all the relevant
provisions contained in the company law clinches the fact that no specific
provision has been provided in the said Act projecting a remedy to the
aggrieved person like the applicants in the instant case. But, in the context
of the present position, I am of the firm view that this court can interfere in
a matter of this kind and provide a legal remedy to the aggrieved person, viz.,
the applicants herein, because I find that there is no provision, barring the
jurisdiction of the civil court in matters where relief is sought for in
respect of the personal rights of the shareholders, directors and so on, such
denial of their right of voting or attending the general meeting and so on. It
has to be seen further that the ordinary civil courts are not deprived of their
jurisdiction to decide the rights of parties except where the Companies Act
expressly excludes it such as in matters relating to winding up. It is,
therefore, clear that in the present context, section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure can be made applicable to cases of this nature, except where the
jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly excluded. It would follow that the
civil court has jurisdiction in respect of matters "falling within the jurisdiction
of this court, having jurisdiction under the Companies Act which would mean
that the power or jurisdiction of the civil court operates only in respect of
matters falling within the Companies Act. It is also the accepted norm that as
a rule, except in matters for which the Companies Act itself provides remedies,
the civil court may have jurisdiction over all other matters of civil nature.
In
this context, it has become useful for me to refer at this stage to section 9
of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as follows:
"9.
Courts to try all civil suits unless
barred.—The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained)
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation I.—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is
contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may
depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or
ceremonies.
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial
whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such
office is attached to a particular place".
A
mere reading of this section visualises the fact that in so far as the
jurisdiction of the civil court is concerned, there shall be a presumption in
favour of its jurisdiction and to have it otherwise, the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and that such
exclusive jurisdiction must be explicitly expressed or merely implied. It,
therefore, follows that there must be a clear provision of law available
ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court which must be strictly considered
and that the onus for the same lies on the party who claims the ousting of the
jurisdiction.
Importing
the said legal norm and the presumption I find that there is no difficulty in
holding that the civil court shall take cognizance of every matter, because it
possesses jurisdiction to do so under the purview of section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and not because of anything contained in the Companies Act.
Having followed the above legal norm, I am able to gauge that the personal
right conferred in favour of all the applicants herein, viz., the directorship
of the board of directors of the first respondent company is at stake by the
contemplated convening of an extraordinary general meeting as specifically
provided under the notice given by virtue of section 169 of the Companies Act,
covered under exhibits A-6 and A-25 in both the suits, the personal right and
interest of the applicants will be dissipated, if allowed.
Having
considered the established factual aspects of the case, I am so clear in my
mind to hold that the respondents are not entitled to give notice pursuant to
the legal ingredients provided under section 169 of the Companies Act to call
for an extraordinary general meeting of the first respondent for the purpose
specified in the said notice for which, they are not legally entitled to do so.
The reason being is that it may be true that after the election was over, the
defeated candidates, viz., the respondents and their supporters may be able to
muster huge strength by adopting one mode or other obviously known to
themselves and that in consequence thereof, the respondents would have been
able to comply with the legal requirements provided under section 169 of the
Companies Act in calling for an extraordinary general meeting. But that
strength of the respondent cannot be allowed to obliterate or remove the
personal remedy provided to all the applicants herein by dislodging themselves
from their directorship who were duly elected under the due process, mode and
law. There is no law to recognize such kind of covert act now being adopted by
the respondents. It does not mean that the respondents are remedyless, but what
they could say at the present circumstances is that since they are not entitled
to, in my view, to convene the extra-ordinary general meeting for the purpose
of removing the directors from the directorship of the first respondent, but to
declare them as self-styled directors of the first respondent. At best, in my
firm view, the respondents can wait till the next vacancy arises either by
rotation or otherwise in the board of directors of the first respondent and
that before the same occurs, they are not entitled to convene the extraordinary
general meeting for the purpose mentioned in the notice covered under exhibits
A-6 and A-25 in the respective suits and for which there is no law recognising
the activities of the respondent in dislodging the applicants from their duly
elected board of directors and declare themselves as directors of the first
respondent company which may at the extreme amount to a self-styled one. In the
context of the pleadings raised in the affidavit as well as the pleadings
narrated in the plaint and by the documentary evidence relied on on behalf of
the applicants/plaintiff in both the cases, Thiru Harikrishnan and Thiru V.S.
Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the applicants/plaintiffs, would
strenuously and justifiably contend that if the order of ad interim injunction
granted already is not made absolute or vacated, then it would confer every
right or strength to the respondents to virtually stop the entire
administration of the first respondent by dislodging the applicants from their
duly elected directorship position and the respondents would occupy the said
position, which would cause every hindrance and irreparable loss and prejudice
to the applicants herein and that further, on such contingency, the entire
provisions of the company law would be defeated. There is every force in the
argument of learned counsel for the plaintiffs. Per contra, learned counsel,
Thiru G. Subramaniam, was not able to counter the arguments advanced on behalf
of the applicants.
One
of the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents was that by virtue of
the combined effect of sections 169 and 263 of the Companies Act, by carrying
out a single resolution for the appointment of all the applicants herein as
directors of the board of the first respondent, they are necessarily to be
removed, but since the very resolution entered in the books of the first
respondent itself is not valid under the above sections of law. Having
considered the gamut of sections 169 read with section 263 of the Companies Act
to the facts of the instant case, I am so clear in my mind that the above
contentions of the respondents cannot be sustained for any purpose for the
simple reason that all the applicants herein have not been appointed by
carrying out a single resolution held on December 24, 1990. But this is a case
where all the five applicants were declared to be the nominees for the election
by show of hands and consequently, the chairman of the annual general meeting
ordered the poll and in pursuance thereof the poll was conducted in accordance
with the mode announced by the legal adviser of the first respondent and
explained in the open meeting as evident from the explanatory statement given
by the first respondent and scrutineers were appointed by the chairman as
provided by law and they have submitted their report on the basis of which the
chairman has declared and announced the result of the poll by getting the
consent of the applicants, complied with the legal requirements as provided
under section 264 of the Companies Act. In the context of the above compliance
with all the legal ingredients and formalities by the applicants as I have
referred to, I feel totally unable to accept the contention raised in the
counter-affidavit as well as the arguments advanced by learned counsel, Thiru
G. Subramanian on behalf of the respondents that the election was vitiated by
fraud.
Then
learned counsel, Thiru V.S. Subramanian and Thiru Harikrishnan, appearing for
the plaintiff in both the suits have cited the following text books and
case-laws in support of the contentions and arguments advanced on behalf of the
applicants.
(1) Gold Company, In re [1874-1880] All
ER (reprint) 957 at 964; [1879] 11 Ch 701 (Ch D),
(2) Palmer's Company Law, 22nd edition,
at page 530,
(3) Sections
193, 195, 177, 179, 257, 195 and 505 of the Companies Act,
(4) Shackleton on Meetings (Company Law), 6th edition (1977), at pages 198 and 199,
(5) Holmes v. Keyes (Lord) [1958] 28 Comp Cas 414; [1958] 2 All
ER 129 (CA), and
(6) Shaw v. Tati Concessions Ltd. [1913] 1 Ch 292.
Per
contra, relying on sections 169, 177, 178, 179 and 184 of the Companies Act,
Thiru G. Subramaniam, appearing for the respondent, added the following
case-laws in support of the arguments advanced by him on behalf of the
respondents:
(1) Isle of Wight Railway Company v. Tahourdin [1884] 25 Ch 320, 334 (Ch
D),
(2) Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Madhav L. Apte [1975] 45 Comp Cas 574
(Bom) at pages 584, 585,
(3) Pennington's Company Law, fifth
edition, at page 724,
(4) Life Insurance Corporation of India v.
Escorts Limited [1986] 59 Comp
Cas 548; [1986] 1 SCJ 38,
(5) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358.
(6) Raghunath Swarup Mathur v. Dr. Raghuraj Bahadur Mathur [1967] 37 Comp Cas 304; AIR 1967 All
145,
(7) K.P.M Aboobucker v. K.
Kunhamoo, AIR 1958 Mad 287, and lastly,
(8) Hakhitan Law of Meetings at page 115.
I
have carefully perused the above text books on company law and the case-laws
cited above, in the context of the proved and established factual aspects of
the instant case. Though I have absolutely no discontent with the legal ratios
held out in the above case-laws as well as the text books pertaining to the
rights of the shareholders of a company and the various modes to be adopted in
appointing and removing the directors and conducting the elections and so on,
since they were on different facts not at all germane to the present case, the
ratio held therein may not render any help or assistance to the respective
parties in this case. Therefore, under the circumstances, I feel that it is
totally not necessary to traverse or import or refer to any of the citations
individually one by one in this case.
On
the basis of the pleadings and the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties
by the respective learned counsel, I have fully considered the same to the very
depth of the matter and I am so clear in my mind to hold that the plaintiffs in
both the suits, viz., the applicants, being the elected directors of the first
respondent duly elected as the shareholders of the first respondent company
have established a strong prima facie
case in their favour against the respondents and that there was no iota of
evidence even to the extent of semblance of prima facie are not available on behalf of the respondents and
that, therefore, I am fully satisfied to accept the case advanced on behalf of
the applicants herein. In the result, I feel totally unable to accept any of the
arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents herein, nor their contentions
raised in the affidavit.
In
the result, I answer point No. 1 in both the Original Applications Nos. 288 and
289 of 1991, in favour of the applicants/plaintiffs and with regard to the
points in Applications Nos. 2597 and 2598 of 1991 and 2595 and 2596 of 1991, I
answer the same against the applicants, viz., the contesting respondents.
Accordingly,
I hereby allow the Original Applications Nos. 288 and 289 of 1991. The order of
interim injunction passed on March 26, 1991, is hereby made absolute till the
disposal of the suit, as contemplated by Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code
and sections 36 and 37 of the Specific Relief Act. Accordingly, both the above
applications are allowed with no order as to costs.
Applications Nos.
2595, 2596, 2597 and 2598 of 1991 filed by the respondents/defendants Nos. 4
and 5 fail and, accordingly, the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
v.
Venire Industries Ltd.
Y.K.
Sabharwal, C.J.
and S.H. Kapadia, J.
Appeal
No. 1038 of 1999
NOtice of
motion No. 2696 of 1999
Suit No.
5010 of 1999
Section 81 of the Companies Act, 1956 - Further
issue of capital - Rights issue - Defendant No. 1 company decided to increase
paid-up share capital by issue of equity right shares on pro rata basis to
shareholders - After expiry of time specified in offer letter, defendant No. 1
company decided to allot right shares of plaintiff’s quota to defendant No. 2
- Plaintiff filed suit against action of defendant company and interim relief
to restrain defendants from taking any steps pursuant to resolutions passed in
respect of allotment of right shares was sought - Facts revealed that
defendants made repeated requests welcoming plaintiff company to put in funds
in proportion of their shareholding by contributing to rights issue but at no
stage plaintiff was interested in contributing any amount in defendant No. 1
company - Whether it could be said that intentions of plaintiff were not honest
and further since suit was filed two years after allotment of right issue,
question of injuncting defendants from taking any steps pursuant to resolutions
in respect of allotment of rights issue did not arise - Held, yes
Section 252, read with section 291, of the
Companies Act, 1956 read with Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Directors - Number of - Plaintiff No. 2 was Chairman of
plaintiff No. 1 company and defendant No. 2 was Chairman and Managing Director
of defendant No. 1 company - Memorandum of Understanding was executed between
plaintiff No. 2 and defendant No. 2, which, inter alia, provided that till
plaintiff company held share capital in defendant company of face value of Rs.
10 lakhs, plaintiff company would continue to have a representative on board of
directors of defendant company and that number of directors on board of directors
of defendant company would not exceed three - In board meeting defendant
company proposed to induct defendant No. 3 as fourth director - Banking upon
MoU, plaintiff, filed suit seeking to restrain defendant from increasing number
of directors - Whether it is impermissible to construe an agreement between
shareholders as a contract binding on company even if company has taken note of
pooling agreement or even if company has acted thereon - Held, yes - Whether
specific performance of pooling agreements between shareholders to vote in
particular manner cannot be extended to denude or sterilise powers of directors
and any such agreement would be unenforceable - Held, yes - Whether pooling
agreement can be between directors regarding their powers as directors - Held,
no - Whether shareholders can infringe upon directors’ fiduciary rights and
duties - Held, no - Whether directors can enter into agreement thereby agreeing
not to increase number of directors in absence of such restriction in Articles
of Association - Held, no - Whether, therefore, Memorandum of Understanding to
extent it provided that number of Directors would not exceed three till
plaintiff company held share capital in defendant company of face value of Rs.
10 lakhs, could not be specifically enforced and in that view question of
restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by issue of interim injunction did not arise
- Held, yes
Facts
Plaintiff No. 2 was the Chairman of plaintiff
No. 1 company. The defendant No. 2 was the Chairman and Managing Director of
Defendant No. 1 company which had three directors on its Board of Directors.
Defendant No. 1 was younger brother of plaintiff No. 2. A Memorandum of
Understanding was executed between the two brothers under which the plaintiff
No. 2, his wife and family trust, which held 10,551 shares equivalent to 30 per
cent of the issued capital of defendant company, agreed to transfer, without
any monetary consideration, the said shares in favour of defendant No. 1. The
plaintiff company owned 40 per cent of the issued capital of defendant company.
The Memorandum of Understanding inter
alia, provided that till plaintiff company held share capital in
defendant company of the face value of Rs. 10 lakhs, it would continue to have
a representative on Board of Director of defendant company and that the number
of Directors on the Board of Directors of defendant company would not exceed
three, out of which two should be the nominees of defendant No. 2 and one would
always be the nominee of the plaintiff company.
The difference between the two brothers
started when defendant No. 1 company in
its meeting decided to increase the paid-up capital by issue of equity
rights shares on pro rata basis
to the shareholders. It was resolved that, after the expiry of time specified
in the offer letter or on receipt of earlier intimation from the person to whom
such notice was given that he declined to accept the shares offered, the Board
of Directors might dispose them of in such manner as they thought most
beneficial to the company. According to the plaintiffs, the offer of allotment of
the rights shares was not sent to/received by them. That had however been
disputed by the defendents. Defendant No. 1 company decided to allot rights
shares of the quota of the plaintiff company to the defendant No. 2 after
expiry of stipulated time. In further meeting the defendant No. 1 company
decided to issue second rights issue which was objected by the plaintiffs on
the ground that the disputes relating to first rights issue had not been
resolved. In the board meeting, the defendant company, inter alia, proposed to induct defendant No. 3 as the fourth
director. This was objected to on the ground that the proposed appointment of
additional director was contrary to Memorandum of Understanding. The plaintiffs
filed suit seeking interim relief by restraining defendants from taking any
steps pursuant to the resolution passed in respect of the allotment of rights
shares and restraining the appointment of any Additional Director on the Board
of Directors of defendant company.
Held
As regards rights
issue :
On perusal of
letters exchanged between the two brothers it was difficult to accept the
contention that the Letter of Offer was not sent to the plaintiff company. At
no stage, the plaintiffs were interested in contributing any amount in
defendant No. 1 company. In none of the letters it was stated that the
plaintiff company was interested in subscribing to the rights shares. What the
plaintiffs had been stating in the correspondence and that too in the guarded
language was that they would consider the offer of allotment of rights shares.
In the Letter of Offer which defendant No. 1 said was sent to the plaintiff,
it had also been stated that if offer was not accepted, the first
Defendant-company would consider grant of additional shares to others. There was
no other applicant, except defendant No. 2 who had sought allotment of
additional shares.
If the object of
defendants was to keep plaintiffs in dark, they would not have written letters
to plaintiffs, which were all admitted and had rather been acknowledged by
plaintiff. Repeated requests were made welcoming plaintiff company to put in
funds in proportion of their shareholding by contributing to the rights issue.
If the intentions of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were not honest, they would not
have sent the type of letters actually sent. Further, on these facts, it was
also not possible to accept the contention that defendant No. 2 was an
interested Director and there was no quorum for the meeting as urged on behalf
of the plaintiffs. Further, the allotment of the first rights issue was made in
August, 1997. The present suit was filed two years later. The question of
injuncting the defendants from taking any steps pursuant to or in
implementation of or in furtherance of the resolution in respect of the allotment
of rights issue did not arise. Defendant No. 2 did not deserve to be restrained
from exercising his rights on the basis of the rights shares. At this stage,
the said allotments could not be held to be void.
As regards resolution
to increase number of directors :
Defendant No. 1 was
a closely-held family company, though some outsiders, family friends and
relatives had also a small shareholding. There was no restriction in the
Articles of Association of defendant No. 1 of the type contemplated by clause 8
of the Memorandum of Understanding regarding number of Directors. It had been
provided in the Articles of Association that until otherwise determined by a
general meeting, the number of Directors would be not less than three and not
more than twelve. It had also been provided that the Board would have power at
any time and from time to time to appoint any person as a Director as an
addition to the Board but the total number of directors would not any time
exceed the maximum number fixed by the Articles. Section 252 of the of the
Companies Act, inter alia, provides that every public company shall
have at least three Directors. There had been no amendment of Articles of
Association on the aspect of number of Directors. But for clause 8 of the MoU
the board of directors had the power to appoint any person as a Director as
provided in the Articles of Association.
The question was
whether a shareholder in his capacity as a Director can be injuncted or not to
vote for increasing the number of Directors in view of terms of agreement but
in absence of any such restriction in the Articles of Association. Regarding
pooling agreement, it may be noted that it is an agreement between two or more
shareholders which generally provides that in exercising any voting rights, the
shares held by the shareholders shall be voted as provided therein; it is a
contract to the effect that the shares held by them shall be voted as one
single unit. The shareholders bind one another to vote as they mutually agree.
In a pooling agreement, each shareholder retains sole ownership of shares
binding himself only to vote for a specific person or in a certain way. These
agreements are enforceable because the right to vote is a proprietary right.
The right to vote may be aided and effecutated by a contract. Generally,
pooling agreements are thought of in relation to control of private companies
and smaller public companies. A pooling agreement may be utilised in connection
with the election of Directors and shareholders’ resolutions where shareholders
have a right to vote. However, a pooling agreement cannot be used to supersede
the statutory rights given to the Board of Directors to manage the company, the
underlying reason being that the shareholders cannot achieve by pooling
agreement that which is prohibited to them, if they are voting individually.
Therefore, the power of shareholders to unite is not extended to contracts,
whereby restrictions are placed on the powers of Directors to manage the
business of the Corporation. It is for this reason that a pooling agreement
cannot be between Directors regarding their powers as Directors. There is vast
difference in principle between the case of a shareholder binding himself by
such a contract and the Director of the company undertaking such an obligation
by compromising his fiduciary status. The shareholder is dealing with his own
property. He is entitled to consider his own interests, without regard to
interests of other shareholders. However, Directors are fiduciaries of the
company and the shareholders. It is their duty to do what they consider best in
the interests of the company. They cannot abdicate their independent judgment
by entering into pooling agreements. The company works through two main organs,
viz., - the shareholders and the Board of Directors.
In fact, in U.S.A.
the law has made further advances. The American Courts have accepted that
Directors are fiduciaries of the various constituencies in the Corporation.
With globalisation, the concepts of merger and amalgamation have come into
picture. With the companies issuing shares to employees and workers and also to
set of creditors, the American Courts have accepted that in the company there
are various constituencies like shareholders’ constituency, workers’
constituency, creditors’ constituency etc. It is clear that Directors shall not
only act exclusively in the interests of shareholders or with reference to
stock prices, but shall also be obliged to charter a course for the company
which is in its best interest without regard to fixed investment horizon.
Applying the
aforesaid principle of fixed investment horizon, it would be noticed that the
Memorandum of Understanding was entered into essentially to favour a fixed
investment pattern. It was to protect the family interest in the event of
division of the shareholding. It was never contemplated that the company would
do well and would require infusion of capital. If this was the purpose, for
which the Memorandum of Understanding was entered into, and if this object was
required to be kept in mind, then, it was clear that the Memorandum of
Understanding, which imposed a ban on the increase on the number of Directors
for all times, is likely to denude the powers of the Board of Directors and may
cause sterilisation of Directors, a terminology used in America. It is for this
reason that the American Courts have taken the view that the pooling
agreements, which are based on fixed investment objectives, should not be made
enforceable if such agreements come in the way of Directors’ decision to
charter a course which favours expansion of the company. It is also because the
Directors should not only look to the shareholders’ interest or to maximise the
shareholders’ value in the context of a takeover, but it is their duty to make
the Corporation progressive. This approach is also very necessary because it
encourages the growth of the company which is vital for the economic progress
of the company. Moreover, the various authorities indicate that the pooling
agreements are short-term measures, viz., up to the next Annual
General Meeting. They are never meant to operate in perpetuity. They are
essentially meant to protect the proprietary interest of the shareholders. The
Courts have been slow in granting enforcement of such agreement. An agreement
between shareholders cannot be construed to be a contract binding on the
company even if the company has taken note of the pooling agreement or even if
the company has acted thereon and, on this basis, the English Courts have
denied specific performance of such agreements. Even if the Articles provides
that the Directors shall give effect to the pooling agreement between the
shareholders, still such an agreement shall not be construed as part of the
Articles and acts performed pursuant to such an agreement cannot be ratified
subsequently. Even if such an agreement is treated as being part of the
Articles, still it would not result in a binding contract qua the company.
It is thus clear
that the specific performance of pooling agreements between shareholders to
vote in a particular manner cannot be extended to denude or sterilise the
powers of directors and any such agreement would be unenforceable. Applying
the aforesaid propositions to the instant case, it would be noticed that the
company was in need to increase the capital. There was also need for
professionalisation, but it would be deprived of it despite the fact that there
was no such restriction in the Articles of Association. It was on the basis of
clause 8 of the Memorandum of Understanding. The curtailment of the powers of
Director by enforcement of such a clause would not be permissible. Clause 8
would result in curtailment of the fiduciary rights and duties of the
Directors. The shareholders could not infringe upon the Director’s fiduciary
rights and duties. Even Directors could not enter into an agreement, thereby
agreeing not to increase the number of Directors when there was no such
restriction in the Articles of Association. The shareholders could not dictate
the terms to the Directors, except by amendment of Articles of Association or
by removal of Directors. The agreement infringed upon the right of the first
Defendant to have more number of Directors, in the interests of the company.
The grant of interim injunction would amount to stultifying management of the
company. For the aforesaid reasons, clause 8 of the Memorandum of
Understanding, to the extent it provided that the number of Directors would not
exceed three till the plaintiff company held share capital in the company of
the face value of Rs. 10 lakhs, could not be specifically enforced and, in this
view, the question of restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by issue of intermin
injunction did not arise.
Cases referred to
Ramshankar Prasad v. Sindri
Iron Foundry (P.) Ltd. AIR [1996] (Cal.) 512, Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. [1971] 41 Comp. Cas. 377 (Bom.),
V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopala Krishnan [1992] 73 Comp.
Cas. 201 (SC), Shanti Prasad Jain
v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd. [1965] 35
Comp. Cas. 351 (SC), Hickman v.
Kent Marsh Shipbreakers Association
[1915] 1 CH. D. 881, Browne v. Trinidad 33, Ch. Dn. 1, Ringuet v. Bergeron [1960] 24 DLR (2d) 449, Boulting v. Association
of Cinematograph Television & Allied Technicians [1963] 2 Q.B. 606,
and Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros. [1854] 1 Macq. 461.
Judgment
Sabharwal, CJ. - The appellants are Plaintiffs in the suit.
They are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 17-8-1999 passed by the learned
Single Judge declining to grant to them ad
interim order of injunction restraining the Defendants from taking steps
pursuant to or in implementation of the Resolutions in respect of the allotment
of Rights shares and/or from appointing any Additional Directors on the board
of directors of the First Defendant-company.
2. On the request of the learned Counsel for the parties, considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, we have taken up for decision the
application filed in the suit for grant of interim injunction, (Notice of
Motion No. 2696 of 1999) instead of only considering the question of grant of ad interim injunction. In order to
appreciate the rival contentions, facts, in brief, may be noticed as follows :—
3. Plaintiff No. 2 (Kamal K. Singh) is the Chairman of Plaintiff No. 1
company (for short ‘RIL’), Defendant No. 2 (Chetan K. Singh) is the Chairman
and Managing Director of Defendant No. 1 company, which has three Directors on
its board of directors. Defendant No. 3 is sought to be appointed as an
Additional Director. Chetan is younger brother of Kamal. Defendant No. 1
company, which was originally known as “Rolta Motors Ltd.” (for short ‘RML’)
was incorporated on 19-5-1983. Kamal was the Chairman and Chetan was the
Director of the said company. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated
19-4-1991 was executed between the two brothers, under which the elder brother
Kamal, his wife and family trust, which held 10551 shares equivalent to 30 per
cent of the issued capital of RML, agreed to transfer, without any monetary
consideration, the said shares in favour of Chetan. RIL owned 40 per cent of
the issued capital of RML. The MoU, inter
alia, provides that, till RIL holds share capital in RML of the face
value of Rs. 10 lakhs, it will continue to have a representative on board of
directors of RML and that the number of Directors on the board of directors of
RML shall not exceed three, out of which two shall be the nominees of younger
brother and one shall always be the nominee of RML. The younger brother shall
also procure release of the Guarantees given by the RIL and give a Counter
Guarantee/Indemnity to the Plaintiffs against any claim by the bank. It also
provides that till RIL holds shares of face value of Rs. 10 lakhs, the younger
brother and his family members would not dispose of the shareholding to any
outsider. Further, the younger brother shall also change the name of the
company from RML and use any other name without word ‘Rolta’ and shall also
take steps for shifting the Registered Office of RML from the address of RIL at
Mumbai. The requisite Resolutions were passed and other documents, including
Counter-guarantee/Indemnity Bond and Undertaking were executed in implementation
of the MoU, by Defendant No. 1 and 2. Resultantly, the 30.50 per cent shares of
Kamal were transferred in favour of Chetan.
4. The Meeting of the board of directors of RML held on 27-8-1992 has
noted the contents of the MoU in the minutes which further record that the
Managing Director, Chetan Singh, stated that the board of directors of RML
shall not have any authority or discretion to change or modify the terms of
the MoU, unless and until such changes or modifications are approved personally
by Kamal Singh. Between 1992 and 1997, one S.L. Baluja was the nominee-Director
of RIL on the board of directors of Defendant No. 1.
5. It seems that the working of defendant No. 1-company went on smoothly
till middle of 1997. The differences between the two brothers started somewhere
in middle of 1997. Defendant No. 1-company, in its meeting held on 25-6-1997,
decided to increase the paid-up capital from Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 100 lakhs by
issue of 50,000 equity Rights shares on pro
rata basis to the shareholders. In this meeting, it was, inter alia, decided to offer to RIL
20036 shares on 1 : 1 basis. This meeting was attended by Chetan and his wife.
Leave of absence was granted to S.L. Baluja. It was resolved that, after the
expiry of time specified in the offer letter or on receipt of earlier
intimation from the person to whom such notice is given that he declines to
accept the shares offered, the board of directors may dispose them off in such
manner as they think most beneficial to the company. The correspondence
exchanged between the two brothers after 25-6-1997 has been placed on record.
According to the Plaintiffs, the offer of allotment of the Rights shares was
not sent/received by RIL. That has, however, been strenuously disputed by the
Defendants 1 and 2. Defendant No. 1-company, in Board’s Meeting dated
12-8-1997, which was attended by Chetan, his wife and Baluja, decided to allot 20036
Rights shares of the quota of RIL to Chetan. The correspondence exchanged
between the two brothers after 12-8-1997 has also been placed on record. In the
Meeting of board of directors of Defendant No. 1-company dated 4-10-1997, the
resignation of Baluja, nominee-Director was accepted and in his place the
appointment of B.I. Joshipura as nominee-Director of RIL was approved.
6. In its Meeting dated 5-1-1999, the board of directors of Defendant No.
1 - company decided to issue fresh rights issue of 62.5 lacs (second Rights
issue). This was objected by Joshipura. The offer of the second Rights issue
was received by RIL. RIL objected the decision to issue this rights issue on
the ground that the disputes relating to the first Rights issue had not been resolved.
7. The First Defendant-company wrote a letter dated 22-6-1999 to Joshipura
that in the Board Meeting fixed for 26-6-1999, it inter alia, proposed to induct one Dr. S. Singh - Defendant No.
3 - as the 4th Director. This was protested by Joshipura, inter alia, on the ground of short
notice of the meeting. The First Defendant-company addressed a letter dated
21-7-1999 to Joshipura recording that, at the last Board Meeting, Dr. Singh was
not taken up as a Director, but, at the next Board Meeting, he would be so
taken. It was objected on the ground that the proposed appointment of
Additional Director was contrary to the MoU, inasmuch as the MoU contemplates
that, till RIL holds share capital of the face value of Rs. 10 lacs, the number
of Directors cannot exceed three. The meeting of board of directors of
Defendant No. 1 was fixed for 11-8-1999 and one of the items of agenda was
appointment of Defendant No. 3 as its Additional Director. At this stage the
present suit was filed. On 10-8-1999, an ex
parte ad interim order was granted restraining defendants 1 and 2 from
appointing Defendant No. 3 as a Director on the Board of the First Defendant
company. This order was valid till 17-8-1999, on which date, the impugned order
was passed vacating the order dated 10-8-1999.
8. In this Appeal and Notice of Motion, pending the decision of the suit,
two interim reliefs are sought by the Plaintiffs.
(1) Restraining
the Defendants from taking any steps pursuant to or in implementation or in
furtherance of the Resolutions passed in respect of the allotment of rights
shares and
(2) Restraining
the appointment of any Additional Director on the board of directors of
Defendant No. 1 company.
9. In support of the first relief, the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellants is that the meeting dated 25-6-1997, in which decision was
taken to issue Rights shares, was itself illegal as Baluja, the
nominee-Director of RIL was not given any written notice of the meeting and,
thus, section 286 of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) has been violated. The
further contention is that RIL was not sent any Letter of Offer in respect of
this issue and the Letter of Offer alleged to have been sent by Defendant No. 1
company under Certificate of Posting, was never received by RIL. The Counsel
also contends that other correspondence was always sent through courier and,
therefore, it cannot be believed that the alleged letter of offer was sent by
Defendant No. 1-company to RIL. Another contention urged is that there was no
quorum for the meeting of 12-8-1997 when the shares of quota of RIL were
allotted in favour of Chetan. The contention of Mr. Chinoy is that Chetan was an interested Director, since
additional allotment was sought to be made in his favour, and therefore, he was
not entitled to vote and thus there was
no quorum.
10. We have perused various letters exchanged between the two brothers as
also other material on record, including the Letter of Offer which Defendant No.
1 says was sent to RIL and also the Certificate of Posting. On perusal thereof,
we find it difficult to accept the contention that the Letter of Offer was not
sent to RIL. To our mind, it seems that at no stage, the Plaintiffs were
interested in contributing any amount in Defendant No. 1 company. In none of
the letters, even after 12-8-1997, it was stated that RIL was interested in
subscribing to the Rights shares. What the Plaintiffs have been stating in the
correspondence and that too in the guarded language is that they would consider
the offer of allotment of Rights shares. In the Letter of Offer which defendant
No. 1 says was sent to RIL, it has also been stated that if offer is not
accepted, the First Defendant - Company would consider grant of additional
shares to others. There was no other applicant, except Chetan who had sought
allotment of additional shares. Further, in the plaint, the factum of the
holding of meeting on 25-6-1997 itself was disputed, but that plea was given up
by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Now it has not been disputed that
Baluja had the notice for the meeting of 25-6-1997. Mr. Chinoy contends that no
written notice was sent to him. It is clear from the material on record that
the Defendants were not acting in a clandestine manner. In fact, on the next
date after the meeting, i.e.,
on 26-6-1997, Chetan wrote a letter to Kamal, inter alia, stating that it would be good if RIL could subscribe
to the shares and participate in the growth of first defendant company. He also
stated that he would ensure that the shares are not issued to any outsiders and
that he had avoided issue of Rights shares for the last five years, but now it
had become unavoidable. Kamal was thus requested to confirm the willingness of
RIL to participate in the Rights issue. Kamal in terms of his letter dated
2-7-1997 expressed reservations to the idea of issue of Rights shares and gave
other options to raise capital. Chetan again, by his letter dated 3-7-1997,
expressed the need to raise the liability-free funds and stated that, in case
RIL is willing to put in funds in proportion of its shareholding, it is most
welcome and percentage shareholding would stand at the same rate as of the said
date. It was also stated that as per present Maruti Udyog Ltd. policies, they
cannot issue shares to public, unless the issue is directly for dealership
expansion.
11. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, the
decision of Calcutta High Court in Ramashankar
Prosad v. Sindri Iron Foundry
(P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 Cal. 512 on the question of sending of notice under
Certificate of Posting will have no applicability. It is apparent that the
conclusion in the said decision that the notice was never sent and the
Certificate of Posting had been obtained in respect thereof, was arrived at on
the facts of that case. As already noticed, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were not
acting in a clandestine manner. If the object of defendants was to keep
Plaintiffs in dark, Chetan would not have written letter dated 26th June and
subsequent letters to Kamal, which are all admitted and have rather been
acknowledged by Kamal. Repeated requests were made welcoming RIL to put in
funds in proportion of their shareholding by contributing to the Rights issue.
If the intentions of Defendants No. 1 and 2 were not honest, they would not
have sent the type of letters acutally sent. Further, on these facts, it is
also not possible to accept the contention that Chetan was an interested
Director and there was no quorum for the meeting as urged on behalf of the
Plaintiffs.
12. The decision of the Bombay
High Court in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. [1977] 41 Comp. Cas. 377 has no
applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. There was no
such conflict of interests in the case in hand so as to contravene section 300
of the Act. Further, the allotment of the first Rights issue was made in
August, 1997. The present suit was filed two years later. The question of in-
juncting the Defendants from taking any steps pursuant to or in implementation
of or in furtherance of the Resolutions in respect of the allotment of Rights
issue does not arise. Chetan does not deserve to be restrained from exercising
his rights on the basis of the Rights shares. At this stage, the said
allotments cannot be held to be void.
13. Reverting now to the second relief, Mr. Chinoy strenuously contends
that the appointment of Additional Director by Defendant No. 1 company is in
clear contravention of clause 8 of the MoU, on the basis of which Kamal,
without any monetary consideration, had transferred his shareholding of about
30% comprising of more than 10,000 shares in favour of his younger brother
Chetan. The learned counsel further contends that RML is a party to the MoU and
has acted on the basis of the MoU and has also confirmed it. The submission of
the learned Counsel is that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalkrishnan [1992] 73 Comp.
Cas. 201, on basis whereof the learned Single Judge declined ad interim relief, has no
applicability to the present case. It is true, as already noticed, clause 8, inter alia, postulates that, till RIL
holds shares in Defendant No. 1 company of the face value of Rs. 10 lakhs, the
number of Directors on its board of directors shall not exceed three. It is not
in dispute that RIL holds shares of the face value of more than Rs. 10 lakhs.
14. At this stage, we may note that Mr. Kapadia, the learned counsel for
the Defendants/Respondents, has seriously disputed the contention that the
Defendant No. 1 company is a party to the MoU or has acted upon it or confirmed
it and has also seriously disputed the contention that the MoU is a
Shareholders Agreement. Besides it, he has also raised the objection of
misjoinder of causes of action. But, for the present purposes, assuming aforesaid
contentions in favour of plaintiffs, we would examine the matter.
15. The important question to be determined is about the enforceability of
clause 8 of the MoU to the extent it restricts the power of Directors to
increase the number of Directors of RML from more than three.
16. Now, some undisputed aspects. Defendant No. 1 is a closely held family
company, though some outsiders, family friends and relatives have also a small
shareholding. There is no restriction in the Articles of Association of
Defendant No. 1 of the Type contemplated by clause 8 of the MoU regarding
number of Directors. It has been provided in the Articles of Association that
until otherwise determined by a General Meeting, the number of directors shall
be not less than three and not more than twelve (Article 113). It has also been
provided that the Board shall have power at any time and from time to time to
appoint any person as a Director as an addition to the Board but the total
number of directors shall not any time exceed the maximum number fixed by the
Article (Article 117). Section 252 of the Act, inter alia, provides that every public company shall have at
least three Directors. There has been no amendment of Articles of Association
on the aspect of number of Directors. But for clause 8, the board of directors
has the power to appoint any person as a Director as provided in the Articles
of Association.
17. The question is, on aforesaid facts, can Chetan as a Director be
restrained from voting in favour of appointment of an Additional Director.
18. Let us, first examine V.B.
Rangaraj’s case (supra).
In that case, the main question that fell for consideration was whether the
shareholders can among themselves enter into an agreement, which is contrary to
or inconsistent with the Articles of Association of the company. In the said
decision, the High Court had held that the sale of shares by the First
Defendant in favour of Defendant Nos. 4 to 6 was invalid being in breach of
agreement between two brothers to the effect that each of the brothers of the
family would always continue to hold an equal number of shares and that if any
member in either branch wishes to sell he would give the first option of the
purchase to the members of that branch and only if the offer is not accepted,
shares would be sold to others. In this view it was held that the plaintiffs
and Second Defendant became entitled to purchase the said shares and the
Agreement was binding on the company, which was bound in law to register the
said shares in plaintiff’s name. It was not in dispute that the Articles of
Association of the company were not amended to bring them in conformity with
the agreement between two brothers. In that case one of the contentions urged
was that the agreement was entered into to maintain the ownership of the
company in the family and to ensure that the two branches of the family had an
equal share in the management and profits and losses of the company and further
that there was nothing in the Articles which prohibits such Agreement and the
two branches of the family being parties to the agreement, it was enforceable
against them. Answering the question in negative, the Supreme Court held that
the agreement imposed additional restrictions on the member’s right of transfer
of his shares which were not stipulated in the Articles and, therefore, were
not binding either on the shareholders or on the company. It was also held that
the shares are movable property and transfer thereof is regulated by the
Articles of Association of the company. Mr. Chinoy pointing out that the only
question considered in V.B. Rangaraj’s
case (supra) was about the
non-enforceability of the restriction on the transfer of shares of the company
which restriction was not specified in the articles and thus held by Supreme
Court to be not binding on the company or the shareholders, contends that in
the present case, the question is about the enforceability of clause 8 of MoU
against Chetan who under the very MoU was given shares without any monetary
consideration. The Counsel contends that MoU was like a shareholders agreement
providing for voting in a particular manner which has always been held to be
enforceable. Thus, according to Mr. Chinoy, Rangraj’s case has no
applicability to the present case. A little later we will examine what are
shareholders or pooling agreements and their enforceability and whether
enforceability of such agreements can be extended to the present case which
limits or denudes powers of Directors.
19. To reinforce the proposition that the restriction, on transfer of
shares, which is not specified in the Articles of Association, is not binding
either on the company or on the Shareholders, the earlier decision of the
Supreme Court in Shanti Prasad Jain
v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd. [1965] 35
Comp. Cas. 351, was also referred to. In Kalinga Tubes, the company was not
party to the Agreement, which, inter
alia, provided that the appellant, Shanti Prasad Jain, would be allotted
shares in the company equal to those held by Patnaik and Loganathan after
increasing the share capital of the company, so that the company would have
three groups of shareholders represented by Jain, Patnaik and Loganathan
holding equal number of shares, besides a foreign company and one Rath, who,
between themselves, held shares worth Rs. 4 lacs. Those shareholders, however,
were not parties to the agreement. In the said case, too, the agreement was
followed by certain Resolutions passed by the company by which some of the
terms of the Agreement were carried out. Further, no change was made in the
Articles of Association of the company to bring them in conformity with the
terms of the agreement. It was held by Supreme Court that the agreement was
not binding on the company as the terms thereof were not incorporated in the
Articles of Association. Pointing out that Shanti Prasad Jain’s case (supra)
is one under sections 397 and 398 of the Act dealing with the question of
operation and mismanagement, Mr. Chinoy contends that unlike the present case,
in Shanti Prasad Jain’s (supra) the agreement was between a
non-member and two members of the company and, therefore, that decision has no
applicability to the present case particularly when plaintiffs are seeking
enforcement of agreement against Chetan like any other enforceable shareholders
agreement. One of the basis for denial of relief to Jain in Shanti Prasad Jain’s case (supra) was absence of stipulation in
the Articles of the company. As pointed out by Mr. Chinoy, it is no doubt true
that the reference to Gore - Brown on Companies, Palmer’s Company Law,
Halsbury’s Laws of England and Penningtaon’s Company Law in V.B. Rangaraj’s case (supra) as also in Shanti Prasad Jain’s case (supra) was in relation to restriction
on transfer of shares when there is no such restriction incorporated in the
Articles of Association for the proposition that the shareholders’ right of
transfer of shares cannot be taken away, unless so provided in the Articles of
Association, and is not with reference to enforcement of shareholders
agreement. In the present case, we are concerned with the question whether a
shareholder in his capacity as a Director can be injuncted or not to vote for
increasing the number of Directors in view of terms of agreement but in absence
of any such restriction in the Articles of Association.
20. The argument of Mr. Chinoy is that there is no legal mandate that the
company must have more than three Directors. The only mandate is that the
minimum number of Directors should be three. As per Articles the maximum number
could be twelve. He contends that, in these circumstances, a shareholder
Directors can enter into an agreement stipulating not to exceed the minimum
number of three Directors. According to the learned counsel, those are in the
nature of proprietary rights as opposed to corporate rights and like
shareholders or pooling agreements, such right could be circumscribed by the
will of the shareholders reflected by the Agreement entered into by them.
21. Regarding pooling agreement, it may be noted that it is an agreement
between two or more shareholders which generally provides that in exercising
any voting rights, the shares held by the shareholders shall be voted as
provided therein; it is a contract to the effect that the shares held by them
shall be voted as one single unit. The shareholders bind one another to vote as
they mutually agree. In a pooling agreement, each shareholder retains sole
ownership of shares binding himself only to vote for a specific person or in a
certain way. These agreements are enforceable because the right to vote is a
proprietary right. The right to vote may be guided and effectuated by a
contract. Generally, pooling agreements are thought of in relation to control
of private companies and smaller public companies. (See Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 94, p. 561).
22. A pooling agreement may be utilised in connection with the election of
Directors and shareholders’ Resolutions where shareholders have a right to
vote. However, a pooling agreement cannot be used to supersede the statutory
rights given to the board of directors to manage the company, the underlying
reason being that the shareholders cannot achieve by pooling agreement that
which is prohibited to them, if they are voting individually. Therefore, the
power of shareholders to unite is not extended to contracts, whereby
restrictions are placed on the powers of Directors to manage the business of
the corporation. It is for this reason that a pooling agreement cannot be
between Directors regarding their powers as Directors. There is vast difference
in principle between the case of a shareholder binding himself by such a
contract and the Director of the company undertaking such an obligation by
compromising his fiduciary status. The shareholder is dealing with his own
property. He is entitled to consider his own interests, without regard to
interests of other shareholders. However, Directors are fiduciaries of the
company and the shareholders. It is their duty to do what they consider best in
the interests of the company. They cannot abdicate their independent judgment
by entering into pooling agreements. The company works through two main organs,
viz. the shareholders and the
Board of Directors.
23. In fact, in U.S.A. the law has made further advances. The American
Courts have accepted that Directors are fiduciaries of the various
constituencies in the Corporation. With globalisation, the concepts of merger
and amalgamation have come into picture. With the companies issuing shares to employees
and workers and also to set of creditors, the American Courts have accepted
that in the company there are various constituencies like shareholders’
constituency, workers’ constituency, creditors’ constituency etc. This
advancement of law has been very vividly mentioned in Harvard International Law
Journal, Volume 38, page 540 under the Chapter dealing with Constituency
Status. Implication for Director Fiduciary Duties. The Article mentions the
advancement of Corporate Law. It is clear that Directors shall not only act
exclusively in the interests of shareholders or with reference to stock prices,
but shall also be obliged to charter a course for the company which is in its
best interest without regard to fixed investment horizon.
24. Applying the aforesaid principle, in particular the principle of fixed
investment horizon, it would be noticed that the MoU was entered into
essentially to favour a fixed investment pattern. It was to protect the family
interest in the event of division of the shareholding : It was never
contemplated that the company would do well and would require infusion of
capital. If this is the purpose, for which the MoU was entered into, and if
this object is required to be kept in mind, then, it is clear that the MoU,
which imposes a ban on the increase on the number of Directors for all times,
is likely to denude the powers of the board of directors and may cause
sterilisation of Directors, a terminology used in America. It is for this
reason that the American Courts have taken the view that the pooling
agreements, which are based on fixed investment objectives, should not be made
enforceable, if such agreements come in the way of Directors’ decision to
character a course which favours expansion of the company. It is also because
the Directors should not only look to the shareholders’ interest or to maximise
the shareholders’ value in the context of a takeover, but it is their duty to
make the Corporation progressive. This approach is also very necessary because
it encourages the growth of the company which is vital for the economic
progress of the company. Moreover, the various authorities indicate that the
pooling agreements are short-term measures, viz., up to the next Annual General Meeting. They were never
meant to operate in perpetuity. They are essentially meant to protect the
proprietary interest of the shareholders. The Courts have been slow in granting
enforcement of such agreements. [See
Hickman v. Kent Marsh
Shipbreakers Association [1915] 1 Ch. D. 881.]
25. The aforesaid decision also lays down that an agreement between
shareholders cannot be construed to be a contract binding on the company even
if the company has taken note of the pooling agreement or even if the company
has acted thereon and, on this basis, the English Courts have denied specific
performance of such agreements. The aforesaid judgment also lays down that,
even if the Articles provides that the Directors shall give effect to the
pooling agreement between the shareholders, still, such an agreement shall not
be construed as part of the Articles and that acts performed pursuant to such
an agreement cannot be ratified subsequently. It further lays down that, even
if such an agreement is treated as being part of the Articles, still, it would
not result in a binding contract qua the
company.
26. In the case of Browne
v. Trinidad 33, Ch. Dn. 1, the
pooling agreement provided that the founder-member shall not be removed as a
Director for all times. He was subsequently sought to be removed. The court took
the view that, even if the Directors had acted upon the agreement in the past,
such acts will not be binding on the company.
27. A reading of the above judgments indicate that the Courts have been
slow to enforce such pooling agreements. The pooling agreements, which are
enforced are concerning only the right to vote of the shareholders. The Courts
have not been granting specific performance of the agreements whereby the
powers of the Directors stand denuded.
28. The Supreme Court of Canada in Ringuet
v. Bergeron [1960] 24 DLR (2d)
449, dealing with shareholders entering into agreement to vote unanimously and
observing such agreements not to be illegal, at the same time held that the
fiduciary relationship occupied by Directors requires the exercise of these
entire duties and attention to the best interest of the company and its
shareholders. It was accordingly held that the discretion of the Directors to
act in the administration of the affairs of the company cannot be fettered by
agreement and, therefore, such agreement was invalid.
29. In Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph Television
& Allied Technicians [1963] 2 Q.B. 606, Lord Denning M.R. while
dealing with fiduciary nature of Directors’ duties and also referring to the opinion
of Lord Cranworth L.C. in Aberdeen
Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros.
[1854] 1 Macq. 461, 471, H.L. (SC) said :
“It seems to me that no one, who has duties of
a fiduciary nature to discharge, can be allowed to enter into an engagement by
which he binds himself to disregard those duties or to act inconsistently with
them. No stipulation is lawful by which he agrees to carry out his duties in
accordance with the instructions of another rather than on his own
conscientious judgment; or by which he agrees to subordinate the interests of
those whom he must protect to the interests of someone else.”
30. It is thus clear that the specific performance of pooling agreements
between shareholders to vote in a particular manner cannot be extended to
denude or sterilise the powers of directors and any such agreement would be
unenforceable.
31. Applying the aforesaid propositions to the present case, it would be
noticed that the company was in need to increase the capital. There was also
need for professionalisation, but it would be deprived of it despite the fact
that there is no such restriction in the Articles of Association. It is on the
basis of clause 8 of the MoU. In our view, the curtailment of the powers of
Director by enforcement of such a clause would not be permissible. Clause 8
would result in curtailment of the fiduciary rights and duties of the
Directors. The shareholders cannot infringe upon the Directors’ fiduciary
rights and duties. Even Directors cannot enter into an agreement, thereby
agreeing not to increase the number of Directors when there is no such restriction
in the Articles of Association. The shareholders cannot dictate the terms to
the Directors, except by amendment of Articles of Association or by removal of
Directors. The agreement infringes upon the right of the first Defendant to
have more number of Directors, in the interests of the company. The grant of
interim injunction would amount to stultifying management of the company.
32. For the aforesaid reasons, to our mind, clause 8 of the MOU, to the
extent it provides that the number of Directors shall not exceed three till
Rolta India Ltd., holds share capital in the company of the face value of Rs.
10 lacs, cannot be specifically enforced and, in this view, the question of
restraining Defendant No. 1 and 2 by issue of interim injunction does not
arise. Therefore, appellants are not entitled to the second relief as well. The
observations made in this judgment are prima
facie for the purpose of decision of the Appeal and Notice of Motion and
will not affect the rights and contentions of the parties on merits which are
subject-matter of the suit.
33. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the Appeal and Notice of Motion.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to bear their own
costs.
34. Status Quo regarding the appointment of the Additional Director will continue for a period of six weeks from today.
[2002] 37 SCL 660 (guj.)
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
N.G. NANDI, J.
COMPANY PETITION NO. 140 OF 2001
COMPANY APPLICATION NO. 230 OF
2001
APRIL 8,
2002
Section 391
of the Companies Act, 1956, read with Bombay Relief Undertaking (Special
Provisions) Act, 1948 - Compromise and arrangement - Petitioner-company, a
leading textile company employing over 10,000 persons, was confronted with
financial crunch and it had been incurring losses for past few years - It had
obtained huge borrowings/credits from on-shore as well as off-shore lenders to
finance its business needs before such financial crunch - Company felt need for
rescheduling and restructuring of its debt - A Steering Committee consisting of
represen-tatives of lenders prepared a scheme of restructuring - Thereafter
meetings of various classes of creditors, viz., unsecured creditors, working
capital lenders and secured creditors were convened and all classes of
creditors approved scheme with requisite majority - Thereupon, company
presented said scheme before company court for approval of same under section
391 - In response to public notice of instant petition, certain off shore
secured creditors, who had voted against scheme, objected to scheme on various
grounds - Contention of objectors was that court had no jurisdiction under
section 391(1), inasmuch as foreign currency secured lenders (i.e. objectors) had
not been constituted as a separate class as consent of each class of creditors
should be available with court before sanctioning scheme and objectors had not
consented or agreed to Scheme of arrangement - Whether inter se
differences/disputes amongst some secured creditors could be criterion for
constituting separate class of secured creditors in foreign currency, when
there was no conflict of commercial interest between objectors and other
secured creditors and same scheme with same terms had been offered to all
secured creditors - Held, no - Whether there was no distinction kept between
secured creditors lending either in foreign currency or Indian currency - Held,
yes - Whether objectors were disentitled to be treated as a different class of
secured creditors, a class within class, as there was no conflict of commercial
interest between objectors and other secured creditors, especially when same
scheme with same terms had been offered to all secured creditors and there was
no distinction made in scheme between objectors and other secured creditors -
Held, yes - Whether merely because company was declared a relief undertaking
and notification under section 3 of Bombay Relief Undertaking Act was in force
it could be held that section 391 could not be invoked - Held, no - Whether as
far as provisions contained in section 391 and section 394 are concerned past
conduct would be hardly relevant for purpose of approval of arrangement - Held,
yes - Whether past events were no disqualification as far as approval of scheme
of restructuring was concerned - Held, yes - Whether it is impermissible for
court to exercise jurisdiction like an appellate court to minutely scrutinize
scheme or to arrive at any independent conclusion as to whether scheme should
be permitted to go through or not when majority of creditors or members or
their respective classes have approved scheme as required under section 391(2)
- Held, yes - Whether court has to see commercial viability of scheme - Held,
no - Whether it was also not within realm of court to find out whether a better
scheme could have been adopted by parties or not - Held, yes - Whether scheme
supported by majority of creditors appeared to be unconscionable or illegal in
any manner - Held, no - Whether scheme was otherwise unfair or unjust to
classes of creditors for whom scheme was meant - Held, no - Whether other
secured creditors could be deprived of benefits under scheme simply because
objectors had filed suit against company and one secured creditor in English
Court - Held, no - Whether, therefore, sanction was to be accorded to scheme -
Held, yes
Section 177
of the Companies Act, 1956 - Voting - Whether voting is formal expression of
will or opinion by person entitled to exercise right on subject or issue in
question which has to be either in affirmative or negative, and any writing on
ballot paper suggesting condition or reservation cannot be said to be an
expression of will or opinion either for or against proposition and those votes
have to be necessarily treated as invalid or void as such votes are no votes
leading either way - Held, yes
Facts
The petitioner-company, engaged in spinning, weaving, etc., of cotton or other fabrics and employing over 10,000 persons, was earning profit for a pretty long time. It had obtained borrowings/credits from various banks and financial institutions - on-shore as well as off-shore - to finance its business needs. During the past few years it started making loss and, therefore, felt the need for rescheduling and restructuring of its debts. Consequently, lenders elected representatives to form a Steering Committee (SC) in order to implement the restructuring process in an efficient manner. The SC prepared a scheme of restructuring the debt. Thereafter, the meetings of the various classes of the creditors, viz., unsecured creditors, working capital lenders and secured creditors were, convened as per the directions of the court. All the classes of creditors approved the scheme with requisite majority. Thereupon, the company presented the scheme before the court for approval of the same under section 391. The petition was advertised as per the court’s directions and notices were also served. In response to the said public notice, some of the off-shore secured creditors objected to the scheme on grounds that (i) the company could not invoke jurisdiction of the Court under section 391 as the company was a Relief Undertaking under the provisions of the Bombay Relief Undertaking Act, (ii) jurisdiction to entertainment the instant petition was absent, (iii) there was no genuine compromise or arrangement, (iv) the Scheme operated unfairly, while favouring some creditors, the Scheme sought to confiscate the legitimate rights and securities of the objectors and members of its class, (v) sanction of the Scheme, if accorded would operate as a cloak to cover up the legitimize fraud perpetrated by the company in collusion with one of its lenders, ICICI Ltd. and also would legitimize criminal acts and breach of malfeasance by the company and ICICI, (vi) the reliefs sought were beyond the scope of the powers of the Court under section 391, and (vii) the Scheme offended public and commercial morality and that the Scheme did not have the approval by requisite majority, and that the foreign currency lenders (off-shore lenders) had not been constituted as a separate class.
Held
It was not disputed that the Scheme had been
floated and supported by the majority of the creditors. The objectors did not
have majority even among off-shore lenders. The objectors as the foreign
currency lenders had insisted for the better terms than the terms offered by
the Scheme to the other secured creditors including off-shore lenders, and the
terms offered under the scheme to the secured creditors were not palatable to
the objectors and, hence, the objections to the scheme. The objectors had also
attended the meeting of secured creditors but had declined to be the members of
the Steering Committee or a Sub-Committee which was constituted by the Steering
Committee to scrutinize the transactions of the company for the purpose of the
Scheme of compromise, but attended the meeting as the observers and
participated in the meeting.
One of the arguments advanced by the
objectors was that, the Court had no jurisdiction under section 391(1), in as
much as the foreign currency secured lenders (i.e. the objectors) had not been constituted as
a separate class as the consent of each class of creditors should be available
with the Court before sanctioning the scheme and the objectors had not
consented or agreed to the Scheme of arrangement.
It was not in dispute that all secured
creditors, i.e., lenders in
foreign currency and lenders in Indian rupees, and who were to be repaid in
foreign currency and Indian currency, respectively, had been constituted as one
single class of creditors. Thus, there was no distinction kept between secured
creditors lending either in foreign currency or Indian currency. It was also
the say of objector that as against other secured creditor, the objectors had a
conflicting interest as a civil suit and criminal complaint had been filed and
pending against one of the secured creditors. Thus, in the say of the
objectors, there was not only absence of commonality of interest but also a
conflict of interest between objectors and other secured creditor.
It is suggested from the provisions
contained in section 391 that it is only where different terms are offered to
different class of creditors under the proposed compromise or arrangement,
separate class would be required to be constituted in respect of each class of
creditors or shareholders for whom either compromise or arrangement has been
offered. The use of the phrase ‘as the case may be’ in section 391(1) for the
purpose of holding separate meeting and sub-section (2) for the purpose of
agreeing with the proposed scheme by requisite majority and its binding effect
of being sanctioned by the Court, would be superfluous. In any given case,
whether the compromise or arrangement has been proposed between the company and
the creditors as a whole without spelling out different terms for different
classes of creditors or between the company and its members as a whole without
giving any separate package for different class of members, separate meetings
of different classes of members are required to be held. The phrase ‘as the
case may be’ for the purpose of holding of meeting of creditors or class of
creditors or of the members or class of members or the requirement of majority
representing the requisite value of creditors or class of creditors or members
or class of members as the case may be would carry no meaning. Thus, it was to
be seen whether any different terms had been offered to different classes of
creditors or members and whether any classification of members was required to
be made in accordance with the distinctions in terms of arrangement offered to
the creditors and whether any such separate meeting was required to be called.
The classification of members or creditors can be founded on the basis of
difference in the terms offered under the scheme. The difference in terms of
the scheme can be the only criterion for identifying separate class for the
purpose of convening a separate meeting for such class.
The contention of the objectors was that
their interest was not similar to that of other secured creditors, and on that
basis the objectors contended that the foreign currency lenders constituted a
separate class of secured creditors. However, it was not because of the
different treatment/treatment given to the objectors that they constituted a
separate class of secured creditors, and it was not the say of the objectors
that the terms offered to them under the scheme were different. There was no
dissimilarity of interest vis-a-vis, the scheme. As far as objectors were concerned all the secured
creditors under the scheme were offered the same terms but the objectors being
foreign currency lenders perceived their interest differently or considered
that their interest might be affected differently from other secured creditors
because of their inter-relationship or their interest other than as secured
creditors simplicitor but the same could not entitle the objectors to sustain
their claim of separate class distinct from other secured creditors. The inter
se differences/disputes amongst some
secured creditors could not be the criterion for constituting separate class of
secured creditors in foreign currency. Personal conflict of interest of the
objectors with a particular creditor would be totally foreign to the scope of
class meeting convened by the company to consider the Scheme.
As far as the company was concerned all
secured creditors, off-shore lenders as well as on shore lenders had been
treated alike and no distinction was kept by the company within/amongst the secured
creditors. It was not the say of the objectors that this group of secured
creditors had been treated differently from other secured creditors by the
company. The grievance was otherwise identical/same terms of compromise had
been offered to all the secured creditors. There could not be any preferential
treatment to some secured creditors and the scheme could not give any special
treatment to some creditors. Simply because some of the secured creditors had
some dispute between them or had been fighting litigation inter se could be no ground for treating litigating
secured creditors differently from the body of secured creditors. There could
not be a class within the class and the class had to be of one type of
creditors, namely secured creditors, unsecured creditors and working capital
lenders as all the secured creditors had similar rights in the company. As far
as commonality or conflict of interest was concerned all the secured creditors
had a common interest of securing their dues in proportion to the amount lent
and the terms or conditions thereof. It was not the say of the objectors that
their rights were dissimilar to the rights of supporting secured creditors. As
far as the body of secured creditors was concerned, there could be an effective
consultation as far as their dues/interest/rights against the company under the
Scheme were concerned. It was not the say of the objectors that in the meeting
they were not allowed to participate in the proceedings of the meeting nor any
secured creditor including the on-shore lenders prevented them to have their
say in the meeting. The class of creditors constituted, namely, secured
creditors, could not be regarded as a heterogeneous group having nothing in
common or want of the commonality of interest or the objectors had conflict of
interest vis-a-vis the Scheme
with other secured creditors or that the class was formed to ensure that the
rights and interest of some of the secured creditors (objectors) were
confiscated.
All the secured creditors, including foreign
currency lenders who were constituted as one class and called at the meeting
had the commonality of interest and their rights were not so dissimilar as to
make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to have their
common interest. The nature of the proposals embodied in the Scheme applied
equally to all the secured creditors, domestic currency lenders as well as
foreign currency lenders and same terms were offered to the entire body of
secured creditors under the Scheme. It was not suggested from the Scheme
offered that the interest of the secured creditors was in any manner
conflicting or there was no commonality of interest vis-a-vis the company and the objectors formed a
homogeneous group along with other secured creditors and the class of secured
creditors constituted could not be regarded as heterogeneous.
The objectors was not entitled to be treated
as a different class of secured creditors, a class within the class, as there
was no conflict of commercial interest between objectors and other secured
creditors, especially when the same scheme with same terms had been offered to
all the secured creditors and there was no distinction made in the scheme
between the objectors and other secured creditors.
The second objection on the score of
jurisdiction of the Court under section 391(1) was that the company had been
declared as a relief undertaking and during the period the notification under
section 3(1) was in force, section 391(1) could not be invoked.
If the provisions of sections 391(1) and
391(6) are read together the protection is the resultant effect of the entire
scheme of the Act. As far as the scheme brought before the Court under section
391(1) is concerned, there is no question of granting any relief or remedy to
the company. The Court under section 391(1) examines the scheme irrespective of
the objection if any, to the scheme from any corner and when the Court is
examining the scheme for the purpose of deciding whether the same should be sanctioned
with or without modification or not, then the protection under section 391(6)
would follow. As far as the power to consider or examine the scheme under
section 391 is concerned the power has to be either express or implied. As far
as provisions under the BRU Act are concerned there is no implied or express
bar to any petition for the sanction of the scheme and in absence of any
express or implied bar to the petition under section 391 merely because the
company was declared a relief undertaking under section 3 there was no
substance in the contentions raised by the objectors on the score of want of
jurisdiction of the Court to consider the scheme under section 391(1)/(2) and
the company could pursue the proceedings under section 391, even during subsistence
of the notification under section 3. Reading sections 3 and 4 of the Bru Act together the privilege or
insulation offered to the undertaking is because of the subjective satisfaction
of the State Government that the particular undertaking needs some help or
protection. It be hardly said that the notification under section 4 is not
issued pursuant to any prayer by the company and therefore, there is no
question of double insulation to the company under section 4(1)(a)(iv) and section 391(6). Thus, the second argument was not sustainable.
Another argument advanced by the objectors
was that the scheme of compromise had not been supported/approved by the
requisite majority of the secured creditors as envisaged by sub-section (2) of
section 391, and therefore, the scheme could not be sanctioned.
The scheme of compromise or arrangement with
creditors and members must have the support from majority in number
three-fourth in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or
class of members present and voting either in person or where proxies are
allowed, by proxy, at the meeting, agreeing to any compromise or arrangement.
It was contended that, if the objectors were
treated as a separate class then the voting pattern would have been changed and
there would not have been requisite majority supporting the scheme; that the
votes cast by SBI, one of the secured creditors could not have been treated as
invalid and the same could have been considered as votes against the scheme.
In the instant case, the SBI supported the
scheme on condition, so it was not an unconditional or blanket support/or
agreement with the scheme.
A member present and voting may remain
neutral, indifferent, unbiased, impartial, not engaged on either side. Voting
is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the
right on the subject or issue in question which has to be either in the
affirmative or negative, and any writing on the ballot paper suggesting
condition or reservation cannot be said to be an expression of will or opinion
either for or against the proposition and those votes have to be necessarily
treated as invalid or void as such votes are no votes leading either way.
It need hardly be said that the votes cast
on the proposition and voting thereof are to be construed in the ordinary and
usual sense and that mean ‘expressing the will, mind or preference; casting or
giving a vote’. They do not include the votes or ballets, that do not cast a
vote on the proposition legally or void votes may not be counted either for or
against the proposition submitted even though they may have been even received,
placed in the ballot box and constitute sum of the total number of ballots. A
bare attempt to vote by depositing blank ballot containing any writing is not effective
and cannot be included in the total count upon which the 3/4th majority is to
be estimated. Only those ballots that express voters points with such clearing
that the ballot can be counted for or against can be counted in total. The
requirement contemplates two ballots only, one affirmative and the other
negative. To adopt any other rule would be to say that three ballots were
contemplated one affirmative, one negative and the other neither affirmative or
negative but forming a new class into which all ballots for any reason void
must go. In the instant case to accept the submission of the objectors to
consider the ballots by the SBI suggesting condition would have tantamounted to
creating a third class of ballots which could not be regarded as legal and such
class of ballots putting condition for acceptance or on agreement to the scheme
could not be treated but as void and illegal and such ballots had to be treated
as rejected ballots which could not be counted in determining whether or not to
submit proposition it received the necessary three-fourth affirmative votes.
All such votes had to be treated as no votes.
The vote of SBI had been rightly excluded
from consideration by the Chairman at the meeting treating the vote so be
nullity/void and void vote was of no more effect than no vote and the vote by
SBI being unintelligible, ballot being ineffective, could not be included in
the total count done which the required majority of a 3/4th was to be
estimated.
There was no question of considering that votes
of the foreign currency lenders which were negative treating the foreign
currency lenders as a separate class since the objectors as foreign currency
lenders were not entitled to be treated as a separate class and, therefore,
their votes was to be counted along with other secured creditors for the
purpose of determining the 3/4th majority to the proposition as required under
section 391 and the proposition was rightly said to have been supported by
requisite majority of 3/4th secured creditors as stated by the Chairman in his
report.
One of the objections raised by the
objectors was that the proposed scheme of restructuring if accorded sanction
would operate as a cloak to cover up/ legitimize
the fraud perpetrated by the company in collusion with one of its lenders,
ICICI and would also legitimize ICICI’s criminal acts and also legitimize gross
acts of misfeasance and malfeasance by the company and ICICI.
In this regard it had been submitted by the
objectors that the scheme sought to regularise petitioner’s unauthorised
transactions with ICICI. There was sale and lease back transaction and the
spin-off of the Garment division and the scheme made no provision for recovery
of large scale diversion to the subsidiaries and family controlled companies
and the intention of the scheme was to legitimize these transactions and that
the scheme was a cloak to cover the misdeeds of the company and/or to shield
the directors against any investigation into their management.
As far as foreign currency lenders were
concerned they only had floating charge on movable items and all that the
company was required to do was to maintain the asset coverage under the
agreement. The sale of assets by way of sale and lease back transaction by the
company to ICICI, one of the secured creditors, so long as the assets coverage
did not fall below the minimum required under the agreement and also such
transactions not covered under the scheme could not come in the way of scheme
of restructuring the debts of the company.
As far as the diversion of funds to
subsidiary companies were concerned, the investment of the company in the
subsidiary companies were made quite sometime back and only the nature of
investment was changed. It was not in dispute that not a farthing had gone out
of the company. All the information was supplied by the company to all the
creditors and the same was available with the objectors also. The negotiations
for the scheme lasted for 16 months, yet no secured creditor objected on this
point, except the objectors.
If there was anything wrong on the score of
diversion of funds, at least some one from the other secured creditors who had
larger stake than the objectors would have in all probability taken some action
against the company. If anything objectionable had been noticed the creditors
would not have supported the scheme of compromise.
Since it was not suggested from the record
that a single rupee was given by the company to any of its subsidiary company
and the original investments had been made quite sometime back, and that, only
the nature of investment had changed, there was no force in the objection on
this score.
One more objection under the head of cloak
to cover up and legitimize fraud was the spin off of the garment division by
the company.
As revealed from the record and facts, there
was no question of legitimizing or covering up the fraud or misfeasance or
malfeasance, since no criminal act was covered up or legitimized by sanction of
the scheme, and the same could be subject to/without affecting the criminal
acts, if any.
The other objection to the scheme by the
objectors was that the scheme offended public and commercial morality. It was
submitted on behalf of the objectors that the scheme was against the public
policy, discriminatory and unconscionable and there was no sufficient provision
for the payment of State Government’s dues. The State Government had rightly
not been included in the scheme so as not to insist upon the sacrifice from the
State Government. Perusal of the scheme did not refer to sources of funds from
which the payment of debt was to be made under the scheme to the creditors. The
petitioner company was protected by the notification under sections 3 and 4. It
was irrelevant whether the Government was battling for the funds in the
aftermath of the earthquake in Gujarat. As far as the Government dues were
concerned, same had to be paid as and when it became payable. Since the
Government dues were excluded from the scheme there was no question whether any
source for payment of Government debt was provided or not. All that could be
said was that there were Government dues payable by the company and that was
why the notification under section 3 protecting the company came to be issued.
There was absolutely nothing to suggest as to how the scheme was against the
public and commercial morality. The scheme was acceptable to large majority of
the creditors and the objectors were less than 3.5 per cent of the total debts.
One of the arguments advanced by the
objectors was that the past conduct/transactions of the company disentitled
approval of the scheme. As far as provisions contained in section 391 and
section 394 are concerned the past conduct would be hardly relevant for the
purpose of the approval of the arrangement. In case of the scheme of restructuring
the company concerned would very much remain as legal entity and would continue
to function. Past transactions would be relevant or required to be seen in
cases of amalgamation of the company where the transferor company merges into
the transferee company. Section 391 does not contemplate or require that the
past events be reflected in the scheme document. The past events could not be a
disqualification as far as approval of the scheme of restructuring was
concerned. It was only because the financial difficulties experienced/undergone
by the company and the debt mounting over the company the scheme of
restructuring was necessitated, so that the company could survive and the
creditors might also get their dues with some sacrifice on their part depending
upon the resources available to the company and the object behind the exercise
of restructuring was that the employees of the company might not starve and
putting the company on a sound financial footing to serve interest of all
concerned under the circumstances. What was sought to be approved/sanctioned
was the scheme of restructuring of debt and not the past conduct. Suffice it to
say that the past conduct was not relevant for consideration of the scheme of
restructuring of the debt.
The court cannot exercise jurisdiction like
an Appellate Court to minutely scrutinize the scheme or to arrive at any
independent conclusion, whether the scheme should be permitted to go through or
not when the majority of the creditors or members or their respective classes
had approved the scheme as required under section 391(2), and the Court has
also not to see the commercial viability of the scheme. The court is to
consider as to whether the scheme is unconscionable or illegal or otherwise
unfair and unjust to the classes of creditors for whom the scheme is meant.
Propriety, merits of the compromise or arrangement has to be judged by the
parties to the scheme, who with their open eyes and full information about the pros
and cons of the scheme arrived at
their own reasoned judgment and agreed to join such compromise or arrangement.
It is also not within the realm of the Court to find out whether a better
scheme could have been adopted by the parties or not. The scheme had been
favoured by the requisite statutory majority of the creditors who as the
experts into the commercial wisdom had exercised their commercial wisdom by
supporting the scheme. In the instant case the scheme supported by the majority
of the creditors did not appear to be unconscionable or illegal in any manner
or that the same was otherwise unfair or unjust to the classes of creditors for
whom the scheme was meant. It was not the say of the objectors that they were
not offered equal terms under the scheme like other secured creditors. To be
precise, off-shore lenders - foreign currency lenders, nor the objectors in
principle opposed to the scheme; simply because the terms demanded by the
objectors did not find favour with the SC that would not make the scheme
unfair, dishonest, unconscionable or illegal.
As regards the objection that, if the scheme
was sanctioned then the suit filed by the objectors in the English Court would
be set at naught and the rights of these objectors could not be prejudicially
affected as the scheme would have the effect of negating the remedy available
to these objectors, simply because the objectors had filed suit in English
Court, that could not deprive the other secured creditors of the benefits under
the scheme when they had floated and supported the scheme.
As far as the reliefs claimed in the suit
pending before the Court in England were concerned, consideration of the scheme
could not come in the way of grant of relief of declaration prayed thereof if
the English Court was inclined to grant the same against the company.
The approach of the company court has always
been to revive/put the company on sound financial footing and to see that the
company continues as an ongoing concern and the employees are not driven to
economic death, particularly in the days of recession. It is a settled
principle of law that larger good shall prevail over the smaller good and
smaller good shall pave way to larger good. In the instant case, as suggested
from the record, different classes of creditors had been offered different
packages by the company and all the creditors had sacrificed to some extent.
Refusal to sanction the scheme would have credited further economic problems
not only to the company but would have effect on the persons directly and,
indirectly dependent on/connected with the company, including the workers.
Apart from the company and the creditors who had floated and supported the
scheme, the approval to the scheme was necessary in the larger social interest.
It may be realised that when majority of the secured creditors had supported
the scheme sacrificing to certain extent, it would be unfair to refuse approval
to the scheme when it was generally fair to all classes of creditors and it
stood to serve the interest of the workers also, so that with the help of the
scheme the company could tie over the financial crisis and could regain sound
financial footing. As compared to the percentage of creditors who had supported
the scheme and the benefit of the scheme would indirectly extend to the other
classes of persons including the employees, the objections by only four (4)
foreign currency lenders who were in microscopic minority, for the larger good
when it did not appear that the scheme was dishonest, unfair to any class of
creditors nor illegal or opposed to public policy or unconscionable, must be
allowed to go its way.
The prospect of putting the company on sound
financial footing could not be totally disregarded. Moreover the Court also
could not be oblivious to the fact that the industry generating employment to
about 10,000 persons directly and about 1,00,000 indirectly dependent on it,
did not require to be obliterated if it could be resuscitated with the
assistance help of its creditors.
The scheme for reconstruction of the debt of
the company floated by all the classes of creditors was supported by the
statutory majority as required under section 391(2). The company had only
placed the scheme, floated and supported by statutory majority of the
creditors, before the court for approval/sanction of the same under section
391(1). Since the scheme was of the creditors of the company there was no
question of the same being dishonest/unfair to or against the interest of the
body of the creditors nor was it suggested that the scheme was otherwise
illegal or unconscionable. The inter se disputes between some of the secured creditors would hardly be a
ground for refusing approval of the scheme. Even the objectors did not in
principle oppose the Scheme saying that no scheme for restructuring the debt of
the company was required. On the contrary the need for the scheme for
restructuring the debt of the company was accepted. The objectors demanded
better terms/preferential treatment being foreign currency lenders. As the same
did not find favour with the SC the objections saw the light of the day. This
went to show that as far as the objections to the scheme were concerned, the
same could not be regarded as bona fide besides the scheme tended to serve the interest of all the classes of
creditors over and above 10,000 workers and their family members who were
dependent on the company for their livelihood. The objectors could not throttle
the scheme when the scheme was otherwise just, fair and equitable to all
covered under the scheme. However, the sanction of the scheme was subject to
the criminal prosecution for the alleged acts of misfeasance and/or malfeasance
(past transactions) for which criminal complaint had been pending before the
criminal court, and the issue of past transaction was kept open to be
adjudicated in appropriate proceedings, civil as well as criminal, by the
appropriate Court.
The sanction was thereby accorded to
restructuring of the debt of the petitioner company subject to and without
prejudice to the liability, if any, in the civil and criminal proceedings in
respect of the past transactions.
Cases referred to
Indequip Ltd. v. Maneckchowk & Ahmedabad Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1970] 2 CLJ 300, Mafatlal Industries Ltd. In re [1996] 87 Comp. Cas 705 (Guj.), Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 506, D.A. Swamy v. India Meters Ltd. [1994] 79 Comp. Cas. 27 (Mad.), Re Osiris Insurance Ltd. (Chd.) (Companies Court) [1999] 1 BCLC 182, Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573, Inderjit C. Parekh v. U.K. Bhatt 15 Guj. LR 574, Hindustan General Electric Corpn. Ltd., In re AIR 1959 Cal. 679, Ms. Lily Thomas v. Speaker, Lok Sabha [1993] 4 SCC 234, Textile Labour Association v. State of Gujarat 1995 (1) Guj. L.H. 12 (D.B.), Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Micro Forge (India) Ltd. 41 (2) G.L.R. 1594 (D.B), Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd., In re AIR 1962 Guj. 305 and Ratmani Engg. Ltd., In re [1999] 33 CLA 358 Guj.
S.N. Soparkar, Mrs. Swati Soparkar, S.B. Vakil, A.S. Vakil, P.C. Kavina, A.S. Diwan, N.C. Thakkar, P.P. Banaji, Rajni Iyer, Jal Soli Unwala, S.N. Shelat, N.V. Anjaria, K.S. Navati, Ms. Megha Jani, Ms. P.J. Davawala, Mihir H. Joshi, Sandeep Singhi and D.S. Vasawada for the Appearing parties.
Judgment
1. This petition under section 391(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) has been filed by Arvind Mills Ltd. (‘the company’), seeking sanction to the scheme of restructuring of its debts, floated by the creditors.
The company was incorporated on 1-6-1931 as a Public Limited Company to carry on business of spinning, weaving, manufacturing, dealing in cotton or other fabrics, substances and the preparation, dyeing or colouring of any of the said substances and the sale of yarn cloth or other manufactured fabrics and products and to carry on the business namely cotton spinners etc.; that the company had the authorised issued and subscribed share capital running into crores of rupees and issued equity shares of Rs. 1,00,54,99,450 with redeemable cumulative and non-convertible preference shares etc.; that the company and its associated textile companies employed over 10,000 persons in and around the city of Ahmedabad making them a largest private sector employer in the State of Gujarat; that the petitioner company earned profit for pretty long time; that the company obtained borrowings/credits from various Banks and financial institutions to finance its business needs and as on 31-3-2000 the total debt of the company mounted to approximately $ 593 million or Rs. 2,700 crores; that 64 per cent of that is from on-shore lenders and balance from off-shore lenders. That during the period between years 1997-2000 the company started making loss and was confronted with falling denim price and increase in manufacturing cost. The changed supply and demand structure in the industry, world-wide intensified price competition and as a result there was steep fall in the company’s sales realisation. That, on account of sharp increase in full expenses, significant cost and time overrun in certain projects, pre-operative expenses due to longer period of trial production and translation loss on dollar debt due to the depreciation of Indian rupees, the company did not generate adequate operational cash to service its debt during the financial year 2000. That the petitioner company felt the need for rescheduling and restructuring of its debts. That the company pro-actively sought a debt restructuring in a comprehensive manner that could prevent it from seeking repeated roll-overs from several lenders at differing terms. That the company held meetings with its lenders to formulate its debt restructuring and lenders elected representatives to form a Steering Committee in order to implement the restructuring process in an efficient manner. On 14-11-2000 the Steering Committee approved the restructuring plan for launch to all lenders. That the detailed terms of the restructuring were incorporated in term sheet which was despatched to all lenders on 25-1-2001 for their approval. A large majority of the existing lenders have approved the ‘Term Sheet’ incorporating the detailed terms of the restructuring.
2. The company filed Company Application No. 160 of 2001 for requisite directions for convening meeting of the various classes of creditors of the company. Vide order dated 13-6-2001 the Court directed the company to convene meeting of its various classes of creditors for the purpose of considering and if thought fit approve with or without modifications, the arrangement embodied in the Scheme of Arrangement. The order further directed Mr. A.L. Shah, Advocate and failing him Mr. A.C. Gandhi, Advocate to act as Chairman of the meeting of the classes of creditors of the Company, i.e. unsecured creditors, working capital lenders and secured creditors of the company and to report the result thereof to this Court. Necessary notices of the meeting together with copy of the scheme, explanatory statement and form of proxy were individually sent to each of the creditors of the company; that on 13-7-2001 meeting of each of the class of creditors of the company was held at the registered office of the company in accordance with the order dated 13-6-2001; that the meeting of the unsecured creditors of the company was attended by 21 unsecured creditors. That the scheme duly amended was placed for consideration of the meeting, after inviting debate thereon and the question submitted to the meeting of secured creditors, unsecured creditors and working capital lenders was, whether unsecured/secured/working capital creditors of the company approved the Scheme of Arrangement submitted at the meeting in the form of resolution. That, thereupon the aforesaid resolution on the proposed Scheme of Arrangement was put to vote by poll. That twenty (20) unsecured creditors holding Rs. 8,914.94 million of the outstanding unsecured debt of the company as on 31-3-2000 voted in favour of the said Scheme of Arrangement, representing 95.24 per cent in the number of unsecured creditors and 98.95 per cent in value of the total outstanding unsecured debt of the company as on 31-3-2000, present and voting, excluding invalid ballot papers. One unsecured creditor voted against the Scheme of Arrangement representing 4.76 per cent in the number of unsecured creditors and 1.05 per cent in value of the total outstanding unsecured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 present and voting. Thus the scheme was approved and resolution was passed with the requisite majority. That the meeting of the working capital lenders of the company was attended by 12 working capital lenders. That the resolution on the proposed Scheme of Arrangement was put to vote by poll. Ten working capital lenders holding Rs. 4,432.32 million of the outstanding working capital debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted in favour of the said Scheme of Arrangement representing 90.91 per cent in number of the working capital lenders and 96.2 per cent in value of the total outstanding working capital debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting, excluding invalid ballot papers. One working capital lender holding Rs. 175 million of the outstanding unsecured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted against the said Scheme of Arrangement representing 9.09 per cent in number of working capital lenders and 3.80 per cent in value of the total outstanding working capital debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting. One vote was found to be invalid. The scheme was approved and resolution was passed by the working capital lenders with the requisite majority. That the meeting of the secured creditors of the company was attended by forty six (46) secured creditors. Forty (40) secured creditors holding Rs. 10,735.30 million of the outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted in favour of the amendment representing 90.09 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 89.90 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting, excluding invalid ballot paper. Four (4) secured creditors holding Rs. 1205.16 million of the outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted against the said Scheme of Arrangement representing 9.09 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 10.09 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting. Two (2) votes were found to be invalid. The amendment was approved and the resolution was passed with the requisite majority. Thereafter the scheme duly amended was placed for consideration of the meeting. The meeting passed requisite resolution and approved the scheme. Thereupon, resolution on the proposed Scheme of Arrangement was put to vote by poll. Thirty five (35) secured creditors holding Rs. 9,565.03 million of the outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted in favour of the said Scheme of Arrangement representing 85.36 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 88.56 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting, excluding invalid ballot papers. Six (6) secured creditors holding Rs. 1,235.16 million of the outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted against the said Scheme of Arrangement representing 14.63 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 11.43 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 present and voting. Five (5) votes were found to be invalid. That the scheme approved and resolution was passed with the requisite majority.
3. The company along with the petition under section 391(1) presented the scheme ‘Exhibit D’ floated by the body of creditors for approval and prayed for the reliefs stated in para-24 of the petition.
The petition was admitted on 25-7-2001. This Court directed the petition to be advertised in Times of India (Ahmedabad edition), Gujarat Samachar (Ahmedabad edition) and Sandesh (Ahmedabad edition). Notice in Official Gazette was dispensed with. The notice to the Central Government was directed to be served through Regional Director, Department of Company Affairs, Bombay. Mr. S.B. Vakil, the learned senior counsel with Mr. A.S. Vakil for respondent United Bank of Switzerland, Mr. P.C. Kavina, the learned counsel with Mr. A.S. Diwan and Mr. N.C. Thakkar for respondent Commerzebank AG, Mr. P.P. Banaji, the learned counsel for respondent Fuji Bank, Ms. Rajni Iyer, the learned counsel with Mr. Jal Soli Unwala for respondent Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd. Mr. S.N. Shelat, the learned senior counsel with Mr. N.V. Anjaria for respondent Deutsche Bank, Mr. K.S. Nanavati, the learned senior counsel with Ms. Megha Jani for respondent UCO Bank, Ms. P.J. Davawala, the learned counsel for UOI, Deptt. of Company Affairs, Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned counsel for respondent State Bank of Saurasthra, Mr. Sandip Singhi, the learned counsel for respondent Exim Bank and Mr. D.S. Vasawada, the learned counsel for Textile Labour Association appeared on advance copy being supplied to them. The petition was published in the newspapers referred to above as directed by this Court.
4. Secured Creditors, namely Commerzebank AG, and The Bank of Nova-Scotia Asia Ltd., Singapore Branch filed collective objections to the Scheme of Arrangement in response to the public notice of the company’s advocate published in the issue dated 27-7-2001 of Times of India (Ahmedabad edition). The objectors in their affidavit of objections raised following disputes, namely (1) that the company cannot invoke jurisdiction of this Court under section 391 as the company is a ‘Relief Undertaking’ under the provisions of Bombay Relief Undertaking Act, (2) Jurisdiction to entertainment this petition, (3) there is no genuine compromise or arrangement, (4) the scheme operates unfairly, while favouring some creditors, the scheme seeks to confiscate the legitimate rights and securities of the objectors and members of its class, (5) sanction of the scheme, if accorded by this Court would operate as a cloak to cover up the legitimize fraud perpetrated by the company in collusion with one of its lenders, ICICI Limited (ICICI) and also would legitimize criminal acts and breach of trust as also legitimize gross acts of misfeasance and malfeasance by the company and ICICI, (6) that the relief sought are beyond the scope of the powers of this Court under section 391 and (7) the scheme of offends public and commercial morality, and that the scheme does not have the approval by requisite majority, that the foreign currency lenders (off-shore lenders) have not been constituted as a separate class.
5. On 1-2-2002 Ms. P.J. Davawala, the learned additional standing counsel for the Central Government stated that the Government of India has no objection to the sanctioning of the scheme or restructuring and produced letter dated 13-9-2001 by Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, to the said effect.
6. I have heard Mr. S.N. Soparkar, the learned senior counsel with Mrs. Swati Soparkar for the petitioner company, Mr. S.B. Vakil, learned senior counsel with Mr. A.S. Vakil for United Bank of Switzerland, Mr. P.C. Kavina, the learned counsel with Mr. A.S. Diwan & Mr. N.C. Thakkar for Commerzebank AG, Mr. P.P. Banaji, the learned counsel for Fuji Bank, Ms. Rajni Iyer, the learned counsel with Mr. Jal Soli Unwala for Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd., Mr. S.N. Shelat, the learned senior counsel with Mr. N.V. Anjaria for Deutsche Bank, Mr. K.S. Nanavati, the learned senior counsel with Ms. Megha Jani for UCO Bank, Ms. P.J. Davawala, the learned counsel for Union of India, Department of Company Affairs, Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned counsel for State Bank of Saurasthra, Singhi & Co. for Exim Bank and Mr. D.S. Vasawada the learned counsel for Textile Labour Association.
7. It is not much in dispute that the company at one point of time a leading textile company in the country fell into rough weather in the latter half of 1990’s and incurred losses and confronted with financial crunch. As seen above its debts on 31-3-2000 mounted to approximately $ 593 million/Rs. 2,700 Crores and 64 per cent of the aforesaid debt was from the on-shore (Indian Currency) lenders and balance from off-shore (foreign currency) lenders - the present objectors are the off-shore lenders who have lent money to the company in foreign currency, namely American dollars and the repayment thereof also agreed to be in the foreign currency. The company filed company application being Company Application No. 160 of 2001 for directions for convening meeting of the various classes of creditors of the company. Vide order dated 13-6-2001 this Court directed the company to convene meeting of various classes of creditors of the company for the purpose of considering and if thought fit approving with or without modification the arrangement embodied in the Scheme of Arrangement. After service of notice individually sent to the creditors as well as the publication of the notice in the local daily newspapers as directed in the said order, the meetings of the different classes of creditors i.e. unsecured creditors, working capital lenders and secured creditors of the company were convened on 13-7-2001. The said meeting of the unsecured creditors was attended by 21 unsecured creditors. The meeting of the working capital lenders was attended by 12 working capital lenders. The meeting of the secured creditors was attended by 46 secured creditors. All the classes of creditors approved the scheme with requisite majority. Finally, amended scheme of Compromise or Arrangement (Annexure-D) was put to vote by poll. 35 secured creditors, i.e. 88.56 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting, excluding invalid ballot papers. Six secured creditors representing 14.63 per cent in number of sercured cretitors and 11.43 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000, present and voting, with 5 votes found to be invalid, approved the Scheme of Arrangement and the Chairman reported the result of all the three meetings to this Court vide report dated 20-7-2001. It is not in dispute that, out of total number of secured creditors the present objectors four (4) in number have chosen to object to the scheme being sanctioned by this Court under section 391.
8. The salient features of the scheme reproduced in para-14 of the petition read :—
(a) The Scheme of Arrangement (‘the Scheme’) with the creditors has the effect of restructuring of the debt of the company owed to the existing lenders (as defined in section 1 of the Schedule) pursuant to section 391 and other relevant provisions of the Act.
(b) In the scheme, unless repugnant to the meaning or context thereof, the following expressions shall have the following meanings :
I. ‘Act’ means the Companies Act or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof;
II. ‘Commencement Date’ or ‘Appointed Date’ shall mean 1-4-2000, being the date as of which (or by reference to which) relevant existing credits will be restructured on the basis that relevant calculations of and relating to, existing creditors are made as of 31-3-2000;
III. ‘effective date’ shall mean the date, which is the later of;
(i) the date on which the certified copy of the order of the High Court of Gujarat sanctioning the scheme is filed with the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, and;
(ii) the date on which all the conditions precedent sent forth in section 3(A) and section 3(B) of the Schedule are, unless waived as per clause 19 of the scheme, satisfied;
IV. ‘Existing Credit’ shall mean the credit facilities as specified in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 of the Schedule; and
V. ‘Schedule’ means the schedule annexed to the scheme being the ‘Term Sheet’ in relation to the restructuring.
(c) The term sheet annexed as the Schedule to the scheme shall be, unless the scheme provides otherwise, deemed to be incorporated by reference herein, and all capitalised terms in the scheme which are not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Schedule. The Schedule forms an integral part of the scheme and all actions that are contemplated to be done or done under or in pursuance of the term sheet shall be deemed to have been done in pursuance of the scheme. Upon the coming into effect of the scheme, the provisions of set forth in the term sheet shall become binding in terms of the provisions of the scheme and shall operate notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any deed, instrument or writing, provided that all references to signing of restructuring documents to implement the restructuring would be construed as referring to the implementation of the restructuring through the Scheme of Arrangement and ‘Closing Date’ as defined in section 1 of the Schedule would be construed as referring to the effect date and no effect would be given to the date mentioned therein. It is, however, clarified that in the event of any conflict between the scheme and the term sheet, the former shall prevail over the latter.
(d) From the effective date and with effect from the commencement date and subject to the provisions of the scheme including in relation to the execution of any documentation to give formal effect thereto, the existing credits of the company shall be restructured on the terms and conditions and in the manner provided for in the Schedule.
(e) The restructuring of the preference shares may be effected, if need be, by a separate proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in section 2(D) of the Schedule.
(f) Pursuant to section 1 [under clause (c) of the heading ‘Credits to be Restructured’] of the Schedule, the non-retail public debenture holders shall be restructured under the scheme in the same manner as the restructured lenders and would accordingly elect or be deemed have elected to participate in either the Buyback Schemes or the Restructuring Scheme on the same terms and conditions as the restructured lenders.
(g) Excluded Debt - The excluded debt shall remain unaffected by the restructuring contemplated under the scheme and the company shall continue to make the payments due in relation to them as and when they become due and payable. Provided however, that any consequential changes to their terms in relation to the restructuring of the security or otherwise to give effect to the restructuring of the debt under the scheme, shall be carried out by the company.
(h) Modification of Security - From the effective date and subject to the provisions of the scheme including in relation to the execution of any documentation to give formal effect thereto, the approvals from any party which is not a holder of the existing credits and the time frame therefore, the following security shall be deemed to be created and/or modified in the manner provided for in section 4 of the Schedule :
(i) security held by the existing lenders (first charge and second charge);
(ii) security held by the working capital lenders; and
(iii) security to be created in favour of the lenders providing the new debt and/or participating in Debt Buyback Scheme C.
(i) Documentation - The existing credits of the company have been restructured under the scheme and all rights and liabilities relating to the restructured debt are created under the scheme. In addition, the company and the restructured lenders shall enter into any documentation that may be required, only to give formal effect to the restructuring and for the creation of the security contemplated by the scheme, and to govern the prospective/ongoing relationship between the company and its existing lenders (including covenants of the company, supervision of the management of the company, events of default etc.) Section 11(c) of the Schedule and the references in the Schedule to restructuring documents would be construed accordingly. Provided however that on and from the effective date, in the absence of the formal documentation referred to above, the rights, obligations and privileges of the company and the existing lenders shall continue to be governed by the documents in relation to the existing credits in so far as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the scheme, and to the extent of any inconsistency between the scheme and the said documents the scheme shall prevail.
(j) Election to the Restructuring and Buyback Schemes - As indicated in Section 2(A) of the Schedule (under the heading ‘Election Process’) the restructured lenders are to make elections to the Debt Buyback Schemes and/or the Restructuring Schemes. Such election shall be made within seven days from the date of conclusion of the meeting of the classes of the existing lenders. As this election has already been made by most of the existing lenders consenting to the term sheet pursuant to a circular sent by the company, such existing lenders would not be required to send fresh letters of election and in the absence of such fresh letters of election their existing elections shall be deemed to be the elections for the purposes of the scheme. The existing lenders not consenting to the scheme at the meeting of the classes of the creditors would be dealt with in accordance with section 11(B) of the Scheme.
(k) Regulatory Approvals for Payments - The company shall make all the payments contemplated under the Debt Buyback Schemes, subject to all necessary regulatory approvals. The company shall make all necessary applications (and shall do all follow up actions that may be required) to the relevant regulatory authorities for effecting such payments. In the event that any payments that are required to be made by the company cannot be made immediately due to regulatory reasons, the company shall open a separate no lien account with a third party agent acceptable to the existing lenders whose payments cannot be made and such account would be charged to the security agent or any other agent chosen by such existing lenders for the benefit of the existing lenders and the company would make all necessary applications for the creation of such charge.
(l) References to 75 per cent consent of Lenders - Except in relation to consent/actions to be taken after the effective date from the post restructuring lenders all references in the schedule to 75 per cent consent of the lenders shall be deemed to have been satisfied upon the sanction of the scheme by the requisite majority of each class of existing lenders and references to the consent of 100 per cent of existing lenders shall be deemed to have been satisfied upon the sanction of the scheme by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.
(m) Borrowing Restrictions and Disposal Restrictions - The scheme shall be deemed to restrict the company’s ability to borrow further monies and upon the company’s ability to sell, transfer or lease any of the fixed assets of the company, except in the circumstances provided for in section 8(B) and 8(C) respectively of the Schedule.
(n) Issue of Warrants - The company shall issue warrants as provided for in the Schedule.
(o) Contractual Arrangements prior to coming into effect of the Scheme - During the pendency of the scheme before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, nothing contained in the scheme shall restrict any of the parties hereto from entering into any definitive documentation or receiving any payments pursuant to their elections made under the circular sent to existing lenders consenting to the term sheet by the company [as described under clause (j) above] from the company, provided that no such arrangement would be inconsistent with the object or provisions of the scheme.
(p) Pending Legal Proceedings - Any proceedings pending against the company, in India or abroad, relating to any of the existing credits shall, on the effectiveness of the scheme, be terminated and the rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties shall be governed by the terms of the scheme.
(q) The company shall with all reasonable despatch, make applications/petitions under section 391 and other applicable provisions of the Act to the High Court of Judicature of Gujarat for sanctioning the scheme and obtain all approvals as may be required under law.
(r) In the event of the scheme failing to take effect by 31-12-2001 or such later date as may be agreed by the company and the working group, the scheme shall become null and void and in that event no rights or liabilities whatsoever shall accrue or be incurred inter se by the parties. Provided that the company may, with the approval of the working group, at anytime withdraw the scheme so as to implement the restructuring in any other manner if that is found to be feasible.
(s) All costs, charges and expenses, including any taxes and duties in connection with the scheme and incidental to the completion of the restructuring of the debt of the company in pursuance of the scheme shall be borne and paid by the company.
(t) The working group shall take all decisions required to be made by it under the scheme, including in relation to waiver of any of the conditions precedent set out in sections 3(A) and 3(B) of the Schedule, with the consent of at least three of its members.
(u) The board of directors of the company, with the consent of the working group may assent from time to time on behalf of all persons concerned to any modifications or amendments or additions to the scheme, or which the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad and/or any other authorities under law may deem fit to approve or impose and to resolve all doubts or difficulties that may arise for carrying out the scheme and to do and execute all acts, deeds, matters and things necessary for bringing scheme into effect.
9. The benefits of the Scheme of Arrangement reproduced in Para-15 of the petition read thus :—
(a) This scheme would help in the revival and continued existence of the petitioner company, which as a group employs over 10,000 employees at various locations. It is apprehended that if a scheme of revival/rehabilitation is not sanctioned, the petitioner company may have to be wound up resulting into tremendous unemployment. Further the chances of the creditors receiving any money in such a situation are always bleak. Incidentally it may be stated that one winding up petition is already pending against the petitioner company before this Hon’ble Court.
(b) This scheme would help in the revival and continued existence of the petitioner company, which has contributed heavily to the exchequer by way of sales-tax and excise duty. It is also one of India’s largest exporters in the textile industry. Over the years it has played a major role in the economic development of the State of Gujarat.
(c) The scheme presents the comprehensive solution for the entire debt problem of the petitioner company. Once the scheme is implemented, the financial health of the petitioner company will be restored as the scheme is aiming at infusion of fresh equity, reduction of substantial portion of debt and rescheduling of balance debt so as to align with the expected generation of cash in future. The scheme is acceptable to large majority of the creditors and has been worked out after protracted negotiation with the creditors.
(d) The scheme contains the best possible solution under the present circumstances for all the stakeholders of the petitioner company, i.e. the shareholders, the management, the workers and the creditors and involves substantial sacrifice and commitment to contributions from the management, the promoters and the creditors.
(i) The shareholders are infusing additional capital of Rs. 75 crores by way of a rights issue even though there would be severe restrictions on the declaration of dividend on equity capital.
(ii) The promoters will make additional investment in the equity capital of the petitioner company by subscribing to their portion of the rights issue and may also arrange for shortfall, if any, in the subscription to the rights issue. The promoters have also agreed not to dispose of the existing share held by them in the petitioner company until all the post restructuring debt is fully paid. If any dividend were paid on existing equity, the promoters would reinvest the dividend in the petitioner company in the form of interest-free and subordinated loans.
(iii) The lenders who are opting for buyback of their debt are sacrificing 52 per cent—55 per cent of principal outstanding and waiving the entire unpaid interest in consideration of their immediate exit from the petitioner company lenders who are not opting for buyback are accepting longer (5 to 10 years) tenure for repayment and reduced rates of interest.
(iv) The management of the petitioner company is accepting well defined control and monitoring by the lenders over the management of the petitioner company. The board of the petitioner company is to be reconstituted with lenders appointing four nominee directors and influencing the appointment of another four directors. The Chairman of the board of directors and director (Finance) will be independent persons not connected with the promoters of the company. There will be a Supervisory Board consisting of Chairman, Managing Director, Director (Finance), one nominee director and one independent director. The management is also accepting the appointment of an independent auditor for assisting lenders in reviewing and monitoring the cash flow and performance of the petitioner company in a specified manner. The management of the petitioner company has also given rights to the creditors to appoint independent engineer to oversee the technical performance of the manufacturing facilities of the company. Further, lenders are being given the power to change the management upon the occurrence of certain events of default.
(e) The scheme would maintain the petitioner company as a ‘going concern’. Since the petitioner company is unable to generate cash sufficient to meet its contract debt service obligations, the only alternative would be to liquidate the petitioner company which would not benefit the creditors as their recovery would be substantially lower in the case of liquidation than what is possible from the operation of the petitioner company. The continued operation of the petitioner company would ensure that the assets of the petitioner company remain productive, the petitioner company will continue to earn foreign exchange and contribute to the exchequer in the form of taxes and the employment of over 10,000 employees would also be protected.
(f) The scheme does not involve any sacrifice from retail fixed deposit/debenture holders or the workers of the company as their dues are sought to be repaid in full and therefore the small investor or workers would not suffer due to this restructuring of the petitioner company.
10. It is not disputed that the scheme has been floated and supported by the majority of the creditors. The objectors do not have majority even in the $ 75 million syndicate, i.e. off-shore lenders. Fuji Bank who had earlier supported the scheme later on, on account of the change of the management, the new management Deutsche Bank AG Singapore has objected to the scheme but majority of the $ 75 million Syndicate off-shore lenders who are lenders in foreign currency have supported the scheme at the time of meeting of the secured creditors. It is not disputed that the objectors as the foreign currency lenders insisted for the better terms than the terms offered by the scheme to the other secured creditors including off-shore lenders, and the terms offered under the scheme to the secured creditors were not palatable to the present objectors and that is why the objections to the scheme. It is also not disputed that the objectors attended the meeting of secured creditors but have declined to be the members of the Steering Committee or a Sub-Committee which was constituted by the Steering Committee to scrutinize the transactions of the company for the purpose of the scheme of compromise, but attended the meeting as the observers had participated in the meeting.
It is also admitted that in December 1999 a Technical Expert KSA Technopak was appointed as consultant to carry out techno-economic viability study of the company at the instance of some of the lenders, including the objectors. Thereafter, in January 2000 the Company appointed Jardine Fleming (P.) Ltd. a firm of financial consultants to devise the package for revival of the company. After receipt of the report of the said consultants in March 2000, two meetings of the lenders of the company were held and a Core Group of the major lenders by the name ‘Steering Committee’ (‘SC’) was formed to examine reports of the experts of majority lenders, including the objectors. The SC which met five times all the representatives of the objectors attended these meetings but refused to be the part of the SC as members thereof. Request of the objectors for better terms as it is revealed from Pages 00005, 6 and 49 of Document File, Part-I was refused by the SC. The objectors raised allegation of illegality of sale and lease back transaction, spin-off garment division and diversion of funds. The objections raised by the objectors did not find favour with the SC which consisted of foreign currency lenders also, and the SC approved terms of restructuring.
11. One of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the objectors is that, this Court has no jurisdiction under section 391(1), in as much as the foreign currency secured lenders (i.e. the objectors) have not been constituted as a separate class as the consent of each class of creditors should be available with the Court before sanctioning the scheme and the objectors have not consented or agreed to the Scheme of Arrangement Exhibit-D.
It is not in dispute that all secured creditors i.e. lenders in foreign currency and lenders in Indian rupees and who are to be repaid in foreign currency and Indian currency respectively have been constituted as one single class of creditors for the purpose of meeting convened on 13-7-2001. Thus, there is no distinction kept between secured creditors lending either in foreign currency or Indian currency. In other words the foreign currency lenders were not treated as a distinct group/class. It is also the say of objector No. 1 in particular that as against other secured creditor, namely ICICI, the objectors have a conflicting interest as a civil suit and criminal complaint have been filed and pending against ICICI. Thus, in the say of the objectors, there is not only absence of commonality of interest but also a conflict of interest between objectors and other secured creditor viz. ICICI; that, there could not have been and in fact there is no effective consultation in the meeting of the secured creditors on 13-7-2001. That, the group or class of secured creditors as constituted by the company are heterogeneous group having nothing in common and that the objectors cannot be identified with lenders in domestic currency.
12. In order to appreciate what is meant by class of members/creditors and what is the nature of interest which is required for a separate classification of members, and also in what set of circumstances separate classes of creditors would be required to be constituted under section 391, it would be necessary as to what section 391 provides:-
“391. Power to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members - (1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed -
(a) between a company and its creditors or any class of them; or
(b) between a company and its members or any class of them;”
The aforesaid provisions provide for two types of arrangement or compromise. One type of arrangement made by and between the company and its creditors as a whole or between its members as a whole, and the other type of compromise or arrangement is such which is between the company and its creditors and members as a whole, but it may be between the company and class of creditors or between the company and class of members. Sub-section (4) of section 391 provides for an application being made for the issue of direction for meeting of the creditors or class of members or the members of class of creditors as the case may be. Sub-section (2) deals with when majority in number in value of creditors or class of creditors agree to any arrangement or compromise, if sanctioned by the Court, be binding on all the creditors. It is suggested from the provisions contained in section 391 that, it is only where different terms are offered to different class of creditors under the proposed compromise or arrangement, separate class would-be required to be constituted in respect of each class of creditors or shareholders for whom either com-promise or arrangement has been offered. The use of the phrase ‘as the case may be’ in sub-section (1) for the purpose of holding separate meeting and sub-section (2) for the purpose of agreeing with the proposed scheme by requisite majority and its binding effect of being sanctioned by the Court, would be superfluous. In any given case, whether the compromise or arrangement has been proposed between the company and the creditors as a whole without spelling out different terms for different classes of creditors or between the company and its members as a whole without giving any separate package for different class of members, separate meetings of different classes of members are required to be held. The phrase ‘as the case may be’ for the purpose of holding of meeting of creditors or class of creditors or of the members or class of members or the requirement of majority representing the requisite value of creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members as the case may be would carry no meaning. Thus it is to be seen whether any different terms have been offered to different classes of creditors or members and whether any classification of members is required to be made in accordance with the distinctions in terms of arrangement offered to the creditors and whether any such separate meeting was required to be called. The classification of members or creditors can be founded on the basis of difference in the terms offered under the scheme. The difference in terms of the scheme can be the only criterion for identifying separate class for the purpose of convening a separate meeting for such class.
13. The learned counsel for the objectors in this regard referred to the decision in the case of Indequip Ltd. v. Maneckchowk & Ahmedabad Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1970] 2 CLJ, 300. At page 339 it is observed:-
“... Speaking very generally, in order to constitute a class, members belonging to the class must form a homogeneous group with commonality of interest. If people with heterogeneous interests are combined in a class, naturally the majority having common interest may ride rough shod over the minority representing a distinct interest. One test that can be applied with reasonable certainty is as to the nature of compromise offered to different groups or classes. The company will ordinarily be expected to offer an identical compromise to persons belonging to one class, otherwise it may be discriminatory. At any rate, those who are offered substantially different compromises each will form a different class. Even if there are different groups within a class the interests of which are different from the rest of the class or who are to be treated differently in the scheme, such groups must be treated as separate classes for the purpose of the scheme. Broadly speaking, a group of persons would constitute one class when it is shown that they have conveyed all interest and their claims are capable of being ascertained by any common system of valuation. The group styled as a class should ordinarily be homogeneous and must have commonality of interest and the compromise offered to them must be identical. This will provide rational indicia for determining the peripheral boundaries of classification. The test as stated earlier would be that a class must be confined to those persons whose rights are so similar as to make it possible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.”
In the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd., In re [1996] 87 Comp. Cas. 705, the Division Bench of this Court observed that, ‘what is of the primary importance for the purpose of constituting a class requiring a separate meeting thereof is, a different treatment given to a group under the proposed scheme and no separate classification is required until a group is treated differently under the scheme. The term ‘any interest treated differently under the scheme’ is important. The fact that the shareholders/members of the same class offered the same terms under the scheme perceive their interest differently and or considered that their interest may be affected differently from others because of their inter-relationship or the interests other than as shareholder simpliciter, cannot sustain their claim to constitute a class distinct from others. Such interest is to be taken care of by expressing their views during the course of the meeting. If that were not so, all interests would be identical and if anybody has any interest apart from being treated differently under the scheme, likely to be affected in different manner because of the personal circumstance of the holder of shares or creditor, as the case may be, on account of consequences of the scheme but not on account of the terms of treatment under the scheme, would lead to the whole provisions being unworkable in as much as every person claiming his interest to be adversely affected by the proposed scheme on that account will have to be treated differently resulting in classification of groups having identical interest and identical response to the scheme.
14. The contention of the objectors is that their interest is not similar to that of other secured creditors, particularly ICICI, and on that basis the objectors contended that the foreign currency lenders constitute a separate class of secured creditors. It may be appreciated that, it is not because of the different treatment/treatment given to the objectors that they constitute a separate class of secured creditors, and it is not the say of the objectors that the terms offered to them under the scheme are different. There is no dissimilarity of interest vis-a-vis the scheme. As far as objectors are concerned all the secured creditors under the scheme are offered the same terms but the objectors being foreign currency lenders perceive their interest differently or consider that their interest may be affected differently from other secured creditors because of their interrelationship particularly ICICI or their interest other than as secured creditors simplicitor but the same cannot entitle the objectors to sustain their claim of separate class distinct from other secured creditors. The inter se differences/disputes amongst some secured creditors cannot be the criterion for constituting separate class of secured creditors in foreign currency. Personal conflict of interest of the objectors with ICICI would be totally foreign to the scope of class meeting convened by the company to consider the scheme.
In case of Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 506; at para-38 the Supreme Court considered provisions contained in section 391(1) and observed thus :
“... So far as the Articles of Association of respondent-company are concerned they also contemplate two classes of shareholders. No separate class of equity shareholders is contemplated either by the Act or by the Articles of Association of the respondent-company. Appellant is admittedly an equity shareholder.”
Therefore, he would fall within the same class of equity shareholders whose meeting was convened by the orders of the Company Court...... Even though the Companies Act or the Articles of Association do not provide for such a class within the class of equity shareholders, in a given contingency it may be contended by a group of shareholders that because of their separate and conflicting interests vis-a-vis other equity shareholders with whom they formed a wider class, a separate meeting of such separately interested shareholders should have been convened. But such is not the case of the appellant. It is not his case that his interest as an equity shareholder in respondent-company is in any way conflicting with the general interest of the equity shareholders as a class. Consequently it could not be urged by him with any emphasis that the General Body of equity shareholders acting as a class while considering the question of approval of the Scheme was likely to take a decision which would adversely affect the commercial interest of the appellant as an equity shareholder. His personal conflict of interest with the director was totally foreign to the scope of class meeting which was convened to consider the Scheme in question as we have seen earlier while considering earlier points for determination. It is also to be kept in view that the appellant would have urged with some justification his contention for convening a separate meeting representing for him and his group of dissenting equity shareholders if it was his case that the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement as offered to him and his group was in any way different from the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement offered to other equity shareholders who also belonged to the same class in the wider sense of the term. On the express language of section 391(1) it becomes clear that where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its members or any class of them a meeting of such members or class of them has to be convened. This clearly presupposes that if the Scheme of Arrangement or Compromise is offered to the members as a class and no separate Scheme is offered to any sub-class of members which has a separate interest and a separate Scheme to consider, no question of holding a separate meeting of such a sub-class would at all survive.... Consequently when one and the same Scheme is offered to the entire class of equity shareholders for their consideration and when commercial interest of the appellant so far as the Scheme is concerned is in common with other equity shareholders he would have a common cause with them either to accept or to reject the Scheme from commercial point of view. Consequently there was no occasion for convening a separate class meeting of the minority equity shareholders represented by the appellant and his group as tried to be suggested.”
In this connection the Supreme Court referred to what the learned author Palmer in his Treatise Company Law 24th Edition, has to say on ‘What Constitutes a class’:
“The Court does not itself consider at this point what classes of creditors or members should be made parties to the Scheme”.
The Supreme court then proceeds to observe :—
“... It is, therefore, obvious that unless a separate and different type of Scheme of Compromise is offered to a sub-class of a class of creditors or shareholders otherwise equally circumscribed by the class no separate meeting of such sub-class of the main class of members or creditors is required to be convened.”
In case of D.A. Swamy v. India Meters Ltd. [1994] 79 Comp. Cas., 27, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed, ‘broadly speaking, a group of persons would constitute one class when it is shown that they have conveyed all interest and their claims are capable of being ascertained by any common system of valuation. The group styled as a class should, ordinarily, be homogeneous and must have commonality of interest and the compromise offered to them must be identical.’
In the above case before the Madras High Court, at the meeting of the unsecured creditors of the company to consider a proposed scheme for revival of the company, certain motions for amendments sought to the scheme were not carried for want of majority and the scheme was approved as proposed. The learned single Judge accorded sanction to the scheme in the interest of the employees, rejecting the objections of certain unsecured creditors, inter alia, that the scheme proposed differential treatment to fixed depositors and other unsecured creditors such as loan and hundi and suppliers, and that proxies obtained by those attending the meeting had been misused (including by the Chairman, a director of the company) to defeat the motion for amendments. As far as the principle enunciated is concerned, there cannot be any disagreement with the same.
In case of Re Osiris Insurance Ltd. Chancery Division (Companies Court), [1999] 1 BCLC pg. 182, at page 188, case of Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573 has been referred, reproducing the following observations from page-583 thereof :
“The word ‘class’ is vague, and to find out what is meant by it we must look at the scope of the section, which is a section enabling the Court to order a meeting of a class of creditors to be called. It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term ‘class’ as will prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.”
15. As far as the company is concerned all secured creditors, off-shore lenders as well as on-shore lenders have been treated alike and no distinction is kept by the company within/amongst the secured creditors. It is not the say of the objectors that this group of secured creditors have been treated differently from other secured creditors by the company. The grievance is otherwise. Identical/same terms of compromise have been offered to all the secured creditors. There cannot be any preferential treatment to some secured creditors and the scheme cannot give any special treatment to some creditors. Simply because some of the secured creditors, have some dispute between them or have been fighting litigation inter se can be no ground for treating litigating secured creditors differently from the body of secured creditors. There cannot be a class within the class and the class has to be of one type of creditors, namely secured creditors unsecured creditors and working capital lenders as all the secured creditors have similar rights in the company. As far as commonality or conflict of interest is concerned all the secured creditors have a common interest of securing their dues in proportion to the amount lend and the terms or conditions thereof. It is not the say of the objectors that their rights are dissimilar to the rights of supporting secured creditors. As far as the body of secured creditors is concerned, there can be an effective consultation as far as their dues/interest/rights against the company under the scheme are concerned. It is not the say of the objectors that in the meeting of 13-7-2001 they were not allowed to participate in the proceedings of the meeting nor any secured creditor including the on-shore lenders prevented them to have their say in the meeting. The class of creditors constituted, namely secured creditors cannot be regarded as a heterogeneous group having nothing in common or want of the commonality of interest or the objectors have conflict of interest vis-a-vis the scheme with other secured creditors or that the class was formed to ensure that the rights and interest of some of the secured creditors (objectors) are confiscated.
It will be seen from the above discussion that all the secured creditors, including foreign currency lenders who were constituted as one class and called at the meeting had the commonality of interest and their rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to have their common interest. The nature of the proposals embodied in the scheme apply equally to all the secured creditors, domestic currency lenders as well as foreign currency lenders and same terms were offered to the entire body of secured creditors under the scheme. It is not suggested from the scheme offered that the interest of the secured creditors is in any manner conflicting or there is no commonality of interest vis-a-vis the company and the objectors form a homogeneous group along with other secured creditors and the class of secured creditors constituted cannot be regarded as heterogeneous.
In my opinion, the objectors would not be entitled to be treated as a different class of secured creditors, a class within the class, as there is no conflict of commercial interest between objectors and other secured creditors, especially when the same scheme with same terms has been offered to all the secured creditors and there is no distinction made in the scheme between the objectors and other secured creditors.
16. The second objection on the score of jurisdiction of this Court under section 391(1) is that the company is declared as a relief undertaking and during the period the notifications under section 3(1) of Bombay Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1948 (‘BRU Act’) is in force, section 391(1) cannot be invoked.
It is the say of the objectors that in view of section 4(1)(a)(iv) which enacts a complete suspension of all rights and obligations of the company, the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under section 391(1) are also suspended, consequently this Court does not have jurisdiction to sanction the Scheme; that the provisions of the BRU Act and the provisions of section 391 operate in the same field viz., an undertaking requiring rehabilitation and protection against distraint from execution and sale of its assets may move either under the BRU Act or under provisions of section 391. While rehabilitation and protection extended by the BRU Act is under the aegis of the State Government, the rehabilitation and protection extended by section 391 is under the aegis of Company Court and as the company enjoys protection of the State Government under the BRU Act it cannot seek Company Court’s protection.
It is submitted for the company that, the issue as regards jurisdiction is closed/concluded in view of the order dated 9-7-1991 passed in Company Application No. 160 of 2001 by this Court when the meeting was permitted to be convened by this Court. In the alternative it is submitted that, even if the question as regards jurisdiction in the context of section 4(1)(a)(iv) of BRU Act is not concluded, then also, the company, having been declared as relief undertaking under section 3 of the BRU Act, cannot be precluded because of section 4(1)(iv) of BRU Act, from approaching Company Court under section 391 for sanction of the scheme floated and supported by the creditors.
17. The relevant provisions of section 4(1) of the said Act read as follows:—
“4(1). Notwithstanding any law, usage, custom, contract, instrument, decree, order, award, submission, settlement, standing order or other provisions whatsoever the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that—
(a) in relation to any relief undertaking and in respect of the period for which the relief undertaking continues as such under sub-section (2) of section 3—
** ** **
(iv) any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all proceedings relative thereto pending before any court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed;”
Confining to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this petition and considering the scheme of restructuring of the debts of the company under section 391 in the context of section 4(1)(iv) of the BRU Act reproduced above, the Division Bench of this Court in case of D.S. Patel & Co. v. Gujarat State Textile Corpn. Ltd. 41 Comp. Cas. (sic) 1908, had the occasion to consider sections 3 and 4 of the BRU Act. The Division Bench while considering reasonableness of the restrictions contemplated under section 4 of the BRU Act, in light of the restrictions being in public interest, observed that; ‘The Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act was enacted for three main purposes, namely; (1) to make temporary provisions for industrial relations; (2) to enable the State Government provide loan, grant or financial assistance for the industrial undertaking in question and (3) to do the above as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief. It is undoubtedly true that sub-clause (iv) is so worded that on a plain reading it gives an impression that what is suspended is not only the remedy for the enforcement of the right to hold but also the right itself. But we find that on a true construction of this sub-clause the right itself is not suspended but only the remedy for the enforcement of the right is suspended. In our opinion, this appears to be the true construction of sub-clause (iv) because, if this sub-clause is interpreted as suspending the very existence of the rights covered by the notification issued under section 4, the very object of the statute would be frustrated. This will be evident from the discussion which follows:—
“It is evident from the wording of this sub-clause that it contemplates the suspension of ‘any’ right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred in the past. The sub-clause, therefore, covers within its vide compass even the rights accrued in favour of the relief undertaking itself. Now, if this sub-clause is construed as putting a temporary halt to the very existence of the rights covered by the notification issued under section 4, the result would be that even the rights of the undertaking accrued in the past would have no existence for the temporary period in question. If this happens, it would be totally impossible for the undertaking to function at all because it cannot use its machinery or premises for running its industry. This would obviously destroy the very object for achieving the statute as enacted. ... The rights, remedies and proceedings with regard to obligations are suspended under section 4. Suspension does not mean to destruction of the rights.”
In case of Inderjit C. Parekh v. V.K. Bhatt 15 Guj. LR 574, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the object of section 4(1)(a)(iv) of the BRU Act is to declare a moratorium on actions against the undertaking during the currency of the notification declaring it to be a relief undertaking. By such clause (iv), any remedy for the enforcement of an obligation or any liability against the relief undertaking is suspended and proceedings which are already commenced are to be stayed during the operation of the notification. On the notification ceasing to have force, such obligations and liabilities revive and become enforceable and the proceedings which are stayed can be continued. These provisions are aimed at resurrecting and rehabilitating industrial undertakings brought by inefficiency or mismanagement to the brink of dissolution, posing thereby the grave threat of unemployment of industrial workers. ‘Relief Undertaking’ means under section 2(2) an industrial undertaking in respect of which a declaration under section 3 is in force. By section 3, power is conferred on the state Government to declare an industrial undertaking as a relief undertaking, ‘as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief’. Relief undertakings, so long as they continue as such, are given immunity from legal actions so as to render their working smooth and effective. Such undertaking can be run more effectively as a measure of unemployment relief, if the conduct of their affairs is unhampered by legal proceeding or the threat of such proceedings. That is the genesis and justification of section 4(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.
18. If the provisions of section 391(1) and 391(6) of the Act are read together the protection is the resultant effect of the entire scheme of the Act. As far as the scheme brought before the Court under section 391(1) is concerned, there is no question of granting any relief or remedy to the company. The Court under section 391(1) examines the scheme irrespective of the objection if any, to the scheme from any corner and when the Court is examining the scheme for the purpose of deciding whether the same should be sanctioned with or without modification or not, then the protection under section 391(6) would follow. As far as the power to consider or examine the scheme under section 391 is concerned the power has to be either express or implied. As far as provisions under the BRU Act are concerned there is no implied or express bar to any petition for the sanction of the scheme and in absence of any express or implied bar to the petition under section 391, merely because the company is declared a relief undertaking under section 3 of the BRU Act, I do not see any substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the objectors on the score of want of jurisdiction of this Court to consider the scheme under section 391(1)/(2), and the company can pursue the proceedings under section 391, even during subsistence of the notification under section 3 of the BRU Act. Reading sections 3 and 4 together the privilege or insulation offered to the undertaking is because of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government that the particular undertaking needs some help or protection. It be hardly said that the notification under section 4 is not issued pursuant to any prayer by the company and, therefore, there is no question of double insulation to the company under section 4(1)(a)(iv) and section 391(6). For these reasons I am unable to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the objectors as regards want of jurisdiction under section 391(1).
19. One of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the objectors is that the Scheme of compromise has not been supported/approved by the requisite majority of the secured creditors as envisaged by sub-section (2) of section 391, and, therefore the scheme cannot be sanctioned.
The relevant provision of sub-section (2) of section 391 provides as under:—
“391. Power to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members.—
(2) If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, or members, or class of members, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or, where proxies are allowed [under the rules made under section 643], by proxy, at the meeting, agree to any compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement shall, if sanctioned by the Court, be binding on all the creditors, all the creditors of the class, all the members, or all the members of the class as the case may be, and also on the company, or in the case of a company which is being wound up the liquidator and contributories of the company.”
It will be seen from the above reproduced sub-section (2) that the scheme of compromise or arrangement with creditors and members must have the support from majority in number three-fourth in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members present and voting either in person or where proxies are allowed, by proxy, at the meeting, agreeing to any compromise or arrangement.
According to the petitioner on 13-7-2001, pursuant to the order dated 13-6-2001 passed in Company Application No. 160 of 2001 the meeting of each of the classes of creditors of the company was convened and held at the registered office of the company, under the Chairmanship of Mr. A.L. Shah, Advocate, appointed by this Court. That the meeting of the secured creditors of the company was attended by 46 (forty-six) secured creditors and that the scheme of arrangement was taken as read with the permission of the members of the meeting. Thereafter the proposed Scheme of arrangement was put to vote by poll. 35 (thirty-five) secured creditors holding 9,565.03 millions of the outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 voted in favour of the said scheme for arrangement representing 85.36 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 88.68 per cent of the value of the total outstanding secured debt of the petitioner company as of 31-3-2000 present and voting. 6(six) secured creditors holding Rs. 1,235.16 million of the outstanding secured creditors of the petitioner company as of 31-3-2000 voted against said scheme of arrangement representing 40.63 per cent in the number of secured creditors and 11.43 per cent in value of the total outstanding secured debt of the company as of 31-3-2000 present and voting. 5(five) votes were found to be invalid and, thus, the scheme was approved and resolution was passed with the requisite majority.
20. Sub-section (2) of section 391 requires that the scheme of compromise or arrangement must be approved by majority of creditors/members representing 3/4 in value of the creditors or class of creditors/or members or class of members.
It is contended that, if the objectors were treated as a separate class then the voting pattern would have been changed and there would not be requisite majority supporting the scheme; that the votes cast by State Bank of India could not have been treated as invalid and the same could have been considered as votes against the scheme; that three fourth of the majority supporting the scheme must agree to the scheme as per the statutory requirement.
In this regard reliance has been placed on behalf of the objectors on the decision in the case of Hindustan General Electric Corpn. Ltd. In re AIR 1959 Cal. 679. It has been observed that ‘the function and duties of the court in the matter of sanctioning of schemes are well known. Any scheme which is fair and reasonable and made in good faith will be sanctioned if it could reasonably be supposed by sensible people to be for the benefit of each class of the members or creditors concerned. It is also the duty of the court to see that the resolutions were passed by the statutory majority. The majority of the three fourth value must be of persons who were present and who took part in the voting. Mere presence would not be enough.
It may be noted that, in the instant case State Bank of India supported the scheme on condition, so it was not an unconditional or blanket support/or agreement with the scheme.
21. In the case of Ms. Lily Thomas Advocate v. Speaker, Lok Sabha [1993] 4 SCC Cases, Pg. 234, it is observed :
“. . . Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question.”
In Black’s Law Dictionary ‘Voting’ is explained as ‘the expression of one’s will, preference, or choice, formally manifested by a member of a legislative or deliberative body, or of a constituency or a body of qualified electors, in regard to the decision to be made by the body as a whole upon any proposed measure or proceeding or in passing laws, rules, regulations, or the selection of an officer or representative. ...’ ‘Right to vote means right to exercise the right in favour of or against the motion or resolution. Such right implies right to remain neutral as well...’
It is also observed not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting implies that the motion shall be carried only if the requisite numbers expressed their opinion by casting vote in support of the Motion. One may be present and yet not voting. A reading of paragraph 1163 of Vol. 34 of Halsbury’s Laws of England indicates that when division becomes necessary then the Speaker directs, those in support to go in the right lobby and those who oppose in left lobby. And, ‘the members who take part in it pass through one or other of lobbies, give their names to the clerks, who sit at desks, and are counted by the tellers as they leave the respective lobbies...’
In practice and procedure of the Parliament by M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher, the procedure of voting in Lok Sabha is described thus :
“Under the automatic vote recorder system, each member casts his vote from the seat allotted to him by pressing the requisite button provided for the purpose. A push button set containing a pilot light and three push buttons - a green button for ‘Yes’, a red button for ‘No’ and a black button for ‘Abstain’ - together with a push switch suspended by a wire, is provided at the seat of each member.”
Thus, it will be seen from the above that a member present and voting may remain neutral, indifferent, unbiased, impartial, not engaged on either side. Voting is formal expression of will or opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right on the subject or issue in question has to be either in the affirmative or negative, that is yes or no. On the ballot paper or voting paper one is not supposed to write anything, except putting a ‘X’ ‘ü’ either in favour of the proposition or against the proposition and any writing suggesting condition or reservation cannot be said to be an expression of will or opinion either for or against the proposition and those votes have to be necessarily treated as invalid or void as such votes are no votes leading either way.
22. It need hardly be said that the votes cast on the proposition and voting thereof are to be construed in the ordinary and usual sense and that mean ‘expressing the will, mind or preference; casting or giving a vote’. They do not include the votes or ballots, that do not cast a vote on the proposition legally or void votes may no be counted either for or against the proposition submitted even though they may have been even received, placed in the ballot box and constitute sum of the total number of ballots. A bare attempt to vote by depositing blank ballot containing any writing is not effective and cannot be included in the total count upon the 3/4th majority is to be estimated. Only those ballots that express voters points with such clearing that the ballot can be counted for or against can be counted in total. The requirement contemplates two ballots only, one affirmative and the other negative. To adopt any other rule would be to say that three ballots were contemplated one affirmative, one negative and the other neither affirmative or negative but forming a new class into which all ballots for any reason void must go. In the instant case to accept the submission of the objectors to consider the ballots by the State Bank of India suggesting condition would tantamount to creating a third class of ballots which cannot be regarded as legal and such class of ballots putting condition for acceptance or on agreement to the scheme cannot be treated but as void and illegal and such ballots have to be treated as rejected ballots which could not be counted in determining whether or not to submit proposition it received the necessary three-fourth affirmative votes. All such votes have to be treated as no votes. In other words it is nullity and void and a void vote is of no more effect than no vote. It is only those ballots entitled to be counted for or against the proposition in determining the required majority.
23. Mr. A.L. Shah, Chairman appointed by this Court in Company Application No. 160 of 2001 in the matter of Scheme of Arrangement of Arvind Mills Limited with its creditors, filed his report, copy whereof is at pages 237 to 272 of the document file Part-III. Page-252, Clause (C) whereof refers to the Meeting of Secured Creditors, suggesting that 46 secured creditors. 18 attended through proxy and 28 through representatives. That the total amount due as on 31-3-2000 to the said total 46 creditors who attended the meeting is Rs. 11,970.77 millions. That, at page 257 it is observed that Shri. A. Sekar, proxy holder of the Commerzebank AG and of three other Secured Creditors, with the permission of the Chairman of the meeting raised 4 objections to the approval of the Scheme of Restructuring :
1. The garment business as also brands of the company have been illegally sold away at a price of about Rs. 361 crore.
2. Various amounts have been transferred to subsidiaries and as a result about Rs. 395 crores of the Company has been siphoned.
3. The company had entered into between September 1998 and March 1999, transaction of sale and leaseback with ICICI Ltd., whereby the assets which were hypothecated and mortgaged to the Syndicate were sold away.
4. That, ICICI, one of the secured creditors has been given better treatment by prepaying amount due to ICICI and that, all information were not given in the information/memorandum circulated by the Company.
Objections raised were discussed in the meeting. It is observed at page-262 that, after full and complete discussion voting by poll was called for. The question submitted to the said meeting was whether the Secured Creditors of the said company approved of the Compromise and/or Arrangement (as arranged). The representative of State Bank of India inquired whether any vote for the Scheme subject to certain condition would be valid or not and it was explained by the Chairman to the meeting that the members had to vote either ‘For’ or ‘Against’ the proposed motion. That, there cannot be any conditional vote. If a vote is conditional it would be treated as a invalid since in a meeting convened for considering a Scheme of Compromise or arrangement one has to either vote ‘For’ or ‘Against’ the resolution. Giving a conditional vote might make the vote invalid and might be considered as no voting at all. It is observed at page-263 that the Chairman informed the meeting that anyone voting for or against the Scheme subject to certain conditions would be treated as invalid and a note to that effect would be included in the report to the Court. At page-264 it is observed that the meeting was of the opinion that the compromise or arrangement (as modified by the amendment) should be approved or agreed to. All the forty-six (46) secured creditors attending either by proxy or representative of total of thirty-five (35) Secured Creditors (86.36 per cent) in number of those attending and casting valid votes) having a total voting value of Rs. 9,565.03 million (88.56 per cent in value of those attending and casting valid votes) voted ‘For’ the scheme and approved the same, while six (6) Secured Creditors (14.63 per cent in number of those attending and casting valid votes) having voting value of Rs. 1,235.16 million (11.43 per cent in value of those attending and casting valid vote) voted ‘Against’ the motion. Five votes cast by State Bank of India, London, State Bank of India, and Indian Bank, were considered invalid since though Secured Creditors viz. State Bank of India (four votes) and Indian Bank (one vote) had the ballot papers voted ‘For’ the Scheme they attached with the ballot papers their letter dated 12-7-2001 (in case of State Bank of India) and in case of Indian Bank writing on the ballot paper itself stating that they were approving the Scheme subject to condition mentioned in their letters/comments on the ballot papers. Thus, these five votes, four of State Bank of India and one of Indian Bank were treated invalid.
24. The above observations would reveal that the votes cast by State Bank of India and Indian Bank are conditionally agreeing with the Scheme. Conditional approval to the Scheme cannot be regarded as votes in favour of the proposition nor at the same time these votes can be regarded as against the proposition because it is conditional expression of opinion by the State Bank of India and Indian Bank and the votes of State Bank of India and Indian Bank have been rightly excluded from consideration by the Chairman at the meeting treating these votes to be nullity/void and void votes are of no more effect than no votes and the votes by State Bank of India being unintelligible ballot being ineffective cannot be included in the total count done which the required majority of a 3/4th is to be estimated. There is no question of considering that votes of the foreign currency lenders which are negative treating the foreign currency lenders as a separate class since the objectors as foreign currency lenders are not entitled to be treated as a separate class as observed earlier and therefore their votes would be counted along with other secured creditors for the purpose of determining the 3/4th majority to the proposition as required under section 391 and the proposition is rightly said to have been supported by requisite majority of 3/4th secured creditors as stated by the Chairman in his report as pointed out, above and I do not find any flaw in this regard.
25. One of the objections raised by the objectors is that the proposed scheme of restructuring should not be accorded sanction as the scheme would operate as a cloak to cover up/legitimize the fraud perpetrated by the company in collusion with one of its lenders, ICICI Ltd. (ICICI) and would also legitimize ICICI’s criminal acts and also legitimize gross acts of misfeasance and malfeasance by the company and ICICI.
In this regard it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the objectors that the scheme seeks to regularise petitioner’s unauthorised transactions with ICICI. There is sale and lease back transaction and the spin-off of the Garment division and the scheme makes no provision for recovery of large scale diversion to the extent of Rs. 362 crores for the period 1998-99 and 1999-2000 to subsidiaries and family controlled companies and the intention of the scheme is to legitimize these transactions and that the scheme is a cloak to cover the misdeeds of the company and/or to shield the directors against any investigation into their management and that the scheme will have the shield on the pending proceedings, namely the suit filed in the English Court by one of the objectors.
It is submitted on behalf of the company that the scheme does not operate as a cloak to cover up/legitimize so called fraud with the syndicate consisting of 14 members. The objectors are only 4 and no other members of the Syndicate has objected to the scheme of compromise. That these four objectors do not have even majority amongst the Syndicate. That the Scheme has been floated, and supported/approved by various creditors themselves. That the company does not stand to lose anything in these transactions and nothing has gone out of the company and that there has been no transfer of fund to any of the subsidiary companies and as such there is no diversion of funds. That no objection has been raised even by the statutory auditor against any of the above transactions.
The petitioner in rejoinder has denied all these allegations and stated that the criminal proceedings are pending before the Court of the learned magistrate; that under the scheme it is proposed that all the existing securities offered to the secured creditors would undergo a change and only fresh documentation would be necessary for that purpose. Leasehold assets are not owned by the petitioner company, the same would not, therefore, be part of security available to the lenders; that even independent of the scheme it is always open to the company to enter into compromise with any of its lenders and the scheme recognises the right which even otherwise is available to the company; that the proceedings pending in the English Court are beyond jurisdiction of this Court and the said issue is irrelevant in view of the fact that the objectors having seen futility of continuing the litigation, pending the scheme of proceedings have agreed to keep such proceedings in abeyance; that the transactions relating and sale and leaseback are not under the scheme and no unfair advantage has been offered to ICICI by the company.
It is suggested that the Government of Gujarat issued a Notification under section 3. The petitioner then filed Special Civil Application No. 9188 of 2000 before this High Court challenging the Notification under sections 3 and 4. The High Court issued directions vide its order dated 22-2-2001 requiring the petitioner company to propose a rehabilitation scheme which was to be examined by GBIFR guided by the consideration, namely putting the company on a sound footing. Pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court, GBIFR held a meeting wherein all the lenders, including the objectors were heard. The objectors filed same objections to the scheme as suggested from pages 339-345 of Document File Part-I, before the GBIFR. It is also suggested that even before GBIFR majority of the lenders supported the scheme floated by creditors of the company and the GBIFR found the restructuring proposal to be the best possible solution observing that ‘the rehabilitation package proposed by the company is fair in the circumstances that are prevailing’. That the scheme is ‘in the best interest of all concerned’. Thus, the GBIFR recommended to the State Government that the BRU Notification should be extended by one more year, with the result the Notification under section 3(1) issued by GBIFR is extended up to 21-6-2002.
GBIFR is an independent technical expert Government agency. It is not in dispute that the same scheme floated and supported by the creditors was placed before GBIFR. All the aspects of the Scheme were examined by GBIFR, guided by supreme consideration of putting the company on sound financial footing. The GBIFR gave its report which is to be found at page 746 of File Part-I.
26. It is not disputed that the company sold movable machineries at market price. It is also suggested that the petitioner company had undergone expansion project worth Rs. 1,500 crores and it had spent about Rs. 1,100 crores and there was cost and time overrun to the tune of Rs. 400 crores. At this juncture company experienced financial difficulties for want of sufficient resources to complete the project and it became necessary for the company to raise funds as the capital invested by that time would become a dead investment as the project would have remained incomplete. The incomplete project with investment of Rs. 1,100 crores would have led to financial catastrophe. At this point of time the sale and lease back transaction came to be entered into between the company and ICICI. Under the said transaction ICICI gave Rs. 150.00 crores more which have been adjusted against the dues of the ICICI and the same assets sold to the ICICI have been taken on lease by the company which has raised the assets coverage to Rs. 290 crores between 1996-1999. Under the agreement with the Syndicate undisputedly the company was required to provide asset coverage of Rs. 133 crores against the loan of Rs. 100 crores. It is not the say of the objectors that the project was not in incomplete state and needed no further funds, has not been completed by the company after the sale and lease back transactions with ICICI. It may be appreciated that, as far as foreign currency lenders are concerned they only had floating charge on movable items and all that the company was required to do was to maintain the asset coverage under the agreement. The sale of assets by way of sale and lease back transaction by the company to ICICI, so long as the assets coverage does not fall below the minimum required under the agreement and also such transactions not covered under the scheme, cannot come in the way of scheme of restructuring the debts of the company.
27. As far as the diversion of funds to subsidiary companies are concerned, the investment of the company in the subsidiary companies were made quite some time back and only the nature of investment is charged. It is not in dispute that not a farthing has gone out of the company. All the information was supplied by the company to all the creditors in February 2000 and the same was available with the objectors also since February 2000. The negotiations for the Scheme lasted from February 2000 to July 2001, i.e., for 16 months, yet no secured creditor has objected on this point, except the objectors. It may also be seen that the information supplied in Document File Part-III has not been questioned as incorrect by the objectors at any point of time.
It is admitted that to examine the accounts of the company and to verify the allegations as regards diversion of funds steering committee appointed by the secured creditors appointed a Sub Committee. The objectors did not object to the constitution of the said Sub Committee. It is suggested from the record that the said Sub Committee held its meeting in the month of August 2000 which lasted for two days. Before the Sub Committee the accounts and all the disputed transactions including the financial projections made in the Scheme were scrutinised by members of the Sub Committee and nothing objectional was found on examination of the accounts as far as the allegations on the question of diversion of funds are concerned. The Sub Committee on the contrary approved the financial projections. It is highly unbelievable that the other secured creditors who have larger stake would not notice anything objectionable if the accounts so revealed in the meeting before the Sub Committee. If there was anything wrong on the score of diversion of funds, at least some one from the other secured creditors who have larger stake than the objectors would have in all probability taken some action against the company. It may be appreciated that if anything objectionable was noticed by the Sub Committee, then the Steering Committee which consist of major secured creditors, including members of the Syndicate, after scrutiny of the accounts would not have supported the Scheme of compromise. It may be appreciated that on the information supplied to all the creditors the discussions amongst secured creditors lasted for sixteen months and the total period taken for the proposed scheme of reconstruction is twenty-one months. It may also be noted that the four objectors are not the only foreign currency lenders, but there are other foreign currency lenders, ten in number, who have supported the scheme along with other secured creditors in domestic currency. Since it is not suggested from the record that a single rupee was given by the company to any of its subsidiary company and the original investments have been made quite some time back, and that, only the nature of investment has changed, I do not find any force in the objection on this score.
28. One more objection under the head of Cloak to cover up and legitimize fraud is the spin off of the Garment Division by the company. It is submitted on behalf of the objectors that between the years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 the company diverted up to Rs. 395 crores to its subsidiaries as loans and investments which in fact amounts to spinning off of the cash available with the company. The garment business spin-off is reflected from para-1 of Exhibit ‘C-I’ which is at page-327. Perusal of the same suggests the details of sale of Garment Division by the company for Rs. 361 crores to Arvind Brands Ltd. (ABL). It further suggests that the company owns the brands New port, Flying Machine, Ruggers, Excalibur and Ruf-N-Tuf; that the company under the loan agreement was prohibited, without prior written consent of the agent (Objector No. 2) acting on instructions of the majority of Syndicate other than in the ordinary course of business and for full market consideration, from selling, transferring, lending, surrendering or otherwise disposing of its material undertakings or any of its material assets and despite being such prohibition the petitioner sold the Garment Division to ABL. Exhibit ‘C-2’ at page-332 is in respect of Information Memorandum for Creditors by Jardine Fleming relating to garment business spin-off. It is suggested therefrom that the garment business spin-off involved three entities, AML’s garment division, Arvind Clothing Ltd. (ACL) and Arvind Fashions Ltd. (AFL). The performance of the AML garment division, ACL and AFL have been detailed on pages 333 to 335. It is suggested from the transaction details that the existing shell company Evergreen Growfine (P.) Ltd. was renamed as Arvind Brand Ltd. (ABL), which has been taken over by the garment division of AML and held 100 per cent stake each in ACL and AFL and the AML engaged the services of Arthur Andersen to assist it in valuation, identifying investors and negotiating the transaction. The transaction structure involving both selling AML’s garment business to ABL and selling ABL’s 40 per cent equity to the potential investors. The AML had two offers, one from an international private equity fund and the other from ICICI. ICICI’s valuation and terms were superior to the former and the AML decided to favour the ICICI.
It has been stated at page-338 which deals with ‘cash flows from spin-off’ that due preference has been shown to ICICI in as much as the ICICI’s debt of Rs. 519 million has been paid off from extra valuation available from ICICI’s offer and the additional benefit to the Company is reduction in debt and consequent interest burden thereon. That during year 1998-99 and 1999-2000 sale and leaseback of fixed assets was done with ICICI for Rs. 491 million of book value of the assets and the purpose could be to pay for project cost. In December 1998, AML sold 35 per cent of two of its branded garments unlisted subsidiaries, namely Arvind Clothing Ltd. (Arrow brand of apparels) and Arvind Fashions Ltd. (LEE brand of apparels) to ICICI at an aggregate consideration of Rs. 410 million. That, AML had a buy back obligation for these shares at an interest-driven price. That the proceeds helped the Company to beef up its liquidity position to keep servicing debt obligations and continue operations. That remaining 65 per cent holding in each of the subsidiaries to Asman Investments Ltd. (AIL), a wholly owned subsidiary, as part of consolidating all investments in one balance sheet and the AIL pledged 65 per cent holding to ICICI as security for AML’s buy back obligation.
That, the company sold some fixed assets in March 1999 to ICICI Group at the book value of Rs. 2,545 million and leased those assets back. Some of the debt instalments of ICICI maturing in financial year ended in 3/1999 and 3/2000 were pre-paid from the proceeds of 7 to 10 years lease transactions and these transactions helped the company repay some of the debts and also helped boost up working capital. Out of sale and leaseback proceeds Rs. 1,910 million was utilised to pay certain debts and the balance of Rs. 635 million was used in the operation. Page-340 contains Table 6.1 suggesting detailed debt repayment from sale and leaseback transactions. It is further suggested that in December 1999 AML sold some of the fixed assets which was taken on lease with which rental payable over a period of 9 years in Santej plant and raised net proceeds of Rs. 583 million. That the attempt of the AML management in the early stages of the financial crisis seems firstly to complete the project, secondly to repay the debt obligations as per original schedule and lastly to keep the operations going on at normal level and the transactions described above appear to have been carried out to achieve these objectives. It may be noted that transfer to ICICI would always be subject to the charge in favour of the objectors/secured creditors.
29. As revealed from the record the Company transferred its garment division as well as its investments in ACL and AFL to a new company called ABL and invited the participation of a financial investor (ICICI) in the new company. Out of the proceeds the company repaid Rs. 515 million of loans to ICICI relating to the loan payments due in financial year 2000-2001, as a result of the above two transactions there are no outstanding loan repayments to ICICI during financial years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. In Table 6.2 cash flow from spin-off garment business indicate gross consideration on account of sale of garments division to be Rs. 3,610 million and sale of assets, sale and leaseback to be Rs. 583 million. It is suggested from the said table that the net cash receivable is Rs. 2,343 million. It also indicates repurchase of 35 per cent holding of ACL and AFL and repayment of ICICI debts of Rs. 519 million, reduction in consortium working capital limit (garment division) Rs. 175 million and payment of consortium working capital interest December 1999 quarter Rs. 135 million, overdue interest and lease rentals Rs. 511 millions. Utilized/to be utilized in operations Rs. 433 millions.
30. Exhibit-‘D’ at page 343 is the letter dated 10-3-2000 of the petitioner Company to The Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd., Singapore and to Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong (both the objectors). It is suggested therefrom that the meeting of the off-shore lenders was convened on 3-3-2000 and some of the lenders present requested for information on certain matter and the information provided related to assets cover ratio. The position of asset cover ratio as on 31-3-1998, 31-3-1999 and 31-12-1999 was attached with the said letter. That the information was also supplied of directors’ resolutions on sale and leaseback thereof. The information provided contain relating to sale of fixed assets and leaseback related to period 24-9-1998 for the first sale and lease back of September 1998, 16-3-1999 and 25-3-1999 and both the above transactions were noted by the Board of Directors on 29-5-1999 and 14-9-1999. That the information was also supplied as regards assets sale and leaseback with the list of plant and machineries in respect of which sale and leaseback transactions were executed with ICICI group also attached with the said letter. The information was also supplied as regards Regulatory Returns on end-use which include details of returns filed with Reserve Bank of India in form ECB 2, including inter alia the end use of the USD 75 million syndicated loan also attached, further stating that the end use amount stated in the returns filed with RBI have been audited by the statutory auditor of the company. That the details were also furnished as regards two offers of garment spin-off, further stating that the comparative salient features of the two alternative garment spin-off transactions are provided in Annexure-D and the terms offered by ICICI Ltd. were superior in terms of valuation, milder covenants and trunkey financing package. The details were also furnished as regards Security provided on lease transactions with ICICI group. Said letter also states that no security was provided for lease transaction in September 1998. The transaction of March 1999 and December 1999 were secured by (1) the company and its subsidiaries were to pledge certain equity shares they held in erstwhile Arvind Polycot, Arvind Intex and Arvind Cotspin. These companies have now been merged into Arvind Products. Post merger the holding is 70 per cent of which 54 per cent has been pledged; (2) the promoters of Arvind Mills were to pledge 5 per cent of their equity holding in Arvind Mills immediately and other 10 per cent as and when released from their current encumbrances and the mill company was to create charge on certain unencumbered commercial real estate and movable assets of the value of approx. Rs. 376 million.
31. It is not in dispute that Jardine Fleming were appointed as advisor who prepared restructuring package of the company and a meeting was convened on 3-3-2000 of off-shore lenders followed by another meeting dated 4-3-2000 of on-shore lenders. It is pertinent to note that, it is not even the say of the objectors that the garment business transferred by the company to its wholly owned subsidiary namely ABL was in any manner mortgaged, hypothecated or charged to any of the objectors. In that case, it would be open to the company to deal with the Garment Business in any manner it liked. The Scheme, therefore, is not affected by the transfer of Garment Business. Why transfer of Garment Business and at what price are commercial issues and cannot be the subject matter in this petition. As far as the sale of Garment Business is concerned the same is irrelevant for deciding the sanction if any, of the scheme.
As observed earlier, a Sub Committee has scrutinised the books of account of the company and transactions were checked and nothing was found objectionable in any of the transactions entered into by the company and the Sub Committee approved the Financial Projections. It is pertinent to note that the objectors though requested to join the Sub Committee to scrutinise the books of account of the Company, have declined to join the Sub Committee. Document File Part-II (page-271) Appendix II and information Memorandum of Document File Part-III (page-875) suggests the inventory, advances, other loans and advances current assets, investments by each of the Company, investment in bonds and investment in other equity shares etc. Perusal of the same suggest that there is no transfer of funds/assets to AIL, and that, the company transferred amount of its investments in AIL for a total consideration of Rs. 1,752.3 million in the financial year 1998-99. Most of the investments were in AIL. While total exposure of the company to AIL was Rs. 2,506 million at the end of December, 1999. It is suggested from sub para 4.2 that major investments transferred included Arvind Products Ltd., Arvind Clothing Ltd., Arvind Fashions Ltd., Arvind Intex Ltd., Arvind Polycot Ltd. and Arvind Cotspin Ltd. Convertible debentures, loans and receivables, all from Company paying for acquisition. That, Arvind Intex, Arvind Polycot and Arvind Cotspin were subsequently merged into Arvind Products Ltd., as pointed out above. That, neither the merger nor sale of investments had any positive or negative impact on the company, and after above merger Arvind Products Ltd. will become 70 per cent owned by the company through AIL. All these information relating to all the transactions was available with the members attending the meeting, since information memorandum was circulated to all the members which also included information relating to Spin-off of garment business as pointed out above. The record does not suggests any details have been asked by any of the secured creditors or for that matter unsecured creditor or working capital lenders relating to the diversion of funds namely Spin-off garment business. It is also suggested that there was discussion in August, 1999 with the Syndicate about transaction entered into by the petitioner company. The Document File Part-II (page-00449) para-43 suggests that there was sufficient knowledge by correspondence to the Syndicate about the transactions relating to sale/the garments spin-off transactions. It is also suggested that there was extensive correspondence relating to the proposed Spin-off of Garment division which would bestow knowledge on the Syndicate about the sale of garment business.
There is no question of legitimizing or cover up the fraud of ICICI or misfeasance or malfeasance, since no criminal act would be covered up or legitimized by sanction of the Scheme, and the same can be subject to/without affecting the criminal acts, if any.
32. The other objection to the Scheme by the objectors is that the Scheme offends public and commercial morality. It is submitted on behalf of the objectors that the Scheme is against the public policy, discriminatory and unconscionable and there is no sufficient provision for payment of State Government’s dues; that under the Scheme the debt due to the State Government features in the category of excluded debt, i.e., outside the purview of rehabilitation scheme and the Scheme does not set out sources of funds for payment of State Government’s dues; that, it would have been quite appropriate, especially when the Company is paying sum of Rs. 550 crores to its creditors, to have paid dues of the State Government first. More so when the State Government is battling for funds in the aftermath of the earthquake in Gujarat. As against this, the say of the Company is that the scheme seeks to cover only certain debts of the Company and so far as other creditors are concerned no Scheme of Compromise is proposed. That the State Government dues are not covered under the Scheme because they are to be paid on due dates.
It may be appreciated that, the State Government’s dues have been excluded from the scheme, may be for the reason that the same would amount to sacrifice by the State Government also like other creditors. It may be realised that the Scheme has been floated and supported by the creditors, namely working capital creditors, unsecured creditors, secured creditors and all the creditors have sacrificing to certain extent floated and supported the Scheme considering the public interest and the commercial morality. The State Government has rightly not been included in the Scheme so as not to insist upon the sacrifice from the State Government. Perusal of the Scheme does not refer to sources of funds from which the payment of debt is to be made under the Scheme to the creditors. It may be appreciated that the petitioner company is protected by the notification under sections 3 and 4. It is irrelevant whether the Government is battling for the funds in the aftermath of the earthquake in Gujarat as stated in the affidavit in reply. As far as the Government dues are concerned, same have to be paid as and when it becomes payable. Since the Government dues are excluded from the Scheme there is no question whether any source for payment of Government debt is provided or not. All that can be said is that there are Government dues payable by the company and that is why the notification under section 3 protecting the company came to be issued. There is absolutely nothing to suggest as to how the Scheme is against the public and commercial morality. The Scheme is acceptable to large majority of the creditors and the objectors are less than 3.5 per cent of the total debts. The total debt is Rs. 2,700 crores. Secured creditors Rs. 698 crores, out of which debt due to objectors is Rs. 136 crores. It may be appreciated that there are more than 10,000 workers directly employed by the company. If the size of a family is taken to be of 4 persons then 40,000 persons are directly dependent on the employment with the company and there would be large number of other persons indirectly connected with the company. Thus, there are large number of persons directly and indirectly employed/dependent who would be indirectly benefited by the Scheme, and if the Scheme seeks to serve the interest of large number of persons directly/indirectly, how the Scheme can be said to be against public morality/interest.
33. One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the objectors is that the past conduct/transactions of the company would disentitle approval of the Scheme. As far as provisions contained in section 391 and section 394 are concerned the past conduct would be hardly relevant for the purpose of the approval of the arrangement. In case of the Scheme of Restricting the Company concerned would very much remain as legal entity and would continue to function. Past transactions would be relevant or required to be seen in cases of amalgamation of the Company where the transferor company merges into the transferee company. Section 391 does not contemplate or require that the past events be reflected in the scheme document. The past events cannot be a disqualification as far as approval of the scheme of restructuring is concerned. It is only because the financial difficulties experienced/undergone by the company and the debt mounting over the company the scheme of restructuring is necessitated, so that the company can survive and the creditors may also get their dues with some sacrifice on their part depending upon the resources available to the Company and the object behind the exercise of restructuring is that the employees of the Company may not starve and putting the company on a sound financial footing to serve interest of all concerned under the circumstances. It may also be seen that what is sought to be approved/sanctioned is the Scheme of Restructuring of debt and not the past conduct. Suffice it to say that the past conduct is not relevant for consideration of the Scheme of Restructuring of the debt.
34. File Part-I, Page 0001 Annexure-A suggests holding of meeting of the off-shore lenders on 3-3-2000. Page-00003 is the Synopsis of the meeting of the on-shore lenders held on 29-3-2000. It is suggested therefrom that US $ 75 million syndicate demanded payment upto March 2000 and that the SC declined that said payment for the reason of inability from cash-flow perspective for the company to accede. It is also suggested that two syndicates would not be offered a deal better than what would be agreed with the lenders being represented by the SC. Page-00039 is the letter dated 19-2-2000 by the Company to the Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd., Singapore. Page-00040 is the letter dated 15-3-2000 by the company to Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd. and Deutsche Bank AG, formerly Fuji Bank, which suggest that meetings of the off-shore lenders of US $ 75 million syndicate were convened but these two syndicates did not indicate their representatives and these two syndicates were requested to indicate one name of their representative. It is also suggested from page-00050 to page-00060 that the SC considered and discussed every objections raised in the meeting. It is also suggested from page-00011 to 00013 that the second meeting of the SC was held on 11-7-2000, third meeting was held on 16-8-2000, fourth meeting was held on 20-9-2000 and the last meeting was held on 14-11-2000; that, in all five meetings of the SC were held to discuss the Scheme. It is the Scheme of the creditors who have floated and supported the Scheme and Company has agreed to the said Scheme and brought to this Court for sanction. Commercial viability of the Scheme has been considered by the body of creditors who have been dealing in lending of money at national as well as international level and they are the persons with commercial wisdom. They have examined viability of the Scheme from all commercial angles and found the Scheme to be commercially viable best under the circumstances and then the Scheme has received the support of the requisite statutory majority of the creditors. Thus the Scheme is a conscious Scheme by the creditors. As observed in the case of Miheer Mafatlal (supra) this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction like an appellate Court to minutely scrutinize the Scheme or to arrive at any independent conclusion, whether the Scheme should be permitted to go through or not when the majority of the creditors or members or their respective classes have approved the Scheme as required under section 391(2). This Court has also not to see the commercial viability of the Scheme. This Court is to consider as to whether the Scheme is unconscionable or illegal or otherwise unfair and unjust to the classes of creditors for whom the Scheme is meant. Propriety, merits of the compromise or arrangement have to be judged by the parties to the Scheme, who with their open eyes and full information about the pros and cons of the Scheme arrive at their own reasoned judgment and agreed to join such compromise or arrangement. It is also not within the realm of the Court to find out whether a better Scheme could have been adopted by the parties or not. The Scheme has been favoured by the requisite statutory majority of the creditors who as the experts into the commercial wisdom and have exercised their commercial wisdom by supporting the scheme. In the instant case, the Scheme supported by the majority of the creditors does not appear to be unconscionable or illegal in any manner or that the same is otherwise unfair or unjust to the classes of creditors for whom the Scheme is meant. It may be appreciated that it is not the say of the objectors that they are not offered equal terms under the Scheme like other secured creditors. To be precise, off-shore lenders - foreign currency lenders, nor the objectors in principle opposed to the Scheme, Simply because the terms demanded by the objectors did not find favour with the SC that would not make the Scheme unfair, dishonest, unconscionable or illegal. It may be noted that this is the Scheme by the creditors so there is no question of the Scheme being unfair, dishonest or unconscionable qua body of creditors. Discussion on this is nothing but academic.
35. One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the objectors is that, if the Scheme is sanctioned then the suit filed by the objectors Commerzebank AG and Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Ltd., in the English Court would be set at naught and the rights of these objectors cannot be prejudicially affected as the Scheme will have the effect of negating the remedy available to these objectors.
It is no denying the fact that if the Scheme is approved the objectors would not be able to get a money decree against the company. At the same time the objectors would get their dues as per the terms of the Scheme as offered to other secured creditors, but because the objectors have filed suit in English Court, that cannot deprive the other secured creditors of the benefits under the Scheme when they have floated and supported the Scheme. Pages 392 to 403 of File-I is the copy of the plaint filed in English Court. As far as the reliefs claimed in the suit pending before the Court in England against ICICI and the company are concerned, consideration of the Scheme cannot come in the way of grant of relief of declaration prayed in Para-30(a) and (b) thereof if the English Court is inclined to grant the same against the company. The relief of declaration sought against the company in the suit before the English Court will remain irrespective of the Sanctioning, if any, of the Scheme, as the Scheme is to be considered under the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 391. In my opinion, filing of the aforesaid suit by some of the objectors and pendency of the same before the Court in England cannot come in the way of considering the Scheme by this Court as it is the body of the creditors which has floated and supported the scheme with a view to protect it’s own interest coupled with the intention that the company be put on sound financial footing, so that all creditors can have their dues, though with some sacrifice on their part keeping in view the long term benefits accepting the Scheme to be commercially viable, exercising their commercial wisdom.
36. It is submitted by the learned advocate on for the textile labour association that the Scheme be sanctioned otherwise the petitioner company may be wound-up and as result whereof 12,000 workers, i.e., 48,000 persons would be directly affected these days of global recession; that the workers and their families have a right to livelihood.
In this regard reliance has been placed on the decision in case of Textile Labour Association v. State of Gujarat 1995 (1) Guj. Pg. 12 (D.B.). In para-22 it has been observed that ‘The constitutional law and fundamental rights are part of the law and even within the Constitution, the fundamental rights have special importance and within the fundamental rights, right to life and liberty is the most fundamental of such rights. If for enforcement of such rights which is the fundamental law of the land anything comes in conflict thereof, it has to give way to see that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated.’
Reliance is also placed on the decision in case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Micro Forge (India) Ltd., 41 (2) G.L.R. pg. 1594 (D.B.). While dealing with the case under section 433 of the Act the Division Bench in para-17 observed that, certain important chronicles and contours to be kept in the mental radar, before reaching to the conclusion in a winding-up petition. One of such chronicles articulated at Sr. No. 5 reads as follows:—
“(5) If the Company is an ongoing concern having regular business and employment of employees, the Court cannot remain oblivious to the aspect. The effect of winding-up would be of putting an end of the business or an industry or an entrepreneurship, and in turn, resulting into loss of employment to the several employees and loss of production and effect on the larger interest of the society.”
37. The petitioner company as well as the objectors have placed reliance on the decision in case of Miheer H. Mafatlal (supra). The Supreme Court was dealing with the question of amalgamation of the Companies wherein arose the question of exchange of shares which was fixed by the experts in the field of valuation of share and the majority of the shareholders of both the Companies had accepted the said ratio. In para-28 it has been observed that:
“...the Company Court which is called upon to sanction such a scheme has not merely to go by the ipse dixit of the majority of the shareholders or creditors or their respective classes who might have voted in favour of the scheme by requisite majority but the Court has to consider the pros and cons of the scheme with a view to finding out whether the scheme is fair, just and reasonable and is not contrary to any provisions of law and it does not violate any public policy. This is implicit in the very concept of compromise or arrangement which is required to receive the imprimatur of a Court of law. No Court of law would ever countenance any scheme of compromise or arrangement arrived at between the parties and which might be supported by the requisite majority if the Court finds that it is an unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is otherwise unfair or unjust to the class of shareholders or creditors for whom it is meant. Consequently it cannot be said that a Company Court before whom an application is moved for sanctioning such a scheme which might have got the requisite majority support of the creditors or members of any class of them for whom the scheme is mooted by the concerned company has to act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost automatically put its seal of approval on such a scheme. It is trite to say that once the scheme gets sanctioned by the Court it would bind even the dissenting majority shareholders or creditors...”
In para 28A, it is observed that:—
“However further question remains whether the Court has jurisdiction like an appellate authority to minutely scrutinise the scheme and to arrive at an independent conclusion whether the scheme should be permitted to go through or not when the majority of the creditors or members or their respective classes have approved the scheme as required by section 391 sub-section (2). ... The Court certainly would not act as a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over the informed view of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would be in the realm of corporate and commercial wisdom of the concerned parties. The Court has neither the expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the commercial wisdom exercised by the creditors and members of the company who have ratified the Scheme by the requisite majority. Consequently the Company Court’s jurisdiction to that extent is peripheral and supervisory and not appellate. The Court acts like an umpire in a game of cricket who has to see that both the teams play their game according to the rules and do not overstep the limits. But subject to that how best the game is to be played is left to the players and not to the umpire. ... The propriety and the merits of the compromise or arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui juris with their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the Scheme arrive at their own reasoned judgment and agree to be bounded by such compromise or arrangement. The Court cannot, therefore, undertake the exercise of scrutinising the scheme placed for its sanction with a view to finding out whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the parties.”
In para-34 it has been observed that, “while considering the question of bona fides of the majority voters and whether they were unfair to the appellant it has to be kept in view that bona fides of the majority acting as a group has to be examined vis-a-vis the Scheme in question and not the bona fides of the person whose personal interest might be different from the interests of the voters as a class.”
38. Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd. In re AIR 1962 Guj. 305, Miabhoy J, succinctly explained the function of the court while exercising power under section 391(2) as under :
“The function of the court is two-fold. The first function is to determine whether the statutory requirements as laid down in section 391 of the Companies Act have been complied with. The requirements which have been laid down in section 391 are the sine qua non for sanctioning the scheme. However, even if the statutory requirements have been complied with, that does not mean that the court must sanction the scheme as a matter of course. The Legislature has purposely left the discretion with the court in this respect. The court should apply its judicial mind to the scheme and reach a conclusion of its own. It must consider whether it is in the interest of the company as a whole and of the class of persons for whom the majority acts and whether the scheme is such that it must be pushed through. Therefore, the correct approach to a case is to bear in mind that the court is neither called upon merely to register a decision of the majority, nor is it called upon to act in such a manner that the minority will create a stalemate and thereby retard the progress which the majority has legitimately and reasonably a right to expect and make. The court must test the scheme not from the point of view of a lawyer or an accountant or an expert, but it must look at it from the point of view of a reasonable and a fair minded person. When dealing with a company which is dealing in commerce or industry or with similar activities, the scheme has got necessarily to be looked at from the point of view of a prudent commercial man.”
The observations clearly lay down that the scheme must be scrutinised by the court from the point of view of a prudent commercial man and not an expert. The attitude of the court must not be of a sceptic who is out to find faults but of a reasonable and prudent businessman whose insistence is not for an ideal scheme but a workable scheme which would help revive the sick unit. Every circumstance which a reasonable and prudent businessman is expected to bear in mind while approving the scheme must be taken into consideration by the court and thereafter if the court finds that the majority has acted fairly and honestly and has not oppressed the minority in any manner whatsoever, it will proceed to accord sanction to the scheme.
39. At page 593 in the Pennington’s Company Law, Fifth Edition, under the heading ‘Protection of Dissenters’ it is observed that:
“In describing the function of the court when asked to sanction the scheme under the predecessor of the Companies Act, 1985, s. 425, Lindley LJ said :
“...What the court has to do is to see, first of all, that the provisions of that statute have been complied with; and secondly, that the majority has been acting bona fide. The court also has to see that the minority is not being overridden by a majority having interests of its own clashing with those of the minority whom they seek to coerce. Further than that, the court has to look at the scheme and see whether it is one which persons acting honestly, and viewing the scheme laid before them in the interests of those they represent, take a view which can be reasonably taken by business- men.
The court therefore protects dissenters who have voted against the scheme or have not voted for it, by refusing to make it binding on them (a) if it is unreasonable; or (b) if the majority who voted for the scheme did not vote to promote the interests of their own class, but to foster some extraneous interest; or (c) if the scheme is unfair on the face of it.”
40. The approach of the company court has always been to revive/put the Company on sound financial footing and to see that the Company continues as an ongoing concern and the employees are not driven to economic death, particularly in the days of recession. It is a settled principle of law that larger good shall prevail over the smaller good and smaller good shall pave way to larger good. In the instant case, as suggested from the record, different classes of creditors have been offered different packages by the company and all the creditors have sacrificed to some extent. Refusal to sanction the Scheme would create further economic problems not only to the company but will have effect on the persons directly and indirectly dependent on/connected with the company, including the workers. Apart from the company and the creditors who have floated and supported the Scheme, the approval to the Scheme is necessary in the larger social interest. It may be realised that when majority of the secured creditors have supported the Scheme sacrificing to certain extent, it would be unfair to refuse approval to the Scheme when it is generally fair to all classes of creditors and it stands to serve the interest of the workers also, so that with the help of the Scheme the Company can tie over the financial crisis and can regain the sound financial footing. As compared to the percentage of creditors who have supported the Scheme and the benefit of the Scheme would indirectly extend to the other classes of persons including the employees, the objections by only four (4) foreign currency lenders who are in microscopic minority, for the larger good when it does not appear that the Scheme is dishonest, unfair to any class of creditors nor illegal or opposed to public policy or unconscionable, must be allowed to go it’s way.
The prospect of putting the company on sound financial footing cannot be totally disregarded. More over the Court also cannot be oblivious to the fact that the industry generating employment to about 10,000 persons directly and about 1,00,000 indirectly dependent on it, does not require to be obliterated if it can be resuscitated with the assistant/help of it’s creditors.
It may also be seen that the Scheme was scrutinised by the Steering Committee comprising of Syndicate and domestic lenders and also by GBIFR in light of the objections raised by the objectors and came to the conclusion that the only way to salvage under the circumstances is to restructure the debts of the Company. The approach of the court, so far as it is practical, it has to be to revive the company.
41. The above discussions would reveal that the Scheme for reconstruction of the debt of the company floated by all the classes of creditors is supported by the statutory majority as required under section 391(2). The company has only placed the Scheme, floated and supported by statutory majority of the creditors, before this Court for approval/sanction of the same under section 391(1). Since the Scheme is of the creditors of the company there is no question of the same being dishonest/unfair to or against the interest of the body of the creditors nor it is suggested that the Scheme is otherwise illegal or unconscionable. The inter se disputes between some of the secured creditors can hardly be a ground for refusing approval of the Scheme. Even the objectors do not in principle oppose the Scheme saying that no Scheme for restructuring the debt of the Company is required. On the contrary the need for the Scheme for restructuring the debt of the Company is accepted. As observed earlier the objectors demanded better terms/preferential treatment being foreign currency lenders. The learned counsel for the objectors have never denied that the objectors did not demand better terms or preferential treatment before the SC in the matter of repayment of their dues. As the same did not find favour with the SC the objections saw the light of the day. This would go to show that as far as the objections to the Scheme are concerned, the same cannot be regarded as bona fide besides the Scheme tends to serve the interest of all the classes of creditors over and above 10,000 workers and their family members who are dependent on the company for their livelihood and as stated above there are about one lac persons indirectly connected/dependent on the company for their subsistence and the Scheme being for social good as pointed out earlier, the objectors cannot throttle the Scheme when the Scheme is otherwise just, fair and equitable to all covered under the Scheme. However, it is wished to be clear that the sanction of the Scheme is subject to the criminal prosecution for the alleged acts of misfeasance and/or malfeasance (past transactions) for which criminal complaint has been pending before the Criminal Court, and the issue of past transaction is kept open to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings, civil as well as criminal, by the appropriate Court. (Ratmani Engg. Ltd. In re [1999] (33) CLA 358 Guj.) and the Scheme deserves to be sanctioned subject to and without prejudice to the liability if any, in the civil and criminal proceedings in respect of the past transactions.
42. The sanction is hereby accordingly accorded to the Scheme of compromise and arrangement and restructuring of the debt of the petitioner company, copy whereof is Annexure-D to the petition. This Court hereby accord sanction to Restructuring of the debt of the petitioner company as envisaged in the Scheme Annexure-D, subject to and without prejudice to the liability if any, in the civil and criminal proceedings in respect of the past transactions.
43. All the parties who appeared at the hearing should bear their respective costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
In Company Application No. 230 of 2001:
No order is necessitated in this Company Application, in view of the disposal of main Company Petition No. 140 of 2001. Company Application No. 230 of 2001 stands disposed of as not surviving.
Other order dated 8-4-2002.
After the pronouncement of the judgment, it is submitted by Mr. P.C. Kavina, learned counsel for the objectors that, the operation of the statement dated 17-8-2001 made by Mr. S.N. Soparkar, learned Senior counsel for the Company in Company Application No. 230 of 2001 in Company Petition No. 140 of 2001, be extended for a suitable period, so as to enable the objectors to move the appellate Court.
Mr. Soparkar, learned senior counsel has stated that, he is not willing to continue the statement made by him on 17-8-2001, as the supporting creditors are pressing hard for payment. Mr. S.B. Vakil, learned senior counsel, Mr. S.N. Shelat, learned senior counsel and Mr. M.J. Thakore, learned senior counsel appearing for supporting creditors respectively objects to the deferment of the payment.
Having regard to the
facts and circumstances and the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of
section 391 of the Companies Act, the request made by Mr. Kavina for the
objectors does not deserve to be accepted, and the same is accordingly
rejected.
Section
179
Demand
for poll
[1972] 42 COMP. CAS. 48 (BOM.)
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
v.
Gajanan Gopalrao Dixit
BHOLE, J.
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 37 OF 1971
FEBRUARY 25, 1971
V.R. Manohar for the Applicants.
W.G. Deo for the Opponent
JUDGMENT
The
original defendants Nos. 1 and 3 being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed
by the assistant judge, Akola, in a miscellaneous civil appeal arising out of
an order passed by the second joint civil judge, junior division, Akola, in a
civil suit, have come here in revision.
The
applicant No. 1 is a public limited company registered under the provisions of
the Companies Act. Applicant No. 2 is now a director against whom the suit was
filed by opponent No. 1. Opponent No. 2 was a chairman of the board of
directors till January 24, 1970, on which date an annual general meeting of the
company was held. The agenda included the election of a new director in place
of opponent No. 2 who was retiring by rotation. The meeting was presided over
by opponent No. 2. Opponent No. 1 was present in the meeting in person as well
as by proxy for three other shareholders. There were two others, D.A. Bhalerao
and D.R. Palsodkar, who were not shareholders but were present as proxies. In
the said meeting applicant No. 2 was declared elected as the director of the
company.
The
opponent No. 1's grievance is that applicant No. 2 was elected illegally. He,
therefore, filed a suit on February 5, 1970, seeking a declaration that the
resolutions adopted at the said meeting as well as the election were in
contravention of the rules and regulations and were therefore null and void.
Opponent No. 1 also prayed for an injunction and, therefore, filed an
application under Order 39, Civil Procedure Code, against the applicants and
opponent No. 2 restraining them from giving any effect to the resolutions
passed in the meeting on January 24, 1970, and for further restraining the
applicant No. 2 to act as a duly elected director of the company and for
participating in the meetings of the board of directors.
This
application was opposed by the applicants on the ground that there was no
allegation that any irreparable injury would be caused to the opponent No. 1 if
an interim injunction was not granted and the balance of convenience was in
favour of the applicants. The trial court issued an interim injunction to the
effect that the resolution passed in the meeting on January 24, 1970, would not
be given effect to and that the applicant No. 1 shall not permit the applicant
No. 2 to record himself as a duly elected director of the company.
Aggrieved
by this order, the applicants preferred an appeal before the District Court,
Akola. The learned assistant judge who heard the appeal confirmed the order
passed by the trial court as well as the interim injunction issued by it. The
applicants, therefore, are aggrieved by this order passed by the learned
assistant judge and have filed this revision.
On
January 24, 1970, when the annual general meeting of the company was held, a
new director in place of a retiring director was to be elected. There were five
nominations for it. Three candidates withdrew in the meeting. Only two,
therefore, remained for the contest. They were opponent No. 1, plaintiff, and
applicant No. 2, defendant No. 3. The opponent No. 2 was in the chair. Although
it was not necessary for anybody to second the proposals under the provisions
of the Companies Act, it was stated in the suit that opponent No. 2 called for
the names of the proposers as well as the seconders for the nomination of both
the candidates. The plaintiff, opponent No. 1, was seconded not by a shareholder
but by a proxy who had attended the meeting. The other candidate was proposed and
seconded by the shareholders present. The chairman, opponent No. 2, therefore,
ruled that opponent No. 1, Gajanan Dixit's nomination, was not validly
seconded. Accordingly, therefore, he was not treated to be a candidate validly
proposed and seconded. The chairman then ruled that applicant No. 2, Deshmukh,
was the only candidate remaining in the field validly nominated. He therefore
declared him elected. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the way the meeting was
held and by the way the chairman of the meeting ruled against the provisions of
the Companies Act, filed the suit as well as an application for the interim
injunction with which we are now concerned.
It
is now well settled that Order 39, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, provides for
temporary injunctions; rule 2 requires that some injury must be threatened, the
injury must be a legal injury and not any fancied injury. The court in an
application under this order has to enquire as to what are the contents of the
rights claimed by the plaintiff. The court has not only to find the contents of
the rights claimed by the plaintiff but also has to consider whether
irreparable injury or inconvenience would result to the plaintiff if the same
is refused. But the learned advocate for the applicants contends here that it
is not always necessary to look into both these elements. According to him in a
case such as the one with which we are concerned, viz., regarding an election to a post, temporary injunction
should not be granted even if a legal injury was caused unless and until the
election was set aside. For this purpose, he relies on a case of this court in Jagannath Pundlik v. Sukhdeo Onkar. A Division
Bench of this court was hearing a writ petition against an order in an election
petition challenging the validity of the election of successful candidates to a
village panchayat. It does not appear to me that this court laid down any ratio
in this case that, even if an injury is caused, temporary injunction cannot be
granted in such cases unless and until the election is finally set aside. It is
to the contrary. This court did consider rule 2 of Order 39 in which the
element of injury also is mentioned. This court observed in paragraph 5 that in
order to prove legal injury the applicant has to establish that he has a legal
right to do something and the opponent prevents him from the exercise of such
right; that unless a right is alleged and/or shown to exist prima facie, there
can be no question of any breach of that right. This court, however, while
considering the scheme of the Panchayat Act observed at one place that the
person who was elected to the office continued to act in the office until his
election was set aside by a tribunal entitled to do so. Reading the whole of
the judgment it does not appear to me that the startling ratio, which the
learned advocate for the applicants says, was propagated. It cannot be. The
very rule 2 in Order 39 shows that in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a
breach of contractor other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed
in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of
the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the court for a
temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of
contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like
kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or
right. Therefore, some injury must be threatened and some right must be claimed
by the plaintiff in a suit before an application under Order 39, rule 2, is
made.
The
learned advocate for the applicants also refers to Shamsuddin Ahmed v. Charu
Chandra Biswas as well as Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State
of Bihar.
These were also cases under Order 39, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. They were
naturally decided on the facts and circumstances of those cases. In the
Calcutta case where the plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that they were
the only elected members and that the defendants were not the members, and
applied for an interim injunction restraining them from attending the meeting,
it was held that the likelihood of injury and inconvenience was much greater if
the defendants were not allowed to function as members and that the injunction
should not be granted. The Patna case also observes as follows:
"Whether an
order of injunction should or should not be issued will depend on the facts of the
case, and the court must also consider the question of irreparable or serious
injury and balance of convenience."
The
learned assistant judge against whose order the present application is filed
relied on Abdul Gafur v. Mustakim Ali. The
plaintiff there had filed a suit for declaration that the election of the
defendant as chairman of the society was void and illegal and that the
defendant was not entitled to hold the office as the chairman of the said
society and an interim injunction restraining the defendant from taking over
charge and functioning as chairman was granted by the trial court. The
defendant challenged the injunction order, inter alia, on the ground that the
suit itself was barred by section 79(2) of the Assam Co-operative Societies
Act. It was held there that as the plaintiff had challenged the very
constitution of the managing committee which elected the defendant as the
chairman, the plaintiff had a prima facie case to go to trial. Under section
79(2) of the above-said Co-operative Societies Act, the civil court's
jurisdiction was not barred where the question of jurisdiction was involved
regarding the subject-matter of the suit. Hence it could not be said that the suit
was prima facie barred under that section. The principle there too was
regarding the balance of convenience. We have to see whether an injury or
inconvenience is likely to arise from refusing the injunction or it is likely
to arise from granting the injunction. We have, therefore, to consider the
facts and circumstances of our case.
Both
the courts below have agreed that the plaintiff has a prima facie case in his
favour. Section 257 of the Indian Companies Act which deals with the rights of
persons other than the retiring directors to stand for directorship is as
follows:
"257.
Right of persons other than retiring
directors to stand for directorship.—(1) A person who is not a retiring
director shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be eligible for
appointment to the office of director at any general meeting, if he or some
member intending to propose him has, not less than fourteen days before the
meeting, left at the office of the company a notice in writing under his hand
signifying his candidature for the office of director or the intention of such
member to propose him as a candidate for that office, as the case may be.
(1A)
The company shall inform its members of the candidature of a person for the
office of director or the intention of a member to propose such person as a
candidate for that office, by serving individual notices on the members not
less than seven days before the meeting:
Provided
that it shall not be necessary for the company to serve individual notices upon
the members as aforesaid if the company advertises such candidature or
intention not less than seven days before the meeting in at least two
newspapers circulating in the place where the registered office of the company
is located, of which one is published in the English language and the other in
the regional language of that place.
(2)
Sub-section (1) shall not apply to a private company, unless it is a subsidiary
of a public company."
The
section clearly contemplates that a member was only to be proposed. It does not
contemplate that he should also be seconded. In fact, the provisions of the
company law contemplated the deposit of a notice of a candidate showing his
intention to stand as a director. Then there is a publication in the newspapers
regarding his candidature. The shareholders are to be present by proxies, by
depositing the proxies according to law. There can be a demand for poll under
section 179 of the Companies Act before or on the declaration of the result of
the voting of any resolution and the chairman has to accept such demand. The
proxies also can demand a poll. The minutes show that the chairman ruled out
the demand for poll because, according to him, the proxy represented by a
person who was not a member could not demand a poll. Then in the matter of election
of a director it was said by the chairman that a proxy who is not a shareholder
cannot second the proposal of Dixit, opponent No. 1. This is also prima facie
not correct. But when one Mr. Deo, who was a shareholder, stood up and seconded
the proposal, the chairman said that it was not then open for anybody to propose, second or support any proposal. It is
in these circumstances that the chairman declared that there was only one
candidate, Dr. B. V. Deshmukh, and declared him to be elected as a director of
the company. The plaintiff, opponent No. 1, therefore, is aggrieved by this
conduct of the meeting.
We
have a case in In re Horbury Bridge
Coal, Iron and Waggon Company where
that court was considering whether in such meetings it was necessary to second
the proposal. The judgment shows that in such meetings of the companies, it was
not necessary for seconding any proposal. I am, therefore, inclined to agree
that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. The point that is, however,
important is whether any injury is threatened and what are the contents of the
rights claimed by the plaintiff. In this case, the plaintiff, opponent No. 1,
wanted to be director and, therefore, had actually deposited his notice of
candidature with the company on January 5, 1970, and his candidature was also
published in the newspapers according to the provisions of the Companies Act.
In Joseph v. Jos the Kerala High Court was
considering the rights of a shareholder. The plaintiff, opponent No. 1, is also
of course a shareholder. That court observed that the right of a shareholder to
stand for election as a director of the company is an individual membership
right and gives rise to a justiciable issue. It has further observed that there
are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual
membership right, and the other, the corporate membership rights; that so far
as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert
those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the
shareholders; and that an individual membership right is a right to maintain
himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to
that status. This right, according to that court, implies that the individual
shareholder can insist on the strict observance of the legal rules, statutory
provisions and provisions in the memorandum and articles which cannot be waived
by a bare majority of shareholders. It is not, therefore, that the plaintiff
has no right or has any fancied right. He having a membership right which is
justiciable, can have also a right to stand for election as a director. If
there is a prima facie case that the election of the other person was against
legal rules and statutory provisions, he has a right to complain. This right is
therefore threatened and laid low because of the conduct of the proceedings of
the annual general meeting.
What is the balance of
convenience? There are five directors of the company. Two directors form a
quorum. Prima facie, applicant No. 2 appears to have got himself elected
against the legal rules and statutory provisions. If, therefore, an injunction
is granted, the business of the company cannot be stopped; it can be carried on
without the newly elected director. On the other hand, if the applicant No. 2 is allowed to
remain as director there is likelihood of his inflicting legal injuries not
only to the plaintiff-opponent No. 1 but also to the interests of the company.
In that way, he would be acting against or detrimental to the interests of the
shareholders. Moreover, prima facie, an illegality was committed; such
illegality should not be allowed to continue. It appears to me, therefore, that
the order passed by the learned assistant judge is quite legal and proper.
Moreover,
this is a civil revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure
Code. The revisional jurisdiction has its own limits. If the subordinate court
has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise
a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity, then only this court can interfere. It
would be difficult for me also to entertain this revision application under
section 11 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
This
revision application therefore is dismissed with costs.
Bombay High
Court
[1997]
12 SCL 13 (BOM.)
HIGH COURT OF
BOMBAY
v.
J.B.A. Printing Inks Ltd.
A.P. SHAH, J.
COMPANY APPLICATION NO. 272 OF 1995
IN COMPANY PETITION NO. 331 OF 1985
AUGUST 21, 1995
Section 179, read with
section 177, of the Companies Act, 1956 - Meetings -Demand for poll - Petitioners
held 32 per cent shareholding in respondent-company - In EGM, resolution
declaring that company became public limited company and alteration of articles
of association as proposed in substitution for existing one was passed on show
of hands - Petitioner who was present in meeting opposed resolution but had not
demanded a poll - Petitioner challenged resolution as invalid on ground that
resolution was required to be passed by not less than three times of number of
votes against resolution and poll should have been demanded by Chairman of
meeting - Whether it is obligatory on part of Chairman of meeting to demand
poll where resolution is to be passed by not less than three times of votes
against resolution - Held, no - Whether, where petitioner participated in
meeting in which resolution was passed but not demanded a poll, after a lapse
of number of years, he could be allowed to challenge resolution as void on
ground that poll was not taken - Held, no
Section
81, read with section 396, of the Companies Act, 1956 - Further issue of
capital - Whether, where in absence of oblique motive behind resolution to
issue further capital on rights base, merely because minority shareholders
would be required to make substantial payments for buying shares (failure of
which may give right to others to acquire unsubscribed shares) resolution can
be branded as oppressive of minority - Held, no
On
5-4-1989, the company issued notice for holding extraordinary general meeting
on 12-5-1989 in order to pass resolution that company had ceased to be a
private limited company by virtue of section 43A and it became public limited
company and to adopt articles of association of the company as proposed in
substitution for the existing one. The petitioners holding 32 per cent of
shareholding informed the company that they were against the passing of
resolutions. At the EGM held on 12-5-1989 in which petitioner was present
resolution was passed on a show of hands with the requisite majority under
section 177. Subsequently petitioners wrote letter to the company stating that
resolutions passed at EGM were invalid as it had been passed without the
requisite majority as petitioners represented 31.2 per cent shareholding and
they voted against the item at EGM. The petitioner had also written letter to
the Department of Company Affairs but no action was taken. The petitioner had
also not pursued the matter any further. While so the company issued a notice
of EGM to be held on 17-4-1995 for passing of the resolutions including transfer
of the reserve fund of Rs. 44 lakhs to share capital against which the company
proposed to issue 4,40,000 new equity shares of Rs. 10 each in the proportion
of one equity share of Rs. 10 each for every existing fully paid equity shares
of the company and for issue of rights to the equity shareholders. The
resolutions were passed in the EGM held on 17-4-1995. The petitioners
challenged the resolutions passed in the meeting held on 17-4-1995 mainly on
two grounds, that the resolutions were passed on the basis that the company had already become a public limited
company by virtue of the resolution passed in EGM of 12-5-1989, but since the
said resolution in EGM of 12-5-1989 was invalid as the resolution was not
passed with required votes of 3 times against votes opposing the resolution,
the resolution passed on 17-4-1995 was also not valid. The petitioner's case
was that the resolution dated 12-7-1989 was passed on show of hands. The
resolution was required to be passed by not less than three times number of votes
against the resolution. Since the petitioner had 31.2 per cent shareholding, it
could not be said that the resolution was passed validly in terms of section
31. Further, it was the duty of the Chairman of meeting to have demanded a poll
even though not asked for by the petitioners voting against the resolution. It
was contended that the second resolution passed in 1995 was with an oblique
motive to put petitioners in an embarrassing situation inasmuch as they had to
pay Rs. 85 lakhs to acquire the rights share, and if they were unable to
subscribe right issue the majority would take over the minority shareholding.
While defending validity of
the resolutions in question, the company contended that the further issue was
in the interest of the company as the company was about 50 years old with
outdated machinery and technology which required substantial financial input if
it was to survive and grow in today's highly competitive and globalized
economy.
HELD
At
the EGM held on 12-5-1989 all the resolutions including for making the company
a public company and for substitution of a new set of articles of association
were passed on a show of hands with the requisite majority under section 177.
There was no dispute that the second petitioner who attended the meeting did
not demand a poll. The Chairman declared that the special resolution was
carried with requisite majority.
Section
177 provides that at any general meeting, a resolution put to the vote of the
meeting shall, unless a poll is demanded under section 179, be decided on a
show of hands. In taking a vote by show of hands, the duty of the Chairman
unless the articles otherwise provide, is to count the hands held up and to
declare the resolution accordingly, without regard to the number of votes that
a member possesses and without regard to proxies, whether held by member for
other members or by non-members for members.
Section
179 specifically provides that before or on the declaration of the result of
the voting or any resolution on a show of hands, poll may be ordered to be
taken by the Chairman of the meeting on his own motion, and shall be ordered to
be taken by him on a demand made in that behalf by the persons mentioned in
section 179. When a poll is duly demanded it must be taken, and in such case, the
meeting is deemed to subsist and continue until the poll is taken. Thus, it was
open for the petitioner to demand poll and in case such demand had been made,
it was obligatory for the Chairman to take the poll The petitioner was not a
layman or a novice. In fact, he was the managing director of the company for
quite some time. Therefore, he must be presumed to be aware of his rights under
the Act. But for reasons best known to him, the petitioner did not demand the
poll. In these circumstances, it was not possible to entertain a belated
challenge to the resolution after a lapse of nearly six years.
As
regards the contention that under section 31 of the Act which requires such
resolution to be passed by not less than 3 times number of votes against the resolution,
and that though the second petitioner did not ask for poll, the Chairman was
under a legal duty not to give effect to the ruling since he was obliged to
take into consideration the fact that the petitioners who were holding 31.2 per
cent shareholdings were against the resolution, there is no provision
either in the Act and the Rules or the articles of association which cast such
obligation on the Chairman of the meeting. In every meeting it is not necessary
for the Chairman to ascertain the sense of the meeting by ordering a poll,
although on a given case the situation may be such that obligation on the part
of the Chairman could be spelt out.
As
regards the contention that if the resolution to issue rights shares was
allowed, it would have the effect of virtually allowing the majority
shareholders to take over the minority shareholding, the first and the foremost
question to be considered in such cases was whether the impugned resolution was
passed in the interest of the company. On a careful scrutiny of the record it
was clear that there was no oblique motive behind the resolution and the
company was compelled to increase its share capital in view of the changing
times. It had been pointed out by the respondents that they had to keep with
the market requirements otherwise they would not be able to compete with the
new entrants. The respondents also pointed out that they were contemplating to
enter into technical collaboration with a German company. The respondents
rightly contended that in order to strengthen their products currently
manufactured by the company and to concentrate on the manufacture of a wide
variety of publishing inks it was necessary to increase the share capital. The
directors of the company act in fiduciary capacity and if they in their
discretion decide to issue share for the purpose of raising funds, the main
question for decision is whether the issuance of share for the purpose of
raising funds is in the interest of the company. In view of decision of the
Supreme Court in Nanalal v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. AIR 1950 SC 172, it was to be held that the
impugned resolution was in the interest of the company.
Merely because the minority shareholders were required to make substantial
payments for paying the shares was no ground for branding the resolution as
oppressive of the minority unless it was shown that the board of directors had
acted with some oblique motive.
Company application was thus dismissed.
Second Consolidated Trust Ltd v. Ceylon Amalgamated Tea & Rubber Estates Ltd. [1943] 2 All.
ELRA 567, Re a Company 1985
BCLC 80, Needle Industries India Ltd. v.
Needle Industries Newey (India)
Holding Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 743 and Nanalal
v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. AIR
1950 SC 172, Harsche v. Sims 1814 AC 651.
K.S.
Cooper with Mudnani,
Soli K. Cooper, V.R. Dhond and Ms. Madhavi Goradia for the Petitioner. E.P. Bharucha,
D. Merchant, Kevic Setalvad and Mrs. Laxmi Mankari for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
Shah,
J.—This company
application taken out by the original petitioners seeks leave to amend the
company petition and further seeks interim injunction to restrain the
respondents from acting on the resolution passed in the extraordinary general
meeting of the 1st respondent company dated 17-4-1995 and issuing or allotting
bonus or rights shares in pursuance of the said resolution.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving
rise to this company application are as follows:
The
respondent No. 1 company was set up in 1950. The respondent No. 1 was initially
incorporated as a private limited company. It became a deemed public limited
company in 1968. The company manufactures printing inks at their units located
in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Ahmedabad and Delhi. There are five families in
control of the company, namely, (a)
Mirchandani (b) Advani (c) Malkani G.H. (d) Malkani T.L. and (e) Lalwani. The families of Advani
and Lalvani hold about 62 per cent of the shareholdings and the remaining
shares are held by the other families. Each of the aforesaid families also hold
equal shares in a company called J.B. Advani & Co. Ltd., which was a
holding company of Advani Oerlikon Ltd. The petitioners who are the members of
Lalvani family have filed the company petition under sections 433,439, 397,398,
402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956 ('the Act') on various grounds set out
in the petition. Broadly it is the case of the petitioners that the respondents
by a series of actions have sought to oppress the minority shareholders and
have been acting against the interest of the company.
3. First I will deal with certain development which took
place during the pendency of the petition which has important bearing on the
controversy raised in the present application. A notice dated 5-4-1989 was
issued by the company for an extraordinary general meeting of the company to be
held on 12-5-1989 in which there was a resolution proposed resolving that the
company had ceased to be a private limited company by virtue of section 43A of
the Act and it became a public limited company and to adopt articles of
association of the company as proposed in the substitution for and to the
exclusion of all the articles thereof. Prior to the meeting, the petitioners by
their letter dated 5-5-1989 informed the company that the petitioners are
against passing of the said resolution. At the said E.G.M. held on 12-5-1989
all the resolutions including for making the company a public company and for
substitution of a new set of Articles of Association were passed on a show of
hands with the requisite majority under section 177 of the Act. There is no
dispute that the 2nd petitioner who attended the meeting did not demand a poll.
4. The petitioner subsequently wrote a letter dated 8-7-1989
to the company stating that the minutes of the E.G.M. held on 12-5-1989 were
not correctly recorded. He stated that it is not understood as to how the
special resolutions have been passed without the requisite majority. He further
stated that the petitioners represent 31.2 per cent shareholders and he having
voted against the item at the E.G.M., no resolution could validly have been
passed in the said meeting. The petitioner No. 2 also addressed a letter dated
17-5-1989 to the Controller of Capital Issues, placing his version as to what
transpired in the said meeting held on 12-5-1989. The Department of Company
Affairs by a letter dated 4-10-1991 asked the company for an explanation in the
matter. The company replied by their letter dated 10-10-1991. Admittedly, the
Department of Company Affairs has not taken any action in the matter. The
petitioners have not thereafter made any grievance about the passing of the
resolution in the said E.G.M. till March 1995. Now I shall narrate the events
which prompted the petitioners to file the present company application.
5. The company issued a notice dated 20-3-1995 of E.G.M. to
be held on 17-4-1995 for passing of the resolutions including transfer of the
reserve fund of Rs. 44 lakhs to share capital against which the company
proposed to issue 4,40,000 new equity shares of Rs. 10 each in the proportion
of one equity share of Rs. 10 each for every existing fully paid equity shares
of the company and for issue of rights to the equity shareholders. In the
proposed resolution it is inter alia provided
that the offer of rights shares shall include the right exercisable by the
shareholders concerned to renounce the shares offered to them in whole or in
part in favour of any other person subject to the approval of the Board. The
resolutions were passed in the E.G.M. held on 17-4-1995.
6. The petitioners seek to challenge the resolutions passed
in the meeting of 17-4-1995 mainly on two grounds. Firstly they say that the
resolutions are passed in the E.G.M. of 17-4-1995 on the basis that the company
has already become a public limited company by virtue of the resolution passed in
E.G.M of 12-5-1989, but since the said resolution in E.G.M. of 12-5-1989 is
invalid, the resolutions in E.G.M. of 17-4-1995 are also liable to be declared
as illegal and invalid. The 2nd ground is that the passing of such resolutions
is mala fide and the only
object is to compel the minority to relinquish their shareholding in the
company.
7. Before I deal with the main grounds agitated by the
petitioners, it will be necessary to refer briefly to the defences raised by
the respondents. It is the case of the respondents that the resolutions
converting the company into a public limited company was validly passed in the
E.G.M. of 1989. It is also the case of the respondents that the resolutions
passed in 1995 meeting are in the interest of the company. The respondents say
that the company is about 50 years old with outdated machinery and technology
and requires substantial financial input if it is to survive and grow in
today's highly competitive and globalized economy. The respondents point out
that in the new liberalised economic scenario, the company has reached a level
where it needs to expand or else it will lead to extinction which can cause
loss or damage not only to the shareholders but public financial institutions,
banks, employees, creditors and various other Government agencies like
income-tax. In paragraphs 19,20 and 21 of their affidavit in-reply, the
respondents have explained why the company has decided to increase the share
capital. The respondents say that the resolution was passed in the best interest
of the company and it is not open for the petitioners to challenge its validity
in the present proceedings. They point out that the resolutions passed in 1989
are being challenged for the first time in 1995 only with a view to create
obstacle in the expansion programme undertaken by the company.
8. Mr. Cooper, the learned counsel for the petitioners
strenuously urged that the resolution of making the company public limited
company passed in the E.G.M. of 1989 is not validly passed. Mr. Cooper urged that
the petitioners represent 31.2 per cent of shareholding and since the 2nd
petitioner voted against the resolution, the same cannot be said to have been
validly passed under section 31 of the Act which requires such resolution to be
passed by not less than 3 times number of votes against the resolution. Mr.
Cooper also urged that though the 2nd petitioner did not ask for poll, the
Chairman was under a legal duty not to give effect to the ruling since he was
obliged to take into consideration the fact that the petitioners who were
holding 31.2 per cent shareholdings were against the resolution. In view of
this admitted position, says Mr. Cooper, the Chairman ought to have demanded
the poll even though no such request was made by the petitioner No. 2. Mr. Cooper
placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Chancery Division in, Second Consolidated Trust Ltd. v. Ceylon Amalgamated Tea & Rubber Estates
Ltd., 1943 2 All ELR 567.
9. There is no dispute that the E.G.M. of the company which
was held on 12-5-1989 was attended by 4 persons, namely, T.L. Malkani, A.B.
Advani, Nina Mirchandani and T.J. Lalwani, i.e., petitioner No. 2 Ms. Advani proposed the name of Mr.
Malkani to be in the chair in the absence of Mr. G.H. Malkani, Chairman of the
company, which was seconded by Mrs. Mirchandani and approved by the 2nd
petitioner. Ms. Advani proposed the following resolution as a special
resolution which was seconded by Mrs. Mirchandani:
"Resolved that the
authorised capital of the company be increased from Rs. 25,00,000—divided into
25,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each to Rs. 5,00,00,000 divided into 50,00,000
equity shares of Rs. 10 each ranking pari
passu with the existing shares of the company."
The resolution was put to vote.
Mr. Malkani and Ms. Advani and Mrs. Mirchandani voted for it while the 2nd
petitioner voted against the resolution. The Chairman declared the special
resolution carried with requisite majority. Section 177 provides that at any
general meeting, a resolution put to the vote of the meeting shall, unless a
poll is demanded under section 179, be decided on a show of hands. In taking a
vote by show of hands, the duty of the Chairman unless the articles otherwise
provide, is to count the hands held up and to declare the resolution
accordingly, without regard to the number of votes that a member possesses and
without regard to proxies, whether held by members for other members or by
non-members for members. The procedure followed in the general meeting is succinctly
summarised in A. Ramaiya's Guide to
the Companies Act (13th edn.):
"The procedure usually
followed is that a resolution is proposed either by the Chairman or some other
member and is seconded by some one who is member (including the Chairman if he
had not proposed the resolution). Unless the articles so require, seconding is
not essential. A proposal put to the meeting is open to discussion and after
the discussion is closed, the Chairman puts the resolution to vote and after
counting the numbers for and against, declares the result. In the meantime, if
a poll is demanded, the procedure prescribed in the section next following is
followed."
Section 179 specifically
provides that before or on the declaration of the result of the voting on any
resolution on a show of hands, poll may be ordered to be taken by the Chairman
of the meeting on his own motion, and shall be ordered to be taken by him on a
demand made in that behalf by the persons mentioned in section 179. When a poll
is duly demanded it must be taken, and in such case, the meeting is deemed to
subsist and continue until the poll is taken. Thus, it was open for the
petitioner No. 2 to demand poll and in case such demand had been made, it was
obligatory for the Chairman to take the poll. The petitioner No. 2 is not a
layman or a novice. In fact, he was the managing director of the company for
quite some time. Therefore, he must be presumed to be aware of his rights under
the Act. But for reasons best known to him, the petitioner No. 2 did not demand
the poll. In these circumstances, it is not possible to entertain a belated
challenge to the resolution after a lapse of nearly six years.
10. Turning then to the arguments of Mr. Cooper that it was
the duty of the Chairman to demand the poll, I do not find any provision either
in the Act and the Rules or the articles of association which cast such
obligation on the Chairman of the meeting. It is not possible to agree with Mr.
Cooper that in every meeting it is not necessary for the Chairman to ascertain the
sense of the meeting by ordering a poll, although on a given case the situation
may be such that obligation on the part of the Chairman could be spelt out. In
my opinion, the reliance placed on the decision in the Second Consolidated Trust Ltd. 's case (supra) is
misconceived. The facts of the said case were rather peculiar and, therefore, I
am reproducing the same in detail. There the defendant company wished to alter
the conditions under which its debenture stock was held, pursuant to the
provisions of the Trust deed securing that stock. In order to do so it was
necessary to pass an extraordinary resolution which was a resolution which had
to be passed by a three-quarters majority at a duly convened meeting at which
the holders of a clear majority in value of the stock were present in person or
by proxy. The trust deed further stated that on a show of hands a stockholder
present only by proxy should have no vote. The meeting was duly convened and
with the notice thereof was sent a form of proxy to all the stockholders
whereby they could indicate the specified manner in which they wished their
votes to be used. At the meeting the fourteen persons present in person were
unanimously in favour of the resolution, but they did not constitute a quorum
unless the proxies were counted in. The proxies were such that, if a poll was
demanded and the proxies used for the purpose of the vote, the resolution could
not be passed. The resolution was passed by the stockholders present in person
; the Chairman, aware of all the facts and acting bona fide, did not demand a poll. The plaintiff stockholders
contended that the meeting was not duly constituted, and, alternatively, that
the proceedings were irregularly conducted and that the resolution was
invalidly passed. In
these circumstances, it was held by Uthwatt, J., that upon the true
construction of the trust deed the power of the Chairman to demand a poll was
not a personal right to be exercised according to his wishes. He was under a
legal duty so to exercise that right that effect was given to the real sense of
the meeting and, in the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the
fact that the persons present did not form a quorum, the Chairman ought to have
demanded a poll and used the proxies. Thus, the observations of Uthwatt, J., do
not help the petitioners in any way and, therefore, their challenge to the
resolution of 1989 must be rejected.
11. Mr. Cooper next urged that the
whole object of the respondents is to embarrass the petitioners who are
involved in the litigation with the company as no outsider may be ready and
willing to acquire the shares of the company which is incurring loss. Mr.
Cooper pointed out that the petitioners will have to pay a hefty sum of nearly
Rs. 85 lakhs for acquiring 8,24,800 rights shares. Mr. Cooper urged that even
assuming that such resolution is in the interest of the company, it should not
be allowed if it has the effect of virtually allowing the majority shareholders
to take over the minority shareholdings. Mr. Cooper brought to my notice a
judgment of Harman, J., in Re a
Company 1985 B.C.L.C. 80. Mr. Cooper also invited my attention to the
observations made by the Supreme Court in Needle Industries India Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd. AIR 1981 S.C. 743
which read as follows:
"Every
action in contravention of law may not per
se be oppressive for the purpose of section 397 of the Companies Act,
1956; a resolution passed by the directors may be perfectly legal and yet
oppressive and conversely a resolution which is in contravention of the law may
be in the interests of the shareholders and the company. An isolated act, which
is contrary to law, may not necessarily and by itself support the inference
that the law was violated with a mala
fide intention or that such violation was burdensome, harsh and
wrongful. But a series of illegal acts following upon one another can, in the
context, lead justifiably to the conclusion that they are a part of the same
transaction, of which the object is to cause or commit the oppression of
persons against whom those acts are directed.
12. In my opinion, the first and the
foremost question to be considered in such cases is whether the impugned
resolution is passed in the interest of the company. On a careful scrutiny of the
record I am fully satisfied that there is no oblique motive behind the
resolution and the company is compelled to increase its share capital in view
of the changing times. It has been pointed out by the respondents that they
have to keep with the market requirements otherwise they will not be able to
compete with the new entrants like Hindustan Inks, United Inks and Rainbow
Inks. The respondents also pointed out that they are contemplating to enter
into technical collaboration with a German
company. The respondents rightly contend that in order to strengthen their
products currently manufactured by the company and to concentrate on the
manufacture of a wide variety of publishing inks it is necessary to increase
the share capital. The Directors of the company act in fiduciary capacity and
if they in their discretion decide to issue share for the purpose of raising
funds, the main question for decision is whether the issuance of share for the
purpose of raising funds is in the interest of the company.
13. It will be useful to refer to a decision of the Supreme
Court in Nanalal v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. AIR 1950 SC
172. In Nanalal's case (supra) the Supreme Court after considering various judgments of the
English Courts held that if the Directors exercise the power for the benefit of
the company and at the same time they have a subsidiary motive which in no way
affects the company or its interests or the existing shareholders then the very
basis of interference of the Court is absent. The Supreme Court observed as
follows:
"On the facts of this
case, the concurrent finding is that the company was in need of funds and,
therefore, the issue of further shares was clearly necessary and is referable
to such need. The further motive of keeping out the Singhania group, who are
not yet shareholders but are strangers, does not prejudicially affect the
company or the existing shareholders and the presence of such further motive
cannot vitiate the good motive of finding the necessary funds for the company.
In my judgment it is impossible to hold that the issue of fresh shares was, in
the circumstances, illegal or void." (p. 185)
14. I may also refer to the observations made by their
lordships of the Judicial Committee in Harsche
v. Sims 1814 AC 651 at
pp. 660 & 661:
"If the true effect of
the whole evidence is, that the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the
time that what they did was for the interest of the company, they are not
chargeable with dolus mains or
breach of trust merely because in promoting the interest of the company they
were also promoting their own, or because they afterwards sold shares at prices
which gave them large profits."
Palmer's Company Law, 18th
Edn., p. 183, says:
"in exercising their
powers, whether general or special, directors must always bear in mind that
they are in a fiduciary position, and must exercise their powers for the
benefit of the company, and for that alone."
Therefore, to my mind, the
true test is whether the resolution is in the interest of the company and I
have no hesitation to hold that the impugned resolution is in the interest of
the company. Merely because the minority shareholders are required to make
substantial payments for buying the shares, is no ground for branding the
resolution as oppressive of the minority unless it is shown that the Board of
Directors has acted with some oblique motive.
15. I may also mention that the decision in Re a Company's case (supra) of the Chancery Division
relied upon by Mr. Cooper does not assist the petitioners. The facts of that
case were: One L was a member of a company and had also been a director, but
was removed from the board by a vote of the shareholders. Immediately after his
removal, L presented a petition for relief under section 75 of the Companies
Act, 1948 or alternatively a just and equitable winding up. Subsequent to the
presentation of the winding-up petition, an extraordinary general meeting of
the company was summoned for the purpose of increasing the capital of the
company and conferring on the directors a power to allot the new shares. It was
the intention of the majority shareholders, who were also directors but did not
constitute a majority of the board, not to issue the shares other than as a
rights issue for cash on a pro rata basis.
L sought an injunction to restrain the majority shareholders from voting,
either in person or by proxy, at the meeting summoned to increase the company's
capital and to confer a power of allotment on the directors, pending the
hearing of his petition. Harman, J., granted interim injunction because the
learned Judge felt that the possibility of there being a third motive to enable
a takeover bid by the majority of the shareholders could not be ruled out.
Harman, J., observed:
"At the moment, upon
the evidence before me, I could not decide that this is in fact such a matter,
but as it seems to me it is arguable that this is the correct view, and that
upon discovery, cross-examination and so forth at trial, it may be established
that the persons proposing this issue - the board of the company who have
convened the meeting and who wish to have the power to allot-wish to have it
for reasons which are nothing to do with the ostensible and apparent reasons
which come to mind for a rights issue. The analogy, which is not perfect, with Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. 1974 AC 821:
[1974] 1 All ER 1126, where directors were proposing to make an allotment, and
had made an allotment, which was directly beneficial to the company which needed
the money, and yet were held to have made the allotment improperly and in
breach of their duty because they had yet a third motive, which was to enable a
take-over bid to be made, seems to me to be one which might lead a Judge on
sufficient evidence to find that the proposals here were unfairly prejudicial
to Mr. Lewis. It seems to me thus that there is an arguable case that
jurisdiction exists under section 75 to restrain a proposed pari passu rights issue, and, if that
is so, then there must be jurisdiction upon this motion pending the hearing of
the petition."
In these circumstances, the
2nd contention of Mr. Cooper also fails. In the result, company application is
dismissed with no order as to costs.
Sections 181 to 183
Voting
rights
[1971]
41 COMP CAS 26 (MAD)
HIGH COURT OF
MADRAS
v.
Tamilnad Transports (Coimbatore)
Private Ltd.,
PALANISWAMY J.
C.P. NOS. 57 AND 58 OF 1969
MARCH 17, 1970
JUDGMENT
Palaniswamy
J.—In the year 1960,
P.K. Palaniappa Gounder, the second respondent in both these petitions,
promoted two private companies going by the name of Sambandam Engineering Works
Private Ltd. and TamilNad Transports (Coimbatore) Private Ltd., which may, for
the sake of convenience, be hereinafter referred to as the "engineering
company" and "transport company", respectively. The petitioner
in both these petitions is the son of the second respondent by his first wife.
The third respondent in both these petitions is one Kathiresan, son-in-law of
the second respondent. In the engineering company, out of the 84 shares, the
petitioner owns 21 shares. In the transport company the petitioner owns 40 out
of 1,660 shares. The other shares in the two companies are held by respondents
Nos. 2 and 3, the second wife of the second respondent and her children and
some other close relations. The petitioner has taken out Company Petition No.
57 of 1969 under sections 433(b) and 439(c) of the Companies Act for winding up
the transport company on the grounds, (1) that the petitioner being a minority
shareholder, the other shareholders have joined together and are continuously
mismanaging the affairs of the company resulting in loss ; (2) that there is a
complete deadlock in the management, and the petitioner is not allowed to enter
into the place of business; (3) that the company has committed default in its
statutory obligations; and (4) that the substratum of the company has gone by
reason of the reduction in routes and dwindling in business and it is
impossible to carry on the business except at a loss. The petitioner has taken
out Company Petition No. 58 of 1969 in respect of the engineering company under
sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act alleging, inter alia, that
respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are virtually in charge of the affairs of the company,
that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to
him, that though he is the managing director of the company, he is not able to
function as such on account of such oppressive conduct, that the circumstances
are such that it is just and equitable to wind up the company and that as the
company is not owing any debts, the petitioner is anxious that the company
should not be wound up. The petitioner, therefore, prays for appointment of an
administrator to take charge of the affairs of the company and to direct the
second respondent and his group to purchase the petitioner's shares on such
value as may be determined by the court.
Respondents
Nos. 2 and 3 have filed separate counter-statements opposing both the
petitions. So far as C.P. No. 57 of 1969 relating to the transport company is
concerned, the defence is that it is neither just nor equitable to wind up the
company. These respondents contend that the petitioner, besides being a
director was also works manager on salary, that it was due entirely to his
mismanagement that labour problems arose resulting in labour disputes, that the
petitioner, with a view to enrich himself, committed several acts of
mismanagement at the expense of the company, that the petitioner was solely
responsible for the stoppage of some of the route buses, that some routes had
to be given up because they were unremunerative and that this petition is an
abuse of the process of the court. As regards C.P. No. 53 of 1969 relating to
the engineering company, it is contended by
respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that the petition is not maintainable under section
399(1)(e) of the Companies Act, as the petitioner had not paid the value of the
shares held by him. They deny the allegations of oppression and deadlock and
contend that the petitioner, as the managing director of this company, was
found guilty of several serious acts of omission and commission in regard to
the management of the company, that at a meeting held on July 9, 1969, the
petitioner was removed from his position as managing director for good and
justifiable grounds and that there is no ground to appoint either an
administrator or to give any direction to purchase the petitioner's shares.
First, we may take up C.P.
No. 58 of 1969 relating to the engineering company. As already noticed, in this
company the petitioner owns 21 out of 84 shares. The objection taken by
respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the maintainability of this petition is that the
petitioner has not paid the value of his shares. This objection is based upon
section 399(1)(a) of the Companies Act, which reads thus :
"399. (1) The
following members of a company shall have the right to apply under section 397
or 398 :—
(a) in the case of a
company having a share capital, not less than one hundred members of the
company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of its members,
whichever is less, or any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of
the issued share capital of the company, provided that the applicant or
applicants have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares".
The case of the petitioner,
as put forward in paragraph 8 of his petition, is that he has paid all calls
made on him and other sums due on his shares. The contention of respondents
Nos. 2 and 3 is that the petitioner has not paid all calls and other sums due
on his shares. In his reply to this allegation, the petitioner has filed an
affidavit denying that any other call was made on him and that any amount is
due from him. Initially, the burden lies upon the petitioner to prove that he
has paid all calls made on him and other sums due on his shares. He has made
out that case in his petition so far as calls made on him are concerned. But
the contention of the respondents is that all the calls have not been paid and
that some balance is due. To support this allegation, they have not let in any
evidence. A call becomes due when a notice is issued making a call. The word
"call" necessarily implies a calling which ordinarily means a calling
for the amount due on the share. The respondents have not substantiated their
allegation that any call was made on the petitioner and that that call remained
unanswered. Therefore, it is not possible to uphold the objections of the respondents
that the petition is not maintainable under section 399(1)(a).
Before adverting to the
contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions
of the Act relating to this matter. Section 397 reads thus:
"397. (1) Any members of
a company, who complain that the affairs of the company are being
conducted..........in a manner oppressive to any member or members (including
any one or more of themselves) may apply to the court for an order under this
section, provided such members have a right so to apply in virtue of section
399.
(2) If, on any application
under sub-section (1), the court is of opinion—
(a) that the
company's affairs are being conducted..........in a manner oppressive to any
member or members ; and
(b) that to wind up
the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise
the facts would justify the making of a winding-up order on the ground that it
was just and equitable that the company should be wound up;
The court may, with a view
to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks
fit".
Omitting the portions which
are not relevant, section 398 reads thus :
"398. (1) Any members
of a company who complain—
(a) that the affairs of the
company are being conducted...in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the
company ; ... may apply to the court for an order under this section, provided
such members have a right so to apply in virtue of section 399.
(2) if, on any application
under sub-section (1), the court is of opinion that the affairs of the company
are being conducted as aforesaid or that by reason of any material change as
aforesaid in the management or control of the company, it is likely that the
affairs of the company will be conducted as aforesaid, the court may, with a
view to bringing to an end or preventing the matters complained of or
apprehended, make such order as it thinks fit".
In order to entitle the
petitioner to succeed in his petition under sections 397 and 398, if he has
right to apply by virtue of section 399, he should satisfy, (1) that the
affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to any member
or members; and (2) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such
member or members, but that otherwise the facts would justify the making of a
winding-up order on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company
should be wound up. The question whether the affairs of the company are being
conducted in a manner oppressive to any member or members is a question of fact
depending upon the facts of each case: "Oppression" means burdensome,
harsh and wrongful. A conduct to be oppressive should indicate lack of probity
and fair dealing towards one or more members of the company.
Oppression
may take various forms. But an isolated act of oppression will not normally be
sufficient to justify the relief under this section. The words used are
"the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to
any member or members" and they suggest that the oppressive conduct must
be a continuing process. In a recent case of Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga
Tubes Ltd.,
the Supreme Court, after reviewing the leading authorities, has
expressed the position thus:
"...it
is not enough to show that there is just and equitable cause for winding up the
company, though that must be shown as preliminary to the application of section
397. It must further be shown that the conduct of the majority shareholders was
oppressive to the minority as members and this requires that events have to be
considered not in isolation but as a part of a consecutive story. There must be
continuous acts on the part of the majority shareholders, continuing up to the
date of petition, showing that the affairs of the company were being conducted
in a manner oppressive to some part of the members. The conduct must be
burdensome, harsh and wrongful and mere lack of confidence between the majority
shareholders and the minority shareholders would not be enough unless the lack
of confidence springs from oppression of a minority by a majority in the
management of the company's affairs, and such oppression must involve at least
an element of lack of probity or fair dealing to a member in the matter of his
proprietary rights as a shareholder".
Section
397 of the Indian Companies Act corresponds to section 210 of the English
Companies Act, 1948. In In re Five
Minute Car Wash Service Ltd., arising
under section 210 of the English Companies Act, Buckley J., delivering the
judgment, laid down the following principles in a case in which relief under
section 210 of the English Companies Act was sought on the ground of
oppression. The relevant passage occurs at pages 246 and 247:
"To
succeed in obtaining relief under section 210 of the Companies Act, 1948, a
member of a company must have established that at the time when his petition
was presented, the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner
oppressive of himself, or of a part of the members including himself, and
unless a petitioner in his petition alleges facts capable of establishing that
the company's affairs are being conducted in such a manner, the petition will
disclose no ground for granting any relief and will be dismissed in limine as being demurrable.
First,
the matters complained of must affect the person or persons alleged to have
been oppressed in his or their character as a member or members of the company.
Harsh or unfair treatment of the petitioner in some
other capacity, as, for instance, a director or a creditor of the company, or
as a person doing business or having dealings with the company, or in relation
to his personal affairs apart from the company, cannot entitle him to any
relief under section 210.
Secondly, the matters
complained of must relate to the conduct of the affairs of the company.
Thirdly, they must be such
as not only to make the winding up of the company just and equitable, but also
to lead to the conclusion that the affairs of the company are being conducted
in a manner which can properly be described as 'oppressive' of the petitioner,
and, it may be, other members. The mere fact that a member of a company has
lost confidence in the manner in which the company's affairs are conducted does
not lead to the conclusion that he is oppressed; nor can resentment at being
out-voted; nor mere dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the conduct of the company's
affairs, whether on grounds relating to policy or to efficiency, however well
founded. Those who are alleged to have acted oppressively must be shown to have
acted at least unfairly towards those who claim to have been oppressed".
Section 210 of the English
Companies Act was liberally construed by the Court of Appeal in In re H.R. Harmer Ltd., where
a petition for relief was presented by the two sons of the founder of the business
who himself controlled the company. The father and the two sons were life
directors, the father was the chairman and the governing director, although
this gave him no special powers under the articles of association. The lather
had continued to regard the business of the company as his own and had
constantly ignored the wishes of his co-directors and the resolutions of the
board. Affirming the order of Roxburgh J., the Court of Appeal held that the
company should contract for the services of the father as consultant at a
stated salary, that he should not interfere in the affairs of the company
otherwise than in accordance with the valid decisions of the board of directors
and that he should be appointed President of the company for life, but that this
should not impose any duties or confer any rights or powers. In In re Bellador Silk Ltd. it
was alleged, inter alia, that the petitioner had been wrongfully excluded from
all discussion of the company's affairs. Plowman J. held that this allegation
was not true, but observed that, even if it were true, it would be a complaint
of oppression as a director and not as a member and that, therefore, the case
was outside the purview of section 210. The learned judge also held that the
petition failed because of the petitioner's own admission that it was not
designed primarily to obtain relief under the section but for the collateral
purpose of putting pressure on the company to repay a loan due to another
company in which he had a major share. The same learned judge in In re Lundie Brothers Ltd.
affirmed the same view and rejected a petition for relief under section 210 in
which it was alleged that the petitioner had been removed from his position as
working director and excluded from taking any part in the business of the
company, although it was held that the facts justified the making of a
winding-up order on the just and equitable ground. Commenting upon these two
decisions it is observed in Palmer's
Company Law, 21st edition, at page 514, that in the light of the dicta
in the earlier cases any such doubt should be resolved in favour of the
petitioner and that these two decisions of Plowman J. should not be regarded as
laying down any general principles.
As against the foregoing
decisions, Mr. Raghavachari, appearing for the petitioner, cited the decision in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer. In that case the company was a subsidiary company. The
controlling powers vested in the majority shareholders and they were found to
have been exercised for the purpose of destroying the company's business. The
facts established that the majority shareholders acted in such a way as to
cause oppression on the minority shareholders. In view of these facts, it was
held that relief under section 210 was necessary. Mr. Raghavachari also referred
to the decision in In re H.R. Harmer
Ltd.,
already referred to, as supporting the petitioner's case that the conduct of
the second respondent, the father of the petitioner, is such as to cause
oppression upon the petitioner. The facts in that case are not identical with
the facts of the instant case. Reliance was next placed upon the decision of
the Calcutta High Court
in In re Hindustan Co-operative
Insurance Society Ltd.,
which is a case under sections 397 and 398 of
the Indian Companies Act. There, the facts established that the affairs of the
company were conducted by the directors on the strength of majority backing in
a manner prejudicial to the interest of the company. The compensation obtained
as a result of the company having been taken over for nationalisation was not
distributed. General meetings of the company were not called and accounts were
not submitted. There was also an attempt to change the business of the company.
In those circumstances, it was held that it was a fit case for invoking the
powers under sections 397 and 398.
Keeping the foregoing principles
in view, the facts of this case may be examined. The petitioner was the
managing director of the engineering company from the time of its inception.
The object of the company is to carry on the business in fixtures, mechanical engineering, manufacture
of machineries and implements of all kinds, tool making, etc. The. engineering section of this
company was leased to the transport company for a period of five years on a
rent of Rs. 500 from June, 1963. The rent was subsequently raised to Rs. 1,000
per month from April 1, 1964. In the year 1966, the rent was reduced to Rs.
300. The petitioner was a party to that resolution passed on September 4, 1968,
reducing the rent from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 300 per month. There is controversy as
to whether any amount of arrears of rent is payable by the transport company to
the engineering company. The case of the petitioner is that the arrears amount
to Rs. 13,925.70. But the case of the respondents is that if proper accounts
are taken, some amount may be found due from the engineering company to the
transport company. Exhibit P-23 is the report made to the shareholders on
September 4, 1967, by the second respondent in his capacity as chairman of the
board of directors. It is stated in that report that the engineering company
had incurred a net loss of Rs. 4,927.14 and that this was because the rent
payable by the transport company had been reduced in that year. Exhibit P-26 is
the balance-sheet for the year ending with March 31, 1968. There, we find a sum
of Rs. 13,925.70 as being the debt payable by the transport company to the
engineering company. But it is, however, the common case of both the parties
that the engineering company is financially sound.
Differences
appear to have arisen between the petitioner on the one hand and his father,
the second respondent, on the other, in about May, 1969, and, as a result of
that misunderstanding, one was attempting to find fault with the other.
Complaining that the petitioner, as the managing director of the engineering
company, had defaulted in convening the meetings of the board, the second
respondent wrote on May 27, 1969, exhibit R-1, calling upon the petitioner to
convene a meeting as early as possible. The petitioner appears to have declined
to acknowledge receipt of the notice and therefore the second respondent was
obliged to send the notice by certificate of posting. To the same effect, the
third respondent also sent a notice to the petitioner under exhibit R-2 on May
27, 1969. On May 29, 1969, the second respondent informed the petitioner by his
letter, exhibit R-3, in his capacity as the permanent chairman of the board of
directors of the engineering company that he wanted to inspect the records and
documents of the company. The petitioner was called upon to make it convenient
to give necessary inspection. To that notice, the petitioner replied under
exhibit R-4 stating that it was the second respondent who was in actual control
and management of the company and its books. He also stated that the second
respondent was at liberty to inspect the documents. In reply to exhibit R-1 the
petitioner stated in his letter, exhibit R-5, on May 29, 1969, that at six
meetings held on the specified dates the third
respondent, Kadiresan, did not take any part, that the stalemate was due to the
irregularity practised by the second respondent in the matter of conducting
meetings and that the second respondent was managing the affairs of the company
in an autocratic manner. It was also stated, that the petitioner was willing to
convene a meeting if the second respondent expressed an inclination for the
same and he called upon the second respondent to intimate to him the convenient
date. The second respondent sent the communication, exhibit R-6, to the
petitioner on June 4, 1969, complaining that in spite of his efforts to inspect
the records he could not do so as the clerk in charge refused to produce them.
The post script found in the letter says that the petitioner refused to receive
the notice and that, therefore, the communication was sent under certificate of
posting. The second respondent also informed the petitioner by his
communication, exhibit R-7, dated June 5, 1969, that it was the petitioner who
was in actual charge of the affairs of the company as the managing director and
that it was false to say that the second respondent was in actual management.
The second respondent also informed the petitioner that a time had come for the
petitioner to account for all his acts. He followed up that communication by
another communication on June 6, 1969, exhibit R-8, denying the allegation of
the petitioner that the third respondent did not attend the meetings. He also
made allegations against the petitioner in the matter of his management of the
affairs of the company. The third respondent, for his part, repudiated the
allegations by his letter, exhibit R-9, on June 9, 1969, that he did not attend
the meetings. He said that he did not receive any notice of any of the meetings
referred to by the petitioner in his letter, exhibit R-5. Respondents Nos. 2
and 3 together wrote exhibit R-10, to the petitioner on June 11, 1969, stating
that though they wanted inspection, the books were not made available. On June
11, 1969, the third respondent sent the registered communication, exhibit R-11,
to the petitioner making serious allegations against him in regard to his
management of the affairs of the company and calling upon the petitioner to
furnish some details. On June 26, 1969, respondents Nos, 2 and 3 together sent
the communication, exhibit R-12, to the petitioner stating that in spite of
their efforts the petitioner had not convened a meeting and that they gave him
a last chance to convene a meeting of the board. They also informed him that if
the petitioner failed to take necessary steps, they would be taking necessary
action open to them for convening a meeting as expeditiously as possible.
On 1st July, 1969, the
petitioner replied under exhibit R-13 to exhibit R-10 making
counter-allegations to the effect that the minutes books were with the second
respondent. He also called upon the second respondent to pay all arrears of rent payable
by the transport company to the engineering company.
Finding that the petitioner was not in a mood to convene a meeting, respondents
Nos. 2 and 3 issued the notice, exhibit R-14, on July 4, 1969, setting out the
agenda for the meeting which was announced to beheld on July 9, 1969, at 10
a.m. In the agenda, some items related to the conduct of the petitioner as the
managing director and to his failure to convene a meeting and to some other
matters. The petitioner was requested to be present at the meeting with all the
books of the company. To that notice, the petitioner replied under exhibit R-15
on July 6, 1969, stating that it was highly inconvenient for him to attend the
meeting on July 9, 1969, on account of his personal matters of a pressing
nature. The result was that he did not attend the meeting. On receipt of that
letter, the second respondent sent the letter, exhibit R-16, under certificate
of posting on July 7, 1969, advising the petitioner to attend the meeting and
to give his explanation in respect of certain matters. Still the petitioner did
not attend the meeting. On July 9, 1969, the board of directors met and
considered several matters and passed a resolution removing the petitioner from
his post as managing director. Enclosing a copy of the minutes of the meeting,
the second respondent wrote the letter, exhibit R-17, to the petitioner on July
12, 1969, calling upon him to hand over charge as managing director to the
third respondent, who was appointed as the managing director. After receiving
this notice, the petitioner filed the two company petitions under enquiry on
July 16, 1969. On July 19, 1969, the petitioner wrote the letter, exhibit R-19,
to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 denying that any meeting had been held and also
stating that the alleged meeting, even if true, was void and illegal. After the
resolution was passed on July 9, 1969, the petitioner was removed from managing
directorship, but his continuance as a director of the company is noted in the
register, exhibit R-20.
It is also necessary to
state that the petitioner has filed a suit O.S. No. 386 of 1969 on the file of
the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for partition and other reliefs, of his family
properties, impleading the second respondent and his sons by his second wife as
defendants. After filing that suit, the petitioner took out Interlocutory
Application No. 425 of 1969, on July 11, 1969, praying for the appointment of a
receiver for the family properties. The subordinate judge passed an order on
December 12, 1969, directing the second respondent herein to deposit into court
a sum of Rs. 500 on or before 15th of every month commencing from January,
1970, and further holding that in case of default, a receiver would be
appointed. Against that order, the second respondent has filed an appeal to
this court and the order of the lower court has been stayed.
It would be seen from the
foregoing facts that all is not well between the petitioner and the other
members of his family. But the question is whether the petitioner has made out a case that the affairs
of the company are being managed in a manner
oppressive to him. The materials on record do not justify an inference in
favour of the petitioner. The correspondence reveals that the petitioner was
consistently evading the request of the second respondent for convening a
meeting. He did not face the board of directors to answer the several charges
made against him in his capacity as the managing director. It was open to the
other directors to take such action as was open to them in law for the purpose
of protecting the interest of the company. Any action taken by them in that
behalf cannot be characterised as an oppressive conduct. What respondents Nos.
2 and 3 have done is neither harsh nor wrongful. The necessary inference that
follow from the correspondence is that the petitioner was adopting obstructive
tactics in regard to the affairs of the company in his capacity as the managing
director. I, therefore, do not find any circumstance whatsoever to hold that
the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to the
petitioner.
The burden lies upon the
petitioner to make out that it is just and equitable that the company should be
wound up and that such an order of winding-up would unfairly prejudice him.
Admittedly, the company is in sound financial position. The mere fact that the
petitioner says that he has no confidence in respondents Nos. 2 and 3 by itself
is not a sufficient ground to hold that it is just and equitable that the
company should be wound up. Nothing is proved to justify the apprehension of
the petitioner that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are likely to do anything to the
prejudice of the company or to its shareholders. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation v. Nageswara Rao
the Supreme Court has stated:
"Where nothing more is
established than that the directors have misappropriated the funds of the
company, an order for winding up would not be just or equitable, because if it
is a sound concern, such an order must operate harshly on the rights of the
shareholders".
In dealing with the
question as to what the petitioner, seeking to wind up the company on the
ground of just and equitable rule, should establish, the Judicial Committee in Loch v. John Blackwood Ltd.
observed:
"It is undoubtedly
true that at the foundation of applications for winding-up, on the 'just and
equitable' rule, there must be a justifiable lack of confidence in the conduct
and management of the company's affairs. But this: lack of confidence must be
grounded on conduct of the directors, not in regard to their private life or
affairs, but in regard to the company's business. Furthermore, the lack of
confidence must spring not from dissatisfaction at being outvoted on the
business affairs or on what is called the domestic policy of the company. On the
other hand, wherever the lack of confidence is rested on a lack of probity in
the conduct of the company's affairs, then the former is justified by the
latter, and it is under the statute just and equitable that the company be
wound up".
Applying this test, I do
not find any circumstance whatsoever to hold that it is just and equitable to
wind up the company.
It is next contended on
behalf of the petitioner that on account of the difference of opinion between
the petitioner and the other shareholders, a complete deadlock has been created
and that on account of such deadlock, it is just and equitable to wind up the
company. It is true that if there is complete deadlock in the management of the
company, it would be just and equitable to wind up the company, for, with such
deadlock, the affairs of the company cannot be carried on to its advantage. The
question in this case is whether there is such deadlock. In my view, there is
not. The petitioner is only a minority shareholder. Even, according to him, all
the other shareholders are all one side, of course as against him. In those
circumstances, it can hardly be said that such a deadlock has come into exist
ence as to make it impossible for the affairs of the company being carried on
normally. In In re Yenidje Tobacco Co.
Ltd. it
was observed by Warring- ton L.J. that inasmuch as there were only two persons
interested and and as there were no shareholders other than those two and as
there was no means of overruling by the action of a general body of
shareholders, the trouble which was occasioned by the quarrels of the two
directors was such that a deadlock had come into existence and, in such
circumstances, the company should be wound up. The same principle was applied
in In re Newbridge Sanitary Steam
Laundry in which an order of. compulsory winding up
was made on the ground that in the situation which had arisen, such winding-up
order afforded the only means of enabling justice to be done to the
petitioners. The principle upon which these decisions have proceeded is this.
If there is a private partnership between two people having equal shares and
there being no other provision to terminate it, what would be the position if
the two partners are opposed to each other making it impossible for the
business of the partnership to go on ? In such a case the course open to the
court, at the instance of one of the partners, is to direct the dissolution of
the partnership. The same principle is applicable, in the case of a company
also. But if the difference of opinion between one set of shareholders and
another set. in the case of a company is such that it may be resolved by a
determination of the view of the majority at a duly convened meeting, certainly
it cannot be said that there is a deadlock in the management. At such a
meeting, it would always be open to the majority to take a decision and after
the decision was implemented, there can be no ground to hold that merely on
account of the difference of opinion among the shareholders there is deadlock. In the case
before us, the majority do not want a winding up order and, therefore, the
court has to be very careful in exercise of its discretion in considering the
request of the petitioner for directing a winding up. Taking all the
circumstances into consideration, I hold that though the petitioner does not
see eye to eye with the other shareholders, there is no ground to direct a
winding up, as I am of the view that there is no deadlock in the management of
the company.
Mr.
Raghavachari, appearing for the petitioner, lastly, contended that if I should
hold that there is no ground to appoint an administrator as prayed for by the
petitioner, necessary direction may be given to the second respondent to
purchase the shares of the petitioner, as the petitioner does not want to
continue to be a shareholder any longer. He submitted that a commissioner may
be appointed for the purpose of valuing the shares of the petitioner. I do not
think that the circumstances of the case call for such an action, though it is
undoubtedly open to the court in suitable cases to pass such an order. The
petitioner is solely responsible for the present state of affairs and he cannot
take advantage of his own fault and get out by getting an order compelling the
other shareholders to purchase his share.
We
may next take up the case of the petitioner as regards the transport company.
In this case, the petitioner has prayed for an order of winding up the company
on the following grounds: (1) that the affairs of the company are continuously
mismanaged by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 resulting in financial loss; (2) that
there is complete deadlock in the management; that the company has committed
default in its statutory obligations; and (3) that the substratum of the
company has gone on account of the reduction of the route buses and in the
dwindling of the business. The contention of the petitioner is that the mismanagement
has resulted in labour trouble on account of which labourers struck work
resulting in loss to the company, that on account of inefficient transport
service, several punishments have been meted out, that on account of
inefficient and improper management, three out of ten routes, which were
acquired, had been given up and that even these routes are not used properly.
Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 deny these allegations. The evidence does not
establish the contention of the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner was the
works manager of the trans port company at all relevant times. He was also a
director. On October 16, 1968, he tendered his resignation of his post as
director and sent the letter, exhibit P-7. But the resignation was not
accepted. On May 28, 1969, he wrote to the second respondent under exhibit P-8
stating that he had already resigned from directorship and that he would not be
responsible for any of the functions of the company as a director. In
continuation of that letter he wrote exhibit P-9 on June 2, 1969, stating that he would be
sending a detailed reply clarifying his stand and that in the meantime
facilities should be given to him to inspect
the records. To that letter, a reply was sent under exhibit P-10 on behalf of
the transport company stating that the second respondent was looking forward to
a detailed clarification as promised by the petitioner. The petitioner was also
informed that he had already inspected the accounts on two days when he took
elaborate notes. The petitioner was further informed that at a meeting held on
June 11, 1969, his resignation of his directorship was accepted and that,
therefore, he was not entitled to inspect the books, as asked for by him. On
June 18, 1969, the petitioner complained by telegram, exhibit P-11, that he had
been refused access to have inspection. To that telegram he received a reply
under exhibit P-12 drawing his attention to the letter, exhibit P-10.
Making reference to the
telegram and the previous letter, the petitioner wrote exhibit P-13 on June 19,
1969, stating that suitable arrangements must be made to facilitate for his
inspection of the accounts. He followed up the letter by the next letter,
exhibit P-14, on July 5, 1969, stating that it was rather amusing that his
resignation sent on October 16, 1968, was accepted only on June 11, 1969. He
also stated that he was not responsible for any of the functions as a director
after October 16, 1968. This is the state of relationship between the
petitioner and the other directors as regards the affairs of the transport
company.
In view of the foregoing
situation, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Raghavachari that
there is a complete deadlock in the management of the business and that,
therefore, it is necessary to direct the winding up of the company. I have
already dealt with the contention of the petitioner in regard to the management
of the engineering company with regard to which also it was contended that
there was similar deadlock. For the reasons, which need not be repeated here, I
am of the view that there is no deadlock as regards the management of the
affairs of the transport company. In spite of the petitioner having a hostile
attitude against the other shareholders, the affairs of the company can be
carried on by the other shareholders who do not want the company to be wound
up. Therefore, there is no deadlock, much less complete deadlock, as contended
for on behalf of the petitioner.
The next contention urged on
behalf of the petitioner is that on account of the mismanagement of the affairs
of the company by the second respondent, as managing director, the company is
running at a loss. To substantiate this contention, it is pointed out that,
whereas at the time of the acquisition of the transport business there were ten
route buses, there were only seven route buses at the time of the filing of the
petition and that the stoppage of the three buses was due to mismanagement. I
am not impressed with this argument. The respondents no doubt concede that out
of ten route buses, only 7 were running. Their explanation is that one route
bus had to be
stopped as the plying was not remunerative. Their contention is that it was on
account of the inefficient management of the petitioner himself as the works
manager that all the routes could not be maintained. In the course of the
argument it was contended by Mr. Raghavachari that at present no bus was
plying. In reply to this, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that,
on account of the attitude of the petitioner in launching the litigations, the
running of the buses had to be temporarily stopped, that there was labour
trouble on account of which there was damage and sabotage, and that after
getting adequate safeguards against such acts of damage and sabotage, the buses
are proposed to be re-started. To this effect, the second respondent has filed
an affidavit dated March 5, 1970. This is an event that happened subsequent to
the institution of the petition, and the petitioner is not entitled to take
advantage of that circumstance in support of his prayer for winding up.
Reliance
was next placed upon the fact that, in the course of the transport operations,
the transport authorities had to take action for some offences resulting in
imposition of fine and that it was due to inefficient management. The
respondents no doubt admit that there were occasions of action for overloading
and overspeed. But this can hardly be a ground to hold that there was such
mismanagement as to call for interference by the court by an order for winding
up.
It
was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that having regard to the
liabilities of the company, it is not possible to expect profitable working so
as to wipe off the liabilities and that if the company is not wound up, there
is the likelihood of further loss which would have to be shared by the
petitioner also. This argument assumes as if the company was started on a clean
slate with regard to its financial position. It is admitted that the buses were
acquired from another operator and that for such acquisition, loans had to be
raised on security of property. It is not the case of the petitioner that the
quantum of loan has since increased. It is not disputed that the loan
originally borrowed has been reduced, though it is not completely' wiped out.
Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that on account of the debts,
the company should be wound up.
To
support the contention that creditors have taken action against the company for
realising their dues, reliance is placed upon some notices issued by some
creditors and those notices are exhibits P-1G to P-21. All these notices were
issued during the period from June to September, 1969, that is, after the
petitioner and the father and other members of his family fell out. It is
contended on behalf of the respondents that these notices were engineered by
the petitioner so as to lend support to these petitions. The point to be noted
in this connection is that none of these creditors has taken any action by way
of suit to recover the dues.
It is also important to
note in this connection that none of those creditors has come forward to
support this petition for winding up. Therefore, the fact that some creditors
have issued notices is not by itself sufficient to hold that the financial
position of the company is such as to call for a compulsory winding-up.
Mr. Raghavachari finally
contended that, inasmuch as the company has at present stopped running all its
buses, it should be taken that the substratum of the company has disappeared
and that such disappearance is a sufficient ground for an order to compulsorily
wind-up the company. I have already pointed out that the petitioner is not
entitled to take advantage of a circumstance that happened after the
presentation of the petition in order to support his prayer for winding-up. But
even if such an event were to be taken note of, I do not think that the
argument that the substratum of the company has disappeared is well-founded.
After all, what has happened is the stoppage of the buses temporarily. That can
hardly be called a disappearance of the substratum of the company. The
substratum of the company can be said to have disappeared when the object for
which it was incorporated has substantially failed or when it is impossible to
carry on the business of the company except at a loss or the existing or
possible assets are insufficient to meet the existing liabilities (vide Seth Mohan Lal v. Grain Chambers Ltd.). Therefore, there is no substance in
the contention that the substratum of the company has disappeared.
On a consideration of all
the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner does not seem
to have come forward with these petitions with a view to protect his interest
in the two companies. His object seems to be to force the hands of the second
respondent to come to terms with regard to their dispute for partition of the
joint family properties. Both the petitions are dismissed with costs.
Advocate's fee one set.
[1986] 60 COMP. CAS.1075
(P&H)
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
v.
Paragaon Utility Financiers (P.)
Ltd.
R. N. MITTAL J
C.
NO. 158 OF 1983 IN COMPANY PETITION NO. 79 OF 1982
MAY 8, 1984
N.
K. Sodhi for the Applicant.
J. S. Narang for Respondent.
JUDGMENT
Rajendra Nath Mittal J.—Paragaon Utility Financiers (P.) Limited (hereinafter
referred to as "the company") was incorporated on August 21, 1961,
under the provisions of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act"). The registered office of the company is situated at Jullundur. Its
authorised capital is ten lakhs divided into 1,000 equity shares of Rs. 1,000
each. The called capital out of the authorised capital is Rs. 8,50,000 and the
paid up and subscribed capital is Rs. 7,91,000. The calls in arrears amount to
Rs. 59,000. Col. Kuldip Singh Dhillon and 6 other shareholders of the company
filed an application under sections 397 and 398 of the Act. Smt. Rattan Kaur
and Col. P. S. Dhillon claiming themselves as the director and the managing
director respectively of the company sought to defend the petition on behalf of
the company. They are represented by Mr. J. S. Narang, advocate. Ramesh Inder Singh,
respondent No. 4, claims himself to be a director and authorised by the board
of directors headed by Dr. Vikram Singh to contest the petition. He is
represented by Mr. N. K. Sodhi, advocate. Thus, two sets of parties, i.e., Col.
P.S.Dhillon and Smt. Rattan Kaur on the one hand and Ramesh Inder Singh on the
other claim to be authorised by two different boards of directors to contest
the petition.
The question arises whether
Col. P. S. Dhillon and Smt. Rattan Kaur or Ramesh Inder Singh should be allowed
to defend the petition on behalf of the company. Ramesh Inder Singh filed a
Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 158 of 1983, stating that the management of
the company vests in the board of directors headed by Dr. Vikram Singh as
managing director and that Col. P. S. Dhillon and Smt. Rattan Kaur have nothing
to do with the affairs of the company. He has annexed 20 affidavits of the
shareholders of the company alleged to be holding 625 shares of Rs. 1,000 each.
He has prayed that affidavits be read for determining the issue. Reply to the
application has been filed on behalf of Smt. Rattan Kaur.
In order to determine the
issue, a few other facts are required to be stated. Col. P. S. Dhillon was
admittedly elected as the managing director of the company and continued to be
so up to April 20, 1982. The case of Col. P. S. Dhillon is that the board of
directors held a meeting on November 7, 1981, in which it was decided that ten
per cent, of the nominal value of each share be called and the same be paid by
the shareholders on or before January 5, 1982. In pursuance of the decision,
letters were posted to the shareholders to pay the call money. Most of the
shareholders supporting Dr. Vikram Singh did not pay the call money. The matter
was taken up again in the meeting of the board of directors on August 7, 1983,
and it was decided that notice be issued to the defaulter-shareholders stating
that if they failed to make the payment in respect of the call money on or
before September 2, 1983, their shares shall be liable to be forfeited. In
pursuance of the notice, ten out of the total number of defaulter-shareholders
came forward and made payment in respect of the call money and the rest of the
defaulter-shareholders neither asked for any extension nor made the payment.
The matter in respect of the arrears of the call money was again discussed in
the meeting of the board of directors on September 9, 1983, and it was decided
that if any shareholder had not made. the payment till that date, his share be
forfeited and consequently the shares of the following shareholders stood
forfeited :
1. S. Pavitar Singh
2. Ramesh Inder Singh
3. Ravinder Singh
4. Smt. Nasib Kaur
5. Dr. Vikram Singh
6. Mrs. Gurbax Kaur
7. Mrs. Inderjit Kaur
8. Mrs. Bhagya Vikram
9. S. Gurcharan Singh s/o
Atma Singh
10. Mrs. Prem
Piari
11. S. Mohan
Singh
12. Smt.
Gurmej Kaur w/o S. Mohan Singh
13. Smt.
Gurcharan Kaur
14. S. Swaran
Singh and
15. Mohan
Singh
It is alleged that out of
the above defaulter-shareholders, some of them were posing themselves to be
shareholders and directors of the company.
The case of Ramesh Inder
Singh and his party is that some shareholders gave a requisition on January 25,
1982, to Col. P. S. Dhillon, that an extraordinary general meeting be
requisitioned for removal of Col. P. S. Dhillon and the board of directors and
appointment of another managing director and board of directors. Col. P. S.
Dhillon did not requisition the meeting within the period of 21 days.
Consequently, the requisitionists called the meeting for April 21, 1982, on
March 22, 1982. In the meeting, all the resolutions were passed unanimously and
were recorded in another set of books as Col. P. S. Dhillon did not hand over
the books to them. In the meeting, Dr. Vikram Singh was appointed as the director-cum-managing
director and Mrs. Bhagya Vikram, Smt. Nasib Kaur, Niranjan Singh Domeli,
Gurcharan Singh, Ramesh Inder Singh, Ravinder Singh, Swaran Singh, Amar Singh,
Avtar Singh, Bir Singh and Rajinder Singh Johl were appointed as directors of
the company. It is further stated that they did not receive any notice for
depositing the call money in pursuance of the alleged meeting dated November 7,
1981. The party represented by Ramesh Inder Singh claims that Dr. Vikram Singh
and the abovesaid persons were duly elected as directors in the meeting on
April 21, 1982, and, therefore, he could represent the company.
In order to determine the
aforesaid question, the pivotal point to be decided is whether the meeting
dated April 21, 1982, was a validly convened meeting or not and the
shareholders who attended the meeting had the right to vote. The contention of
Mr. Narang is that in case any sum is payable by a shareholder to the company
and he has not paid the same, he has no right of voting in a meeting. He submits
that after the meeting of November 7, 1981, notice for call money was served
upon all the shareholders and those who did not pay the call money had no right
of voting in the meeting held on April 21, 1982. According to him, the majority
of the shareholders who attended the meeting on that date had not paid the call
money and, therefore, they could not elect the managing director and other
directors. On the other hand, Mr. Sodhi has argued that no meeting of the board
of directors was held on November 7, 1981, and no notices in pursuance of the
alleged meeting were issued to the shareholder. He further submits that,
therefore, it cannot be held that any money was due to the company and thus the
meeting held on April 21, 1982, was a valid meeting.
I have given due
consideration to the arguments of learned counsel. The first matter to be
determined is whether any meeting took place on November 7, 1981, or not. It is
not disputed that up to April 20, 1982, Col. P. S. Dhillon was the managing
director of the company and the old board of directors was continuing. Col.
Dhillon has produced the register containing the minutes of the meeting of the
board of directors dated November 7, 1981. The meeting was attended by ten
directors whereas the quorum for the meeting was six. The directors who
attended the meeting were Niranjan Singh Domeli, Col. P.S. Dhillon, Puran
Singh, Bir Singh Johl, Ravinder Kaur, Col. K. S. Dhillon, Smt. Inder Kaur,
Didar Singh, Puran Chand and Hardev Singh Minhas. Niranjan Singh Domeli was in
the chair. The original proceedings book contains the signatures of all the
directors present at the meeting. At the conclusion of the minutes, Niranjan
Singh Domeli signed the register on the same date. One of the proposed
resolutions was to consider further call on shares. The resolution which was
passed by the board of directors reads as follows :
"Resolved unanimously
that a fourth call on shares of the company be and is hereby made at 10% of the
nominal value of each share, i.e., Rs. 100 per share, to be paid before
5-1-82."
Niranjan Singh Domeli, Bir
Singh Johl and Smt. Inder Kaur, who were present in the meeting dated November
7, 1981, and passed the above resolution, are also amongst the requisitionists
for calling a meeting on March 22, 1982, for April 21, 1982. Out of them,
Niranjan Singh Domeli and Bir Singh Johl were elected as directors on that
date, i.e., on April 21, 1982. It has not been denied by them that they were
present in the meeting on November 7, 1981. Their presence in the meeting dated
November 7, 1981, proves beyond a shadow of doubt that that meeting was held
and the resolution reproduced above was passed therein. I, therefore, do not
find any substance in the contention of Mr. Sodhi that in fact no meeting was
held on November 7, 1981, and false entries have been made in the proceedings
book.
Now, it is to be seen
whether notices were sent to the shareholders in pursuance of the resolution
dated November 7, 1981. Col. P.S. Dhillon produced the despatch register in the
court along with the photostat copy of the relevant entries. The relevant
entires regarding despatch of the letter calling the share money are contained
in the register at serial Nos. 250 to 289. A copy of the letter is also annexed
to the register which reads as follows:
** ** **
"Ref. No./PUF/250 to
289 Dated : 20-11-81.
All shareholders
Call on shares
In the meeting of the board
of directors held on 7-11-81, it has been resolved that a further call of 10%
(Rs. 100) per share be made, to be paid on or before 5-1-82.
2. You are accordingly
called upon to pay the above call in this office by the due date."
** ** **
The register continues till
date. The last entry in the register is dated March 27, 1984. From the register
it is evident that the letters were despatched by the company to the
shareholders. Section 53 deals with service of documents on members by a
company. Sub-section (1), inter alia, provides that a document may be served by
a company on any member thereof either personally, or by sending it by post to
him to his registered address. Sub-section (2)(a) says that where a document is sent by post, service thereof
shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a
letter containing the document. A proviso had been added to the sub-section
saying that where a member has intimated to the company in advance that
documents should be sent to him under a certificate of posting or by registered
post with or without acknowledgment due and has deposited with the company a
sum sufficient to defray the expenses of doing so, service of the document
shall not be deemed to be effected unless it is sent in the manner intimated by
the member.
From a reading of the above
sub-sections, it is clear that if a letter is posted to a shareholder on his
registered address by affixing the requisite postal stamps, the service shall
be deemed to have been effected on him, unless he had issued instructions to
the company that he should be served after obtaining a certificate of posting
or under registered cover and provided funds for that purpose. It has not been
shown that any instructions had been issued and funds were provided by the
requisitionists for sending letters to them after obtaining certificate of
posting or under registered covers. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the
company complied with the provisions of law in sending the notices to the
shareholders. It is further relevant to mention that in pursuance of the notice
dated November 20, 1981, Niranjan Singh Domeli, Smt. Inder Kaur and Smt. Pritam
Kaur wives of Niranjan Singh Dimeli, Smt. Vaneet, daughter of Niranjan Singh
Domeli, Raghuvinder Singh, Bir Singh Johl, Col. P. S. Dhillon, Smt Kir-pal
Kaur, Smt. Gurmej Kaur, Smt. Rattan Kaur, Hardev Singh Minhas, Puran Singh,
Didar Singh, Col. K. S. Dhillon and K. Gurdev Singh paid the call money. Since
notices were not received, it was not possible for Smt. Vaneet, Raghuvinder
Singh, Smt. Kirpal Kaur, Smt. Gurmej Kaur, Smt. Rattan Kaur and K. Gurdev Singh
to pay the call money as they were not present in the meeting of the board of
directors.
Faced with that situation,
Mr. Sodhi argued that the requisitionists stated on affidavit that they did not
come to know about the resolution nor did they receive any letter dated
November 20, 1981 and, therefore, it cannot be held that they came to know of
the resolution. He tried to support his argument by making a reference to this
court's decision in Escorts Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, Haryana [1983] Lab IC 223. I am not impressed with the submission of learned counsel. In view of the
provisions of the Companies Act, it cannot be held that the mode in which the
service was effected was not a proper mode of service. M/s. Escorts Ltd.'s case, referred to by learned counsel, is
under the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no such provision in the Industrial
Disputes Act as contained in section 53 of the Companies Act. That case is thus
distinguishable and the observations therein are of no assistance to learned
counsel.
Mr. Sodhi next argued that
the notice dated November 20, 1981, did not contain all the particulars,
namely, the exact amount, the place of payment, and interest, if any, and
unless these were provided, the notice was bad and the shares could not be
forfeited. To support his contention, he made reference to Public Passenger Service Ltd. v. M. A. Khader, AIR 1962 Mad 276, Public Passenger Service Ltd. v. M. A. Khadar, [1966] 36 Comp Cas 1;
AIR 1966 SC 489 and Karachi Oil
Products Ltd. v. Kumar Shree
Narendrasinghji, [1948] 28 Comp Cas 215 ; AIR 1950 Bom 149.
I have duly considered the
argument of learned counsel. The question to be decided at this stage is not
the one whether the shares of the requisitionists are to be forfeited or not.
The question is whether prima facie they had the right to requisition the meeting
and to vote therein. This question is required to be determined for the purpose
of deciding whether the board of directors headed by Dr. Vikram Singh should be
allowed to defend the petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Act. In my
view, the point raised by Mr. Sodhi has no relevance for the purpose of
deciding the aforesaid question. In Public
Passenger Service Ltd.'s case, it is observed by the Madras High Court
that when the company forfeited the shares, the shareholder whose shares are
forfeited ceases to be a member of the company. He loses the privileges and
rights of the membership. The money he paid on the shares is irrecoverable.
But, on the other hand, he continues to remain liable to pay to the company the
moneys which are due and payable by him on the date of forfeiture in respect of
his shares and he becomes a debtor qua the company. Forfeiture, being a penalty
and sometimes a very severe one, the greatest care should be taken to comply
strictly with all the provisions relating to it in the articles. It is further
observed that any irregularity in the procedure or any departure from the rules
laid down, however slight, will, as against the company, invalidate the
forfeiture. An appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court was dismissed
by the Supreme Court in Public
'Passenger Service Ltd.'s case, AIR 1966 SC 489. Similarview was taken
by the Bombay High Court in Karachi
Oil Products Ltd.'s case. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid
down in the aforesaid cases but as no shares are being forfeited, the ratio
therein is not applicable to this case. Section 181, inter alia, provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the articles of a company may
provide that no member shall exercise any voting right in respect of any shares
registered in his name on which any calls or other sums presently payable by
him have not been paid. Article 36 of the articles of association had made a
provision in this regard. It reads as follows :
"No member shall be
entitled to vote at any general meeting unless all sums presently payable by
him in respect of shares in the company or otherwise have been paid."
From conjoint reading of
the section and the article, it is clear that if any sum is due from a
shareholder in respect of a share, he is not entitled to vote at any general
meeting. It consequently follows that the requisitionists who had not paid the
call money in pursuance of the resolution dated November 7, 1981, were not
entitled to vote in the alleged meeting. Even the meeting dated April 21, 1982,
cannot be held to be a properly convened meeting. Section 169 deals with
calling of extraordinary general meeting on requisition. Sub-section (4) says
that the number of members entitled to requisition a meeting in regard to any matter
shall be in the case of a company having a share capital, such number of them
as hold at the date of the deposit of the requisition, not less than one-tenth
of such of the paid up capital of the company as at that date carry the right
of voting in regard to that matter. From a reading of the sub-section it is
clear that only those shareholders who have a right of voting can requisition a
meeting. It has already been held that many of the requisitionists had no right
of voting and, therefore, they were not entitled to requisition the meeting.
After taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, I
am of the opinion that the meeting dated April 21, 1982, was not a valid
meeting, that the board of directors represented by Dr. Vikram Singh is not a
validly constituted board and, therefore, the party represented by Ramesh Inder
Singh has no right to defend the present proceedings on behalf of the company.
Before parting with the
judgment, it may be mentioned that the observations made in the judgment shall
not be taken into consideration at the time of deciding the civil suit between
the parties.
[1962] 32 COMP.
CAS. 896 (MP)
SHIV
DAYAL J.
OCTOBER
31, 1960
This is a petition
under section 186 of the Companies Act made by Radheylal Khaitan praying that
this court may order an extraordinary meeting of the Pasari Flour Mills Ltd.,
Bhilsa, to be held under the directions of this court. The Pasari Flour Mills
Ltd. (hereinafter called the company) is a public limited company which was
incorporated on November 16, 1937, under the Gwalior State Companies Act of
Samvat 1963. The registered office of the company is at Vidisha (Bhilsa) in the
erstwhile Gwalior State, now in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The authorised share
capital of the company is Rs. 5 lakhs divided into 5,000 ordinary shares of the
face value of Rs. 100 each. The petitioner is a shareholder. The company is now
governed by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the
“Act”).
It is stated
in the petition that Messrs. Ram Narain Prem Sukh and Sons (consisting of
Birmadutt Premsukh and Keshavdeo Premsukh) were appointed managing agents of
the company for a period of 31 years from the date of the incorporation by
virtue of an agreement in writing dated September 3, 1938. The managing agents
were entitled to appoint and remove and re-appoint from time to time two
persons as directors (ex officio). They were also given power to appoint an ex
officio chairman of the board of directors.
The ex officio directors nominated by the
managing agents were to hold office until retired by the managing agents; they
were not bound to retire by rotation. In 1940, the managing agents appointed
Birmadutt as an ex officio director and Seth Pratap Seth alias Motilal Manik
Chand as the ex officio chairman. Motilal Manik Chand resigned whereupon Shri
Umadutt Nemani was appointed ex officio chairman. In or about 1956, the
managing agents intimated to the company that with effect from April 30, 1956,
Birmadutt alone would be the sole ex officio director of the company.
The
seventeenth ordinary general meeting of the company, being the ordinary general
meeting for the year ending June 30, 1954, was held on April 7, 1956.
Thereafter, no ordinary or extraordinary general meeting has been called or
held.
Birmadutt has
filed a written statement which virtually supports the petition and, inter
alia, it is admitted that no annual general meeting of the company was held
after April, 1956, as alleged by the petitioner. He has also filed here a copy
of the plaint of the suit (together with its annexures) instituted in the court
of the Additional District Judge, Vidisha (Civil Suit No. 7 of 1960), against
Keshavdeo, Sajjankumar and Kedar Nath.
Keshavdeo has
filed objections challenging the petition as mala fide and actuated by
collusion with Birmadutt. This fact is, however, admitted that no annual
general meeting has been held after April 7, 1956, but has fastened the blame
on Birmadutt for the default. He has also stated that the board of directors
were “taking steps to call an annual general meeting for 7th November, 1960”.
Allegations and counter allegations have been made by Birmadutt and Keshavdeo
against each other.
Kedarnath has
filed objections praying that the petition be dismissed on the ground, inter
alia, that an application under section 186 of the Companies Act is not
maintainable.
No one else
has filed any written statement or objection.
As a
preliminary objection, Shri K. L. Mishra contends that Radheylal has no right
to file this petition inasmuch as he holds only one share and, further, he owes
the company a sum of Rs. 700. Reliance is placed on articles 63, 96 and 97 of
the articles of association of the company. Radheylal has stated on oath that his
accounts have been adjusted and he owes nothing to the company, and that, on
the contrary, when accounts will further be taken as regards the service
rendered by him to the company it will be the company which will be found
liable to pay him something. It is unnecessary to go into the details of those
allegations because even if Radheylal is indebted to the company, I do not see
how he is not a member of the company today. Article 63 gives the company a
first and paramount lien upon the shares of a member for his debts, liabilities
and engagements. Lien granted, membership is not lost. Article 63 does not
debar a shareholder from being present or voting at a meeting. Article 96
deprives a member from voting or to be present at any general meeting whilst any
money due from him “in respect of any share or shares in the company” remains
unpaid. It is clear to me that article 96 is irrelevant here. There is no
allegation that there is any outstanding money in respect of his share. Article
97 of the company no doubt entitles only those shareholders to be present and
to vote at a meeting who hold at least 5 shares in the company. But this
article must be held to be inoperative as it is in conflict with section 182 of
the Act. It is enacted in that section that a company shall not prohibit any
member from exercising his voting right on any ground except on the grounds set
out in section 181. And section 181 enables the company to provide in its
articles that no member shall exercise any voting rights in respect of any
shares registered in his name on which any loans or other sums presently
payable by him have not been paid or in regard to which the company has or will
exercise any right or lien. Section 181 does not allow any restriction to be
imposed on the basis of the number of the shares. As such, the mandatory
provisions in section 181 render article 97 inoperative. The preliminary
objection must, therefore, be overruled.
It is
conceded by everybody that there has been a non-compliance with the provisions
of section 166. Now, it is enacted in section 166 of the Companies Act, that
every company must hold a general meeting to be styled its annual general
meeting within 9 months after the expiry of each financial year and not more
than 15 months shall elapse between the date of one annual general meeting and
that of the next. For that reason it is urged by Shri Gupta that this is a
clear case where this court should exercise its powers under section 186 of the
Companies Act and order a meeting of the company to be called, held and
conducted in an appropriate manner.
From the
statements made in the petition and in the affidavits of Keshavdeo and
Birmadutt, it appears quite clear that there are serious disputes between them.
They are step-brothers and seem to be at daggers drawn. A civil suit has also
been instituted in the court of the Additional District Judge, Vidisha, for a
declaration that Birmadutt continues to be the validly appointed ex officio
director of the company; that Mahavir Prasad, Radhakishen and Sitaram are
validly appointed directors and these four are the only validly appointed
directors at present; that Keshavdeo has ceased to be a director of the company
from and after April 7, 1956, and that his appointment as also the appointment
of Sajjan Kumar and Kedar Nath is illegal and ultra vires. Ancillary reliefs
have also been prayed for. It is also said that Keshavdeo has transferred some
of his shares. It is alleged by Keshavdeo that Birmadutt went away to Bombay in
the year 1958; the books of the company up to that year are with him; on the
appointment of new directors (himself, Sajjan Kumar and Kedar Nath) they are
running the mills and with profit.
Before a
meeting can be ordered to be held under section 186 of the Companies Act the
court must find that it has become “impracticable” to call a meeting in the
ordinary manner. It is quite unnecessary to consider in this petition which of
the parties is responsible for the disputes and who is acting in a high-handed
manner. The fact remains that there are factions. Birmadutt and Keshavdeo,
step-brothers, have formed two groups. Each of them has at least two more
persons with himself who claimed to be the rightful directors.
“Impracticable”
and “impossible” are not the same. This distinction was considered in In re El
Sombrero Ltd. at page 4 and it was observed :
“Examine the
circumstances of the particular case and answer the question whether, as a
practical matter, the desired meeting of the company can be conducted, there
being no doubt, of course, that it can be convened and held.”
It is
undoubted that here all the parties have themselves made out a clear case of
“impracticability”. In re Lothian Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Indian Spinning Mills
Ltd. v. Madan Shumshere Jang Bahadur
and Bal Krishna v. Uma Shankar
may also be seen. Shri K. L. Mishra candidly admits that having regard
to the circumstances of this case, no one can reasonably object to a meeting of
the company being called.
This brings
me to the question whether a meeting, if held by an order under section 186 of
the Act, will serve any useful purpose. When 1 read sections 167 and 186 side
by side, there is no doubt that in the present Act there is a clear bifurcation
of the power to call the different kinds of meetings of a company. Section 79
of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, gave power to the court to call any and
every kind of meeting contemplated under the Companies Act, so that the court
could call an annual general meeting as well. Under the 1956 Act, it is only
the Central Government which is empowered to call or direct the calling of 6an
annual general meeting.
Sub-section
(2) of section 167 makes it clear that such a meeting would be deemed to be an
annual general meeting of the company. Section 167 of our Act is analogous to
section 131 (2) of the English Companies Act(11 and 12 Geo. VI, c. 38 of 1948)
which provides that if default is made in holding the annual general meeting, a
member may apply to the Board of Trade to call or direct the calling of such
meeting and on such application the board has power to call a meeting and to
give such directions as appear to it expedient in relation to the calling,
holding and convening of the meeting.
In section
186 of the 1956 Act, which empowers the court to call meetings, an annual
general meeting is excepted. It comes to this that this court has power to call
or direct the calling of only an extraordinary general meeting of a company,
but not an annual general meeting.
The main
object for which the petitioner wants the meeting to be called is that the new
directors may be elected. If this can be done only at an annual general meeting
but not at an extraordinary general meeting, an order under section 186 will
bear no fruit in this case; but if that business can be transacted at a meeting
other than an annual general meeting, the result would be different.
Shri Gupta
seeks aid from section 173 of the Act. I clearly see that it affords no
solution for the problem. Clause (a) of section 173(I) categorises all business
into two broad heads : (1) special and (2) other than special. In the case of
an annual general meeting, four things numbered (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are
not included in the expression “special”, so that at an annual general meeting,
those four things will constitute “ordinary business” (if I may coin that
expression for “business which is not special”). All other business to be
transacted at the annual general meeting is deemed to be special. For special
business, a longer notice is required and it has to fulfil certain formalities.
In the case of an extraordinary general meeting all business, irrespective of
the categories, is deemed special. In other words, whatever business is
transacted at an extraordinary general meeting is “special” and requires the
aforesaid preliminaries. But it is altogether a different question what
business can be transacted at an extraordinary general meeting and, in
particular, whether directors can be appointed at an extraordinary general
meeting. This has to be determined from the relevant provisions in the Act and
in the articles of the company.
Shri K. L.
Mishra calls attention to sections 210, 224 and 256. Under section 210, the
board of directors of a company is required to lay before the company a
balance-sheet and a profit and loss account at “every annual general meeting”.
Section 224 requires every company to appoint an auditor at an annual general
meeting. Section 256 deals with the ascertainment of the directors retiring by
rotation and the filling of vacancies. The argument is that a director who is
liable to retire by rotation can retire only at an annual general meeting and
the vacancy so created can also be filled up only at the annual general meeting
by reappointing the retired director or by appointing some other person.
Emphasis is on the words “the” and “annual”.
The
expression “annual general meeting” in section 256 refers to a meeting which is
to be held annually under the mandatory provisions contained in section 166 of
the Act. But where an annual meeting is not held at the scheduled time, is
retirement automatic and do they cease to hold the office with effect from the
last day on which the annual general meeting should have been held ? In In re
Consolidated Nickel Mines Ltd., the question was whether the two directors,
Steel and Philips, were entitled to remuneration as directors. Article 101 of
the company provided that all directors were to retire from the office at the
ordinary meeting. Section 49 of the Companies Act provided that the directors
were bound to summon a general meeting of the company once in every calendar
year. However, no meeting was held after 1905 and the two directors continued
to act. It was held that they vacated the office in December 31, 1906, that is,
the last day on which the annual meeting should have been held. They were
disentitled to remuneration after that date. In Kanssen v. Rialto (West End)
Ltd., the point for decision was whether the allotment of shares made at a
directors’ meeting held on March 30, 1942, was valid. The allotment was made by
Cromie and Strelitz, who purported to act as directors. The latter claimed to
have been appointed a director at a meeting held on February 1, 1940. It was
found that there was no meeting or appointment. Cromie was one of the original
directors, but he was to retire at the annual meeting and the last date on
which such a meeting should have been held was December 31, 1941. It was held
by the Court of Appeal, relying on the case of In re Consolidated Nickel Mines
Ltd. “ Neither Mr. Cromie nor Mr. Strelitz was then (on March 30, 1942) a,
director of the company. Mr. Cromie had been a director, but he had vacated
office on December 31, 1941, by reason of article 73 of the company’s articles
of association.” This decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in Morris v.
Kanssen where it was held that since no general meeting had been held in 1941
by the effect of article 73 of Table “A” as varied by article 22 Of the
company’s articles of association, there were thereafter no de jure directors.
It is stated in Buckley on Companies Act (12th edition, page 882) : “.... if in
any calendar year an annual meeting is not held under an article in this form,
those directors who would have retired at the meeting had the same been held
will vacate office on the last day of the year.” The dictum laid down in the
above authorities was followed by Rajamannar C.J. and Venkatarama Iyer J. in
Anantalakshmi Ammal v. Indian Trades and Investments Ltd.. The Madras decision
has recently been followed in Krishna Prasad Jwaladutt Pilani v. Colaba Land
and Mills Co. Ltd.. In that case the annual general meeting for the year 1955
of the Colaba Land and Mills Co. Ltd. was held on March 20, 1956. The annual
general meeting for the year 1956 was not called although the time for holding
that meeting was extended by the Registrar up to March 31, 1958. Two directors
(Jaintilal Patel and Solomon Moses) would have retired if a meeting was held in
1957. It was contended before the Bombay High Court that despite the
non-compliance with the provisions of section 166 they continued to be
directors of the company and were entitled to act as such until an annual
general meeting of the company was held. It was declared that both Jaintilal
Patel and Solomon Moses had ceased to be the directors of the company on the
last date on which the annual general meeting for the year 1956 should have
been held. The High Court posed a question : “Whether the tenure of the elected
directors can continue after the expiry of the statutory period laid down for
the calling of an annual general meeting.” This was answered with reference to
the various provisions of the 1956 Act thus :
In our
judgment it (section 256) speaks of directors who till the date of the actual
calling of the meeting continued to be directors in accordance with the
provisions of law. A person who is to cease to be a director by retirement at
the expiry of a stated time cannot claim to have escaped such retirement simply
because an annual general meeting has not been called as required by law within
that time. Section 256 does not include those who vacated their office. It only
applies to directors who had not already vacated their office or ceased to be
directors by operation of any provision of law. It has nothing to do with the
tenure of the office of a director in the proper sense of that expression. The
marginal note of section 256, which we may look at for the purpose of seeing
the trend of the section, speaks of ascertainment of directors retiring by
rotation and filling of vacancies. It does not lay down any substantive rule as
to the tenure of the office of a director. It is not the only section which has
to be considered. We have to ascertain the tenure of the office of an elected
director not merely from that section but from the language of sections 166,
255 and 256 read together.” There is a Calcutta decision which takes a contrary
view : Kailash Chandra v. Jogesh Chandra (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 868.). It was urged
in that case by the learned counsel for the respondent that the directors could
hold office only for one year from the date of their appointment and if no
general meeting was held at the lapse of one year the directors automatically
vacated their office. The learned judge who decided the case rejected the said
contentions in these words : “I am unable to accept this contention of the
learned advocate as it seems to me that it would be unreasonable to hold that
this is the true meaning of the articles of association.” The Bombay High Court
has dissented from this view.
In the Indian
Companies Act, 1913, under which the Madras case was decided, there was no
provision corresponding to section 256 of the 1956 Act but regulation 78 of
Table A read with section 17(2) of that Act laid down substantially the same
law. In that case, however, the High Court was not considering the question of
appointment of directors. Nor did that question arise in the Bombay case. In
the case before me the question precisely is whether I can order the
appointment of new directors on the assumption that there are vacancies in the
board of directors because of the automatic retirement of the former directors.
Section 255 provides that not less than two-thirds of the total number of
directors of a public company shall be persons whose period of office is liable
to terminate by retirement or rotation. Such directors are to be appointed in a
general meeting, save as otherwise provided in the Act. The remaining one-third
of the total number of directors shall be appointed in general meeting, subject
to the articles of the company. No tenure of office has been fixed in the Act
during which a director shall act. But section 256 provides that one-third of
the directors who are liable to retire by rotation, shall retire from office at
the first and at every subsequent annual general meeting. The directors to
retire shall be those who have been longest in office. Vacancies so created at
the general meeting at which some of the directors retire as above shall be
filled up by reappointing the retiring directors or by appointing fresh directors.
The places so vacated are to be filled up in the same meeting and if not so
filled up an adjourned meeting is to be held on the same day of the next week.
If at the adjourned meeting also fresh directors are not appointed as provided
in sub-section (4), the retiring directors shall be deemed to have been
re-appointed at the adjourned meeting. There are five exceptions to this
deeming provision none of which is applicable here. I think these provisions in
our Companies Act of 1956 were made in order to resolve controversies which
arose in a number of English decisions. In the case of Robert Batcheller and
Sons Ltd. v. Batcheller, the articles of the company provided :
“ Save as
hereinafter provided if at any meeting at which an election of directors ought
to take place, the places of the retiring directors or some of them are not
filled up, the retiring directors or such of them as have not had their place
filled up, shall, if willing to act, be deemed to have been re-elected.” A
similar view was taken in Spencer v. Kennedy. Article 124 of this company is
almost in identical terms. It runs thus :
“ If at any
ordinary general meeting at which an election of directors ought to take place,
the place of any retiring director is not filled up, such retiring director as
has not had his place filled up, shall, if willing, continue in office until
the first ordinary meeting in the next year and so on from year to year until
his place is filled up, unless it shall be determined at such meeting on due
notice to reduce the number of directors or leave any vacancy unfilled.” What
exactly is the nature of the contingency under which alone such an article
would operate has been a matter of controversy in England. In In re Great
Northern Salt and Chemical Works it was
held that the true meaning of such an article only is that if for any reason
either the first meeting or the adjourned meeting does not proceed to fill up
the places of the vacating directors, then they are to continue in office.
Astbury J. in
Spencer’s case ([1926] Ch. 25.) made a passing observation suggesting that such
an article applies only where the retirement of a director by rotation and the
necessity of his re-election or replacement has been entirely lost sight of at
the annual meeting. But this view was not acceptable to Maugham J. in Holt v.
Catterall. However, in Batcheller’ case
Romer J. was inclined to agree that the I operation of such article was
confined to cases of accidental omission to fill up vacancies of retiring
directors. Romer J. dealt in detail with the word “deem” in his judgment. In
view of the clear provisions contained in section 256 of our new Companies Act
no such problem arises here. Whatever may be the reason for omission to elect
fresh directors in place of those who retire, either there must be an election
at the same annual general meeting or at the adjourned meeting which is to be
held on the same day in the next week, otherwise the retiring directors shall
be deemed to be re-elected. In the present case indeed there has been no
retirement of directors strictly under the provisions of section 256(1) because
an annual general meeting has not been held for the last four years. If the
dictum of the Madras and the Bombay decisions is applied and it is held that
during the last three years all the directors who were liable to retire (that
is to say, apart from ex officio directors) have retired by rotation (one-third
in each of the three years), it has also to be held that under the deeming
provision contained in section 256(4) they were reappointed as directors.
Article 124 of the articles of the company clinches the issue. That article is
not in conflict with any provision of the Companies Act. By virtue of that
article, the directors whose retirement is overdue are continuing in office and
shall so continue from year to year until their places are filled up. Unless an
ordinary general meeting is held their places cannot be filled and unless their
places are filled they continue in office. The two things are interdependent.
From whatever
angle this point is examined it must be held that the directors continue in
their office whether because they have not retired at an annual general
meeting, or because of the deeming provision contained in sub-section (4) of
section 256 - and shall continue to remain in office unless there is an
election at an annual general meeting Therefore, the only remedy is that an
ordinary meeting of the company should be convened and held. The Companies Act
of 1913 presented no difficulty as the court was competent to call or direct
the calling of any and every kind of meeting of a company. Under the Companies
Act of 1956, however, there has been a bifurcation of the power to call an
annual general meeting and the power to call any meeting other than an annual
general meeting and the two powers having been separately given to two
different authorities (the former to the Central Government and the latter to
the court) they must be exercised in water-tight compartments. All this leads
me to say that I am prepared to call an extraordinary general meeting of the
company for which this court is empowered under section 186, yet I cannot
direct the appointment of directors nor an appointment of an auditor nor the
laying of balance- sheets or profit and loss accounts. And if the above
business cannot be transacted it will be futile and merely ceremonial to hold a
meeting of the company, When no meeting has been held for the last four years,
no accounts have been asked by the shareholders, serious disputes have arisen
regarding directorship and transfer of shares and in a word the whole thing has
been in a mess. The chief object of this petition is that an extraordinary
general meeting of the company be convened and called “to elect and appoint a
board of directors of the company”. That relief I am unable to give to the
petitioner as discussed above. Then it is prayed that I should direct the
meeting “to transact such other business as may be determined by this court”.
This prayer is too vague to be allowed. At the hearing Shri Gupta did not
address me as to what other business the petitioner wanted to be transacted.
Since I have reached the conclusion that I have to deny the petitioner the main
and substantial relief which he wanted but which I cannot give him, the question
of granting ancillary and incidental reliefs does not arise. The prayer that I
should direct a meeting to transact such other business as may be determined by
this court is too vague to be made the subject of a direction.
For these
reasons the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case all the
parties are left to bear their own costs.
[1962] 32 COMP.
CAS. 896 (MP)
SHIV
DAYAL J.
OCTOBER
31, 1960
This is a
petition under section 186 of the Companies Act made by Radheylal Khaitan
praying that this court may order an extraordinary meeting of the Pasari Flour
Mills Ltd., Bhilsa, to be held under the directions of this court. The Pasari
Flour Mills Ltd. (hereinafter called the company) is a public limited company
which was incorporated on November 16, 1937, under the Gwalior State Companies
Act of Samvat 1963. The registered office of the company is at Vidisha (Bhilsa)
in the erstwhile Gwalior State, now in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The
authorised share capital of the company is Rs. 5 lakhs divided into 5,000
ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each. The petitioner is a
shareholder. The company is now governed by the provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the “Act”).
It is stated
in the petition that Messrs. Ram Narain Prem Sukh and Sons (consisting of
Birmadutt Premsukh and Keshavdeo Premsukh) were appointed managing agents of
the company for a period of 31 years from the date of the incorporation by
virtue of an agreement in writing dated September 3, 1938. The managing agents
were entitled to appoint and remove and re-appoint from time to time two
persons as directors (ex officio). They were also given power to appoint an ex
officio chairman of the board of directors.
The ex officio directors nominated by the
managing agents were to hold office until retired by the managing agents; they
were not bound to retire by rotation. In 1940, the managing agents appointed
Birmadutt as an ex officio director and Seth Pratap Seth alias Motilal Manik
Chand as the ex officio chairman. Motilal Manik Chand resigned whereupon Shri
Umadutt Nemani was appointed ex officio chairman. In or about 1956, the
managing agents intimated to the company that with effect from April 30, 1956,
Birmadutt alone would be the sole ex officio director of the company.
The
seventeenth ordinary general meeting of the company, being the ordinary general
meeting for the year ending June 30, 1954, was held on April 7, 1956.
Thereafter, no ordinary or extraordinary general meeting has been called or
held.
Birmadutt has
filed a written statement which virtually supports the petition and, inter
alia, it is admitted that no annual general meeting of the company was held
after April, 1956, as alleged by the petitioner. He has also filed here a copy
of the plaint of the suit (together with its annexures) instituted in the court
of the Additional District Judge, Vidisha (Civil Suit No. 7 of 1960), against
Keshavdeo, Sajjankumar and Kedar Nath.
Keshavdeo has
filed objections challenging the petition as mala fide and actuated by
collusion with Birmadutt. This fact is, however, admitted that no annual
general meeting has been held after April 7, 1956, but has fastened the blame
on Birmadutt for the default. He has also stated that the board of directors
were “taking steps to call an annual general meeting for 7th November, 1960”.
Allegations and counter allegations have been made by Birmadutt and Keshavdeo
against each other.
Kedarnath has
filed objections praying that the petition be dismissed on the ground, inter
alia, that an application under section 186 of the Companies Act is not
maintainable.
No one else
has filed any written statement or objection.
As a
preliminary objection, Shri K. L. Mishra contends that Radheylal has no right
to file this petition inasmuch as he holds only one share and, further, he owes
the company a sum of Rs. 700. Reliance is placed on articles 63, 96 and 97 of
the articles of association of the company. Radheylal has stated on oath that
his accounts have been adjusted and he owes nothing to the company, and that,
on the contrary, when accounts will further be taken as regards the service
rendered by him to the company it will be the company which will be found
liable to pay him something. It is unnecessary to go into the details of those
allegations because even if Radheylal is indebted to the company, I do not see
how he is not a member of the company today. Article 63 gives the company a
first and paramount lien upon the shares of a member for his debts, liabilities
and engagements. Lien granted, membership is not lost. Article 63 does not
debar a shareholder from being present or voting at a meeting. Article 96
deprives a member from voting or to be present at any general meeting whilst
any money due from him “in respect of any share or shares in the company”
remains unpaid. It is clear to me that article 96 is irrelevant here. There is
no allegation that there is any outstanding money in respect of his share.
Article 97 of the company no doubt entitles only those shareholders to be
present and to vote at a meeting who hold at least 5 shares in the company. But
this article must be held to be inoperative as it is in conflict with section
182 of the Act. It is enacted in that section that a company shall not prohibit
any member from exercising his voting right on any ground except on the grounds
set out in section 181. And section 181 enables the company to provide in its
articles that no member shall exercise any voting rights in respect of any
shares registered in his name on which any loans or other sums presently
payable by him have not been paid or in regard to which the company has or will
exercise any right or lien. Section 181 does not allow any restriction to be
imposed on the basis of the number of the shares. As such, the mandatory
provisions in section 181 render article 97 inoperative. The preliminary
objection must, therefore, be overruled.
It is
conceded by everybody that there has been a non-compliance with the provisions
of section 166. Now, it is enacted in section 166 of the Companies Act, that
every company must hold a general meeting to be styled its annual general
meeting within 9 months after the expiry of each financial year and not more
than 15 months shall elapse between the date of one annual general meeting and
that of the next. For that reason it is urged by Shri Gupta that this is a
clear case where this court should exercise its powers under section 186 of the
Companies Act and order a meeting of the company to be called, held and
conducted in an appropriate manner.
From the
statements made in the petition and in the affidavits of Keshavdeo and
Birmadutt, it appears quite clear that there are serious disputes between them.
They are step-brothers and seem to be at daggers drawn. A civil suit has also
been instituted in the court of the Additional District Judge, Vidisha, for a
declaration that Birmadutt continues to be the validly appointed ex officio
director of the company; that Mahavir Prasad, Radhakishen and Sitaram are validly
appointed directors and these four are the only validly appointed directors at
present; that Keshavdeo has ceased to be a director of the company from and
after April 7, 1956, and that his appointment as also the appointment of Sajjan
Kumar and Kedar Nath is illegal and ultra vires. Ancillary reliefs have also
been prayed for. It is also said that Keshavdeo has transferred some of his
shares. It is alleged by Keshavdeo that Birmadutt went away to Bombay in the
year 1958; the books of the company up to that year are with him; on the
appointment of new directors (himself, Sajjan Kumar and Kedar Nath) they are
running the mills and with profit.
Before a
meeting can be ordered to be held under section 186 of the Companies Act the
court must find that it has become “impracticable” to call a meeting in the
ordinary manner. It is quite unnecessary to consider in this petition which of
the parties is responsible for the disputes and who is acting in a high-handed
manner. The fact remains that there are factions. Birmadutt and Keshavdeo,
step-brothers, have formed two groups. Each of them has at least two more
persons with himself who claimed to be the rightful directors.
“Impracticable”
and “impossible” are not the same. This distinction was considered in In re El Sombrero
Ltd. at page 4 and it was observed :
“Examine the
circumstances of the particular case and answer the question whether, as a
practical matter, the desired meeting of the company can be conducted, there
being no doubt, of course, that it can be convened and held.”
It is
undoubted that here all the parties have themselves made out a clear case of
“impracticability”. In re Lothian Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Indian Spinning Mills
Ltd. v. Madan Shumshere Jang Bahadur
and Bal Krishna v. Uma Shankar
may also be seen. Shri K. L. Mishra candidly admits that having regard
to the circumstances of this case, no one can reasonably object to a meeting of
the company being called.
This brings me
to the question whether a meeting, if held by an order under section 186 of the
Act, will serve any useful purpose. When 1 read sections 167 and 186 side by
side, there is no doubt that in the present Act there is a clear bifurcation of
the power to call the different kinds of meetings of a company. Section 79 of
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, gave power to the court to call any and every
kind of meeting contemplated under the Companies Act, so that the court could
call an annual general meeting as well. Under the 1956 Act, it is only the
Central Government which is empowered to call or direct the calling of 6an
annual general meeting.
Sub-section
(2) of section 167 makes it clear that such a meeting would be deemed to be an
annual general meeting of the company. Section 167 of our Act is analogous to
section 131 (2) of the English Companies Act(11 and 12 Geo. VI, c. 38 of 1948)
which provides that if default is made in holding the annual general meeting, a
member may apply to the Board of Trade to call or direct the calling of such
meeting and on such application the board has power to call a meeting and to
give such directions as appear to it expedient in relation to the calling,
holding and convening of the meeting.
In section
186 of the 1956 Act, which empowers the court to call meetings, an annual
general meeting is excepted. It comes to this that this court has power to call
or direct the calling of only an extraordinary general meeting of a company,
but not an annual general meeting.
The main object
for which the petitioner wants the meeting to be called is that the new
directors may be elected. If this can be done only at an annual general meeting
but not at an extraordinary general meeting, an order under section 186 will
bear no fruit in this case; but if that business can be transacted at a meeting
other than an annual general meeting, the result would be different.
Shri Gupta
seeks aid from section 173 of the Act. I clearly see that it affords no
solution for the problem. Clause (a) of section 173(I) categorises all business
into two broad heads : (1) special and (2) other than special. In the case of
an annual general meeting, four things numbered (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are
not included in the expression “special”, so that at an annual general meeting,
those four things will constitute “ordinary business” (if I may coin that
expression for “business which is not special”). All other business to be
transacted at the annual general meeting is deemed to be special. For special
business, a longer notice is required and it has to fulfil certain formalities.
In the case of an extraordinary general meeting all business, irrespective of
the categories, is deemed special. In other words, whatever business is
transacted at an extraordinary general meeting is “special” and requires the
aforesaid preliminaries. But it is altogether a different question what
business can be transacted at an extraordinary general meeting and, in
particular, whether directors can be appointed at an extraordinary general meeting.
This has to be determined from the relevant provisions in the Act and in the
articles of the company.
Shri K. L.
Mishra calls attention to sections 210, 224 and 256. Under section 210, the
board of directors of a company is required to lay before the company a
balance-sheet and a profit and loss account at “every annual general meeting”.
Section 224 requires every company to appoint an auditor at an annual general
meeting. Section 256 deals with the ascertainment of the directors retiring by
rotation and the filling of vacancies. The argument is that a director who is
liable to retire by rotation can retire only at an annual general meeting and
the vacancy so created can also be filled up only at the annual general meeting
by reappointing the retired director or by appointing some other person.
Emphasis is on the words “the” and “annual”.
The
expression “annual general meeting” in section 256 refers to a meeting which is
to be held annually under the mandatory provisions contained in section 166 of
the Act. But where an annual meeting is not held at the scheduled time, is
retirement automatic and do they cease to hold the office with effect from the
last day on which the annual general meeting should have been held ? In In re
Consolidated Nickel Mines Ltd., the question was whether the two directors,
Steel and Philips, were entitled to remuneration as directors. Article 101 of
the company provided that all directors were to retire from the office at the
ordinary meeting. Section 49 of the Companies Act provided that the directors
were bound to summon a general meeting of the company once in every calendar
year. However, no meeting was held after 1905 and the two directors continued
to act. It was held that they vacated the office in December 31, 1906, that is,
the last day on which the annual meeting should have been held. They were
disentitled to remuneration after that date. In Kanssen v. Rialto (West End)
Ltd., the point for decision was whether the allotment of shares made at a
directors’ meeting held on March 30, 1942, was valid. The allotment was made by
Cromie and Strelitz, who purported to act as directors. The latter claimed to
have been appointed a director at a meeting held on February 1, 1940. It was
found that there was no meeting or appointment. Cromie was one of the original
directors, but he was to retire at the annual meeting and the last date on
which such a meeting should have been held was December 31, 1941. It was held
by the Court of Appeal, relying on the case of In re Consolidated Nickel Mines
Ltd. “ Neither Mr. Cromie nor Mr. Strelitz was then (on March 30, 1942) a,
director of the company. Mr. Cromie had been a director, but he had vacated
office on December 31, 1941, by reason of article 73 of the company’s articles
of association.” This decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in Morris v.
Kanssen where it was held that since no general meeting had been held in 1941
by the effect of article 73 of Table “A” as varied by article 22 Of the
company’s articles of association, there were thereafter no de jure directors.
It is stated in Buckley on Companies Act (12th edition, page 882) : “.... if in
any calendar year an annual meeting is not held under an article in this form,
those directors who would have retired at the meeting had the same been held
will vacate office on the last day of the year.” The dictum laid down in the
above authorities was followed by Rajamannar C.J. and Venkatarama Iyer J. in
Anantalakshmi Ammal v. Indian Trades and Investments Ltd.. The Madras decision
has recently been followed in Krishna Prasad Jwaladutt Pilani v. Colaba Land
and Mills Co. Ltd.. In that case the annual general meeting for the year 1955
of the Colaba Land and Mills Co. Ltd. was held on March 20, 1956. The annual
general meeting for the year 1956 was not called although the time for holding
that meeting was extended by the Registrar up to March 31, 1958. Two directors
(Jaintilal Patel and Solomon Moses) would have retired if a meeting was held in
1957. It was contended before the Bombay High Court that despite the
non-compliance with the provisions of section 166 they continued to be
directors of the company and were entitled to act as such until an annual
general meeting of the company was held. It was declared that both Jaintilal
Patel and Solomon Moses had ceased to be the directors of the company on the
last date on which the annual general meeting for the year 1956 should have
been held. The High Court posed a question : “Whether the tenure of the elected
directors can continue after the expiry of the statutory period laid down for
the calling of an annual general meeting.” This was answered with reference to
the various provisions of the 1956 Act thus :
In our
judgment it (section 256) speaks of directors who till the date of the actual
calling of the meeting continued to be directors in accordance with the
provisions of law. A person who is to cease to be a director by retirement at
the expiry of a stated time cannot claim to have escaped such retirement simply
because an annual general meeting has not been called as required by law within
that time. Section 256 does not include those who vacated their office. It only
applies to directors who had not already vacated their office or ceased to be
directors by operation of any provision of law. It has nothing to do with the
tenure of the office of a director in the proper sense of that expression. The
marginal note of section 256, which we may look at for the purpose of seeing
the trend of the section, speaks of ascertainment of directors retiring by
rotation and filling of vacancies. It does not lay down any substantive rule as
to the tenure of the office of a director. It is not the only section which has
to be considered. We have to ascertain the tenure of the office of an elected
director not merely from that section but from the language of sections 166,
255 and 256 read together.” There is a Calcutta decision which takes a contrary
view : Kailash Chandra v. Jogesh Chandra (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 868.). It was urged
in that case by the learned counsel for the respondent that the directors could
hold office only for one year from the date of their appointment and if no
general meeting was held at the lapse of one year the directors automatically
vacated their office. The learned judge who decided the case rejected the said
contentions in these words : “I am unable to accept this contention of the
learned advocate as it seems to me that it would be unreasonable to hold that
this is the true meaning of the articles of association.” The Bombay High Court
has dissented from this view.
In the Indian
Companies Act, 1913, under which the Madras case was decided, there was no
provision corresponding to section 256 of the 1956 Act but regulation 78 of
Table A read with section 17(2) of that Act laid down substantially the same
law. In that case, however, the High Court was not considering the question of
appointment of directors. Nor did that question arise in the Bombay case. In
the case before me the question precisely is whether I can order the
appointment of new directors on the assumption that there are vacancies in the
board of directors because of the automatic retirement of the former directors.
Section 255 provides that not less than two-thirds of the total number of
directors of a public company shall be persons whose period of office is liable
to terminate by retirement or rotation. Such directors are to be appointed in a
general meeting, save as otherwise provided in the Act. The remaining one-third
of the total number of directors shall be appointed in general meeting, subject
to the articles of the company. No tenure of office has been fixed in the Act
during which a director shall act. But section 256 provides that one-third of
the directors who are liable to retire by rotation, shall retire from office at
the first and at every subsequent annual general meeting. The directors to
retire shall be those who have been longest in office. Vacancies so created at
the general meeting at which some of the directors retire as above shall be
filled up by reappointing the retiring directors or by appointing fresh
directors. The places so vacated are to be filled up in the same meeting and if
not so filled up an adjourned meeting is to be held on the same day of the next
week. If at the adjourned meeting also fresh directors are not appointed as
provided in sub-section (4), the retiring directors shall be deemed to have
been re-appointed at the adjourned meeting. There are five exceptions to this
deeming provision none of which is applicable here. I think these provisions in
our Companies Act of 1956 were made in order to resolve controversies which
arose in a number of English decisions. In the case of Robert Batcheller and
Sons Ltd. v. Batcheller, the articles of the company provided :
“ Save as
hereinafter provided if at any meeting at which an election of directors ought
to take place, the places of the retiring directors or some of them are not
filled up, the retiring directors or such of them as have not had their place
filled up, shall, if willing to act, be deemed to have been re-elected.” A
similar view was taken in Spencer v. Kennedy. Article 124 of this company is
almost in identical terms. It runs thus :
“ If at any
ordinary general meeting at which an election of directors ought to take place,
the place of any retiring director is not filled up, such retiring director as
has not had his place filled up, shall, if willing, continue in office until
the first ordinary meeting in the next year and so on from year to year until
his place is filled up, unless it shall be determined at such meeting on due
notice to reduce the number of directors or leave any vacancy unfilled.” What
exactly is the nature of the contingency under which alone such an article
would operate has been a matter of controversy in England. In In re Great
Northern Salt and Chemical Works it was
held that the true meaning of such an article only is that if for any reason
either the first meeting or the adjourned meeting does not proceed to fill up
the places of the vacating directors, then they are to continue in office.
Astbury J. in
Spencer’s case ([1926] Ch. 25.) made a passing observation suggesting that such
an article applies only where the retirement of a director by rotation and the
necessity of his re-election or replacement has been entirely lost sight of at
the annual meeting. But this view was not acceptable to Maugham J. in Holt v.
Catterall. However, in Batcheller’ case
Romer J. was inclined to agree that the I operation of such article was
confined to cases of accidental omission to fill up vacancies of retiring
directors. Romer J. dealt in detail with the word “deem” in his judgment. In
view of the clear provisions contained in section 256 of our new Companies Act
no such problem arises here. Whatever may be the reason for omission to elect
fresh directors in place of those who retire, either there must be an election
at the same annual general meeting or at the adjourned meeting which is to be
held on the same day in the next week, otherwise the retiring directors shall
be deemed to be re-elected. In the present case indeed there has been no
retirement of directors strictly under the provisions of section 256(1) because
an annual general meeting has not been held for the last four years. If the
dictum of the Madras and the Bombay decisions is applied and it is held that
during the last three years all the directors who were liable to retire (that
is to say, apart from ex officio directors) have retired by rotation (one-third
in each of the three years), it has also to be held that under the deeming
provision contained in section 256(4) they were reappointed as directors.
Article 124 of the articles of the company clinches the issue. That article is
not in conflict with any provision of the Companies Act. By virtue of that article,
the directors whose retirement is overdue are continuing in office and shall so
continue from year to year until their places are filled up. Unless an ordinary
general meeting is held their places cannot be filled and unless their places
are filled they continue in office. The two things are interdependent.
From whatever
angle this point is examined it must be held that the directors continue in
their office whether because they have not retired at an annual general
meeting, or because of the deeming provision contained in sub-section (4) of
section 256 - and shall continue to remain in office unless there is an
election at an annual general meeting Therefore, the only remedy is that an
ordinary meeting of the company should be convened and held. The Companies Act
of 1913 presented no difficulty as the court was competent to call or direct
the calling of any and every kind of meeting of a company. Under the Companies
Act of 1956, however, there has been a bifurcation of the power to call an
annual general meeting and the power to call any meeting other than an annual
general meeting and the two powers having been separately given to two
different authorities (the former to the Central Government and the latter to
the court) they must be exercised in water-tight compartments. All this leads
me to say that I am prepared to call an extraordinary general meeting of the
company for which this court is empowered under section 186, yet I cannot
direct the appointment of directors nor an appointment of an auditor nor the
laying of balance- sheets or profit and loss accounts. And if the above
business cannot be transacted it will be futile and merely ceremonial to hold a
meeting of the company, When no meeting has been held for the last four years,
no accounts have been asked by the shareholders, serious disputes have arisen
regarding directorship and transfer of shares and in a word the whole thing has
been in a mess. The chief object of this petition is that an extraordinary
general meeting of the company be convened and called “to elect and appoint a
board of directors of the company”. That relief I am unable to give to the
petitioner as discussed above. Then it is prayed that I should direct the
meeting “to transact such other business as may be determined by this court”.
This prayer is too vague to be allowed. At the hearing Shri Gupta did not
address me as to what other business the petitioner wanted to be transacted.
Since I have reached the conclusion that I have to deny the petitioner the main
and substantial relief which he wanted but which I cannot give him, the
question of granting ancillary and incidental reliefs does not arise. The
prayer that I should direct a meeting to transact such other business as may be
determined by this court is too vague to be made the subject of a direction.
For these
reasons the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case all the
parties are left to bear their own costs.
[1962] 32 COMP.
CAS. 937 (PUNJ)
v.
Punjab Company Ltd., Bhatinda
TEK CHAND, J.
MARCH 21, 1961
This is a petition under sections 397, 398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956, on the behalf of twenty-nine petitioners, against the Pubjab Company Limited, Bhatinda.
Besides the
company, eleven other respondents have also been impleaded. The Punjab Company
Limited, Bhatinda, which will hereinafter be referred to as “the company” was
incorporated in the year 1941, under the Patiala Companies Act, 1996 Kk., as a
public company limited by shares and it is, therefore, a company within the
meaning of section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, with its registered office at
Bhatinda.
The nominal
capital of the company is rupees five lakhs divided into five thousand shares
of Rs. 100 each. Its subscribed capital consists of 963 shares of Rs 100 each
fully paid up: 659 shares on which Rs. 50 per shares have been paid. The amount
of the paid-up capital ,therefore, comes to Rs. 1,29,250. The company when
floated had a large number of businesses but it has been in the main engaged in
doing forward contract business in grains, in particular in rape seeds and
mustard seeds.
The
petitioners feel aggrieved with the manner in which the affairs of the company
have been conducted which, according to them, is oppressive in relation to the
non-trading members . They feel that the directors of the company are behaving
in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the company.
At the
meeting of thee board of directors held on the 14th of December, 1957, it was resolved
that the following notice and resolution be circulated along with the following
explanatory statement as required by section 173 of the Companies Act, 1956:
“Notice is
hereby given that an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the company
will be held on Thursday, the 9th January, 1958, at 2 p.m. at the registered
office of the company to pass the following resolution with or without
modification:
SPECIAL
RESOLUTION:
Resolved that
instead of the existing articles of association of the company and the articles
as amended vide Resolution No. 2 of April 19,1957, the following articles of
association be substituted.
EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1956.
In order to
bring the articles of association in conformity with the amended memorandum of
association of the company and Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, and
suggestions of the Forward Markets Commission and to make the articles more
comprehensive for the benefit of the trade and to run the company’s business
more efficiently and on firm ad sound footing. it has become essential to
alter, add and amend the articles of association of the company.
On the 9th of
January , 1958, a resolution was passed by the shareholders of the company in
an extraordinary general meeting at which 28 shareholders out of the total of
237 were present. This resolution runs as under:
“Resolved
unanimously that the articles of association of the company circulated among
the shareholders for substitution instead of the existing articles and the
articles as amended vide Resolution No. 2 of April 19, 1957, with modifications
and amendments moved by the chairman, and passed in this meeting are hereby
approved and adopted and be substituted listed of the existing articles of associations
of the company and the articles as amended vide Resolution No.2 of April 19,
1957.”
It was also
resolved to send a copy of the resolution to the Forward Markets Commission ,
Bombay, for their approval and to the Register of Companies, Jullunder, for
registration.
The
petitioners consists of non-trading ad also trading members of the company. The
contention on behalf of the on-trading members is that the substituted articles
of association have deprived them of their elementary right as shareholder of
the company under the Act. May now consider the amendments brought by some of
the impugned articles.
In articles 2
which gives the definitions, “member” means “a shareholder and a trading
member” and “a shareholder” means a person who is registered with the company
as a shareholder”. The effect of this charge is that a shareholder who is not a
trading member is excluded from the definition of “member” and the result is
that a number of non-trading shareholders are excluded from the definition of “member”
According to article II new shares of the company shall be allotted only to the
trading members of the company.
The
qualification of a trading member under article 47 are the holding of shares of
the company of the face value of at least Rs. 2,000 besides payment of security
deposit of Rs. 1,000 building deposit of Rs.1,000 admission fee of Rs. 500,
annual subscription of Rs. 151 etc.
Under article
59, the right of entering into contracts with other person, whether trading
member or not , commodities for which the company is recognised by the Central
Government shall belong to trading members of the company. Under articles 62,
the boar is required to keep separate registers of shareholders and of trading
members.
Articles 85
to 106 deal with the holding of meetings. statutory annual general ordinary and
extraordinary general meetings etc. The other matters dealt with relate to
giving of notices of the meetings, quorum, adjournment of meetings, the manner
of taking votes and of demanding of poll, etc. One of the grievances is that in
sequence of the change in the definition of “member”, the non-trading
shareholders cannot participate in the meetings.
Articles 107
provides that voting rights shall be restricted to the trading members only.
Articles 115
provides that every member shall be classified within two month in. panel of
members approved by the board in consultations with the Forward Markets
Commissions. It is then said that the non-trading shareholder is deprived from
being put in one of the panels. Articles 121 provides the constitution of
directors, the total number of which shall not exceed nineteen. There shall be
elected by the members not more than thirteen directors. Broker’s Association
shall elect one director. There is also a provision for co-opting one director
from the surrounding moffusil areas.
Lastly four
directors are to e nominated by the Government of India in accordance with
section 6(2) (b) of the Forward Contracts (regulation ) Act, 1952. Thus the
non-trading shareholder have no representation any all on the board ad they
have no right to participate in the election of a director. Articles 159 which
is very extraordinary provides for declaration of a dividend to be paid to the
members of the accompany. As the word “member” does not include non-trading
shareholder he is excluded from participation in the dividend. It has already
been noticed that the non-trading members have contributed more than fifty per
cent. of the paid-up capital of the company. To sum up the oppression complaint
consists of the non-trading shareholder having no. right if vote, calling of a
meeting of passing or objecting to the passing of the balance sheet of electing
directors or controlling their activities or becoming directors themselves
electing auditors or even declaring or receiving divided.
Before
dealing with the question whether the impugned amendments in the articles of
association call for the exercise of posers of the this court under sections
397 and 398 of the Companies Act, the position taken up by the respondents may
be examined. On their behalf,, it is inter alia contended that the petition
does not disclose any mismanagement of the affairs of the company or oppression
on any member or member of the company or such conduct which may e prejudicial
to the interest of the company. It is conceded that prior to 9th January, 1958,
the particles of association of the company gave the right of vote to every
shareholder and now that right has been restricted to trading members only. The
amendments in the articles of association h have been necessitated in pursuance
of the provisions of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act of 1952 as amended
by Act II of 1957. It is said that the Government of India by its notification
dated 25th January, 1955, to rape-seeds and mustard seeds in the whole of
Indian except Greater Bombay with the result that the contracts in these two
commodities could be contracted only through a recognised association. The
government of India by another notification of the same date applied section 17
of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 to rape-seeds and mustard sees
oils in the hole of India, the effect of which was to continue the ban on
transferable specific delivery contracts to the purchase or sale of these oils.
One of the
recommendations made by the Forward Markets Commissions was that the grant of
recognition to the association dealing in these commodities be conditional “on
their previously carrying out such modifications in their articles of
association, trading bye-laws and working procedure as may be suggested to them
by the Commission”. The commission also recommended that futures markets should
also be established when representative association come to be established
Futures trading n rape seeds and mustered seeds oils should continue to be
banned as at present in the whole of India. These recommendations had been
accepted by the Government of India. It is allege that the amendments in the
articles of association were accepted with a view to comply with the wishes f
the Government of India.
An affidavits
sworn by Shri E K Vasudevan, Deputy Director,. Forward Markets Commissions,
Bombay has been placed on record. This affidavit is discursive and gives the
background resulting in there amendment of the articles of association. It is
stated that on the suggestion of the Forward Markets Commission, the trading
members were given exclusive representation on the governing body of the
association and the respondent company was, therefore required to carry out
several modifications by the articles of associations with a view to achieve
the objects laid down by the Commission. He stated that every amendment had
been suggested by the commission. including and amendments to article 107 and
after the amended article had been adopted, that article along with other
articles were approved by the commission. It was submitted in the affidavit
that the impugned articles of association of the company, though apparently in
conflict with the provisions of the companies Act, 1956 are expressly saved ad
declared legal under the provisions of section 9A was incorporated in the Act
by the amending Act 32 of 1957 with he object of making it legal for companies
granted recognition under section 6 of the Act to restrict the voting right to
persons interested in the trade and keeping out persons interest only in
profits or dividends. This portion of the affidavit is argumentative and is
indicative of the policy and does not contain matters which are factual. It has
also been urged that in February, 1957, the respondent company made an
application under section 5 of the forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952,
for recognition and after the articles of association had been amended, the
recognition was granted by the Central Government under section 6 of the Act on
28th April, 1958. He said that the resolution of the 9th January, 1958, was
passed unanimously by twenty-eight shareholder present, out of whom twenty were
non trading. The petitioners, however are not among those twenty non trading shareholders
It was also said that n objection was raised by any non trains members that the
notice of the meeting was not sufficient or the modification or the proposed
amendments were not understood. It was also said that the first elections
according to the amended articles of association were held in August, 1958, and
non trading shareholder never protested that they were not allowed to vote and
this right of their had been rainless taken away. It was urged that the working
capital of the company runs into poper eight lakhs and contributed in the main
by the trading members as against Rs. 67,100 contributed by the on trading
shareholders. The undeniable fact, however is that out of the paid-up capital
of Rs. 1,29,250, the non trading shareholder have contributed Rs. 67,000 and
trading shareholder have contributed Rs. 62,150. The sum of rupees eight lakhs
referred to above consists of cover money deposits, margin money deposits and
security deposits of trading members.
The questions
which now calls for decision is whether on the admitted facts and circumstances
of this case, a case has been made out for interference under sections 397 and
398 of the Companies Act, 1956. My attention has been drawn to section 9A if
the Forward Contracts (Regulations) Act as amended by Act 32 of 1957. It
empowers and association to which the central government has granted
recognition under section 6 to make uses or amend any rules made by it , to
provide favor all or any of the matters mentioned therein namely to grouping of
the member s of the association according to functional or local interests to
reserve seats on its governing body for members belonging to each group, etc.
This provisions does not extend immunity to the articles which have given
umbrage. These articles do not become inviolate by virtue of provisions of
section 9A.
In this case,
the non trading shareholder have been deprived of their right to vote, to call
meetings , to elect directors and auditors. They cannot exercise the right to
declare or receive dividend. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that
after due naughts had been given to all shareholder of the company a meeting
was called on 9th January, 1958, when the impugned articles had been adopted
unanimously. The first elections were held in August, 1958, within anybody
raising objection to the elections in accordance with the new articles which
prohibited the non-trading shareholders from voting. From this conduct, I am
desired by the respondents to hold that the petitioners are estoppel from raising
the plea under sections 397 and 398. On behalf of the petitioner, it is argued
that the meeting of 9th January, 1958, was no adequately represented because
out of 237 shareholders only 28 were present. This arguments of Mr. B R Tuli,
learned counsel for the petitioners does not carry much weight. If the
shareholder concerned who had received proper notice and to whom the proposed
amendments were sent did not choose to study the modifications or even to
attend the meeting they cannot be helped to say that there was n sanctity
attached to the resolutions unanimously passed because the meeting was not
adequately represented. No weight can be attached to such a contention.
The only
arguments which merits consideration is that omission to object is immaterial
in respect of matters which deprive a shareholder of certain fundamental
statutory rights guaranteed by the Act. There are certain rights which no
shareholder of a company can be permitted to barter away. In respect of such
rights, failure to object is no fatal. Reference in this connection may be made
to the following provisions of the Companies Act.
Section 9(b)
of the Companies Act reads, “any provision contained in the memorandum articles
agreement or resolutions aforesaid shall t the extent to which it is repugnant
to h provisions of this Act, become or be void as the case may be”. The
intention of the above provision is to make the stature law supreme so as to
override the memorandum. articles, etc.
Section 87
confers upon every meter of ac company limited by shares and holding any equity
share capital therein the right to vote in respect of such capita on every
resolution placed before the company.
Section 181
visualizes certain restrictions on exercise of voting right of members. Under
this section, notwithstanding anything contained in the act, the articles of a
company may provide that no members shall exercise an voting right in respect o
f any shares registered in his name on which any call or other sums presently
payable by him had not been paid. Section 182 provides that a public company
shall not prohibit any members from exercising his voting right on any ground
not being a ground set out in section 181, This is a basic recognition of a
fundamental rights that no restriction not specifically saved by the by the act
can be placed upon the voting rights of a members.
The right to
case one’s vote is a proprietary right and the holder of share may exercise is
right in any manner he pleases. The voting rights have been effectively
entrenched by the statute and cannot be taken away by any alteration in the
memorandum of association or by passing of any resolution in that behalf.
Sanctity is attached to the voting rights because it is in this manner that a
holder f such a right expresses his will, preference or choice regarding
decision on a proposed measure or proceedings or on the selection of an
officer, Giving of vote is a vehicle for commenting to other the choice of the
voter The exercise of voting rights is amens for giving expression to one’s
will mind or choice. It is recognize as a formal mode for authoritatively
expressing a person’s opinion. The possession of shares which is a valuable
property will as a right become nugatory by taking away the voting power.
Weightly and important matters affecting the affairs of the company are decided
at meetings by votes of members. A resolution or a motion than against it. When
this right is taken away, the the enjoyment of property is gravely hampered, if
not altogether denied. I cannot conceive of a worse oppression than the denial
of voting right to a shareholder especially in a case like the present where
the trading members whose contributions to the paid up capital is less than
half exclusively enjoy th right voting; and no trading shareholder who in this
case have contributed more to the paid up capital cannot exercise this right. I
would not be understood to mean that the voting right. I should not be
understood to mean that the voting right of a minority can be taken away> I
refer to its fact , in order time phasise to extent of oppression s in this
case , the on trading shareholder who far outnumber the trading shareholder
have no voice in the affairs of the concern. This right which is bestowed by
the stature could not be battered away by the members present at the meeting of
9th January, 1958, either for themselves or for other non-trading shareholders.
Mr. Sikri
argues that if a right is voluntarily given up with the open eyes, howsoever valuable
that right may e it cannot be styled as oppression. According to in oppression
is an act proceeding from one against the other to the latter’s detriment and
against his consent. This arguments has failed to impress me. An oppression may
be an act of cruelty. severity, unlawful exaction domination of will or
excessive use of authority. The sixth chapter of the companies Act deals with
the preservation of oppression and mismanagement.
Section 297
provides relief, inter alia where the court is of the opinion that the company
affairs are being conducted in a manner oppressive to any member or members ,
In this case the nonvoting members are being subjected to hardship or burden
which may truly be called oppressive. They are subjected to an oppressive conduct
in so far as they are being dominated and have to submits to excessive use of
authority. Such a conduct amounts to unjust hardship. To oppress,ordinary,
means to crush smother or trample. In this case, their valuable rights are
being tramped upon by unjust exercise of authority or powers. To take away the
rights of partaking in dividends earned by their contribution is not merely
oppressive but even confiscator.
In my view,
therefore this case calls for an interference by this court under section 397
of the companies Act.
In this
connection my attention has been drawn to section 6(3) of the Forward Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1952, according to which “No rules of a recognised
association shall be amended except with the approval of the Central Government.”
The argument is that this court cannot in the exercise of its powers under
section 397 and the following section pass an order which may have an effect of
causing amendments in the rules of a recognised association without obtaining
approval of the Central Government. The powers of this court for prevention of
corruption and mismanagement under Chapter VI of part Vi subject to te
imitations imposed by the provision therein are of plenary character and are
not abridged by anything contained in section 6(3) of the Forward Contracts
(Regulations) Act, 1952, It is open to the court to struck out such rule o a
recognised association which may result in oppression. Section 6(3) restricts
acts of the association and cannot be read to mean that it subjects this count
to obtain the approval of the Central Government before passing an order which
may have the result of amending rules of an association which offend against
the provisions of the Companies Act.
Where the
shareholders are denied a most valuable right by amending rules of an
association and in utter disregard of the statutory protection the making of a
winding up order on the ground that it is just and equitable, would be
justified. But in this case to wind up the company would be otherwise unfair. To
a case like the present the provision of section 397 are eminently suitable.
It is in
accord with the principles of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, that the
association which have received recognition from the central Government should
consist of member engaged in the trade. The non trading members in this case
excepting those who desire to quality themselves ad trading members, would be
anxious to sever their connection and walk out of the company with such capital
as the had contributed. In these circumstances the relief contemplated by
section 402(b) and(c) is proper.
I direct that
within three months of the date of this order, the company should purchase the
share or the interests off non trading members with the consequently reduction
of the company’s share capital.
I allow the
petition, but i the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear own
costs.
My previous
orders in this case restraining the Punjab Company from holding meetings stand
vacated.
[1962] 32 COMP.
CAS. 804 (CD)
v.
C.H. Musselwhite & Son Ltd.
RUSSELL,
J.
DECEMBER
20, 1961
RUSSELL,
J. read the following
judgment, in which he stated the facts, and continued : On December 30, 1958,
the annual general meeting of the company was held. I am not concerned was what
business was before the meeting or what passed. No notice of the meeting was
served on the plaintiffs. Prima facie the meeting was a nullity for that
reason. The defendants, however, rely on the relevant article 43 of Table A,
which is in this form : “The accidental omission to give notice of a meeting
.... to any member shall not invalidate the proceedings at any meeting.” [His
Lordship referred to the answers to interrogatories and the paragraph quoted
above in the letter from the defendants’ solicitors, who were also the
company’s solicitors, dated July 15, 1959, which was agreed to be correct, and
continued :] On those facts I fail to understand how the omission to give
notice to the plaintiffs was accidental. As Mr. Dehn for the plaintiffs succinctly
put it, it would have been accidental if a notice had been given to the
plaintiffs. It was argued that an omission founded on a misapprehension of law,
or indeed of fact, was accidental. Reference was made to the cases or Barker v.
Pur and In re Inchcape.. Those cases
concerned R.S.C., Ord. 28, r. 11, which in relation to judgments or orders
permits the correction of “errors arising therein from any accidental slip or
omission.” I do not see how these cases can support the argument that an
omission is accidental because it arises from an error.
For the
plaintiffs it was alternatively argued that the general meeting was a nullity
because of the failure to comply with the requirements of section 158(1) of the
Companies Act, 1948. At the risk of seeming discourteous, I would content
myself with saying that there is nothing in that point.
Prima facie,
therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to their declaration that the annual
general meeting was a nullity. On that basis they ask for an order that the annual
general meeting for the year 1957-58, now long overdue, be held. By itself,
this would be unnecessary, even if the court had power to order it, but in
truth what the plaintiffs wanted was declaration that whenever such meeting was
held the voting rights should be on the basis of the state of the share
register at the expiration of the period during which the meeting was required
by law to have been held. The exact date is not determined, but it would have
been prior to a date in October, 1959, when 50 more shares of the original
capital were issued to and registered in the name of the female defendant,
upsetting the balance on the register between the families. Two reason for this
were advanced. First, when that meeting takes place after the end of the period
laid down by law for its holding, it must be conducted on the basis of the
register as it stood on the last permitted day. I know of no justification for
this proposition in authority or statute law, and it seems to me wrong in
principle and contrary to the requirements of the articles of the company. The
second reason advanced was that the applicable article 35 of Table A in the
First Schedule to the Companies Act, 1929, requires that these 50 shares be
first offered proportionately to all the members of the company, which was not
done. But that article does not apply to shares forming part of the original
capital, and article 4 of the company’s articles in terms leaves the allotment
of the shares of the company to the board. It would accordingly have been quite
wrong to disqualify those 50 shares at any new meeting on either of those
grounds. If the matter ever arose it is, of course, possible that such
disqualification, or its equivalent, might be based on some other vice in their
issue, for example, as being contrived not in the interests of the company, but
no such matter was or could have been debated on the pleadings in this action.
This brings
me to the substantial point in this matter. For the individual defendants it
was said that, though, as an academic matter, the plaintiffs were entitled to
asserts against the company that they had a right to receive the notice and
that the annual general meeting was a nullity, they could not do so
effectively, or could not be permitted to do so, in an action to which the
individual defendants were parties, and against their wish. The reasons,
shortly stated, were these : that the result of the contract of May 21, 1958,
it being specifically enforceable, was to confer upon the purchaser the
beneficial ownership in the shares, leaving the vendors (they remaining on the
register) the legal owners of the shares, with but a vendor’s lien for the
unpaid purchase money and otherwise trustees for the purchaser : that as such
trustees they must, in the exercise of any right associated with the shares,
comply with the wishes of the beneficial owner of those shares, and therefore
of that right, short of a wish which would fraudulently deprive them of or
undermine the security of their vendor’s lien : that one right associated with
the shares was the right to complain or not to complain of the omission to give
notice of the annual general meeting; and that the plaintiffs in bringing the
action were obviously acting directly contrary to the known wishes of the
purchaser in this regard without there being any allegation or suggestion that
a direction not to complain would affect in any way the value of their vendor’s
lien, let alone fraudulently.
The matter
was put also in this way : that the plaintiffs in exercising their voting
powers at any general meeting were by virtue of the beneficial ownership of the
purchaser bound, with one exception, to comply with the directions of the
purchaser : that (as I understand the argument) they were in this respect in
exactly the same position as vendors who had been fully paid but remained on
the register as bare trustees, except in respect of any voting direction which
would fraudulently deprive them of or undermine the value of their vendor’s
lien : that there was no suggestion that a repetition of the December, 1958,
meeting would have such a result or indeed would in any way affect the value of
the vendor’s lien : that the court not make a declaration requiring as a purely
academic exercise a repetition of that meeting.
For the plaintiffs
it was contended that unpaid or partly paid vendors were not in the position of
trustees for the purchaser who must obey his behests : they remained entitled
to exercise the voting and ancillary powers as they wished without necessary
reference to the purchaser, though liable to the purchaser if they took, or
liable to challenge by the purchaser if they threatened to take action damaging
the subject-matter of the purchase. The analogy was to a vendor of land
entitled to remain and remaining in possession after the execution of the
contract, of whose actions the purchaser had only a limited right to complain.
Further, for
the plaintiffs it was contended that guidance could be found from the position
in law of a mortgagee of shares to whom the shares had been transferred and who
was the registered holder thereof. Such a mortgagee had, it was submitted, the
prima facie right to decide how the votes were to be case, subject to
interference at the instance of the mortgagor in a case only of unjustifiable damage
to the interests of the latter; and the position of a vendor on the share
register with a vendor’s lien was vis-a-vis the purchaser (who was the the
beneficial owner subject to that lien) relevantly comparable with that of a
mortgagee on the share register with a charge for the money advanced vis-a-vis
the mortgagor whose equity of redemption made him in effect the beneficial
owner subject to that charge.
For the
defendants it was asserted that it was not authoritatively established that a mortgagee
of shares on the register had the right to decide how to vote subject only to a
limited right in the mortgagor to intervene in special circumstances; and
moreover, in principle, the position was the converse. Further, it was argued
that even if the authorities favoured the mortgagee in that regard, that did
not point to a similar answer in the case of the unpaid vendor.
The question
really, for the purpose of this case, is whether, as between the plaintiffs and
the individual defendants, the plaintiffs have the pima facie right to decide
how to exercise the voting rights in respect of the shares, or whether the
defendants have the prima facie right to direct in all cases how those votes
are to be cast. If the former, then there is no justification for not holding a
proper meeting : if the latter, there is no point in holding a proper meeting
and no justification for this action, for there is no suggestion by the
plaintiffs that anything done at the purported annual general meeting went
beyond the scope of the legitimate exercise of the defendants’ prima facie
right to direct how the votes should be cast, and there is no suggestion by the
defendants that if a proper general meeting is held, the plaintiffs will do
anything which exceeds the legitimate exercise of their prima facie right to
decide how the votes should be cast.
It is, I
think, convenient to examine first the position of a mortgagee of shares who is
on the register. I refer first to Siemens Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Burns. The
mortgagees there were trustees for debenture stockholders of company A, and as
such were on the register of company B in respect of shares belonging to
company A which had, by a hiving off of part of the assets and undertaking of
company A, become subject to the specific charge in the debenture trust deed,
and accordingly had been transferred to the trustees. The first part of the
headnote says : “Where a company makes
an issue of debenture stock which it secures by a debenture trust deed, and as
part of the specifically mortgaged property causes shares in another company to
be registered in the names of the trustees of the deed, the trustees are, in
the absence of any contract restricting their rights, entitled, as the legal
owners of the shares, to exercise the voting rights in respect of them in such
manner as in their judgment they may deem best, irrespective of any directions
of the mortgagor company as to how the voting rights should be exercised, and
this, notwithstanding that the security is not yet enforceable.” On this matter
I add that counsel for the trustees, that is to say the mortgagees, were not
called upon. It was argued that where,
as there, there was a clause in the debenture trust deed entitling the
mortgagor to carry on its business until default, the trustees could only vote
before default as the mortgagor directed, since that was carrying on the
business of the company. Further it was argued that this was not negatived by
the existence of a general clause authorising the trustees, pending default, to
empower the mortgagor to exercise any powers and rights incident to the
ownership of any specific mortgaged property and - I quote - “in particular any
voting right ...”
On this,
Swinfen Eady M.R. expressed himself in a judgment concurred in by Duke and Scrutton
L.JJ. as follows : “It cannot be doubted that this provision in sub-clause 11
of clause 19 extends to any voting right in respect of the shares in question.
These shares are specifically mortgaged premises, and the provision that the
trustees may permit the company, or any nominee of the company, to exercise any
powers and right incident to the ownership of any of the specifically mortgaged
premises, and in particular any voting right, has this operation, that it shows
that there was an express agreement between the parties as to the extent to
which, if at all, the company was to exercise or have the benefit of any voting
rights in respect of the shares. In the ordinary way, where shares are
transferred to and registered in the name of a mortgagee it follows, from his
position as owner at law of the shares, that the ownership carries with it the
voting right, that this is vested in the owner of the shares; and it would
require a contract to exclude that right. Sometimes, where shares form a
security, there is a contemporaneous collateral agreement as to the mode in a
which, and the extent to which, voting rights in respect of the shares shall be
exercised. But in the absence of any such agreement the voting rights would be
with the legal owners of the shares, and it would require a contract to control
the exercise of those rights. The present case does not even stop there,
because the contract itself shows that the mortgagor company was only to have
voting rights so far as the trustees for the debenture-holders permitted them
to have them. The words of clause 19, sub-clause 11, are : ‘May permit the
company ... to exercise... in particular any voting right’; and, except so far
as the trustee mortgagees permit the company to exercise the voting right, I am
of opinion that such right remains vested in the debenture trustees to be
exercised by them primarily for the benefit of the stockholders. Then it was
urged that the effect of this would be to contravene the provisions of clause
11 of the trust deed, because that clause provides that ‘The trustees or
trustee shall permit the company to hold and enjoy the mortgaged premises and
to carry on thereon and therewith the business or any of the businesses
mentioned in the memorandum until the security shall become enforceable.’ In my
opinion, the fact that the trustees exercised voting rights in respect of the
shares in the Dynamo company does not in any way interfere with the company
enjoying the mortgaged premised and carrying on thereon and therewith the business
or businesses mentioned in the memorandum which are the business or businesses
of the Siemens company, and not the business of the Dynamo company.” I pause
here to say that the Siemens company is company A and the Dynamo company is
company B.
The judgment
continues: “It is, in my judgment, no breach whatever of this clause for the
debenture trustees to insist that the voting in respect of the shares rests
with them, and that they are entitled to exercise the voting power. Under these
circumstances I am of opinion that the learned judge in the court below was
right in refusing to make any order, and that this court will be right in
refusing to make any order, the effect of which would be, according to the
notice of motion, to prevent the trustees from voting in respect of the shares
in the Dynamo company held by them as part of the security for the debenture
stock otherwise than in accordance with the directions of the Siemens company.
In my opinion the trustees are entitled to exercise their voting rights as in
their judgment they may deem best, irrespective of any directions of the
Siemens company as to the way in which their votes are to be recorded.” It was
submitted that so much of the judgment as stated the general position was
obiter dictum. I do not agree. It appears to me that the judgment enunciates
the general position and considers it as concluding the case and adds a further
ground for good measure based upon the inference to be drawn from the reference
to voting rights, an inference in entire accord with the general position. The
argument of Mr. Gore-Browne, for the mortgagor, did not even venture to propose
that the general position was in fact the opposite, which would obviously have
been the starting point of his argument and not the reservation to the
mortgagor of the power to carry on its business until default.
An indication
to the same effect is to be found in Puddephatt v. Leith. The question on which
the case is reported is whether a mandatory injunction would be granted to
enforce an express agreement by the mortgagee (he being on the register) to
vote as required from time to time as the mortgagor requested him. But a
preliminary point was decided by Sargant J. that the letter containing this
agreement constituted a collateral agreement binding on the mortgagee. If the
general position as between mortgagee and mortgagor had been the opposite of
that stated by the Court of Appeal in the Siemens’ case, it would have been
unnecessary for the mortgagor to place any reliance on the letter.
Reference may
also be made in this case to the fact that a special form is to be found in Key
& Elphinstone, designed to preserve by express agreement to the mortgagor
the right of voting in respect of mortgaged shares. Reference may also be made
to Coote on Mortgages (1927), 9th ed., vol. I, p. 311. I need not discuss the
implications of Wise v. Lansdell, where the mortgagor was in fact on the
register, a bankrupt, whose trustee had disclaimed any interest in the shares,
and who was entitled to exercise voting powers, though at the direction of the
mortgagee.
It was
submitted that older cases indicated that powers in connection with mortgaged
property could only be exercised at the volition of the mortgagee where the
result of such exercise would be to produce moneys towards payment of principal
or interest. Reference was made to mortgages of advowsons where the mortgagee
could not exercise the right or power of presentation, a right or power which
was necessarily unproductive on its exercise of any money. I cannot conclude
from this that the law as to voting power is other than as stated in Siemens
case.
I turn next
to the position of an unpaid vendor of shares (still on the register),
vis-a-vis the purchaser in connection with voting rights. Counsel was not able
to find any authority directly on this point. For the plaintiffs it was
submitted that such a vendor was in at least no worse position than a mortgage
on the register. For the defendants is was submitted the he was in the position
of trustee for the purchaser to whom, on the signing of the contract, the
beneficial ownership had passed (the contract being specifically enforceable)
and that the position of a mortgagee on the register was different.
Counsel
referred to the position of vendor and purchaser on a sale of land and drew my
attention to the following passages in Shaw v. Foster. One passage is from the
speech of Lord Cairns where he says (Ibid. 338.) : “Under these circumstances I
apprehend there cannot be the slightest doubt of the relation subsisting in the
eye of a court of equity between the vendor and the purchaser. The vendor was a
trustee of the property for the purchaser; the purchaser was the real
beneficial owner in the eye of a court of equity of the property, subject only
to this observation, that the vendor, whom I have called the trustee, was not a
mere dormant trustee, he was a trustee having a personal and substantial
interest in the property, a right to protect that interest, and an active right
to assert that interest if anything should be done in derogation of it. The
relation, therefore, of trustee and cestui que trust subsisted, but subsisted
subject to the paramount right of the vendor and trustee to protect his own
interest as vendor of the property.”
I was also
referred to a passage from the speech of Lord O’Hagan which reads as follows
(Ibid. 349.) : “Although a good deal of time was occupied in a learned
disquisition on the effect of a contract for sale, as creating an equitable
estate in the purchased, I do not apprehend that there is any doubt, or that
the noble and learned lord whose judgment we are considering could have meant
to suggest any doubt, upon that subject. The law is clear. It is, as Lord St.
Leonards has said, ‘one of the landmarks of the court’ : Baldwin v. Belcher;
and it ought not to be called into question. By the contract of sale the vendor
in the view of a court of equity disposes of his right over the estate, and on
the execution of the contract he becomes constructively a trustee for the
vendee, who is thereupon on the other side bound by a trust for the payment of
the purchase-money; or as Lord Westbury has put in Rose v. Watson : ‘When the
owner of an estate contracts with a purchaser for the immediate sale of it, the
ownership of the estate is in equity transferred by that contract.’ This I take
to be rudimental doctrine, although its generality is affected by
considerations which to some extent distinguish the position of an unpaid
vendor from that of a trustee. Thus, as it is stated by the Master of the Rolls
in Wall v. Bright : ‘The vendor is not a mere trustee; he is in progress
towards it, and finally becomes such when the money is paid, and when he is
bound to convey. In the meantime he is not bound to convey; there are many
uncertain events to happen before it will be known whether he will ever have to
convey, and he retains for certain purposes his old dominion over the estate.”
The matter
was put thus by Jessel M.R. in Lysaght v. Edwards : “What is the effect of the
contract ? It appears to me that the effect of a contract for sale has been
settled for more than two centuries; certainly it was completely settled before
the time of Lord Hardwicke, who speaks of the settled doctrine of the court as
to it. What is that doctrine ? It is that the moment you have a valid contract
for sale the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate
sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the vendor having a
right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the estate for the security of
that purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the estate until the
purchase- money is paid, in the absence of express contract as to the time of
delivering possession. In other words, the position of the vendor is something
between what has been called a naked or bare trustee, or a mere trustee (that
is, a person without beneficial interest), and a mortgagee who is not, in
equity (any more than a vendor), the owner of the estate, but is, in certain
events, entitled to what the unpaid vendor is, viz., possession of the estate
and a charge upon the estate for his purchase-money. Their positions are
analogous in another way. The unpaid mortgagee has a right to foreclose, that
is to say, he has a right to say to the mortgagor, ‘Either pay me within a
limited time, or you lose your estate,’ and in default of payment he becomes
absolute owner of it. So, although there has been a valid contract of sale, the
vendor has a similar right in a court of equity; he has a right to say to the purchaser,
‘Either pay me the purchase- money, or lose the estate’. “The reference by
Jessel M.R. to an analogy between a mortgagee and an unpaid vendor is of some
interest.
In relation
to a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of shares, similar considerations
apply. Parway Estates Limited v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue is an
example of how shares, the subject-matter of such a contract, become in equity
the property of the purchaser on the execution of the contract. Reference may
also be made to Oughtred v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Such cases, it was
submitted for the defendants, show that the only right or interest of a vendor
after contract is his vendor’s lien, with the exception in the case of land of
a right in the vendor to possession and to the rents and profits of the land up
to the date fixed for completion. If that be the situation then, it was
submitted, the vendor of shares is trustee thereof for the purchaser, the
purchaser owns the whole beneficial interest and, in principle, it is right to
say that the vendor must do as he is bidden by the true owner in relation to
the shares, subject only to such control as may be required to protect the only
interest of the vendor. It was sought to distinguish cases of mortgage as involving
a deliberate transfer of shares into the mortgagee’s name.
In my
judgment, so far as voting powers are concerned, an unpaid vendor remaining on
the register is not be regarded as in a weaker position, so far as the exercise
of voting powers is concerned, than a mortgagee. The purchaser acquires the
beneficial interest subject to the vendor’s lien : the mortgagor retains the
beneficial interest subject to the charge in favour of the mortgagee, in the
form of an equity of redemption. In the one case the mortgagee is deliberately
put on the register to safeguard his money lent : in the other case the vendor
is deliberately left on the register until all is paid to safeguard his
purchase-money due.
In my
judgment an unpaid vendor of shares remaining on the register after the
contract for sale retains vis-a-vis the purchaser the prima facie right to vote
in respect of those shares. That being so then, as I have already indicated, in
the present case he is entitled to complain in this action of the defect in the
purported annual general meeting.
Whether in
the end it would do the plaintiffs any good, I do not know.
I should
refer to a final argument for the defendants, that there is to be spelled out
of the contract in the present case an agreement that the purchaser shall have
the prima facie right to say how the shares should be voted. For myself, I
cannot see how that can be made out.
Accordingly,
the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration in terms of paragraph I of the
writ and prayer in the statement of claim, and the counterclaim must be
dismissed.
[1951] 21 COMP CAS 210
(MAD.)
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
v.
Hindustan Investment &
Financial Trust Ltd.
RAJAMANNAR, C. J.
AND SOMASUNDARAM, J.
ORIGINAL SIDE APPEAL NO. 17 OF 1951
MARCH 13, 1951
Govinda Chetti v. Rangammal, [1929] (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 261).
G. Vasanta Pai, for the Appellant.
O. Radhakrishnan, for
the Respondent.
Rajamannar,
C.J.—This appeal relates to
the affairs of a company incorporated under the
Indian Companies Act called the Hindustan Investment and Financial Trust Ltd,
Madras. The managing director of the company convened the annual general
meeting of the company for 31st December, 1950, by notice dated 14th December
1950. On 26th December, 1950, one Mrs. Ananthalakshmi Ammal, a shareholder of
the company, who is the appellant before us, filed an application (No. 4988 of
1950) on the original side of this Court for the appointment of an independent
chairman to hold and conduct the annual general meeting to be held on 31st December, 1950, with power to scrutinize all the
proxies and record the proceedings of the meeting. The application first came
up before the Judge sitting |n
the Christmas vacation (one of us, Somasundaram, J.) who made an interim order on 27th December, 1950, adjourning the
meeting to 28th January, 1951, and posting the application for final disposal
after reopening of the Court. The application itself was eventually disposed of
on 16th January, 1951, by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., who appointed an
advocate of this Court to preside over the annual general meeting to be held on
28th January, 1951, with power to scrutinise the proxies. On the same day the managing director on behalf of the company
filed an application (No. 190 of 1951) praying that the meeting
scheduled to take place on 28th January, 1951, should
be adjourned to a convenient date after the disposal of an application which he
had taken out for committing one Mr. Ramachandran, the son of the appellant,
for contempt of Court. The ground on which the adjournment was sought was that
the said Mr. Ramachandran had issued a circular containing false and defamatory
allegations against him to which he could not reply pending the disposal of the
application for contempt. This application was opposed. Evidently the learned
Judge, when this application first came up, considered that this reason was not
adequate enough to justify an adjournment of the meeting. Therefore time was
taken for filing a further affidavit and the manag ing director filed subsequently
on 22nd January, 1951, a further affidavit in which he gave an additional
reason, namely, that the share holders should be informed of the fact that the
Court had appointed an independent chairman to preside over the meeting. The
application was heard and disposed of finally by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., on
24th January, 1951. The learned Judge was not satisfied that the first of the
reasons, namely, the issue of a circular by Mr. Ramachandran was sufficient to
grant an adjournment of the meeting. The learned Judge, however, considered
that the second reason which had been subsequently put forward in the further
affidavit was more substantial. He thought that the shareholders must be given
due notice of the appointment of an independent chairman by the Court.
He thought it better to issue fresh notice giving 14 days time, intimating that a chairman had been appointed to preside
over the meeting with power to scrutinize the proxies. Objection was
taken on behalf of the appellant before us that the Court
had no power to adjourn the meeting, but this was overruled. It was then
pointed out on her behalf that prejudice is likely to be caused by reason of
the possibility of new shareholders who had registered themselves within two
months from the date of the meeting would also be entitled to vote. Otherwise,
only those shareholders who were on the list of shareholders two months prior
to the original date of the meeting, namely, 31st December, 1950, would be
entitled to partake and vote, at the meeting. This result was a direct consequence of Article 48 of the Articles of
Association of the company which is in the following terms:—
"No member shall be entitled to vote nor be
reckoned in a quorum when his name has not been in
the register for a continuous period of two months immediately preceding the
date of the meetings nor whilst any call or other sums shall be due and payable
to the company in respect of any of the shares of such member".
The learned Judge appears
to have been impressed with this aspect and observed:—
"This could be avoided
if it is made clear that only those shareholders who are on the list of
shareholders prior to two months of the adjourned date of the meeting, viz., 28th January, 1951, that is,
all shareholders who are on the list of shareholders
as on the 28thNovember, 1950, will alone be entitled to participate and vote at
the meeting".
It was urged on behalf of
the appellant that the relevant date would be 31st October, 1950, but the
learned Judge held that as the meeting had been adjourned by the Court
to 28th January, 1951, that should be the material
date. On behalf of the managing director, it was contended that having regard
to the provisions of Section 79(1)(e) of the Indian Companies Act (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) there could be no such discrimination among the
shareholders and that all shareholders would be entitled to take part whether
their names have been in the list for two months prior to the date of the
meeting or not. The learned Judge was of the opinion that it was not open to
the company to go behind the articles of association; but he thought it was not
necessary for the purpose of the application to give any finding on the
question. In the end he directed the meeting scheduled to take place on
28th January, 1951, to be adjourned to 11th February, 1951, and directed that
such shareholders as were on the list of shareholders on the 28th November,
1950, shall alone be entitled to vote at the meeting.
Against this order the managing director filed an appeal (O. S. A. No.
12 of 1951) and an application for stay of the operation of the order pending
the appeal on 9th February, 1951. The application for stay
was urgently moved before us on the same day, but we refused to grant interim
stay and only directed notice to the other side. Meanwhile, the managing
director had also filed an application for review of the order of 24th
January, 1951 (No. 572 of 1951). The ground on which review was sought was that
the order of the learned Judge was inconsistent with Section 79(1)(e) of the
Act, and there was an error apparent on the face of the
record. This application was taken up and disposed of on the same day on
which we refused to grant interim stay. This learred Judge came to the
conclusion that in view of the clear language of Section 79(1)(e) of the Act,
the order passed by him on 24th January, 1951, was in error and therefore the application was sustainable under Order 47, rule 1, of
the Civil Procedure Code. He held that all the shareholders who were on the register
on the date of the meeting would be entitled to take part and vote at
the-meeting. As the shareholders who would have come into the list after 28th
November, 1950, could not have had notice of the meeting because of his prior
order of the 24th January, 1951, the learned Judge held that it was necessary
to adjourn the meeting, which he did to 4th March,
1951. It is against this order Mrs. Ananthalakshmi Animal the. shareholder,
has filed the above appeal.
A preliminary objection was
taken on behalf of the company by its managing director, that the appeal was
not maintainable as the conditions of Order 47, rule 7, of the Civil Procedure
Code were not fulfilled. According to that rule, an order granting an
application for review could be objected only on the ground that the order was
in contravention of the provisions of rule 2 or rule 4 or that the application
for review was barred by limitation and there was no sufficient cause. This
objection, though very plausible and has some support in decided cases, does
not appear to us to be invulnerable. An appeal would lie on the ground that an
order granting review was in contravention of the provisions of rule 4. Rule 4
(1) says that, "Where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient
ground for a review it shall reject the application".
So. if the Court does not
reject the application where there is no sufficient ground for review
but grants the application, then it contravenes rule 4. We do not see any justification for construing "rule 4" in
rule 7 (1) (b) as confined to rule 4 (2). But we do not think it necessary to
finally decide this question, because even assuming that an order permitting a
review, that is to say, allowing the case to be re-opened, is not by itself
appealable, there is nothing to prevent an appeal being filed against
the final order passed after a reconsideration. That
order on review can be attacked on the merits in an appeal: see Govinda Chetti v. Rangammal.
On the merits we are of
opinion that the learned Judge ought to have dismissed Application No. 190 of
1951. We agree with the learned Judge that there was nothing in the first
reason given by the applicant therein, namely, the Managing Director, for
adjourning the meeting scheduled to take place on the 28th January,
1951. We are further of opinion that there is equally
nothing of substance in the second reason too which was clearly in the
nature of an afterthought and which had not been assigned in the affidavit originally filed along with the application. With respect to the learned Judge, we are
unable to imagine why the shareholders must be given due notice of the fact
that the court had appointed an independent chairman before they could take
part in the meeting. The appointment of an independent chairman which does not
affect their rights in any manner cannot have any possible effect on the way in
which they should cast their votes. The meeting must of course have a chairman
and it does not matter in the least to the shareholders, if the chairman happens
to be a chairman appointed by this Court. It is most undesirable that the
meeting fixed for a particular date should be adjourned on this insubstantial
ground, especially when strong objection was taken to an adjournment. The
learned Judge, in our opinion, erred in granting the application for
adjournment.
It is impossible, however,
to set that right now. The date originally fixed for the meeting has expired
and still the meeting has not been held. It therefore becomes necessary
to deal with the point specifically raised in the
review application, namely, the effect of Section 79(1)(e) of the Indian
Companies Act. Counsel were unable to cite any decision, bearing on the point.
The learned Judge has made a reference to a passage from the Select Committee
Report, but we think that our decision should depend entirely on the
construction of the language of the enactment. We are of opinion that Section
79 (1) (e) of the Act must override any provision made in the articles of the
company and therefore Article 48 also. If a shareholder's name is entered in
the register of shareholders of the company, he cannot be prevented from
enjoying the right to vote on the ground that his name has not been on
the register for any specified time. It was contended by Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar
that there is no discrimination really between the
shareholders, because every shareholder is subject to the same
disability, namely, that he has no right to vote till after the expiry of two months from the time his name is entered in the
register of shareholders. We do not agree, because logically that would mean
that there could be an article to the effect that additional qualifications
should be satisfied before a shareholder can exercise his right to vote. We are
inclined to think that this provision which was inserted by the amending Act of
1936 was designed to prevent the denial to shareholders duly brought on
the register of the full exercise of their rights as shareholders which would include the right to vote.
Now, what is the position?
The annual general meeting was originally called for 31st December, 1950. It
was thereafter adjourned to 28th January, 1951, by the court and it was not contended before us that the court had no
power to adjourn the meeting. The meeting so
adjourned had not till now been held but is being adjourned from time to time.
Now, Article 26 of the Articles of Association of the company provides that the
transfer books of the company shall be closed during 14 days immediately
preceding the ordinary general meeting in each year.
Presumably therefore, the transfer books must have been closed on and
from the 17th December, 1950. The meeting convened for the 31st was adjourned
on the 27th December to 28th January, 1951, and thereafter to subsequent dates.
But the meeting nevertheless is, in our opinion, the
meeting originally convened for the 31st December, 1950, which however is being
adjourned from time to time. If the meeting had been held on the 31st December,
1950, as originally convened, then those persons who were entered in the list
of shareholders as on 17th December, 1950, would alone have been entitled to
take part and vote at the meeting. We think it neither legal nor equitable that merely because of
adjournments due to the action of one party or the other, there should be any
prejudice to the entire body of shareholders as on the material date
namely, 17th December, 1950. We therefore hold that
only such of the shareholders who were entered in the list of
shareholders on 17th December, 1950 would be entitled to vote at the meeting to be held on the adjourned date. This
direction does not in any way contravene the provisions of Section
79(1)(e) of the Act.
The appeal is allowed. The
order of the learned Judge is set aside and there will be an order adjourning
the meeting to 1st April, 1951, with a direction that
only those shareholders whose names are found entered in the register of
shareholders as on 17th December, 1950, will be entitled to take part and vote at that meeting. There will be no order as to
costs.
[1953] 23 Comp Cas 29
(MAD)
v.
Tiffin's
Barytes Asbestos & Paints Ltd.
Rajamannar C.J. and
Venkatarama Aiyar J.
Original Side Appeal No. 56 of 1952
October 16, 1952
K. Rajah Ayyar, R. Swaminatha Ayyar, K.S. Ramamurthy and P.S. Seshadri for the Appellants.
O. Radhakrishnan, G. Vasanta Pai, S. Mohan
Kumaramangalam, V. Venkatraman, for
the Respondents.
Venkatarama Ayyar J. — The question that arises for determination in this appeal is the validity of the election of the respondents as directors of a company called Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. at a meeting of the general body held on February 26, 1951. The facts are not in dispute. The company was incorporated in 1945 and its first directors were five persons named in article 49. One Veeramani was co-opted as a director and the strength of the directorate was thus raised to six. At the first annual meeting which was held on June 24, 1946, all the directors retired as provided in article 53 and were re-elected. Before the next general body meeting which was held on August 27, 1947, three of the directors had resigned and a fourth resigned at that meeting with the result that the strength of the directorate became reduced to two. The next general body meeting was held on December 30, 1948, and thereafter no annual meeting was called. It was in this state of affairs that one of the shareholders, Mrs. Ananthalakshmi Ammal, filed Appln. No. 3898 of 1950 under Section 79(3) of the Indian Companies Act for a direction that a general body meeting might be convened by a commissioner and that an independent chairman might be appointed to preside over the meeting. On November 27, 1950, Krishnaswami Nayudu J. passed an order that the annual general body meeting be held on January 28, 1951, in accordance with the articles of association of the company, Exhibit P. 1. He, however, refused the prayer for the appointment of an independent chairman to preside over the meeting and against this portion of the order Mrs. Ananthalakshmi Ammal preferred O.S.A. No. 118 of 1950. By the order which was passed in the said appeal on January 11, 1951, an advocate, Mr. Sanjeevi Naidu, was appointed as chairman of the meeting with power to scrutinise the proxies. The company then took out an application, Appln. No. 139 of 1951, for postponing the meeting which had been fixed for January 28, 1951, to a later date on the ground that the accounts were not ready. On January 16, 1951, Krishnaswami Nayudu J. passed an order directing the meeting to be held on February 18, 1951. On that date the commissioner proceeded to the premises of the company for the purpose of holding the meeting. The 1st plaintiff moved that the meeting be adjourned. The register of members, the share transfer books of the company and the proxies were in the possession of Veeramani who had been functioning as a director and he refused to hand them over to the chairman with the result that it became impossible for the chairman to proceed with the meeting. He accordingly adjourned it to February 26, 1951, and applied to the court for directions in the matter. On February 22, 1951, Mack J. passed an order directing the company to produce all the books at the meeting on February 26, 1951. On that date the books of the company were produced ; the meeting was actually held and at that meeting defendants 2 to 7 were elected as directors. The plaintiffs then filed Appln. No. 1135 of 1951 for setting aside the election on various grounds. On March 27,1951, Krishnaswami Nayudu J. dismissed this application and referred the petitioners to a suit. The present suit has accordingly been filed by the plaintiffs who are two shareholders of the company on behalf of themselves and other shareholders of the company for a declaration that the election of defendants 2 to 7 as directors at the meeting held on February 26, 1951, was void on the several grounds set out in the plaint.
Balakrishna Aiyar J. who heard the suit disagreed with the contentions put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit with costs. Against that decision the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal.
Several contentions were urged by Mr. K. Rajah Ayyar in support of this appeal. It was firstly argued that the power which the general body has under the articles of the company is only to appoint directors in place of those who retire at the annual meeting; only one director actually retired at the meeting held on February 26, 1951, and that therefore the election of six directors was beyond the competence of the meeting; that there was no proper notice that six directors were to be elected at the meeting and that there was not even a resolution to that effect. Hence, it is urged, the election of defendants 2 to 7 is void. The complaint that there was not clear notice to the members that six directors were going to be elected is without substance. Exhibit P. 6 is the notice of the meeting to be held on February 18, 1951, and item 2 therein is as follows:—"To elect directors. Mr. A.S. Padmanabhan retires at the meeting." It was argued that read as a whole Exhibit P. 6 would mean that a director is to be appointed in place of A.S. Padmanabhan who was to retire and that it would not convey the meaning that six directors were to be elected. We are unable to agree with this contention. The retirement of A.S. Padmanabhan is stated as a fact and the notice does not state as is usual "to elect a director in place of Padmanabhan who retires." The business to be transacted under item No. 2 is generally to elect directors and not to elect a director. This objection is, therefore, overruled.
A more substantial objection to the validity of the election of the defendants is that the power of the general body is limited to electing a director in the place of one who retires at the annual meeting under article 53 that the power to appoint other directors vests under article 58 exclusively with the board of directors and that in consequence the general body could appoint only one director in the place of A.S. Padmanabhan who retired at the meeting. The articles of the company material for the purpose of this contention are 47, 53 and 58. They are as follows:
Article 47:—"The number of directors inclusive of the director (ex-officio) shall not exceed 10 nor be less than 3. The quorum for a directors' meeting is 3. The quorum of a committee meeting shall be determined by the directors."
Article 53:—"The directors nominated by the agents and secretaries shall be ex-officio directors of the company and shall not be subject to retirement by rotation nor shall the clause relating to directors' share qualifications be applicable to him. The first directors of the company (except the ex-officio directors) shall hold office till the annual general meeting in 1946 when the whole of the directors shall retire from office and is every subsequent year one-third of the directors for the time being or if their number is not three or a multiple of three, then the number nearest to one-third shall retire from office. The directors to retire in every year shall be those who have been longest in office since their last election but as between persons who became directors on the same day those to retire shall (unless they otherwise agree among themselves) be determined by lot. A retiring director shall be eligible for re-election."
Article 58:—" If there be any vacancy in the directorate or if it is found necessary to increase the directorate so as not to exceed the maximum number the board may from time to time fill such vacancies by co-opting others as directors."
On these articles it is argued for the appellants that the power to appoint directors had been delegated to the board of directors under article 58 subject only to article 53 and that the exercise of that power by the general body was in contravention of the articles and was therefore void. Reliance is placed on the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart. In that case, at an extraordinary meeting of the company, resolutions were passed increasing the number of directors and electing two additional directors. The company filed a suit for a declaration that under the articles of association the general body had no power to appoint the two additional directors, and that the election of the defendants was, therefore, illegal. Article 82 of the company's articles provided that the number of directors shall not be less than two or more than seven. Article 85 provided that at the ordinary meeting every year one director shall retire and the meeting at which any director shall retire shall fill up his place. Article 93 provided "Any casual vacancy in the office of director may at all times be filled up by the board by the appointment of a director. The directors may from time to time appoint additional directors but so that the total number of directors shall not exceed the prescribed maximum." On a construction of these articles it was held that the company had delegated its power of appointment of directors to the board and that it could not itself exercise it. The ground for the decision is thus stated by Eve J.:—
"I think the express power contained in article 93 excludes the possibility of implying a concurrent power under article 82 and in my opinion the company has by its constitution delegated to those of its members who for the moment constitute the board the sole right of appointing additional directors and that is so whether such additional directors are necessary to make up the number to the maximum number fixed by the original article or to any other number which the company may from time to time determine on as the maximum. As a matter of construction, therefore, I think that the plaintiffs are right and that it was not within the power of the company to do that which it purports to have done at the meeting of the 14th March and on this ground alone the relief sought on the motion must, in my opinion, be granted."
Articles 82, 85 and 93 which were construed in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart are substantially identical with articles 47, 53 and 58 in the present case and the appellants accordingly argued that the reasoning and the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart would directly apply to the instant case.
Now it is doubtful how far the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart can still be considered to be good law. Its correctness was doubted in Worscester Corsetry v. Witting in which the articles were similar to those in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart with the difference that the company had also adopted articles 83 and 85 in Table A in the Companies Act of 1908. Article 83 runs as follows:—
"The company may
from time to time in general meeting increase or reduce the number of
directors, and may also determine in what rotation the increased or reduced
number is to go out of office."
Article 85 provided that "the directors shall have power at any time, and from time to time, to appoint a person as an additional director who shall retire from office at the next following ordinary general meeting, but shall be eligible for election by the company at that meeting as an additional director." On these articles the question arose whether the appointment of two more directors at an extraordinary meeting of the general body was ultra vires of the powers of the general body. Farwell J. held, following the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart, that the general body had no power to appoint the additional directors. On appeal this decision was reversed on the ground that in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart, there was nothing in the articles corresponding to article 83 in Table A and that that article conferred on the general a general power to elect additional directors. In this view it became necessary to pronounce on the correctness of the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart. But Lord Hanworth M.R, remarked: "I am bound to say that I find some little difficulty in seeing that the power must be either in the one or in the other; but be that as it may, we have to interpret the articles of association as we find them." Lawrence L.J. observed: "This court is not concerned upon the present occasion to say whether the construction put upon the articles in the Blair case by Eve J. was right or not; we have here to see what is the true meaning of the articles of the plaintiff company."
In Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan the general body passed a resolution appointing seven new directors in addition to the existing four. The validity of this resolution was disputed in an action by the shareholders. Articles 109, 111 and 128 of the company were in substance similar to articles 82 and 93 which were considered in the Blair case. There was also an additional article 126 corresponding to article 83 in Table A which had been adopted by the company in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting. The Privy Council held on a construction of the articles that the election of new directors by the general body was valid. The decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart does not appear to have been cited before the Board but in view of the fact that the articles in Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan are similar to those in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting and that Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart differed from both in not having anything corresponding to article 83 of Table A in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting or article 126 in Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan it is not possible to hold that Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart is opposed to the decision in Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan.
In Palmer's Company Precedents (16th edn., p. 573) it is stated that "the articles may, however, be so expressed as to delegate the power of appointing new directors to the directors to the exclusion of a general meeting." And the Blair case is quoted as authority for this position with a note that the correctness of the decision had been doubted in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting. In Buckley on Companies Acts (12th edn., p. 885) the position is thus stated:—"It has been held that an article in similar form amounts (in the absence of an article corresponding to article 84 ante,) to such a delegation to the directors of the power of appointing additional directors as to preclude the company in general meeting from appointing such directors." The authority quoted again is the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart but the decision in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting is noted against it. Article 94 referred to in the above quotation corresponds to article 83 in Table A. The position, therefore, is that the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart is of doubtful authority though it has not been overruled.
In this case it has to be noted that the articles of the company provide that "the regulations of Table A of Schedule I of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 shall apply to this company except in so far as otherwise provided for hereunder." Regulation 83 in Table A of Schedule I runs as follows:—"Subject to the provisions of Sections 83-A and 83-B of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the company may from time to time in general meeting increase or reduce the number of directors and may also determine in what rotation the increased or reduced number is to go out of office." This regulation, must, therefore, be read as part of the articles of the company. In Worcester Corsetry v. Witting it was the existence of this article which was held to distinguish it from the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart where there was no such article. In Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan also there was an article 126 corresponding to regulation 83 and the power of the general body to elect additional directors was confirmed. The decisions in Worcester Corsetry v. Witting and Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan rather than the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart will apply to the present case.
It was further argued by Mr. Vasantha Pai on behalf of the respondents that even if the power to appoint additional directors is exclusively vested in the board of directors under Regulation 58 the resolution of the general body appointing defendants 2 to 7 as directors should be upheld because there was at the time of the meeting no board of directors which could validity function under the article and the general body had inherent power, which it could then exercise, to appoint directors for enabling the company to function. In support of this contention he cited the decisions in Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, Barron v. Potter, Foster v. Foster and Munster v. Cammell Company. In Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin the shareholders of a company sent a requisition for the convening of a general body meeting to remove the directors and to appoint fresh directors in the vacancies. The 89th section corresponding to article 68 in the present case conferred on the directors the power to fill up vacancies in the directorate. The question was whether this power could be exercised by the members of the company at its general meeting. In answering it in the affirmative Cotton L.J. observed:—"Then it is said that there is no power in the meeting of shareholders to elect new directors for that under the 89th section the power would be in the remaining directors. The remaining directors would, no doubt, have that power if there was a quorum left. But suppose the meeting were to remove so many directors that a quorum was not left, what then follows ? It has been argued that in that case, there being no board which could act, there would be no power of filling up the board so as to enable it to work. In my opinion that is utterly wrong. A power is given by the 89th section to the remaining directors 'if they think proper so to do, to elect persons to fill up the vacancies.' I do not see how it is possible for a non-existent body to think proper to fill up vacancies. In such a case a general meeting duly summoned for the purpose must have power to elect a new board so as not to let the business of the company be at a deadlock." With this opinion Lindley L.J. agreed Fry L.J. observed:—
"In my judgment it is quite impossible to read the 89th section as the only section relating to the filling up of vacancies in the office of directors. That applies only where there are remaining directors, and those remaining directors think proper to exercise their powers. That does not in my judgment deprive the general meeting of the power to elect directors, where there are no directors or where the directors do not think fit to exercise their powers."
In Barron v. Potter, Potter v. Berry, the facts were that the board, of directors of a company consisted of two persons, Mr. Potter and, Mr. Barron. Owing to their differences no meeting of the board could be held and nothing transacted. Then at an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders two additional directors were appointed. The question was whether this was valid. The articles of the company provided that the number of directors should be not less than two and not more than ten and that the directors should have the power to appoint additional directors but there was no article corresponding to article 83 conferring on the company a power to increase or decrease the number of directors. In this respect the articles of this company were similar to those in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart. It was, accordingly contended on the strength of that decision that the general body had no authority to appoint additional directors. This contention was overruled and it was held that as there was a dead-lock in the administration resulting from the fact that the directors were unwilling to exercise their powers the company had the inherent power to take necessary steps to ensure the working of the company and to appoint additional directors for that purpose. Warringtgn J. observed: "The argument against the validity of the appointment is that the articles of association of the company gave to the board of directors the power of appointing additional directors, that the company has accordingly surrendered the power, and that the directors alone can exercise it. It is true that the general point was so decided by Eve J. in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Co. Ltd. v. Reigart and I am not concerned to say that in ordinary cases where there is a board ready and willing to act it would be competent for the company to override the power conferred on the directors by the articles except by way of special resolution for the purpose of altering the articles. But the case which I have to deal with is a different one. For practical purposes there is no board of directors at all. The only directors are two persons, one of whom refuses to act with the other and the question is, what is to be done under these circumstances. . . If directors having certain powers are unable or unwilling to exercise them—are in fact a non-existent body for the purpose—there must be some power in the company to do itself that which under other circumstances would be otherwise done. The directors in the present case being unwilling to appoint additional directors under the power conferred on them by the articles, in my opinion, the company in general meeting has power to make the appointment. The company has passed a resolution for that purpose." This decision was followed in Foster v. Foster where the general body had appointed a managing director which power was vested under article 99 in the board of directors. The court found that there were only two persons who could be appointed as managing directors and owing to disagreement between them the board had been "reduced to the position that it was unable owing to internal friction and faction to appoint anybody as managing director." Following the decision in Barron v. Potter, Potter v. Berry the court held that the question relating to the appointment of the managing director was one with which the general meeting of the company could deal and that having regard to the circumstances recourse must be had to the general meeting and the appointment by the general body must accordingly be upheld. In Munster v. Cammell Company certain vacancies which had occurred in the directorate before the annual general meeting were filled by the directors after that meeting and this appointment was attacked as illegal on the ground that the power of the board to fill vacancies could be exercised only before the next annual meeting and if not so exercised it lapsed and became incapable of exercise thereafter. Article 80 of the company corresponding to article 53 in the present case provided that the general meeting should have the power to fill vacancies arising by reason of the annual retirement of directors and article 84 conferred on the board power to fill vacancies. On a construction of these articles it was held that the appointment of directors by the general body was valid. The decision by itself, therefore, has no bearing on this point. But the following observations of Fry J. are relied on in support of the position that the company has a general and inherent power to appoint directors. He observed: "I am far from saying that a general meeting might not have filled up the casual vacancy, although, as I have pointed out the 80th clause only requires the general meeting to fill up the vacancies created by the retirement in rotation but nevertheless the general power of a general meeting are so large that I certainly do not mean to determine that if they had been so minded, they might not have filled up the casual vacancy." In this connection the following observations of Lawrence L.J. in Worcester Corsetry Ltd. v. Witting might also be quoted: "The company has an inherent power to nominate and appoint its own directors unless that is in any way restricted by the contract confined in the articles of association. Unless you can find that that inherent power has been handed over by the company to the directors, I think they retain that power as a natural result of their having the power to increase their board of directors." According to Buckley on Companies Act, p. 885, the result of the authorities is that the decision in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company Ltd. v. Reigart will not apply "if owing to a deadlock or otherwise there is no board capable of making the necessary appointment."
In Palmer's Company Precedents (p. 673) it is stated that the company has the power to appoint additional directors "where owing to differences between the directors no board meeting could be held for the purpose." The principles laid down in the authorities discussed above may be summed up thus :—A company has inherent power to take all steps to ensure its proper working and that, of course, includes the power to appoint directors. It can delegate this power to appoint directors to the board of directors and such delegation will be binding upon it but if there is no legally constituted board which could function or if there is a board but that is unable or unwilling to act then the authority delegated to the board lapses and the members can exercise the right inherent in them of appointing directors.
In this view the question arises whether at the time of the annual meeting there was legally in existence a board of directors who could act. The appellants contend that there was, while the respondents deny it. The facts material for this contention may now be stated. It has already been mentioned that the first directors of the company were five persons named in article 49 which number was raised to six by the co-option of Veeramani under that article, that all of them retired at the annual meeting held on June 24, 1946, and were re-elected. Under article 53 a third of the directors had to retire at every annual meeting. Before the next annual meeting which was held on August 27, 1947, three of them had resigned. Of the remaining three, two directors Padmanabhan and Veeramani retired at the meeting and were re-elected. The third director resigned at that meeting and thus the strength of the directorate became reduced to two. Section 83-A of the Companies Act is as follows:—
"Every company
shall have at least three directors."
Article 47 provides that the number of directors inclusive of the director (ex-officio) shall not be less than three and that was also the number prescribed as quorum for a meeting of the directors. Thus after August 27, 1947, there was no board which could act except for the purpose of filling up vacancies under article 62. Admittedly no directors were co-opted in 1948 and the position on December 30, 1948, when the last annual meeting was held was that there were only two directors; both of them had been elected at the annual meeting held on August 27, 1947, and one of them had to retire at that meeting. Veeramani retired at that meeting and was re-elected. Thereafter there was no annual meeting.
The plaintiffs contended that on December 30, 1949, one Dekshinamurthy was co-opted as a director, Exhibit P-9, that he resigned on June 18, 1950, Exhibit P-10, and that on August 12, 1950, one Murugappa Chettiar was co-opted in his place, Exhibit P-11, and that there were thus three directors, Padmanabhan, Veeramani and Murugappa Chettiar who could act at the time of the annual meeting in 1951. But if the annual meeting had been convened in 1949 as it should have been Padmanabhan would have been bound to retire under article 53. But it is argued on behalf of the appellants firstly that article 53 contemplates the existence of at least three directors and it could not apply when their number fell below that minimum. The decision in David Moseley and Sons Ltd., In re was quoted in support of this position. There article 94 provided that "at every succeeding ordinary general meeting one-third of the directors or if their number is not a multiple of three, then the number nearest to but not exceeding one-third, shall retire from office." The strength of the directorate became reduced to two and the question was whether either of them ceased to be a director under this article. In holding that neither of them vacated the office Simonds J. observed: "The article in my judgment does not provide for the retirement of a director unless one of two conditions is satisfied: either there must be a number which is one-third of the directors, or there must be a number which is nearest to but does not exceed one-third. Here it is clear that neither of those conditions is satisfied. There are two directors and, therefore, you cannot find a number which is one-third. There are two directors and, therefore, you cannot find a number which is nearest to but does not exceed one-third."
It will be seen that this decision was based on the words "but not exceeding one-third" and in the absence of similar language in article 53 it must be held that even one of the two directors should have retired at the meeting. It is next argued that as no meeting was actually held in 1949 article 53 would not apply and Padmanabhan would continue to be a director. The respondents contend on the other hand that the directors could not take advantage of their own default and continue in office beyond the period when they would have retired, if they had done their duty and called for a meeting in accordance with article 29. This contention is supported by the decisions in In re Consolidated Nickel Mines Ltd.; Srinivasan v. Watrap Subramania Iyer; Kanssen v. Rialto and Morris v. Kanssen. These decisions were followed by this court in O.S.A. Nos. 120 of 1951 and 15 of 1952: Ananthalakshmi Animal v. The Indian Trades and Investments. It must accordingly be held that Padmanabhan ceased to be a director at the end of 1949. On the same reasoning it must also be held that Veeramani ceased to be a director by the end of 1950. This conclusion furnishes also the answer to a contention of the appellants that at least Veeramani was in office as director on February 26, 1951, and there could have been an election at the most of only five directors.
Then there is the case of Murugappa Chettiar who is put forward as the third director. It is stated that Dakshinamurthy was co-opted on December 30, 1949, but it does not appear in whose place he was co-opted and as four directors who retired in 1946 and 1947 had all been elected at the annual meeting held on June 24, 1946, their term of office would have expired under article 53 during the year 1949 and Dakshinamurthy whose co-option must have been in their place could not hold office beyond 1949. At any rate as he resigned on June 18, 1950, his rights do not merit any further consideration. It would follow from this that the co-option of Murugappa Chettiar in the place of Dakshinamurthy on August 12, 1950, must be held to be inoperative because the vacancy in which Dakshinamurthy could have been co-opted had itself come to an end under article 53. It is unnecessary to refer to the various infirmities in the appointment of Murugappa Chettiar as a director which are referred to in the judgment of Balakbishna Iyer J. We agree with him that Murugappa Chettiar was never validly co-opted as director, and it was not merely a case of defective appointment as director but of no appointment at all. We must accordingly hold that there was at the time of the annual meeting on February 26, 1951, no director validly in office and on the principle laid down in Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin and Barren v. Potter, Potter v. Berry the members had the right to elect the directors at the annual meeting.
One other contention relating to this part of the case remains to be considered. It was contended that by the time the annual meeting was held on February 26, 1951, the place of Murugappa Chettiar as a director was no longer vacant and therefore the election of six directors was invalid. The argument of the appellants may thus be stated: the general meeting was convened for February 18, 1951. On that day it was adjourned to February 26, 1951. Article 43 provides that if at any meeting at which an election is to take place, the places of the vacating directors are not filled up, the meeting shall stand adjourned till the Same day in the next week at the same time and place and if at the adjourned meeting the places of the vacating directors are not filled up the vacating directors or such of them as have not had their places filled shall be deemed to have been re-elected at the adjourned meeting. The contention is that under this article the meeting should have been adjourned from February 18, 1951, to February 25, 1951, and if on that date there was no election the vacating directors must be deemed to have been re-elected; therefore on February 25, 1951, Murugappa Chettiar became re-elected as director. We do not agree with this contention. Article 43 will apply only when there is a meeting held and as none was held before February 26, 1961, it has no application. Moreover in the view we have taken that there was no director who was in office on the date of the meeting there is no scope for applying article 43.
It was also urged that regulation 50 in Table A of Schedule I of the Companies Act provides that the election of directors other than those who retire, that is under article 63, must be by a special resolution, there was none such in this case and that, therefore, the election is illegal. But under article 33 of the articles of the company, which prevails over Regulation 50 no special resolution is required for election of directors. In the result we hold that the election of defendants 2 to 7 as directors is valid and not open to any objection.
It is next contended that members who were entitled to vote at the meeting had been excluded from exercising their right and that, therefore, the proceedings are illegal. In Application No. 139 of 1951 as part of the order adjourning the meeting originally fixed for January 28, 1951, to February 18, 1952, Krishnaswamy Nayudu J. gave the following directions:—
"But I consider that if it is made clear that the register as on November 28, 1950, will be the register that will be taken into consideration for the purpose of finding out the members who are entitled to vote or to be reckoned in a quorum, the apprehension on behalf of the respondent will disappear. To this course the company could have no objection." (Exhibit P. 4). It was in pursuance of this direction that the chairman declined to permit members who were not on the register of the company on November 28, 1950, to vote at the meeting. The contention of the appellants is that this direction is opposed to Section 79(1)(e) of the Companies Act which provides "any shareholder whose name is entered in the register of shareholders of the company shall enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same liabilities as all other shareholders of the same class."
Article 46 of the articles of the company runs as follows:—
"No member shall be entitled to vote nor be reckoned in a quorum when his name has not been in the register for a continuous period of two months immediately preceding the date of the meeting." The direction made in Exhibit P. 4 is obviously in accordance with this article. But Section 79(1) provides that the provision contained therein shall have effect "notwithstanding any provision made in the articles of the company in this behalf" and the contention of the appellants that article 46 is illegal must be accepted. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the order in Application No. 139 of 1951 was made at the instance of the company and that the order has become final and that, therefore, its validity cannot now be questioned. The appellants reply that the shareholders were not as such parties to this application and that their rights could not be concluded by an order to which they were not parties. We are inclined to agree with this contention. But the question is whether this contention is open to the plaintiffs. They were on the register of the company on November 28, 1950, and they were allowed to exercise their right of voting. Therefore they are not persons adversely affected by the direction contained in Exhibit P. 4. Their complaint is that two members Srinivasam Pillai and Narasimharn whose names had been placed on the register after November 28, 1960, had sent their proxies on January 25, 1951, and that those proxies had been wrongly rejected. Assuming that Srinivasam Pillai and Narasimham had validly been admitted as members, a point on which Balakrishna Iyer J. had held against them, it is obvious that when their proxies were rejected they were the persons who were wronged and that, therefore, they are the only persons who can make a complaint of it and not other shareholders.
In Pulbrook v. Richmond Consolidated Mining Company the plaintiff who had been elected as a director complained that he had been excluded by the company from taking part in the management and sued for an injunction. The company contended that the action was not maintainable except in the name of the company. Overruling this contention Jessel M.R. held that when the wrong complained against is individual to the shareholder he was the person who was entitled to maintain the action and observed: "But in a case of an individual wrong, another shareholder cannot on behalf of himself and others, not being the individuals to whom the wrong is done, maintain an action for that wrong." That is precisely what the plaintiffs seek to do in this action. They are not themselves wronged and they seek to sue on behalf of themselves and others.
It may also be mentioned that even if the votes of Srinivasam Pillai and Narasimham are counted in favour of the plaintiff's group and against defendants 2 to 7 the result of the election would not be affected and on this ground also this objection must be overruled.
Another contention passed on behalf of the appellants is that at the general meeting held on February 26, 1951, two persons Ramachandran and Narayanaswami who were not members were allowed to take part in the proceedings and record votes, on the strength of powers of attorney which they had obtained from two members, Mrs. Ananthalakshmi Ammal and Sri N. Sri Ram respectively, and that the same was illegal and vitiated the entire proceedings. It is well settled that the right of a member of a company to vote by proxy is not a common law right and that it is determined solely by its articles which constitute a contract between him and the company.
In Haroen v. Phillips where the nature of the right which a member possessed to vote by proxy was discussed, Cotton L.J. observed: "But the whole of Mr. Benjamin's argument really depended on this, that there was a right independently of contract to vote by proxy. I cannot accede to that." Bowbn L.J. observed, "that there is no common law right on the part of a member of a corporation to vote by proxy. We know, of course, that in many cases a man may do through another person what he may lawfully do himself………But when persons agree to act together in the conduct of a business the way in which that business is to be carried on must depend in each case on the contract, express or implied which exists between them as to the way of carrying it on."
In MacLaren v. Thompson Astbury J. observed: "There is no inherent or equitable right in any shareholder to vote by proxy; such right, if it exists, must be found in the contract binding the shareholders generally, that is, in the company's regulations or constitution and it then exists only in the form and subject to the limitations therein appearing."
Vide Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 8 (2nd edn.) page 61 paragraph 108.
The question then simply is what do the articles say on this matter? Article 38 is as follows:— "On a demand of poll every member present in person or by proxy or by attorney shall have one vote." Under Section 79(2)(g) of the Companies Act "a proxy must be a member of the company," and article 44 in Table A provides "No person shall be appointed a proxy who is not a shareholder," and these provisions are applicable to the present case there being nothing in the articles of the company inconsistent therewith. Therefore, there is no doubt that a proxy can validly be given only to a member. But the respondents argue that article 38 clearly recognises that a member can be present in person or by proxy or by attorney and that, therefore, the attorneys form a class distinct from proxies and as to them there is no limitation that they should be members. Mr. K. Rajah Ayyar contends on behalf of the appellants that in law the status of a proxy is only that of an agent, that no distinction can be made between a proxy and an attorney and that they are synonymous words. He refers to item 48 in Schedule I to the Stamp Act which deals with the power of attorney not being a proxy and item 52 which deals with proxy and argues that this is a recognition that proxies are only a form of power of attorney. He also relies on the observations of Lindley J. in English Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank In re that a "proxy there means some agent properly appointed" and the decision of Satyanarayana Rao and Chandra Reddi JJ. in Narayanan Chettiar v. Kaleswarar Mills where it was held that the relationship between a shareholder and a proxy is that of a principal and an agent. That undoubtedly is so but the question is what do the words "by proxy or by attorney" in article 38 mean? Clearly they cannot be held to be synonymous because the words actually used are "by proxy or by attorney", and not "by proxy or attorney". The argument of the appellants involves the rejection of the words "by attorney" as meaningless surplusage. But it is unnecessary to pursue this matter further because there is a clear ground on which this contention of the appellants must fail. It appears from the voting list appended to the commissioner's report that even excluding the votes cast by the two non-members Narayanaswami and Ramachandran the defendants get 10,120 votes as against 4,078 obtained by the plaintiffs' group. The result of the election has not been affected by this irregularity and, therefore, it cannot be set aside.
Objection is next taken to the inclusion of proxies which were deposited on the 14th and 15th of February 1951. These proxies were cast in favour of the defendants. The contention is that as the meeting was originally fixed for January 28, 1951, as per Exhibit P. 3 the proxies should have been deposited under article 68 in Table A at least 72 hours before the meeting and, therefore those deposited on the 14th and 15th should be rejected. Article 42 of the company's articles provides that the instrument appointing proxy shall be deposited at the registered office of the company not less than 72 hours in advance of the meeting or the adjourned meeting; else it is invalid.
It is argued that this article is opposed to regulation 66 which is obligatory and therefore void. Reliance was also placed on the decision in McLaren v. Thompson that an adjourned meeting was only a continuation of the original meeting and that proxies which could not be used at the date of the original meeting could not be used at the adjourned meeting. But the short answer to this contention is that though the date of the meeting was originally fixed for January 28, 1951, it was not actually held on that date by reason of the order dated January 16, 1951, Exhibit P-3; that there was no notice even given of that meeting and that the meeting which was held on February 18, 1951, can in no sense be said to be an adjourned meeting.
The contention that there had been no valid nomination of the defendants 2 to 7 as directors because it was not made seven days before the meeting is again based on the assumption that there was a meeting on January 28, 1951, and that the meeting held on February 18, 1951, is the continuance thereof. There was no meeting on January 28, 1951, and therefore there can be no question of an adjourned meeting on February 18, 1951. It is conceded that the nominations are in time if the date of the meeting is February 18, 1951, and not January 28, 1951.
It is finally contended that Sanjeevi Naidu the commissioner who was appointed to preside over the meeting which was fixed for February 18, 1951, had no authority to adjourn it to February 26, 1951,and that, therefore, the proceedings of the meeting held on February 26, 1951, are void.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. V, page 359, paragraph 588, (2nd Edn.) the law is thus stated:—"Except where empowered by the regulations of the company, the chairman cannot adjourn the meeting nor dissolve it while any of the business for which it was called remains untransacted." In this case article 35 provides that the chairman may with the consent of the meeting adjourn it from time to time. It is not now disputed that Mr. Sanjeevi Naidu obtained the consent of the meeting to adjourn it. It is suggested that the order appointing him does not confer upon him power to adjourn the meeting. But the meeting is to be conducted in accordance with the articles of association and the chairman had the authority to adjourn the meeting under article 35. Moreover the plaintiffs themselves pressed for adjournment and it is not open to them to make a complaint of it. In Burt v. The British Nation Life Assurance Association it was held that "a plaintiff who has a right to complain of an act done to a numerous society of which he is a member, is entitled to sue on behalf of himself and all others similarly interested though no other may wish to sue; so although there are a hundred who wish and are entitled to sue, still, if they sue by a plaintiff who is personally precluded from suing, the suit cannot proceed although other persons on whose behalf the suit was instituted might maintain the action as plaintiffs." This principle was applied in this court by Satyanarayana Rao and Panchapagesa Sastri JJ. in Nagappa Chettiar v. Madras Race Club. The plaintiffs having moved for an adjournment of the meeting cannot be heard to object to it. They do not even state that they have been prejudiced in any manner. This objection also must be overruled. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
v.
MUKHARJI, J.
SUIT NO. 901 OF 1954
APRIL 1, 1954
S.M. Bose, Advocate-General, H.N. Sanyal and A.K. Sen, for the Applicant.
S. Chaudhuri and P. Ginwallah, for the Respondents.
Mukharji, J.—This is an application by the plaintiff for an injunction to restrain the first defendant, Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited, from acting upon and communicating to the Central Government the resolutions purported to have been passed in the meeting of the defendant company, Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited, held on March 16, 1954.
The tussle is over the managing agency of this company. The main issue in this controversy relates to the transfer by sale of the total interest of ordinary shareholders in Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd., the present managing agents, Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. has been the managing agent of the defendant company for a long time. Some share holders are in favour of such sale of the shares of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. and others against it. There are allegations that they are being sold at a fabulous price which allegations are denied. Rivalry between Lala Lakshmipat Singhania and Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. is alleged to be the main motive of these proceedings.
At the moment the present controversy relates to a meeting of the shareholders where it was decided that such transfer should be made. The actual resolution before the company was:
"That the proposed sale of the 100 percent. interest of the ordinary shareholders in Kettlewell Bullon & Co. Ltd, the managing agents of the company to Messrs. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., of 7, Lyons Range, Calcutta, be and is hereby approved and that the directors be and are hereby authorised to notify the managing agents of this company's approval of such sale."
At the meeting of March 16, 1954, the chairman declared the resolution passed with 1,164 votes for and 313 votes against. The voting was not by a show of hands but by a poll.
The suit filed by the plaintiff challenges this result of the meeting. Its main ground for the challenge is that the chairman of the company and directors of the company in collusion with the scrutineers fraudulently rejected certain proxies, a list of which is set out in paragraph 18 of the petition. It is the case of the plaintiff that such rejection was improper and illegal. The main point of submission on the allegation of improper and illegal rejection of proxies is not concerned, however, with any alleged fraud or conspiracy, and the learned Advocate-General appearing for the plaintiff applicant rightly conceded before me that he was not pressing the question of fraud or conspiracy at this stage of the interlocutory application. Obviously that was the correct approach because no question of fraud and conspiracy can be tried on mere affidavits on an application. The learned Advocate-General contended that he was putting his client's case only on a point of law. The point of law on which he says the rejection of the proxies was illegal must therefore be, briefly, set forth.
The Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India Ltd. were the holders of 256 shares and 1,735 shares respectively. In respect of their holdings the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. gave two proxies, one to the applicant for 50 and the other to the directors of the company for 206, and the Bank of India gave two proxies, one to the applicant for 85 and another to the directors of the company for 1,650 ordinary shares and 61 preference shares. It is the applicant's case that the votes of a shareholder could not be split up in that manner and all should have been rejected but notwithstanding the same the chairman wrongfully and illegally rejected the proxy given by the Bank of India Ltd. in favour of the applicant and wrongly accepted those in favour of the resolution. The chairman also, it is contended, wrongly accepted all the votes cast under the two proxies given by the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. On behalf of the company it is stated that the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd is the holder of 196 shares and gave proxies in respect of 30 shares to the applicant and in respect of 165 shares to Geoffrey John Gardner, a director of the company, and himself, a defendant in this suit. It is also said on behalf of the defendants that the Bank of India Ltd. is the holder of 1,541 shares and gave a proxy in respect of 95 shares to the applicant which, according to the company, was lodged too late and proxies in respect of 1,292 ordinary shares and 61 first preference shares to the same Geoffrey Gardner.
It is contended on this issue by the company that shares registered in the names of the banks and their nominees are in the majority of cases shares that belong to the constituents of such banks, and in respect of such shares the banks are trustees and are bound to vote as their respective constituents may direct. It is also said that it is the usual practice for banks to issue different proxies in respect of different parcels of shares.
It has also been shown on a calculation (which appears as Annexure F to Gardner's affidavit) that even if the opponents of the resolution had been allowed to vote in respect of the disputed 445 shares in respect of which registration was refused and even if all the proxies lodged in time which are alleged to have been improperly rejected were counted and corresponding deductions were made from the total of votes cast in favour of the resolution, the said resolution would still have been passed with a majority. The Advocate-General contends that Annexure F shows a perilous majority of one, and if his contention is accepted this majority of one will be wiped off.
This particular point of splitting the proxy has to be decided as a point of law.
In an interlocutory application there must be a prima facie cast both on facts and law which should justify the grant of an interim injunction restraining company management. That prima facie case should all the more be clearly made in the case where attempt is made to restrain the normal function of a company according to the decisions of the domestic forum of the company. Bearing these principles in mind, I now propose to discuss the prima facie case on law and on facts.
By Article 90 of the articles of association of the Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Company Limited it is provided: "In case of any dispute as to the admission or rejection of any vote, the chairman shall determine the same and such determination made in good faith shall be final and conclusive." Prima facie, therefore, unless a case of bad faith is made, I consider it to be the normal course of the court to allow the decision of the chairman to stand as prima facie final until it can be found to be wrong at the trial and decision in the suit. If that principle is once accepted, then there is no scope here in this case for grant of an interlocutory injunction on the ground that the chairman has wrongly rejected certain votes given by proxy or wrongly accepted such votes.
The principle is fairly well settled on this point. In In re Indian Zoedone Company, the Lord Chancellor Selbobne observes at page 77:—
"The minutes in the books are to be received, not as conclusive, but as prima facie evidence of resolutions and proceedings at general meetings; and also it may be added, and I think correctly that the chairman, who presides at such meetings and has to receive the poll and declare its result, has prima facie authority to decide all emergent questions which necessarily require decision at the time, his decision of those questions will naturally govern, and properly govern the entry of the minute in the books; and, though in no sense conclusive, it throws the burden of proof upon the other side, who may say, contrary to the entry in the minute-book, following the decision of the chairman, that the result of the poll was different from that there recorded."
That represents the main principle which should guide these courts in granting an interlocutory injunction in these matters. In fact, Lord Justice Cotton in the same case observed at page 81 as follows:
"The appellants seem to consider that it was for the respondents to justify and support the chairman's decision. In my opinion that is their fallacy; it is for them to satisfy us that that decision was wrong not for those who rely upon that decision to bring evidence to show that in fact it was right."
The principle is also emphasised in a more recent decision in Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Limited. There an article of association provided that no objection should be made to the validity of any vote except at the meeting at which it was tendered, and that every vote, whether given in person or by proxy, not disallowed at any meeting should be deemed valid for all purposes. It was held, affirming Romer J., that the decision of the chairman, who, in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred upon him by the article, had refused to disallow a vote by proxy to which objection had been taken at the meeting, was final and would not be reviewed by the court. Pollock M. R., at page 145, delivering judgment observed:—
"If the chairman's discretion or powers are to be wide enough for him to determine the matter, and he does not disallow the votes, they are to stand and to be valid for all purposes whatsoever."
The Master of the Rolls discusses different situations which it is needless for me to quote. I cannot improve on what has been said by Sargant L.J., who was one of the members of the Court of Appeal deciding that case along with Pollock M.R., at page 148, and this is what Lord Justice Sargant says:—
"It is obviously desirable that questions of this sort should be determined in a summary way and without the necessity of coming to the courts. Mr. Swords says that, according to the terms of this article if the chairman had disallowed a vote his decision is not conclusive. It may well be that in the case where a vote has been disallowed, the shareholder whose right has been impeached to that extent should have a right to apply to the courts. Here all that is done is to take away from a shareholder a right of appeal against a decision disallowing an objection by him against the votes of some other shareholder, and it seems to me quite reasonable that such a question should be allowed to be decided summarily and finally by the chairman, although there should not be the same summary and final effect given to a decision against the right of a shareholder to vote."
I have only cited these cases to show the general principle in the matter of voting at company meetings and which can be taken as a guide for granting interlocutory injunctions against companies in course of their management.
Here the article that I have quoted is very much wider than the article which was considered by Lord Justice Sargant in the case of Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Limited. I am not concerned at present with the ultimate scope, effect and validity of this provision in the articles of association in excluding, if it does, the review by courts. What is being emphasised is that prima facie it is the company's articles which have said that the chairman's decision, if in good faith, shall be final and conclusive. Whether it succeeds in completely excluding the courts from reviewing such decision in any case is not a matter which I am called upon to decide on this application and I do not do so. But it is quite clear that from the point of view of a prima facie case, the chairman's decision should prima facie be allowed to stand before the suit is heard and a decision is given at the trial.
The results of my review of the authorities on this point show that the courts have evolved certain well-defined principles which regulate company meetings. Primarily the articles of association and the company statute provide the matrix of the company law on the point. Secondly, the courts are generally reluctant to interfere with the decisions taken at company meetings, unless there is almost a manifest breach of the articles or the statute, because it is the company and not the court which is responsible for its management. The court is hardly a substitute for the company in this respect except in specified cases provided by statute and these again are mostly cases where the company itself finds it difficult to manage its own affairs as in liquidation or schemes or where in public interest the court has to interfere or sanction as in cases of fraud by the majority on the minority or cases of amalgamation or reduction. This is the rule of domestic forum applied to company jurisprudence. The third principle which the courts have evolved as a corollary of the first two principles is that prima facie the decision of the chairman at such company meetings is allowed to stand until it is proved to be in breach of the articles or the statute. The burden of proving the chairman's decision to be wrong rests with the party challenging his decision and it is not for those who rely on his decision to bring evidence in the first instance to show that the chairman was right. This is the rule of convenience and of practical wisdom. It is of great practical utility. The chairman, by virtue of his position and the nature of his duties, has to decide on the spot all emergent questions that arise at the meeting and it will be mere folly to reduce the prima facie authority of his verdict. The burden of holding and conducting conducting meetings and recording votes cast therein and for taking decisions at such meetings is the primary responsibility of the company's shareholders and their chosen directors and not of this court.
The learned Advocate-General realised that unless he could show prima facie that some of these proxies which were accepted or rejected were cases of obvious or prima facie illegal rejection or reception of votes, he could not sustain his application for interlocutory injunction. By consent of Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel appearing for the company, and the learned Advocate-General for the plaintiff, it was decided to scrutinise the disputed proxies which were brought into this court to enable the learned Advocate-General to prove his prima facie case. The learned Advocate-General selected two classes of proxies—one of Sourashtra and the other of Central Bank of India Ltd., and said that he would satisfy me that prima facie his client's case should be accepted. I roust record here that on examination it was found that there was no prima facie case against the defendants on these two proxies. The prima facie case of the plaintiff therefore fails on this aspect of the case.
I am therefore satisfied on the basis of these principles, that the prima facie case on facts in this case is against the applicant and that justifies the refusal of this court to grant an interlocutory injunction.
Then comes the prima facie question of law. As I have already indicated, the main challenge is that the shareholder holding a number of votes cannot split his votes and give a few to one proxy and others to another proxy.
The basis of the argument is the plausible one that a shareholder being one person, whether a company or a corporation, cannot be expected to say "yes" and "no" on the same resolution. The answer that is given is that each share carries the right to vote, and, therefore, logically and legally every share has a voice to be heard and there is nothing in law which prevents such voice being exercised in any way as the holder chooses to do. He may say "yes" and "no" in the same resolution and make himself foolish or he may say that he has not been able to come to a Decision one way or the other and so distribute his votes equally to maintain the balance by distributing his votes equally on either side. Nor is it unknown in company meetings or other meetings for the chairman to have a casting vote in addition to the one he has as a member and there is nothing in the rule of law or practice which prevents the chairman from using his original vote for, and his casting vote against, the resolution. The learned Advocate-General, who appears for the plaintiff in this case, then proceeds to contend that this view cannot be supported because it is inapplicable in a case where there is voting by show of hands. A man can only show his hands once and having done so, his power is exhausted although he may be holding proxies for numerous other persons. The analogy of voting by show of hands is misleading and its fallacy requires to be demonstrated because the plausibility of that argument appears very convincing at the first blush. The learned Advocate-General has backed up his argument by reference to the new amendment in the English company law which is now Section 138 of the English Companies Act of 1948 which says: "On a poll taken at the meeting of a company or meeting of any class of members of a company, the member entitled to more than one vote, need not, if he votes, use all his votes or cast all his votes he uses in the same way."
From this the learned Advocate-General concludes that this was necessary because it could not be done without an Act of Parliament. He backs it up by drawing my attention to paragraph 77 of the Indian Company Law Committee Report where the same proposal has been made with further improvement by including even the proxies. I will presently show from an extract from the Report of the Committee presided over by Mr. Justice Cohen in England which was the precursor of the amended English Companies Act on this point, that the learned Advocate-General's hypothesis is wrong.
I have carefully gone through the authorities on this branch of the law and I am satisfied that the learned Advocate-General's contention is not sound and cannot be accepted. The main reason for not accepting his argument is first, that the analogy that proxies cannot be counted on a show of hands and therefore should be rejected is a defective analogy. The main reason to describe the analogy as defective is that by a long series of cases and judicial pronouncements in England it has been clearly laid down that proxies cannot be used on a show of hands but they can be used on a poll. The second reason for rejecting the Advocate-General's contention is that it is not correct from the point of view of legal history, when he said that without an Act of Parliament this splitting of votes could not be done. I find from the history of precedents and review of authorities in England that it was done and at least attempted to be done more than once and there was serious conflict of judicial opinion on the point whether it could be done or not. The reason, therefore, of an Act of Parliament was to clarify the law and to set all this conflict at rest. It is abundantly made clear by a reference to paragraph 135 of the Cohen Committee's Report on English company law amendment where it is recorded: ''When a nominee holds shares in a company on behalf of more than one beneficial owner, he normally consults the persons on whose behalf be holds the shares before voting on any resolution before the shareholders. The beneficial owners of the shares may have divergent views on the proposals put before them. Some will instruct the nominee to vote for the proposals, some will instruct him to vote against. Nominees usually carry out these instructions. It is however doubtful whether it is legal for a shareholder to use some of his voting power in support of a resolution and some of it against the same resolution, though in practice, it is obviously desirable that a nominee should express as faithfully as possible the views of the persons on whose behalf he acts. We accordingly suggest that it should expressly be laid down that a shareholder may, if he wishes, either in completing a proxy form or in voting himself on a poll at a meeting, direct that some of his votes shall be cast for the resolution and some against or use only a part of the votes to which he is entitled."
I propose to indicate the landmarks in the case law on the point in order to show that the prima facie case in law even is against the contention of the plaintiff.
The first decision is In re Horbury Bridge Coal, Iron and Waggon Company decided in the year 1879. In that case Bacon V.C. held that the proper mode of voting was by heads or by shares and he was of the view that even on a show of hands the shares had to be counted and that even in a case where no poll was demanded. The decision of Bacon V.C. was upset in the Court of Appeal by Jessel M.R. sitting with Bramwell L.J. and Brett L. J. Jessel M. R. at page 115 of that report observes: —
"We will first of all consider what may be termed the common law of the country as to voting at meetings. It is undoubted, and it was admitted by Sir Henry Jackson in his argument for the respondents, that, according to such common law, votes at all meetings are taken by show of hands. Of course, it may not always be a satisfactory mode—persons attending in large numbers may be small shareholders, and persons attending in small numbers may be large shareholders, and, therefore, in companies provision is made for taking a poll, and when a poll is taken the votes are to be counted according to the number of shares, in some cases according to the number of shares absolutely, as in this company, viz., a vote for every share, while in other companies there is another scale, and the number of votes increases, but not so rapidly as the number of shares, and there is a. limit to the number of votes which a single shareholder can have."
The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion in that case that proxies were to be counted on a show of hands.
Chronologically the next case of importance is Bidwell Brothers, In re. It represents an interesting and important episode on the evolution of this branch of the company law. It came in the year 1893-There Vaughan Williams J. observes at page 607:—
"I have come to
the conclusion that the votes of the members who were present only by proxy
ought to be taken into consideration even though no poll was demanded."
The learned Judge also expressed the view at page 608: —
''It is said the votes of those persons can be counted, and will be counted, when a poll is demanded, and that it is intended that their voice shall be heard on that occasion only. It seems to me that a decision to that effect would create great injustice to the members present at a meeting by proxy only, because, according to the decision in R. v. Government Stock Investment Company the proxies do not seem able to demand a poll. I think that, under these circumstances, I ought to hold that the chairman of this company was right in counting the votes of the members who were present by proxy. The votes of those persons must be counted as the votes of persons actually present, not according to the number of shares they hold, but each person present by proxy must vote as one person and one person only, and the chairman must ascertain the way in which he wishes to vote from his proxy."
This case was not followed by Chitty J. in the year 1896 in Ernest v. Loma Gold Mines Limited. There Chitty J. came to the conclusion that at a meeting of the shareholders of a company convened for the purpose of a special resolution, though the regulations of the company provide that votes may be given personally or by proxy, a member present only by proxy has no right to vote upon a show of hands. Chitty J. disapproved of the decision in Bidwell Brothers In re. Most of the arguments of Chitiy J. from page 578 to 580 is concerned with showing the practical inconvenience of counting proxies on a show of hands. But the learned Judge does say at page 579-80: "The proxies come in when the poll is demanded."
Then in the year 1807 the view of Chitty J. in the above case was upheld in appeal, overruling finally the decision in Bidwell Brothers In re. The real basis of that decision was that it was against the nature of a show of hands that one hand should count for more than another and a man who holds up his hand holds it up in respect of all his voting power. The decision in appeal was rendered by Lindley L.J. sitting with A. L. Smith L.J.
The review of those authorities shows that certainly from 1879 until 1897 there was great divergence of judicial opinion. This fact alone indicates that it cannot be suggested that the new Section 138 in the English Companies Act was only introduced to create a new statutory right which was never recognised before.
From these authorities two propositions emerge quite clearly. First, that while there was at common law no right of voting by proxy it has come in by way of special company regulations and company statutes. It was never questioned that proxies must be counted at a poll though not by a show of hands and, therefore, the Advocate-General's argument of reducing votes by poll to the same level as votes by show of hands is unsound. The next proposition then is that if the proxies are to be counted at a poll, and I need only repeat here that in the case before me it is not a case of show of hands but of poll, then how are the proxies to be counted? In this case, for instance, the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India Ltd. held a number of shares for which they appointed simultaneously two proxies, each with a number of shares. The shares in this case with which I am concerned carry the right to vote attached to each share. All authorities are clear on the point that proxies have the right to vote. Now, if each share has a vote, then the fact that one person happens to hold a number of shares and, therefore, a number of votes, cannot preclude the operation of the separate voting right attached to each share.
In a sense it is remarkable how this argument has been developed. It is accepted without demur that X holding some forty shares with a vote for each share will have forty votes and he can exercise all these forty votes on one side. Yet it is the argument that while all the votes can be used on one side they cannot be used one against the other, because it is said to be against common sense that a person should be allowed to vote both for and against the same resolution. Supposing a man wishes to do so, he may be whimsical or he can make himself a nuisance or he may genuinely be vacillating or he may genuinely think that his voting rights should be distributed in some proportion both for and against the same resolution. The central idea in solving this particular problem, apart from authorities, is to remember and consider that each share carries with it a right to vote. The fact that all the shares happen to be in the hands of one person does not merge the different voting rights and make them one. The plurality of votes cannot disappear because of the singularity of the person who holds these votes. It is settled in company law that the right to vote attached to a share is property and it will in ray judgment be a most wanton confiscation of property rights in respect of company shares which cannot be justified in law by the magic of one person holding many shares or by the innovation of a spurious doctrine of a newfangled merger. Those who advocate obliteration of the different voting rights in respect of different shares because of the fact that the relative shares happen to be held by one person do not seem to realize that such a holder may sell his different shares to different persons and if that is so these different voting rights will have to re-emerge because the persons holding them become different again. The fallacy of the view lies in the failure to realise that the holders of these shares may coalesce but neither the shares nor the the votes do. The right to vote, therefore, is to be judged not by the personality but by the share. If the shares are different, the votes can be different and the holder need not be precluded by any doctrine of convenience or inconvenience or propriety that he cannot vote both "yes" and "no" on the same resolution. As owner of the specific property in each specific share he can distribute his votes on the shares he holds in any manner he chooses. The way he votes cannot take away the legal right in each share carrying the right to vote.
There is one other point made by the company. It is not disputed that the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India held the shares on behalf of their individual constituents and it is only proper that holding their proxies they must vote according to the desires of their individual constituents although in paper these corporations are holders of the shares. The learned Advocate-General argued that to recognise that fact will mean that the company has to recognise trusts which of course the company cannot do. I am afraid this argument misconceives the whole doctrine of non-recognition of trust in company jurisprudence. What is said in Section 33 of the Indian Companies Act is that no notice of any trust, express or implied or constructive, shall be entered on the register or receivable by the registrar. Nothing of that kind is done by allowing the Allahabad Bank Nominees Ltd. and the Bank of India to vote according to the dictates of the constituents on whose behalf they hold the shares. Indeed to extend the doctrine of non-recognition of trust in the manner argued by the learned Advocate-General will be to destroy the whole principle of voting by proxy. I am therefore unable to uphold the Advocate-General's contention on this point.
On these grounds I am satisfied prima facie that there should be no interlocutory injunction, first, because prima facie article 90 is on the way, secondly, because the trend in law and in fact is against the applicant.
I,
therefore, dismiss this application with costs. I certify this motion for two
counsel.